The progress of the East India trade after 1680 was unusually rapid. The importation of Indian manufactures showed a phenomenal increase, while the exportation of bullion showed no signs of decline. The two were intimately connected, and the Company could hardly import an ever-increasing number of Indian manufactures without increasing the export of bullion to the East. The latter step was rendered inevitable by the fact that English cloth did not sell very well in the East. Otherwise, the returns of English cloth might have been made in Indian silks and calicoes. This would have prevented the agitation against Indian manufactures from assuming dangerous proportions. As will be shown later on, the Company did their best to increase the sale of English cloth in Persia and India. All their efforts were, however, fruitless. The high prices charged by the Company for its cloth forbade its purchase by any but Royal households and Imperial Viceroys. The exportation of bullion was, therefore, necessary. The latter policy did not conciliate the Company's opponents. Even the exportation of bullion might have been allowed, and was actually allowed, if the importation of Indian manufactures had not followed in its wake. It was the increase in Indian imports that aroused a storm of protests. The prohibition of Irish wool has diverted the attention of the economic historians from the serious consequences of the growth which the Indian manufactures attained at the time. That growth had been very slow at first, and had passed unnoticed. But the last twenty years of the seventeenth century saw an unusually rapid development.
The Indian manufactures were greatly increased ; they vitally affected the silk industry of England ; they threatened the staple industry so much prized by the English landlords ; and, finally, they competed with the English manufactures abroad. The data for the history of that conflict exist in abundance. The British Museum and Bodleian Libraries contain a collection of pamphlets and broadsides that is probably unsurpassed in the United Kingdom. We cannot, however, form an impartial judgement without a comparison of those documents with the Company's dispatches to their factors. The latter give minute information on everything connected with the trade in Indian manufactures. They detail the quantity and quality of goods required in England; they criticize the investments made by the Company's factors in undesirable articles; and they enable us to state the volume of that trade with a preciseness and a certainty that is unattainable in the case of any other industry. Hence the necessity for a comparison of the two types of original authorities.
The chief articles of export from the East were: (1) raw silk; (2) silk manufactures; (3) calicoes; (4) coffee; (5) indigo; (6) Kerman wool; (7) saltpetre; (8) pepper; and (9) drugs.
Of these exports silk goods and calicoes were by far the most important. The former had been brought to a high state of perfection by the eminently wise policy of the Company. That policy aimed at the utilization of Indian talent for the purpose of developing the industries for which the Indian workmen were specially fitted. For this purpose the Company invited workmen from all parts of India, and encouraged them in their industry by every means in their power. The needy workmen were lent money on good security; the Company guaranteed complete religious liberty to all who worked for it; it urged its factors to treat them with kindness and 'even indulgence'. All the manufactures that England wanted from abroad, or that could be cheaply produced in India were to be encouraged. 'You are to encourage all you can the Natives to plant Indigo and Cotton, and to make Saltpetre, if there be any proper grounds for it near Chyttegam [Chittagong], which we cannot doubt, as also the planting of Mulberry Trees for Silk Worms.'1 Twelve years later we find them pursuing the same policy with zest.2 The Company (as pointed out in Chapter II) had embarked on the policy of encouraging the Indian manufacturers, and had sent out a number of English instructors for the purpose. This policy was pursued down to the end of the seventeenth century. The war with France necessarily lessened the volume of trade, and produced great hardships among the merchants. The Company’s homeward bound fleet of five ships was taken by the French during the season 1695–6.1 The greatest sufferers were, however, the Turkey merchants. The destruction of the Smyrna fleet brought ruin and misery to the homes of many merchants, and paralysed the commercial activity of the metropolis for a time. The calculating Childe looked, however, with great satisfaction at the ruin of the Company’s opponents. The Turkey merchants, ‘who had assaulted and battered perpetually at the Company’, were to be completely displaced from their privileged position in Turkey, and their place was to be taken by the East India Company.2
The interruption of trade to Turkey had very important results. The Turkey trade was so much interrupted by the French war that raw silk had become ‘an extraordinary commodity’ in England. Its price had risen considerably owing to the limitation of supply. Childe propounded a novel scheme to his factors in Persia. The Company was obliged, by the new Charter, to export at least £100,000 worth of English cloth. The amount stipulated was undoubtedly large; the Indians had never bought the commodity in large quantities, and its sale was confined within narrow limits. This point could hardly be noticed by the English weavers, nor is it certain whether the Company’s own statements did not mislead the public at the time. Evidence leads us to suppose that the Company exaggerated the quantity of woollen goods exported to the East, and that the government, urged by the weavers, inserted this provision with a view to warding off all future attacks from that quarter. It was plain to Childe that, unless a market could be discovered for the sale of English cloth, the Company would suffer a loss. He had suggested the proposal to his factors at Gombroon as early as May 1691.1 The Persian Empire bought nearly 30,000 (clothes?) annually from the Dutch and the Venetians. Childe, therefore, could not 'apprehend' why the English Company should not be able to afford cloth cheaper than any other nation in Persia. The Company would, moreover, pay no Customs, and their freight standard would be little different from that of Bombay.2 It looked, therefore, a profitable transaction, and he hastened the conclusion of the contract with feverish energy. This was due, in no small measure, to his desire to employ the Armenians under the Company's rules. They were considered by him to be 'profoundly skilful, as well as careful, diligent, and exceedingly frugal'. He urged his factors to 'encourage the Armenians in lading Indian goods', and asked them to treat them with kindness and to persuade them to settle in the Company's factories. By these means the Company hoped that their forts and garrisons would be made marts of nations, 'which will, in a few years, aggrandize our revenue and with that our strength'.3 The Armenians were not the only nation to which the Company extended its protection. The Jews were in the same category, and it followed the same enlightened policy with regard to them. The Company's defence of their policy is characteristic. It is not based on a clear-cut, logical theory of religious toleration. They were nothing if not practical, and in their defence of the policy they exhibit the same utilitarian tendency. As to the Armenians' contract, 'they are the only persons that can increase the vent of English cloth, by carrying it into the Upland and Northern parts of Persia and Tartary, whereby new markets for the same can be obtained; the factors and agents never being able to penetrate so far into the country, and by permitting them to carry out foreign commodities as well, which always used to go with the Caravans, it would increase our Navigation, and may, in time, bring all the fine calicoes expended in Italy that used to go overland by the caravans, to the increase of our Trade in India’. With regard to the Jews, the Company observed that it was ‘no more than what is done in England, and they may as well accuse the Government as the Company thereof’. As for their ‘being part of government’, ‘it was admitted to them, as to all other nations, thereby to encourage persons of all persuasion to settle among them, for the increase of Trade’.1
The defence of the Company brings out the importance of the contemplated contract with the Shah. Sir Thomas Roe had suggested it before, and the Company, as we have seen, had actually brought over a large amount of silk from that country. Owing, however, to various causes, the silk trade was not carried on with vigour, and it was not till 1691, when the interruption of the Turkey trade had increased the demand for silk, that the Company’s eyes were opened to the advantages of that policy. Two years later the grant of a charter, providing for the exportation of £100,000 worth of woollen cloth, hastened the negotiations. ‘Owing to the war’, wrote Childe, ‘Raw Silk had become an extraordinary commodity.’2 ‘It is’, wrote the directors in a dispatch dated 3rd January 1694, ‘absolutely impossible to dispose of so great a quantity as we are now obliged to send . . . except we should send over quantity of Cloth to India, sell part of it, and give away the rest, or suffer it to lye in the Godowns till it be eaten by white ants, and other Insects, by which we have exceedingly suffered in India heretofore.’3
The Company aimed at turning the ancient course of trade between Persia and Aleppo. The Persians had, for hundreds of years, bought vast quantities of silk in the province of Ghilan; had carried it to Aleppo, to truck it off there for cloths and other European goods. The Company now proposed to bring the silk from Ghilan to Ispahan, to ‘truck’ there for English cloth and stuffs, and to bring the Persian silk to England. This would, explained the directors, ‘increase the English navigation and greatly augment His Majesty’s Customs here’.1
It is evident that the Company expected to derive great benefits from the proposed contract. A certain Choja was the agent of Childe, and it seemed that the contract would be signed within a short time. But unforeseen events occurred, and the negotiations were broken off. The price of Persian silk was regarded by the directors as prohibitive; the quantity too seems to have been limited. ‘It has been’, wrote the directors, 10th March 1698,2 ‘a great omission that you did not soon inform us of the great unlikelihood of procuring silk in Persia, and that the king suffered none to be exported out of his kingdom, except the Dutch Quota, and at best that it would cost 2 or 3,000 Tomands to purchase that liberty, which we are not so fond of as to procure it at so great an Expence, because we can buy silk at half the Rates in Bengal, and as much as we can want.’3
The failure of the negotiations was a great blow to the hopes of Childe. The contract, if successful, would have revolutionized the silk industry of England; would have increased considerably the English trade with Persia; and would, eventually, have led to the extension of British influence there. The failure of the Persian contract exercised great influence on the development of the East India trade. The Company was enabled to buy raw silk at a comparatively low price in Bengal and to import a large amount into England. The influence of Bengal silk had begun to be felt as early as 1686. The gradual fall in the price of raw silk was due to the ‘importation of great quantities of Bengall Silk, and some considerable increase in the product of Italian silk’.4 The demand showed no decline after that date. ‘Raw Silk and Taffaties’, wrote the directors, in 1685, ‘are always the most noble and staple Commodities your Agency affords. Provide all you can possibly of both kinds, and of the specified sorts which you have often been informed by our Lists do turn best to account here.’5 In the list of goods to be provided at the Bay for the year 1686 the silk goods of Bengal maintain their supremacy. Silk Romalls seem to have been then popular, as we find the directors requiring 50,000 pieces at a time.
Another article that is frequently to be found in the lists is Mulmulls. The exquisite Bengal Mulmulls found no difficulty in beating out the rival silk fabrics of England. Another important silk manufacture exported from Bengal was Taffetas. The directors required 17,000 pieces of Mulmulls and 40,000 pieces of Taffetas in 1686; while the amount of raw silk exported from Bengal was 1,400 bales.1 Three years later the number of bales of raw silk had increased to 1,560. In 1692 an entirely new situation arose. The Turkey trade being practically at an end, the East India Company utilized the opportunity. Sir Josiah Childe was not unaware of the advantages of the situation. With characteristic impetuosity he threw himself heart and soul into the project of importing large quantities of Indian goods. ‘It is’, wrote that calculating merchant, ‘good to strike while the iron is hot.’2 ‘Every ship that arrives while the markets are so high for the East India goods, is as profitable as three in the ordinary times of peace.’ (Letter quoted above.) We find the directors urging their factors in 1692 to send as many Indian goods as they possibly could. ‘You can’, they wrote, ‘send us nothing amiss this time, when everything of India is so much wanted.’3
It seems clear that Indian goods were in great demand from 1691 onwards. They had, as shown in Chapter II, competed with the English manufactures during the reign of Charles II. During the last ten years of the seventeenth century, however, their progress was more rapid. We find the Directors still urging their factors to send as many Indian goods as possible, ‘as everything of India’ was in great demand at that time. The silk goods of Bengal are prominent in all their lists. They figure in the Company’s dispatches, in the memorials of English weavers to parliament, and in the pamphlet literature of the time. The name of Cassimbazaar seems to have been familiar to English weavers. The delicate Atlas of that place, ‘made very good, very well covered with Satin, with all sorts of Stripes’, was no less popular than the Cassimbazaar Taffetas, of which the directors wanted large quantities.
We have a very interesting account of the East India trade in about 1695, from the pen of one Samuel Baron.1 Baron seems to have resided in the East for a considerable period, and to have thoroughly explored the Company’s trade there. He thought that Bombay was a most ‘excellent harbour, able to contain a fleet of ships, and a fit magazine of all warlike stores’. Surat, however, was regarded by him as the ‘Mogul’s Chamber, and Seaport to Agra, Lahore, Brahampore’, &c. The goods yearly exported from Bombay and Surat seem to have been ‘Baftas of all sorts, brown, blue and white; Cotton Yarn and Woollen atlases, Niconees, Braules, Cambayes, Guinea Stuffs’, Indigo, Drugs of several sorts, besides Diamonds that ‘came overland from Vizapore and Golconda, and Pearls that are brought from the Gulf of Persia, and Straits of Manar’. Baron was sanguine about the Persian trade, and thought that if factories were established at Ispahan and Shiraz ‘and the abuses committed by the Armenians in some measure prevented’, the trade in Persia would prove ‘very considerable’. It is, however, in his account of the Bengal Presidency that the importance of this manuscript lies. As far as trade to England was concerned, the presidency of Bengal was the ‘most considerable to the English nation of all their Settlements in India’. Baron then describes the usual freight and price of Bengal goods. Mulmulls, ‘fine piece goods’, and Taffetas are the most important. It is instructive to compare the Directors’ List of Goods desired in England with this List. The similarity between the two lists is striking. Another document in the same series1 furnishes us with a very full account of silk manufacture in Bengal.2 There seem to have been three main types of silk at the time. The silk bought at the best hands must be bought in the ‘Putta or short Skean’, which was first wound off from the ‘Bag of the worm’. Its price seems to have varied from 15 to 19 annas the half seer, 70 Tolas each. This was commonly turned into three kinds, viz., head, belly, and foot. The head and belly seem to have been the only valuable sorts. There was a better kind, called Puttany, which was priced from 5¼ to 6¼ rupees per seer. The third type was procured from Agra and was called ‘Dolleria’, which was ‘head, belly, and foot mixt together’. It is interesting to notice the mutual influence of Cassimbazaar and Agra. ‘According as this silk sells in Agra, so the price of Silk in Cassimbazaar riseth or falleth. The exchange of money from Cassimbazaar riseth and falleth as the said silk findeth a vent in Pattana or Agra.’
This interesting account gives us a glimpse into the condition of the silk industry in Bengal in the years 1678–95. The Company’s policy of fostering the Indian industries in Bengal had resulted in an unusual increase of the Bengal silk trade. The demands of the Directors show no sign of decline, and we find them asking for large quantities of silk goods to be sent.
The Company was not the only body that carried on trade with India. Any account of the East India trade would be totally misleading unless the activities of the Interloper were duly emphasized, and their place in the progress of the trade clearly recognized. Unfortunately, we cannot arrive at any conclusion on the subject. The documents which illustrated their several voyages, their wonderful resource, and their unfailing courage are gone. Gone, also, are the accounts of their dealings with the Indians. A few of them exist, however. We come across many a reference to them in the Company’s dispatches. These, however, are not sufficient for our use, and we have consequently confined our attention to the Company’s trade. The silkworm, stated the Leeward Islanders in 1696, produces hundreds, and hundreds will produce thousands if the inhabitants can find their account with them, ‘as has been clearly evidenced by Cassimbazaar, a town in Bengal, which some years since made but 4,000 bales of silk a year ; (but) upon merchants buying at what price they brought to market have now multiplied their silk to 18,000 bales a year’.1 The Directors’ Lists of Articles desired in subsequent years exhibit the leading features of this progress.2
The demand for Indian silk goods seems to have considerably risen during the years 1697–1702. The MS. Letter Books in the India Office do not supply us with an exact account of the total quantity of silk goods imported into England in any one year. We cannot calculate the total amount of silk goods in, say, 1698. The MSS. of the House of Lords and some of the pamphlets in the Bodleian Library contain, however, extremely interesting information on the subject. No survey of the East India trade would be complete without them. According to an Account laid before Parliament on 13th January 170 3⁄4, by Davenant,3 there were exported in 1698–1702 from England, Indian manufactures, mixed with Silk, Cotton and Herba to the value of £487,896 6s. 10 1⁄4d., while Wrought Silks were exported to Ireland and the Plantations as follows :
| To Ireland | £18,491 | 2 | 7 |
| Plantations | 29,823 | 7 | 3 1⁄4 |
| Total | £48,314 | 9 | 10 1⁄4 |
We derive interesting information on the quantity of Indian goods from Lloyd’s printed lists of Cargoes. These famous lists contain a good deal of interesting information, and are valuable for our purpose. ‘It was commonly said’, said the writer of the English Winding Sheet, ‘that one ship, the Rising Eagle, had brought ninety-seven Chests of Wrought Silk and not one pound of Raw’.
Further information is supplied to us by another writer, who said that the Rising Eagle had brought about 11,000 pieces of wrought silk, ‘and not one pound of Raw Silk’, valued at £40,000. This had ‘put a great damp upon the few silk weavers that are left, and will, no doubt, cause many to be turned out of work’. It appears from a printed list, ‘sold by Mr. Edward Lloyd in his Coffee House in Lombard Street’, that from 20th May 1699 to 4th September 1699, there arrived from East India and China, ten ships, which brought 500,000 pieces of manufactured goods, computed at a million pounds. The ‘Cassimbazaar’ silk goods seem to have been the most popular of all that came from India. Nor did the exquisite workmanship displayed by the Cassimbazaar weavers pass unnoticed at the time. Up to 1698 muslin goods seem to have passed unnoticed in England. A change, however, occurred in that year. ‘Thin shadow muslins of the slight sort are grown into use and fashion again. Send us 20,000 pieces.’1 The demand was not, however, limited to muslins. Every variety of Bengal goods was required. The effect of this increase in the Company’s Indian imports upon the silk and woollen industries of England will be shown later on. Here it is only necessary to point to the enormous increase in the importation of Indian silk goods.
Another commodity that was extremely popular in England was calico. The popularity of Indian calicoes had been commented upon by Pollexfen in 1680. There is reason to believe that this popularity was maintained during the years 1680– 1702. We find the Directors writing to their factors in 1683 as follows: ‘We resolve to drive our trade through, having the markets here to ourselves, especially in Silks and Calicoes, which we would have you be always providing of, upon the very best terms, and in the cheapest seasons of the year.’2 The demand showed an immense increase in 1687. ‘Bafts, broad, white and blue are the best commodities you can send us of Calico, which we note to you that you may exceed our former order therein, as also in Chintz of all sorts, whereof some to be of grave and cloth colours with the greatest variety you can invent, they being become the wear of ladies of the greatest quality.’ Accordingly, we find the Directors requesting their factors to dispatch as many pieces of calico as they could procure. In the Company’s Lists for 1689 and 1690 calicoes figure prominently. The main drawback from which the manufacture suffered was their shortness. The Company had to pay the same duties for long and short pieces, with the result that short pieces were disliked by the Directors. We find them complaining frequently of this serious defect. This, however, does not seem to have affected their popularity in England. On the contrary, their extraordinary sale in England excited the wonder of the Directors themselves; they request their Agents to send us by every ship: ‘Some bales as well of Silk as of Calicoes.’ The demand for calicoes was, however, greater in 1692 than in 1686. We find a marked change in the quantity demanded. The Company write, in a dispatch to their Surat Agent: ‘The very best commodities for this market are measured Calico goods of all sorts, white and coloured.’1
In the Company’s List of Goods to be provided at Surat for the year 1695, the quantity of chintzes of different types, which the Company wanted, reach the high figure of 50,000. Quilts formed another popular manufacture. The Company’s demand for quilts and chintzes from Surat and Bombay showed no great fluctuation. The quantity of chintz required in 1696 was 50,000 pieces.2
Scind goods became popular in England. For the first time we come across a list of goods to be provided at Scind for the year 1696; the quantity and quality required in England depended, no doubt, upon the condition of English trade ‘at the time. Even so, the absence of any violent fluctuation in demand, together with the steady increase in the demand itself, force one to the conclusion that the Indian manufactures in England had attained a measure of popularity that may justly be called unrivalled. Nor was the weaving trade of Bombay neglected. A letter to Bombay, dated 1st July 1696,3 says ‘We cannot but commend the beginnings which our General has made to promote the weaving trade on the island of Bombay, wherein we would have all manner of encouragement given’. The popularity of Agra and Ahmedabad goods is evidenced by the following dispatch: ‘We would have you send as much indigo as you have money to procure. The same applies to all other sorts of Agra and Ahmedabad goods, which are in great request here and would be welcome to us.’1 It is clear that calicoes maintained their ascendancy during the period preceding their prohibition. Nor is it difficult to account for their popularity. It was due mainly to their cheapness. It is difficult to state the price of the calico, and other Indian goods, at the time. Probably the most reliable information is to be found in the Court Minutes. Even so, a number of influences co-operated to render the price of those goods uncertain and indefinite. Some of the pamphlets of the time contain, however, prices of several goods, and it would be better to compare them with some other source, in order that we may arrive at an approximation to truth. A writer complained that ‘from 1678 to 1685 many ships were sent to India, and returned hither with commodities of those countries, upon private accounts’. He thought that the cargoes that several of the ships brought were better in shipment and quality than the Company’s. During the period the price of long cloth varied from 20s. per piece to 32s., 34s., and even to 50s. per piece.2 The rise in prices was due, no doubt, to the increase of demand, consequent on the dislocation of foreign trade by the war with France. Even so, the price of calicoes was only one-third of that of woollen manufactures. The demand for printed goods showed no decline. 49,000 pieces of Betteloes were required in 1698.3 The directors urged their factors to send as many coloured goods as possible. ‘Your chintz Ahmedabad, Chintz Seringo, and in general all the printed coloured goods are profitable commodities, whereof send large quantities, taking care the cloth be good.’4 The quantities of chintz required in 1699 reached still higher figures. The list of goods to be provided at Surat and Bombay included the following : cotton yarn, 400,250 bales ; quilts, 25,000 ; chintz of all kinds, 46,000. Scind goods of all the sorts that could be had were to be sent. Bombay and Surat seem to have been the principal sources from which the Company secured the supply of these goods. Attempts had no doubt been made to develop the industry at Fort St. David. The directors had urged their President to ‘get as many goods, and as good of their kind, to be yearly sent us, and to put off as much of your own manufacture as you can '.1
It seems that Fort St. David's had exported very little ‘Painting’, for we find the Directors complaining as follows : ‘Of late years, you have scarcely had a piece of Painting sent us from your parts of India, but understanding that the clay and water about Fort St. David's is much better for that purpose than either Fort St. George or Vizapatam, we would have you set upon the manufacture of these goods, and do order that you give encouragement to the Painters by taking off their hands all they make and giving them full employment.’ 2 The advice seems to have been faithfully followed, and we find consignments of goods from Fort St. David's. It is clear, however, that the exports from the Fort were not popular with the directors. ‘Your Indigo’, say the latter, in a dispatch, dated 28th October 1698, ‘from Fort St. David's will not do at all here, except you can have it made full as good as the best you sent for a sample, at half the cost you paid for it; and if you can have it so, the gains will be very inconsiderable, because the worst of Indigo pays as much freight and as high duties here, as the best Lahore or Agra Indigo.’ 3 They go on to say, ‘Encourage others to raise Silkworms, and lend them 2 or 300 pagodas or more upon good security, but not upon the Company's Account’. It is evident that the policy pursued by the Company under Charles II had been followed consistently in the succeeding years. Indian industries were encouraged by every means; Indian workmen were lent money by the Company's factors, in order that they might start their trade; and, finally, religious and political liberty was guaranteed to them by Childe. The lists of cargoes of the Company are interesting reading. They supply us with unique materials for the construction of the history of foreign trade during the period, and they express in a brief form the progress of Indian manufactures in England. The following gives a bird's-eye view of the nature of the East India trade during the last years of the seventeenth century. ‘A particular of the Silks and a specimen of the Toys and Handicraft Wares, which came from the East Indies, in the ships Martha, Sarah, and Dorothy, according to the Book of Sale of those ships and printed Cargoes.’ (1) On the ship Martha the price of goods made of silk, herba or mixed, was £117,225; (2) on the Sarah the total amount of silk was valued at £11,422; (3) on the Dorothy £30,000. The total amount, £158,647, may not seem a large sum now, but it must be borne in mind that this refers to three ships only, and that the Company possessed about fifty ships at the time. The most remarkable toys and handicrafts were as follows : china ware pieces, £150,000; fans, £38,557; lacquered sticks for fans, £13,470; lacquered trunks, bowls, cups, dishes, &c., £10,500; lacquered tables £189; shells, painted, double gilt, £286; pictures, £669. I have left out a number of smaller articles.1
Another article that was in great demand was indigo. We find the Directors urging their factors to send as much indigo as they could get. ‘Indigo’, they said in a dispatch of 1686, ‘is now a great commodity here.’2 We do not find much evidence of decline in demand; in later years they frequently ask their agents to send as much ‘Lahore Indigo as can be got’. The two main varieties were Circas indigo, and Lahore indigo. Agra indigo took, later on, the place of Circas indigo. The usual quantities required seem to have been 100 and 200 tons. About the end of the seventeenth century Indian indigo seems to have suffered in competition with indigo from Jamaica and New York. During the years 1697–9 the former exported three hogsheads and 914 barrels to England; while the latter sent, in one year, eight hogsheads and forty-six barrels of indigo.3
Saltpetre was another useful article imported from the East. The average quantity does not seem to have exceeded 800 tons. This applies only to times of peace. During the war-time demands were made by the Government for a larger amount, and its price was fixed by Godolphin in 1693. The quantity of saltpetre imported was not adequate to the demand, and we find several writers complaining of the Company’s inability to supply the nation with saltpetre. The need for that article was so greatly felt that a Bill was brought in Parliament to license its importation from Holland. ‘Though’, asserted a writer in 1693, ‘most sorts of East India Commodities are, and have been sold, some double, some treble, and some four times as much as formerly, for saltpetre they have had scarcely any of late, so that for want thereof a Bill is now brought into Parliament, to license the importing of it from Holland, that Commodity being now sold for £8 per cent., which was formerly sold for little more than 40/- per cent.’ The writer’s statements are confirmed by another writer. In his Reasons Humbly offered, &c., the author states that the price of saltpetre had risen from 32s. to £8 per cwt. Another writer, referring to the desire of the London merchants for freedom of trade to the East Indies, declared that ‘if they could have obtained the same, they would have paid £60,000 for Customs at the return of those Ships, in less than 2 years’ time, and have furnished His Majesty with 500 Tons of Saltpetre at £50 per Ton, which by the Company’s hindering the others from Trade is now sold at £160 per Ton’.1
The Company declared in 1694 that they had more than 100 tons of saltpetre in their warehouses; that one of their ships on her way from Barbadoes had 200 to 300 tons on board; and that there were four more ships expected from India, by which they were to receive about 1,000 tons of saltpetre. In reply it was denied that they possessed more than seventy tons. Moreover, several traders were ready to take up 300 tons a year if the Company were willing to supply them. Another trader could use 2,000 tons a year. The price was raised from £40 per ton to £120 per ton. Nor was it quite clear whether the Company could supply the total amount required. They had been asked to supply 3,000 tons of saltpetre at £4 1s. per cwt. for the brown, and £5 per cwt. for the white saltpetre. The General Meeting of the Company had already rejected the terms of the proposed contract, and demanded a higher price.2
Childe followed up the attack in 1693, and trenchantly criticized the proposals of the Government. By their New Charter, however, the Company was obliged to supply the nation with 500 tons of saltpetre at £45 per ton in times of war, and at £38 10s. per ton in times of peace.1 There is reason to believe that the amount which the Company had promised fell considerably short of the effective demand. A number of persons asked for a patent for making saltpetre.2 Moreover, a bill was brought into Parliament to license the importation of saltpetre from abroad. The Company opposed it on the ground that it could supply 1,000 tons. It is extremely doubtful whether it was in a position to do so. Even if it could furnish 1,000 tons, there were still 1,000 to 2,000 tons to be provided. The quantity required could hardly have been less than 2,000 in times of war. The author of Reasons Humbly offered against a Saltpetre Bill3 declared that the Company and the Interlopers had given out larger commissions for saltpetre than they had done before, and that several gentlemen had laid out £5,000 a piece in order to make it in Europe. ‘By this’, he concluded, ‘the Kingdom has a Expectancy and Security for Petre.’ But expectancy of private persons must give way to national welfare, and, as it was conclusively proved before the Lords that the supply was unequal to the demand, the Saltpetre Importation Bill became law on 2nd April 1694.4 The passage of the Bill into law deprived the Company of one of its strongest grounds of defence. It had repeatedly urged that, as it was the only body that supplied the nation with saltpetre, any diminution in its authority would make it incapable of supplying that indispensable article. Many of the attacks made upon it had been warded off in this ingenious manner. Its most eloquent champion, Dr. Davenant, put forward the same line of argument in its behalf. It is doubtful whether this dexterous device was completely successful. The replies of its opponents teem with references to its negligence to supply the Government with a sufficient amount at a reasonable price. We may therefore conclude that the Company was not altogether successful in its line of defence. It must, however, be said in its favour that it had sustained serious losses during peace times, and the Directors had complained again and again of their inability to sell the article. They informed their agents in 1678 ‘that Saltpetre was at present a very Drug in these times of Peace, and can hardly be sold on any terms’.
Another article that was in great demand was Caramina, or Kerman, goats' wool. The amount demanded can hardly be stated in exact terms, as the materials at our disposal are insufficient for the purpose. It is apparent, however, that the Company needed a large amount. In practically every dispatch that contains a reference to the subject the directors ask their agents to send as much Caramina wool as possible. This applies to the years 1680–1702. The supply of the Caramina Wool seems, however, to have been limited, and it is doubtful whether the Company’s factors were able to satisfy the Directors in this respect.
Two interesting articles figure frequently in the list. These were opium and coffee. I have not come across many references to tea in the Letter Books. Coffee, however, seems to have been in great demand at certain periods. Up till 1686 the amount of coffee required hardly varied. From that time, however, the demand increased. The directors mentioned in a dispatch dated the 6th of December 1686 that ‘Coffee begins to rise. Indigo and Coffee are the most profitable bulky Commodities you can send.’1 After the Revolution the number of coffee houses considerably increased. The Company were never behind the times. Their chief merit consisted in adaptation to novel circumstances, and they increased their demand for coffee. They imported 100 tons of coffee in 1698. The figure is not, however, a representative one, as the New Company and private traders imported about 100 tons more. Opium does not seem to have been popular in England. A number of MSS. in the British Museum show that during the period a large trade in opium was carried on between India and China. The Englishmen do not seem to have been fond of the commodity, as the average amount of opium imported did not exceed 2 to 3 tons per annum.2
The last place in our list is taken by the pepper, spices, and drugs from India. The Company had been founded mainly with a view to securing a share in the spices. Eighty years of strife with the Dutch had resulted in the expulsion of the English from the Spice Islands, and their concentration on the Indian Coast. The trade in spices might have flourished if the Coromandel Coast and other places in India had been suitable for their cultivation. This does not seem to have been the case. The pepper imported from the Coromandel Coast appears to have been poor in quality and very dear in price. The Directors are found complaining of this in their dispatches. ‘The pepper provided by you from the Inland Country has proved so very dear to us, being invoiced from 5d. to 6d. per pound at the Fort, that we forbid them sending more, unless it comes to us at 4d. per pound.’ The Company had tried to cultivate pepper at Sumatra. They hoped to get sufficient supplies from thence ‘and better Regulation of our Officers there’.1 The same applies to drugs. A limited quantity of Persian and other kinds of drugs was still imported. No considerable trade was, however, possible, either in drugs or in spices. The Company could not compete with the Dutch, who had the monopoly of the whole commodity; nor was India suitable for the cultivation of the spices. Hence, it concentrated itself mainly on the exportation of manufactured articles from India. Their opinion with regard to drugs was well expressed in their dispatch to Fort St. George, ‘Make it a rule that a little of any Druggs may probably come to a good price, but a great deal of any Druggs generally damps the market’.2 It was this inability of the Company to content itself with the importation of spices into England that explains the complaints of the weavers and bullionists. If it had restricted its activities to the importation of spices and drugs, there is no doubt that the fierce agitation which began immediately after the Revolution would have been totally ineffective.
The above were the chief articles of import from India. The exports of the Company were usually tin, lead, copper, swords, cloth, quicksilver, vermilion, and bullion. During the years 1680–1702, however, there was no change in the quantity of any of the above exports, with the exception of cloth and bullion. As regards cloth, the Company had made many attempts to increase its sale in the East. All these were, however, fruitless. The cloth was offered at a prohibitive price, and the Indian workmen could not afford to buy it. It met with the same fate in Persia. A dispatch to Bombay dated 28th July 1686 refers to the limited sale of cloth in Persia, and provides that cloth should not remain unsold for more than six months. It adds: ‘For the like purpose of venting great quantities of English cloth, though but at our Invoice Price, and for one third truck in Legee or Ardos Silk, by which trade we know we shall get nothing at present, but, however, to please His Majesty, and for the good of our country, and to turn the course of that trade from Aleppo, we shall be content to carry it on upon such mean terms for 2 or 3 years, in hopes that we may make our Markets hereafter.’1
The Company’s later dispatches tell the same tale of unsold cloth. To remedy this defect it tried to enter into a contract with the Shah, whereby the Persian silk could be exchanged for English cloth. This had been mooted in 1686. In 1691 we find the Company recurring to the same subject in their dispatch to Persia. ‘We hope highly to improve that trade for the Publick Good of our Kingdom, especially by the Trade of English Broadcloth, of which there is provided One thousand whole Pieces dyed into Proper Colours for Persia with great Care, and with the advice of the Armenian Merchants here. . . . We can see no reason why We should not another Year send five times so many. We know the Empire of Persia spends near thirty thousand Clothes annually.’ The Company were, however, disappointed. The contract was not concluded, as the Shah of Persia demanded 500 Tomands. Moreover, the Company was obliged by the Charter granted to them in 1693 to export at least £100,000 worth of English cloth annually. The Company did its best to comply with the regulations. We find the Directors writing as follows: ‘The obligations laid upon us . . . have made us supply your side of India not only with more Broadcloth than usual, but also to enlarge in serges, says and other like sorts of Woollen goods, different from our usual Sortment.’ They are to clear their cargoes of all old remains every year, and to make room for new ships.1
There is no reason to doubt the Company’s statement that they sustained loss by the export of cloth to the East. We find this confirmed by several dispatches in the Company’s Records at the India Office. One to Bombay, dated the 1st of July 1696, refers to the ‘unhappy circumstances our affairs were in Persia, by reason of our Cloth lying unsold there. We hope our Agents have retrieved, as much as in them lay, the misfortune of that great mismanagement, and not suffered our Cloth to lie rotten by.’2 The misfortune to which the Company referred was not local in its effect. We find the Company bewailing the loss on cloth not only in Persia, but also in India. Its dispatch to Fort St. George has the following: ‘We are sorry you should have so great a quantity of woollen goods lying upon your hands, and undisposed of, which, that it might not be burdensome to you, we sent but little last year, and none this.’3 There was no visible improvement in 1698. The Company urged their factor ‘to sell our Cloth, or perishable goods, as well as you can at Invoice price, or under, rather than keep them in your Warehouse’.4 The Company, however, still urged their factors to ‘Endeavour the consumption of woollen goods by selling at low rates, if you can thereby advance their wear’.5 This was due mainly to the fact that the Government required a full account of the total cloth exported to the East. At the back of the Government were the English weavers. The latter had been clamouring against the importation of Indian commodities, and had insisted upon the necessity of exporting at least £100,000 worth of cloth. The Government had inserted this provision in the Company’s new charter, and had obliged it to export £100,000 worth of cloth every year (see above). Nor was it content with mere promises on the part of the Company. Whenever the clamour against the Indian commodities was louder than usual, it had recourse to the Company for information on the quantity of woollen manufactures exported by it. The following example will suffice: ‘On reading a letter from the Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the Council of Trade, it is ordered that the Accountant should forthwith draw up particulars of what woollen Manufactures of this Kingdom have been exported by the Company, in pursuance of their Charter.’1 It is clear that the Company complied with the conditions imposed by the Government, and that an enormous amount of cloth was annually exported to Persia. I have already cited the extracts from the Company’s records on that matter. They show conclusively that much English cloth lay unsold. The amount of cloth exported to Persia seems, however, to have deceived the contemporaries. They testified to the efforts of the Company to develop the trade in cloth. They were mistaken, however, in thinking that all the cloth exported to Persia was actually sold there. Nathaniel Harley wrote to his father from Aleppo that ‘the Turkey Company may thank themselves, who, not content to enjoy the trade themselves, complained that the East India Company carried out no cloth, and thereby gave themselves a mortal blow not to be recovered. For now they do it with that success that they supply Persia, which was wont to be done from Smyrna and this place; and I suppose Parliament so well understands the interest of the nation, as not to alter what is so happily begun, which in time may grow to a vast trade, and beat out the Dutch from thence, as it is from hence.’2
It was not Harley alone who held that belief. The Commissioners of Trade and Plantations reported in January 1698 ‘that it would be inconvenient that the East India Company should send any greater quantities of draperies into Persia than they had done formerly, and that they ought, therefore, to vend the draperies they are obliged to export, either in India, China, Japan or elsewhere, at such distance from those places where the Turkey Company have usually traded as may not cause an interfering between the two Companies’.3 It may be admitted that large quantities were imported into Persia, and that if all the cloth exported to Persia had been capable of being sold, the East India Company would have proved a very serious rival to the Turkey Company. There is, however, no evidence to show that the total amount exported had been sold. The Commissioners were deceived by the statements of the Turkey Company, and they assumed that as the exports of cloth had enormously increased, all of it had actually been bought by the Persians. It seems clear that the Company sustained serious loss through the inability of its agents to sell the cloth, and that all its efforts to increase the sale were fruitless.1 The Company can hardly be blamed for this state of affairs. It had done everything possible, and had sustained serious loss through the transaction. All, however, was of no avail. ‘I have it’, asserted a writer, ‘from known persons that before our cloth was carried directly by sea to Persia, great numbers of Caravans used to come through a long tract of land, many hundreds of miles, with Silk and other commodities to Aleppo, and buy our cloth of our factors that reside there; and in their return in great towns and villages, as they passed, they used to sell our cloth to the inhabitants of those countries in very large numbers; and that since the India merchants have supplied the Persians, these Caravans have ceased to come, and though we have kept the Persia Trade, we have lost the trade in those countries through which these carriers have formerly passed, which is a loss to our Export of Cloth, and employment of the Poor.’2
It is essential to a true understanding of the position of the Company that this should be kept prominently in mind. The Company’s opponents were unscrupulous in the use of their weapons, and every means was adopted to make it odious to the nation. The woollen manufacturers were, according to Davenant, ‘the nourishment of our Body’, and, if it could be shown that the Company neglected to increase the sale of cloth in foreign parts, the object of the opponents would be attained. The Company would become odious to the Whig oligarchs, the English weavers, and, generally, to the nation. It is hardly necessary to add that they partly succeeded in accomplishing their object.
Another commodity exported by the Company from England was bullion. I have already traced the history of the exportation of bullion to India.1 It had aroused a storm of opposition, and had led to the production of valuable pamphlets on the subject. But the trade had not then assumed the serious proportions which it did during the years 1680–1702. It was during the last twenty years of the seventeenth century that the East India trade expanded enormously, and threatened many of the English industries. But the increase of that trade was scarcely possible without an increase in the amount of bullion exported. The trade could be maintained only by the exportation of bullion, and as the trade increased so did the amount of bullion. The amount exported by the Company during the years 1681– 91 could hardly have been less than £400,000 a year. It is difficult to state exactly the total amount exported during the period, as we possess very few accurate materials for the period. The most reliable authority seems to me to be the MS. Letter Books. The latter contain, in their Lists of Cargoes, &c., the amount of bullion exported. During the year 1681, as shown in Chapter II, about £300,000 was shipped to one Presidency alone. As, however, great quantities of bullion were exported to other parts of the East as well, it will be safe to assume that in exceptional years the amount exceeded that figure, viz. £400,000. As, moreover, the trade continued to develop under James II, it is highly probable that more than £400,000 a year was exported during the period 1681–91. Davenant asserted that ‘the Silver and Gold brought from America and the Silver produced from European mines during the last 200 years, amounted to 800 million pounds. I cannot find what is become of the 800 millions dug out of the earth unless 150 millions of it be carried away and sunk in the East Indies.’ It is difficult to accept this statement. Davenant was certainly unscrupulous in the use of some of his materials, if not all. His first two reports on the Public Accounts2 are a model of lucidity and clear exposition.
Yet his egotism seems to pervade nearly every page. He cannot refrain from criticizing Mr. Culliford, his predecessor in office, while his own merits are vaunted in a number of pages of the Reports. The same applies to his account of the East India trade. The figures supplied are obviously exaggerated, and it would be unsafe to rely upon them. He was, however, correct in estimating the average annual export of bullion by the Company at £400,000. This is confirmed by the statement of Pollexfen and a number of other writers. Leaving aside the obviously absurd figures supplied by some of them, the total amount of bullion stated by the majority seems to me to have been correct.
After 1691, however, the amount of bullion exported increased greatly. The average amount annually exported during the years 1697–1702 was hardly less than £800,000. There is reason to believe that during the years 1698–1700 not less than a million pounds was annually exported to the East. It is instructive to compare the different types of authorities for the statement. In the Company's Records we find that £309,264. 1s. 4d. was exported in 1698. This was in eleven ships only. The amount sent by the two other ships is not mentioned; but it could hardly have been less than £100,000. There is a considerable increase in the following year. The following is the amount sent from England to Surat, Bombay, and Persia in 1699. Total sent out: £659,802. 12s., total received back: £314,716. 9s. 3d.
Much more accurate information is to be gleaned from the Bodleian and British Museum Libraries. According to an account laid before the House of Commons in January 170¾ by Charles Crisp, there were exported to the East, during the years 1698–1703, the following:
| £ | |
|---|---|
| Silver | 3,392,158 |
| Gold | 128,229 |
| 3,520,3871 |
From another source we learn that the bullion exported from 5th October 1697 to January 1699 amounted to £1,530,527. Besides this the East India traders took £765,263 into foreign parts. Again, the Company's captains took out about £52,000 to the East Indies. It was asserted that 'there has been exported to the East Indies in two years almost one-third part as much silver as has been coined in England since the Recoining of our Money'.1 The most noticeable feature in this enormous increase of bullion is the demand for silver. Sir Isaac Newton informed the Parliament in his Third Representation to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Revenue2 that 'when ships are lading for the East Indies the demand of Silver for Exportation raises the price to 5s. 6d. or 5s. 8d., though at a medium the Bullion of Standard Alloy is valued at 5s. 4½d. per oz.' The Company frequently gave 3d. an oz. for exportable silver above its value in coin, which was above 5 per cent. 'This tempted our people to send all our Foreign Silver to London, to take the benefit of an advanced price, and also to melt down ours.'3 'Our people' means, of course, the Irishmen. The latter took advantage of the increased demand for bullion, and reaped profits from it. Prior estimated the average amount of bullion exported to the East at a million pounds a year. He feared that 'if so much treasure shall flow for any considerable time in the same channel, it will put an end to that trade. For such large Remittances in Silver must in time make this Metal empty in those parts, and as its quantity increases, its quality will lessen. So that, by Degrees, Silver may come to bear the same proportion to Gold in the East Indies, as it does in Europe, and their Commodities will rise in proportion.'
The prophecy does not seem to have come true. The exportation of bullion to the East increased rather than diminished in the eighteenth century. Yet none of the phenomena which the author had forecasted actually occurred. This does not detract from the merit of his essay. His analysis is wonderfully suggestive, while his anticipation of the quantity theory of money is remarkable. His figures are confirmed by other authorities.
The old Company exported, from Michaelmas 1698 to February 1699, £917,772. 1s. 6d.; while the new Company exported, during the same period, £500,782. 19s. 6d. Moreover, the private traders exported, during the period, £215,701. 2s. The total amount of bullion exported by the three bodies was, therefore, £1,634,256. 3s. This does not include the money shipped from Cadiz. We find many dispatches to the English bankers at Cadiz requesting them to ship a stated amount to the Indies. A writer says that during the period ‘about £600,000’ was shipped. The total of money exported by the New and the Old Companies and Private Traders during 1698–9 was, therefore, £2,234,256. 3s.1 This is certainly a stupendous figure, and, at first sight, may appear to be inaccurate. There is, however, no reason to doubt its accuracy. This is evidenced by the Reports of the Inspector-General. He estimated that from Michaelmas 1697 to Christmas 1699, £1,459,033. 9s. 11d. worth of Indian goods had been imported into England. These figures are misleading, because, as pointed out by Davenant, he does not include in them the large quantities of goods that were re-exported to foreign countries.2 He is much more reliable in his calculation of the quantity of bullion exported to the East. He stated that ‘by the entries in the Custom House books, it appeared that we had for several years exported to the East Indies above £400,000 per annum in bullion, besides what was carried out privately or shipped from Spain. Such trades had occasioned the exportation and decrease of our silver coin.’3 It appears that from Christmas 1698 to Christmas 1699 there was exported to India, in (1) silver, £841,881; (2) in gold, at £4 per oz., £29,228. The total amount exported in one year was therefore £871,109. This does not include the bullion exported by the new Company, the private traders, or the Spanish bankers. Adding a proportionate amount for each of these bodies, and comparing our total with the total given above, we find that there is really not much difference between the two authorities. The figures supplied by both the authorities substantially agree. The Inspector-General’s remarks on the above are worth notice: ‘The exportation of bullion for India has much increased upon us, which has occasioned a greater consumption of silver ; and our increasing expense in the consumption of some foreign Commodities at home has hindered the importation of it.’
Another account of the amount of bullion exported is interesting. It appears that during the years 1697–9 there was exported 4,177,859·13 oz. of silver and 4,027·3 oz. of gold.1 Another report of the Inspector-General informed the Lords that the amount exported by the new Company during the years 1698–1700 was £564,845. 13s. 6d., and that the United Company had exported £600,000 in nine months.2
This was an enormous amount for the times and excited keen opposition. The opposition of the bullionists, sketched in Chapter III, would be totally unintelligible without a due examination of the data on which their conclusions were founded. The above account shows conclusively that their complaints were not without foundation ; that the ‘drain of gold’ to the East which they denounced in forcible terms was not a fiction of their imagination ; and that the amount of bullion exported to the East increased pari passu with the increase of the East India trade. There is no reason to suppose that the amount of bullion exported decreased in the eighteenth century. It was proved in the House of Lords that in 1717 the East India Company had exported nearly 3,000,000 oz. of silver.3 The Goldsmiths’ petition asserted in April 1690 that ‘Since last October, the entries had been made of 286,102 ozs. of silver in bullion, and 89,946 dollars and pieces of eight by divisions’ ; they doubted not ‘but it would appear that not only the East India Company, but also Jews and merchants, had of late bought up great quantities of silver to carry out of the Kingdom, and had given 1½d. per oz. above the value, which had encouraged the melting down of much plate and milled money’.4
The Company’s shipping exhibited the same tendency during the period. In 1689 it had thirteen ships consigned to Fort St. George, the Bay, and the Coromandel Coast ; seven ships to China and the South Seas ; and fifteen ships consigned to Bombay and the Coast of India. Since 1681 sixteen new ships had been built, besides ‘a number of smaller ones now in their service’. All of them were three-decked ships, and were of ‘burthen, according to the King’s Tonnage, from 900 to 1,300 Tons each’.1 The Company’s war with Aurangzebe seems to have increased its tonnage, as a number of Indian junks and vessels were captured. The war with France and the disorganized state of the Company’s finances paralysed its activity for a time. The Company lost several ships during the war, while the increase of piracy in the Indian Ocean added to its difficulties. The famous Captain Kidd’s exploits have been preserved to us in a series of interesting accounts, but, as they are beyond the scope of this work, no notice can be taken of them here. In December 1692 it was alleged that no funds were available to equip twelve ships, which it was proposed to send to India in the following January.2 This is confirmed by the petitions of the Clothiers of Gloucestershire, of ‘Several merchants and others trading to the East Indies’, and of divers merchants of the City of London.3 All of them declared the trade to ‘be lost’. The East India Company, asserted the clothiers, ‘had bought none of their manufactures, nor of other counties’.
This inactivity of the Company was due, as explained above, to its financial weakness. Moreover, the war with France had rendered its voyages to India extremely dangerous, and five of its ships had been captured by the French. A letter of the Company, addressed to several persons, refers ‘to the disappointment the Company sustained in the loss of their 4 ships, which made them apply to the King, who has supplied them with 2 vessels to carry orders and not disclose to any person’.4
The King wanted ships for his own use, and the Company could hardly deny the absolute necessity of utilizing every ship for the purpose of defence against foreign foes. Nor is it clear whether the Admiralty was efficient at the time. Internal evidence goes to show that the losses incurred by the Company could easily have been avoided if a little more care had been exercised by the Admiralty. The Calendars of State Papers, Domestic, William and Mary, leave one with an impression of naval maladministration. This reacted on the disorganized state of the Company, and we are not surprised to see it inactive for a time. Characteristically enough, it was encouraged by the destruction of the Smyrna Fleet, and from that time may be dated the unusual progress of the East India shipping. Childe had urged them in 1692 to send ‘4 ships’. This showed a great falling off. In 1693, however, the grant of a charter encouraged the Company, and no less than twelve ships were sent to India. In 1694 the number increased to thirteen. The total number of ships during the years 1697–1702 is not capable of exact calculation. It is clear, however, from the MS. Letter Books that the Company’s tonnage was greatly increased. A dispatch, dated 15th December 1698, reckoned the number of ships bound for the East at nine.1 The total was probably fifty. This figure occurs in several pamphlets of the time and seems to me to be accurate.2
The Company exported comparatively large quantities of Indian goods to the plantations. As the Indian silk goods became popular in England, the Colonists followed the laws of fashion ordained by the upper classes in England. The cheapness of the Indian calicoes was the strongest ground for their popularity in the colonies. Accordingly, we find evidences of the general use of Indian calicoes. ‘Our West Indies’, bewailed an English writer, ‘that used formerly, and still might be clothed with our own manufactures for the Female Sex, will now touch none, unless such as are very cheap at 8d., 10d., or 12d. per Yard; and to that Degree is that Trade lost, that of all these several species of fine goods, that used to be exported out of England, there is not now 100 looms at work in the whole Nation upon Stuffs for Women.’
Another writer argued that if the English nobility used Indian manufactures, the West India islands would do the same, ‘as all persons know that they will imitate the gentry of England, and those Merchants’ commissions run for fashionable commodities’.1 The weavers feared that ‘if the East India Silks be the mode here, they will be so in our Plantations and Ireland, and where the orders sent being generally to send over such Manufactures as are most fashionable in England, and we would, therefore, in a great measure much lose what we have now’.
That these fears were not groundless is proved by the reports of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to the House of Lords. ‘For the better preventing other more general inconveniences from the East India Trade’, they proposed that ‘the wearing or consumption of the manufactured goods of India, Persia or China, made of silk or herb, or mixed with other of these materials, as also of painted or stained Calicoes, of all handicraft wares, imported from these parts should be discouraged and lessened in these Kingdoms, and in His Majesty’s Plantations’.2 The prohibition of the East India goods in the plantations seems to have produced the desired effect. Reliable materials for the construction of a history of those commodities are difficult of access. It is clear, however, that the amount of silk exported to the plantations was not large. During the years 1697–1702 wrought silks were exported to the plantations to the value of £29,823. 7s. 3d.; and to Ireland, £18,491. 2s. 7d.3 The Accounts do not state the quantity of calicoes exported to the colonies. It is reasonable to suppose that the amount was a large one, as the calicoes were generally preferred to the English woollen goods, owing to their cheapness. The Company's activities were not confined to the plantations. It exported a large amount of Indian goods to Germany. Davenant asserted that ‘for Indian goods we could purchase at a better rate the Linens of Silesia, Saxony and Bohemia’. Moreover, ‘in times of peace, we did and may gain Traffic with France for our India goods against the things of luxury which will always be brought from thence’.1 It is clear that the Indian commodities were exchanged for the German linens and that the English weavers suffered by this method. They had exchanged their linens for English cloth and the transaction seems to have proved profitable to both parties. Now, however, the importation of Indian commodities interfered with this trade. As the German linens were no longer exchanged for the English woollen goods, the former developed the woollen manufactures in their own country. ‘By reason of the great wear of Muslin and Calicoes, we have lost the greater part of our woollen cloth to Germany, Silesia, etc., from whence we had formerly great quantities of Linen. But when we would no longer take off their Linen’, owing, of course, to the popularity of calicoes in England, ‘they were forced to set up manufactures of woollen, by reason of which we have wholly lost that profitable trade.’ The same complaint is echoed by other writers.2
The Indians showed a regrettable liking for the German swords, and it is evident that the returns of Indian manufactures were made sometimes in that weapon. They were highly prized in India, and the astute Armenians, with the traveller Chardin at their head, contracted to supply them with that instrument of destruction.
Another European country to which the Company exported large quantities of Indian goods was Spain. There is evidence to show not only that Spain was well supplied with calicoes, but also that her plantations were regularly furnished with Indian goods. Mr. Thompson informed the House of Lords that when he was in Spain, ‘a great many Calicoes came thither, and bullion came back for them’. In one ship 2,000 pieces had been sent to a Bilbao factory, ‘in a year’—‘more ships go’. They are, he concluded, of general use in Spain. Captain Dorrell informed the Lords that he had carried calicoes to Spain, ‘and brought bullion for it’.1 These are not the only references to Indian commodities in Spain. Owing to the scanty materials at our disposal it would be dangerous to dogmatize. It is safe, however, to conclude that the Indian commodities were well known in Spain and that the Spanish colonies were generally supplied with comparatively large quantities.
The rapid strides made by the East India trade during the last ten years of the seventeenth century could hardly be ignored by the English weavers. The competition of Indian manufactures with English industries was, as pointed out in my former chapters, at first hardly recognizable. From 1675, however, the competition began to be seriously felt. By the end of the century the English weavers had organized a systematic opposition to the importation of Indian calicoes and silks. The opposition ceased only with the utter defeat of the Company. The forces arrayed against it proved too strong. The chief English industries affected by the Indian manufactures were wool and silk. The exquisite workmanship of Indian weavers proved serious to the English silk weavers. It became popular in England, and was used by ladies of quality, by gallants, and by the gentry. Of the serious injury inflicted on the silk industry there can be no doubt. ‘The Silks do us a further mischief by being spent directly in the room of our Stuffs made of Wool, Hair and mixed with Silk and worsted, and that no other Silks made abroad did ever serve for these uses, and are therefore most dangerous.’2 They were used for the same purposes as ‘our Manufactures are, and so discouraged Tradesmen from driving larger Trades, it being uncertain when these ships will come in and uncertain what sort of Commodity they will bring. Every Tradesman is liable to be undone, if he ventures to inlarge his Trade, as is plain by many hundred Instances in 20 years space. These Foreign Manufactures have spoiled our Foreign Trade for Fine Stuffs made in Norwich and London.’1 London, Canterbury, Gloucester and other counties seem to have suffered most from this competition. ‘In Spittlefields, there has been a very large manufacture settled, which long struggled with Italy, France and Holland, but kept its head above the water for a long time. Now come our East India Gentlemen. They carry away our workmen of all sorts, our Patterns and New Inventions, and promote the manufacture in the East Indies. The result is that Masters break, Journeymen run away, having no Trade. Some fly to the Mint and Privileged Places; some to Holland, some to Ireland, some starve to death at Home with their Wives and Children.’2
The clothing trade of Gloucestershire was similarly affected. ‘The poor Clothiers come to London, expecting a Market for their Cloth, but the Merchant can neither pay the old score nor buy more.’ Canterbury, however, seems to have been the greatest sufferer. The instances given by the writer illustrated the difficulty, and the resulting uncertainty of the weavers. ‘Last year they ran into debt, so as to keep on their Trade, and provide quantities of Goods for the English West Indies, but being no prophets, could not foresee the effects of the unmerciful cargo of Indian Damask, and they had to sell from 30 to 40 p. c. loss. By which means, half the working men of the Town of the Weaving trade are now running up and down the Nation, seeking Bread from Canterbury to London, from London to Norwich. Their families are left to the Parishes.’3 There is no reason to doubt the statements of the writer. He himself suffered severely from the competition, and had to leave his trade. We are told by Prince Butler4 ‘that the East India Trade had in a great measure ruined the Canterbury Silk trade, and obliged most of the London Silk Weavers and Throwsters to give over their several Trades and employment. Many have gone to Ireland, and set up Trade there; others fallen to comb, card, and spin; others make cloth, stuffs and serge.’ The dreadful consequences of the wearing of East India silks were vividly stated by a writer. ‘It will destroy our woollen Manufactures, fall the value of our land, cause us to abandon our Duty to God and Nature, by lessening the poor’s wages and Employment, and thereby depopulating our Country, forcing our People away to foreign parts.’1 The English silk weavers, however, did not deny the excellence of the silk goods imported. They admitted that, by various means, great encouragement had been given to the manufacture of silk, half-silk, and worsted, ‘which have been very much improved in a great variety of figure, striped and other Sorts of Stuffs’.2 This is clear from the evidence of other writers. It was no doubt true that the importations from India hindered the sale of silk goods from Holland, France, and Italy. The quantity of Italian wrought silks imported into England was limited to 2,630¼ pounds; it increased, no doubt, two years later, but, even so, it did not exceed 9,828½ pounds in 1698–9.3 The diminution is accounted for by the competition of Indian silk goods. This is confirmed by Mr. Sheldon’s paper. In it he informed the House of Lords that, having no sarsenets, ducapes, taffetas, or plain silks for linings made in England, they formerly had them from Italy and France; ‘but those we have of late years brought from Bengal are found to be more durable and useful, and are sold here in England for little more than half the price of those brought from Italy and France’.4
It was the perfect workmanship of the Indian goods and their comparative cheapness that rendered them a formidable rival to the English silk goods. The Company admitted before the House of Lords that nine-tenths of the Indian silk goods imported into England were consumed here; nor is there any reason to doubt the genuineness of their statement.5 They pointed out that if the Indian silks were prohibited, the French, Danes, and Dutch would furnish the same articles at a far greater price, and that the strictest prohibition could not hinder them from purchasing Indian goods at extravagant rates. The Company's defender showed, in a masterly treatise, the folly of propping up infant industries, and pointed out the benefits derivable from the concentration of energy on the production of a single manufacture. He advised the silk weavers to leave their trade in order that more hands may be employed on woollen manufactures. In his opinion the English soil was not fitted for the development either of silk manufactures or of the linen trade. His opponents were not prepared to follow this advice. If the silk industry had been confined to a few score of men the advice would have proved useful. This was not, however, the case. The silk weavers could point to 'the vast numbers employed at Spittlefield and Canterbury, who had their sole dependence upon them. This would have convinced him that our English weavers showed themselves able to contest the French, Dutch, and Italians.' Nor could the prosperity of the silk trade before the invasion of Indian silk goods be denied either by the Company or its defender. The Company, however, when pressed upon this point, changed their tactics. They argued that, as the Indian silk goods took the place of Dutch and Italian silks, they performed a national service by supplying the nation with those articles at half the prices charged by the foreigners. Was it fair, they asked, that East India goods should be prohibited? Why are not the Dutch and Italian silks prohibited as well? Otherwise, the Dutch and Italians will find opportunity to increase their silk trade with England and to engross the Indian silk trade in their own hands. Why should the East India silk goods be prohibited when they are three times as cheap as Dutch, Italian, and French silks? Nor did they see any reason why we should raise some industries to oppress others. These invidious distinctions were in their opinion calculated to strike at the very root of national well-being. 'If spinning and weaving be English Manufactures, so is Dyeing, Glazeing, and Printing.'1
the Indians could not do less than laugh in their Sleeves at the Act that prevents Throwing and Dyeing, the profit whereof is wholly lost to us, and Gain to India'.
Some of the questions asked by the Company were remarkably acute. They were, however, unskilfully framed, and it was quite easy for their opponents to prove the inaccuracy of their figures and the hollowness of some of their arguments. Their argument that we should buy in the cheapest market was sound. Nor can we say that it was seriously challenged. Their opponents, however, pointed to the misery that the importation of Indian commodities had wrought; brought forward figures to show that the importation of Dutch and Italian silks into England was insignificant, and that it was the Indian silk manufactures that threatened the English silk industry. There can be no doubt of the genuineness of the English silk weavers' grievances. Nor can we doubt the statement that the Dutch and Italian silks were not exported in large quantities at the time. The statement is verified by a series of documents. We cannot controvert it.1
The prohibition of Indian silk goods was only a matter of time. It might have been averted if the injuries inflicted had been confined to one industry. The silk industry was, after all, a manufacture that had been developed only recently, and if it could have been shown that the nation derived more profit from the Indian trade than from that industry, the Prohibition Act might not have been passed. It was the damage to the woollen trade of England that intensified the opposition. The woollen industry was regarded as the national industry. Even Davenant regarded the woollen manufactures as the 'Nourishment of our Body'. 'As Bread is called the Staff of Life, so the Woollen Trade is truly the Principal Nourishment of our Body Politick.'2 The Whig landlords were intensely jealous of the competition of foreign articles with woollen manufacture. They had prohibited the French goods and the Irish woollen goods. They were not likely to tolerate the Indian calicoes, and other goods, in England. No serious danger arose from the calicoes until about 1675. After that their imports increased rapidly. Pollexfen may denounce them; Wood1 may despise ‘the Effeminate luxuries from the East’. The East India merchants went on increasing the importation of calicoes. Within the years 1697 to 1702 no less than £1,053,725. 0s. 5¼d. worth of calicoes were imported into England.2
The effects of this increase were serious. The Indian goods were asserted to have been ‘directly opposite to the Employment of 250,000 Manufacturers, and to the consumption of 16 or 18 thousand Packs of Long Fine Wool in one year, of the growth of the largest sheep that feed in the Pasture Ground. Employment of these people is the only way left to give a value to the Land in those parts where they inhabit.’ We find the calicoes condemned in several petitions and pamphlets of weavers. The Languishing state of our Manufactures3 condemns the ‘Painted Calicoes, Soft Muslins and the Curious Landskips of an Indian fan, brought home with our bullion’. Another writer complained of ‘the grave inconveniences of India Cotton Yarn, which will be as obstructive to our Manufactures as Calicoes were’.4 Some of them seem to have been reduced to the greatest straits. ‘An infinite number of us are already reduced to great misery; the Poor Rates have doubled, and, in some cases, trebled.’5
The progress of the East India trade is attested by the increase in the customs duties on East India goods. From August 1685 to August 1687 the Company paid in customs £225,326. 10s. 1d. In 1688 the war with the Mogul reduced the Company’s trade considerably, and the duties did not realize the same amount. In 1690, however, the Company paid £100,074. 19s. 10d. From Michaelmas 1691 to March 1692 ‘New Impositions on East India Goods’ brought in £141,968. 11s. 7d. The following year, only £92,518. 4s. 5d. was realized. The grant of a Charter restored the Company’s prosperity. This is visible in the customs duties paid by the Company, which amounted to £130,571. 4s. 1d. In 1695 the customs duties were £161,546. 14s. 3d. The following year showed a slight decrease: £157,146. 2s. 6d. The following were the amounts realized in 1698, 1699, 1700, 1701, and 1702 respectively: £137,369. 18s. 11d.; £173,909. 17s. 4¾d.; £191,472. 8s. 5½d.; £173,982. 14s. 3½d.; £145,322. 16s. 2d.; £139,278. 5s. 2½d. Total for the years 1689 to 1702 £1,801,906. 2s. 9¾d. The duty of fifteen per cent. on India wrought silks and muslins yielded the following amount. From 1699 to 1700 £11,793. 12s. 4d. From Michaelmas 1700 to 1701 £80,268. 6s. 9½d. The effect of the Act of 1700 is shown in the amount realized the following year. It did not yield more than £11,793. 12s. 4d. Total for the three years £116,767. 18s. 6d.1
The agitation against the East India goods supplied an instructive example of the way in which the Mercantilism of the day affected the different industries. The woollen manufactures were regarded as the staple commodity of England, and a system of bounties and subsidies was granted solely with a view to the preservation and development of woollen goods. The calicoes, asserted a writer, were prejudicial to the traders and dealers in woollen manufactures, hence ‘the staple commodity of England ought to be upholden and encouraged’.2 This idea runs through all their complaints. The development of a national industry was, in their opinion, a sufficient reason for the prohibition of all competing manufactures. They called upon the State to protect them from the attacks of the Linen Drapers, the East India merchants, and other rival manufactures. It is clear that the State had a very difficult part to play at the time. At first sight it may appear that the prohibition of the Indian goods would have been cordially approved by the Whig landlords and the demands of the weavers satisfied. This would, no doubt, have taken place if the East India trade had benefited the Company alone. There is no reason to suppose that such was the case. It seems clear from a letter of Vernon to Shrewsbury that, as early as 1696, it had been decided to bring in a bill prohibiting the wearing of East India silks. It was ordered on 7th March 1696 and passed on 31st March 1696.1 It was read in the House of Lords on 2nd and 3rd April 1696.2 In Committee the Lords inserted several amendments, extending the operation of the Bill to all wrought silks exported, and all calicoes printed or stained out of the realm.3 The Commons, however, disagreed with these amendments. They thought they would injure the export trade, and that as the amendments imposed additional penalties, and as all impositions ought to originate with the House of Commons only, the action of the Lords was unconstitutional. This was followed by numerous conferences between the two Houses. The Lords, however, insisted on their amendments and the Bill was lost.4 The Act prohibiting the calicoes, &c., was not passed till 1700. The delay in the passage of the Bill showed the difficulties of the Government. It had to deal not only with the Indian merchants, but also with a host of industries that were dependent upon that trade.
Nor was this divergence of interest confined to calicoes. Other Indian goods employed a number of people and maintained flourishing industries. The controversy exemplifies the difficulties by which the Parliamentary Colbertism of the day was beset. It was on the horns of a dilemma. If the Government prohibited the wearing of Indian goods, it would entail misery on thousands of men engaged in printing calicoes. If, on the other hand, the importation of Indian calicoes were not prohibited, the woollen industry might be seriously affected. This was the inevitable result of the Mercantilism then in vogue. The grant of a bounty to, or the imposition of a tax on, a manufacture could be justified only on national grounds. It was very difficult, however, to separate the purely personal from a truly national industry. Every industry called itself national, and justified its existence mainly on that ground. The chief cause of the failure of the Mercantilism of the day lay in its neglect to strike a mean between the two and to abstain from surrounding particular industries with bounties and tariff walls. The question whether bounties were necessary is totally irrelevant to the issue. They were probably necessary at the time, and, considering the state in which the chief English industries then were, essential. This does not, however, prove the necessity of imposing differential duties. There is evidence to show that this was done, and that particular industries suffered thereby. The case of Linen Drapers furnishes us with a classical example of the system, or want of system, that was in operation at the time. The divergence of their interests is revealed in a number of documents. The weavers asserted ‘that the printing and dyeing of linens doth alter the use thereof, and the very intention for which they are profitably brought into England, which is for inside wear only’.1 ‘They ought not’, opined another, ‘by their Gaudy Show be converted into outside garments.’ The Linen Drapers replied that the linen industry was as much a national industry as the woollen manufactures; ‘that it was the interest of the nation that the Home Consumption should be little, of a Cheap and Foreign Growth, and that our own manufactures should be sent abroad.’ This was but a development of Davenant’s argument, and implied a fundamental change in the economic policy of the times. It is interesting, however, to examine the grounds on which they based their opinion. They declared that ‘by all that is spent at home, one loseth what another gains; the nation is not the richer’. They thought that if the Indian calicoes were prohibited, the Dutch, Italian and German linen would take their place.2
England, they asserted, sent to Germany wool, tin, copper, &c., and returned from thence whatever was fit for her purpose; if she bought smaller quantities of German linens, the balance would be returned in money. It would, they argued, be better to send one-third part of that money to buy calicoes if the latter were three times cheaper than German linens. England would, therefore, keep two-thirds of that money, ‘instead of taking it out in Linens from Germany at treble the price’. Carey’s answer is characteristic. He did not deny that calicoes were cheaper than linen. He asserted, however, ‘that our goods will be cheap in time. They would have us wear their slight shadows and rotten Calicoes in England, and send our own manufactures abroad.’1 To the objections of the Linen Drapers that if calicoes were prohibited, Dutch and Italian silk goods would take their place, Carey replied that the additional duty of twenty per cent. on Dutch and Italian silks had so hindered them from sending them to England ‘that there has been not so much as one case of these (Dutch) goods imported for six years; nor is it possible for them to do so’. Moreover, the Scotch and German linens to which the Linen Drapers had referred were not absolutely necessary. Hence, the calicoes would not be replaced by German linen at all, ‘as we now make such variety of things in England, with Silk and Worsted, and with Cotton Yarn from our Plantations, that do in a measure supply the uses of linens’.2 Consequently, the prohibition of Indian calicoes would not result in increased buying of German linen. Even if German and Scotch linen were bought, it would be better to spend money on them rather than on Indian calicoes, as the former were exchanged for English wool, and, therefore, ‘German and Scotch linnen when purchased for our manufactures are much cheaper to us than calicoes, though bought for Bullion in the East Indies at one third part’.3
Even such a specialized trade as the East India trade was related to so many industries in England, and the influence it exercised on Linen Drapers and others was so far-reaching, that the prohibition of calicoes, &c., was effected only after years of bitter controversy. There is reason to believe that Linen Drapers suffered severely. Thomas Kettle informed the House of Lords that ‘if Calico is prohibited, we must starve—thousands are employed in dyeing and calendering, 2 or 300 employed in dyeing and stiffening’.1
Nothing is more remarkable than the evidence furnished by the petitions of thousands of workers against the Bill. The Linen Drapers prayed to be heard before the Second Reading; a petition, signed by 50 Calico Printers, requested a hearing; another petition, signed by 141 Dyers of Wrought Silk, pointed out ‘that the Bill will ruin the petitioners’; while another petition, signed by 281 ‘Gentlemen’s sons and Apprentices’, said ‘that the greater part of their money will be lost if the Bill pass’; a petition of Packers and Clothmakers informed the Lords that if the Bill passed, the greater part of the woollen goods bought by the Company would remain unsold; there were further petitions from the Calenderers, Glaziers, and Buckram Stiffeners in the City of London; while the ‘Shopkeepers and Warehouse keepers trading in East India, Persia, and China Silks, Bengal and Painted Calico, in the City of London’ thought that ‘the Bill will utterly deprive them of the greatest part of their Livelihood’.2 The petitions that poured in testified to the existence of serious alarm among the traders who depended for their livelihood upon the East India trade. It was impossible for the Lords to ignore either the intensity of the feeling or the existence of the serious competition that resulted from its expansion. They tried to settle the dispute by compromise. They prolonged the time for three years—allowed printed, stained, and dyed calicoes from India to be imported without any obligation to transport them; and, finally, they omitted the Bengal goods altogether. The Lords’ amendments were certainly comprehensive and far reaching, nor can it be denied that they altered materially the Bill sent by the Commons. Even the Commons were not unanimous on the point, ‘and many were not hearty for it’. The weavers were, however, determined to enforce their will and to compel them to pass the Bill. The weavers’ wives were irritated by the long delay, and were under the impression that the Bill was going to be dropped.1 They invaded the House of Commons and threatened the members who had voted against the Bill. Soon afterwards a mob of 3,000 weavers assembled to attack Childe’s magnificent mansion; the East India House also was attacked, and the Company’s treasure nearly got possession of. It was not till after the militia and the press-gang had been called out that they dispersed.2
The weavers’ activities were not confined to attacks on the Parliament House and the East India House. The Linen Drapers had advocated the rejection of the Bill in a series of masterly pamphlets and broadsides, and pleaded the cause of free trade with great acumen and insight. The weavers concentrated all the forces at their disposal for an attack on their dangerous rivals. The inhuman treatment of the wearers of printed calicoes and linens ‘hath so terrified them that the commodity has stagnated in the hands of the Dealers therein. They are not only mobbed out of their trade by the Artful Management of weavers, but they still continue their Riotous Practices and pursue them with Clamour and Complaints.’ Owing to this systematic persecution, ‘there remained unsold of printed calicoes in the hands of Drapers and Dealers in London to the value of £250,000, near half of which has been paid in Custom’.3 The Act of 1700 was due mainly to this agitation. The weavers had their reward, and ‘all Silks and all Calicoes, except such as are entirely White, as also almost the whole China Trade’, were prohibited by that sweeping measure.4 Its immediate effects were disastrous. Amsterdam and Rotterdam became the magazines for the wrought silk, Bengal stuffs, calicoes, and other East India goods.1 Such goods were bought cheaper in India, and sold by the shrewd Dutch for very high prices in Europe. England, lamented Davenant, sent out its bullion, ran all the hazard of the sea and by capture, and maintained forts and castles2; yet she derived no advantage thereby. The Dutch took full advantage of the Act of 1700, and, by a medium of four years, the prohibited and unprohibited goods of the growth of East India carried to Holland were valued at £250,317 per annum. They would, asserted Davenant, continue to be sharers in the profit of the East India trade, as long as prohibition continued in England. It was, thought Davenant, better for the public to impose a duty of about thirty per cent. upon the Indian goods, as ‘the taking off of the prohibition will encourage the Company to enlarge their trade in the Indies, viz., by making new settlements and engaging deeper in the Coast trade’.3 He was confident that an experiment of four or five years would plainly demonstrate that their use in England ‘would not so much hurt us at home in the consumption of our Woollen Manufacture, as the vent of them abroad interferes with the sale of our woollen goods in foreign markets’. It is clear that the Dutch utilized the opportunity and flooded Europe with Indian goods. Nor is it quite certain whether this produced any effect on the sale of English cloth in foreign countries. England sustained a double loss through the Act. Not only did she lose the benefit which the East India Company had derived from the sale of the prohibited goods in England, but she also felt keenly the competition to which her woollen manufactures were subjected in European countries. Though the immediate effects were harmful, the ultimate effects were, in my opinion, beneficial to English commerce. It has been shown in this and the third chapter that nearly all English industries were threatened by the Indian goods. The silk industry was seriously affected; the weavers were in distress; the fanmakers were intensely hostile; while other classes of traders were indignant at the freedom allowed to the East India merchants. I have tried to show that the grievances of all these classes were real, and that the competition to which they referred in mournful tones operated harshly on all of them.
The significance of these complaints has been lost sight of, and the Act has been cited as a classical example of the fatuous policy of the Mercantilists. A careful perusal of the last two chapters will convince the reader of the utter absurdity of the charge. It was not the Government, but the weavers who dominated the Government, that desired the Act. The House of Commons was not enthusiastic. We have evidence to show that ‘many of them did not like the Bill and voted against it’. The same applies to the House of Lords. It was the agitation of the English weavers that led to the passing of the Act. Nor is this confined to the period under consideration. The Government merely carries into effect the wishes of the people and registers its decrees during the seventeenth century. There is no imposition of tyrannical economic law on the devoted heads of a long-suffering people. The economic measures which figure in the Statute books of the seventeenth century did not take their origin in the capacious brains of the statesmen, but were placed on the Statute book mainly because they expressed the desires by which all the classes affected by the laws were animated. It is, therefore, totally misleading to choose the Executive in the seventeenth century as a scapegoat, and to heap upon it all the blame of the economic measures of the times. If any one is to blame for the follies of the Government which Adam Smith so trenchantly exposed, it is the people. It was they who desired these measures, and who attacked the Government if it failed to carry them out. Mercantilism was not an alien system, imposed on the unwilling shoulders of a deluded people, but the expression of a common desire for participation in the commercial progress of the times and defence against foreign commercial rivals. It is this conception that helps to explain the seemingly inconsistent laws passed during the period. The East India trade had determined, to a certain extent, the economic and foreign policies of James I, Cromwell, and Charles II. It was the merchants who had compelled these rulers to follow a consistently national policy, and to defend them against the attacks of the foreign powers. The policy of the East India merchants had aimed at the utilization of the State for the purpose of defending their privileges in the East. The complete protection and the unlimited support which Charles II's government conferred on the Company had resulted in an enormous expansion of the East India trade. The State, which the Company had worshipped until the time of Charles II, was now regarded in a totally different light. Its importation of Indian goods had been allowed up till that time, partly because they did not seriously compete with English goods, and partly because Mun's argument that the bullion exported by the Company ultimately brought in a greater amount of money, still held good. After the Revolution, however, the scene was totally changed. Not only was the amount of gold and silver exported to the East greatly increased, but also the Indian goods vitally affected the chief English industries. The English Parliament could hardly remain indifferent to the serious injury inflicted on English commerce. The instinct of self-preservation is no less strong among nations than among individuals, and the Parliament would have abdicated its primary duty if it had remained indifferent to the protests of the English merchants. Hence, the Parliament cannot be blamed for prohibiting the Indian manufactures. It had done the same with regard to the French and Irish manufactures, and would have followed the same policy with regard to any other foreign industry that showed signs of driving an English industry out of existence.
The full significance of the controversy will be totally lost on us unless we pay careful attention to the evolution of the stock argument of the Company into an eloquent plea for freedom of trade. Mun's argument had lost its force, as the Company itself admitted that a large part of the Indian goods were not exported, but 'consumed' in England. It was fixed as high as nine-tenths. The defenders of the Company had to show not only that the exportation of bullion was ultimately beneficial to England, but also that the Indian goods imported into England did not compete with English industries. Both these actions of the Company cut at the root of the fundamental principles which were the basis of the modified Mercantilism of the day. The Company could defend the increased exportation of money only on the ground that it brought in more money to the kingdom. This was true up till the time of Charles II. The Indian goods were undoubtedly exported to foreign parts during the period, and England therefore gained by the transaction. After that time, however, the policy was reversed. Nine-tenths of the Indian goods were used in England, and the Company was therefore forced to defend its policy on Free Trade principles. Hence the importance of the East India trade in the seventeenth century economic thought.
The Company had advocated commercial war against Holland, and had insisted on the necessity of State support. It had, moreover, shaped the economic and foreign policy of Charles II, and had, generally, been the most consistent advocate of the Mercantile System. After the Revolution, however, it was forced to rely upon Free Trade principles for the defence of its policy. This advocacy of Free Trade was not confined to Davenant or Sir Dudley North. It has really obscured the issue, and has induced Professor Ashley to treat the ‘Tory Free Traders’ as isolated beings, who spun out their theories without any reference to the commerce about which they were supposed to be theorizing. Nor is it accurate to label all Free Traders as Tories, and to treat them as being friendly to France, and as advocates of peace. The division of the economists of the last years of the seventeenth century into Whig and Tory, according as they advocated Free Trade or the reverse, seems to me to be illogical. The fundamentum divisionis is vitiated by a fallacy, and the result is that we are liable to concentrate our attention on the unessential points of the controversy. It was not the love of Free Trade in the abstract that compelled some of the economists of the time to advocate freedom of trade. The theories were really due to the progress of the East India trade during the last ten years. We find the Company defending in a series of pamphlets the importation of the East India goods on the grounds that we must buy in the cheapest markets, and that all laws that restrict this freedom of buying are prejudicial to trade. Not merely Davenant and the author of Considerations on the East India Trade defended the Indian manufactures on that ground. We find the same defence employed by the Company in a series of broadsides, pamphlets, answers, &c. The Company was, in fact, bound to have recourse to Free Trade principles for the defence of the policy. In doing this it prepared the fall of the Mercantile System.
Nothing is more misleading than to describe the economic theories of the time without any reference to the causes that gave rise to them. Economic, no less than political and metaphysical, theories are the outcome of a series of events, linked together by a few leading conceptions. In this lay the mistake of Adam Smith. The ‘Smithsianism’ which the Germans condemn is bad, not because it is pernicious in its effects, but because it is misleading. It leaves out the important contribution that the seventeenth century economic thought made to the theory of the State. To Machiavelli the State is everything, and in it he realizes himself. To it he sacrifices morality and law. To the seventeenth century economist the State is the only means whereby the nation can realize its commercial greatness. The economist of the times combines two seemingly inconsistent characteristics. His idea of Sovereignty is borrowed from Hobbes, while his passion for what may be called ‘practicality’ is the gift of Bacon. He has an intimate acquaintance with the minutiae of commerce, and an unlimited faith in the wisdom of State action. These are the main features which strike a student of the seventeenth century economic literature. The Baconian love of analysis is conjoined with the Hobbist fondness for the omnipotence of the State.
Adam Smith has ignored this national aspect of the theories, and treats them merely as curious specimens of the absurdity of the Mercantile System. The East India trade had, as shown in previous Chapters, played a prominent part in this development of the Mercantile System. It became now the most determined enemy of the very system which it had helped to develop.
The leading idea that runs through all the pamphlets written by the opponents of the Company is that of the development of national resources for the acquisition of power. To them, ‘power’ is more important than ‘plenty’, and labour of greater importance than money. ‘The original of our riches’, said Pollexfen, ‘is from labour, riches and industry of our people in getting out of the bowels of the earth, from our lands and seas, what may be improved, and made useful for carrying on our foreign trade, upon which also depends the increase of our seamen and navigation, in which our strength consists.’1 It was the loss to the productive powers of the nation in general, rather than the injury inflicted on a score of private persons, that was frequently emphasized. ‘For’, said another writer, ‘the case of a Nation is like that of a private person; if he be inclined to good husbandry and prudently direct his affairs, he may thrive and grow rich, without any laws to limit or circumscribe the methods thereof.’1 Hence, a nation’s trade was to be carried on mainly with a view to increasing this power. ‘These advocates for Free Trade are gentlemen of the same kidney with those private Tradesmen who supply our Extravagant Gallants with whatsoever his luxurious fancy directs. If his stewards warn him, he replies that he is a Free Agent, and ought not to be circumscribed or restrained.’2
The same aspect of the question was grasped by Prince Butler with unrivalled foresight. He showed the consequences of the theories advocated by the Company, and asked them whether they were prepared to carry them to their extreme limits. As cheap labour was so beneficial, would it not, asked Butler, be better to send for corn to the East Indies, ‘as theirs is much cheaper than ours?’ Would it not be better, asked the same opponent, to employ the Dutch shipping, ‘for they always sail much cheaper than we do, and then we may send our own ships to Foreign Nations that want to hire them?’3 Would it not, asked another writer, be better ‘to clothe the English nation in the Mogul’s Livery?’ The English weavers did not deny that the calicoes were cheap. But, said they, ‘Consider the price of provisions in England, and the goodness of our work, and we shall see who will work cheaper. Our Cloth Weavers work only for 5s. per week in the country; our Dressers are tied to 1d. per hour; our Serge Weavers the same. Even silk weavers get only 12s. a week, and pay two boys out of it.’4 This was really the main ground of their attack. The Company had pointed out the benefits that England would derive from wearing cheap Indian goods and exporting all her dear woollen goods to foreign countries. If this were acted upon, then, said Pollexfen, the Indians being ingenious and being able to secure material cheap and live ‘on half pence or a penny a day’, ‘what costs there 1s. will cost to be made here at 20s.’ This would naturally disable the Europeans from competing with the Indians on equal terms, and as the trade was free, the ultimate result would be that the people would starve, and the English industries would be driven out of the market. Such freedom of trade was not to the liking of the English weavers. A writer, after relating his own experiences of the fatal effects of this freedom of trade, concludes thus: ‘Yet though these calamities are upon us, and many more in view, yet trade must be free; though French, Italian, Holland, and Ireland Trades must be curbed, yet this trade to the Indies must not be touched.’1 The Company’s advocates had pointed out that Holland had pursued the same Free Trade policy, and that her commercial greatness was due mainly to that cause. The Mercantilists denied that there was any analogy. Holland, they replied, was a small country, and was obliged to leave trade free. ‘But we that are blest with a large tract of fruitful land, rich mines, productive and laborious cattle, convenient ports, and navigable rivers, must with the manufacturing our own Productions improve our land by feeding our people, Support our Trade and Traffick, Navigation and Land Carriage, and by all lawful means increase our people.’ The time for Free Trade was not come yet; ‘when the other parts of the world can agree on a Free Trade, it will be time for us to consider; and till then, make the best improvement of the Almighty God’.2 Davenant’s theory ‘that trade is in its nature free, and finds its own channel’, was not congenial to the Mercantilists. They pointed out that all trading nations had put a restraint upon trade, ‘according as their circumstances required; the French have, since many years, prohibited our woollen manufactures, and by that means have set them up in their own country’. The Dutch had also prohibited dyed woollen manufactures, and had by this means ‘gained a profitable employment’. The Venetians too had prohibited the English cloth. The same applied to Sweden and Denmark. They asserted that the cheapness of an article did not always prove its utility, and quoted Childe to prove that ‘wherever the wages are high, it is an infallible Evidence of the Riches of that Country, and vice versa’. It is, said they, the multitude of people and good laws that principally enrich any country.
Their reply to Davenant's argument in favour of exportation of woollen manufactures, and consumption of the Indian goods in England, took the form of a denial of the existence of a foreign market, where English goods could be exported. ‘If we could find a Foreign Market for our manufactures, this objection would be of force, but this is impossible.’1 It followed that Free Trade was impossible, and that England could thrive only after the prohibition of the East Indian goods. The leading idea underlying nearly all the statements of the Mercantilists is admirably expressed by the following: ‘If by Free Trade be meant absolute Free Trade, without any limitation or qualification at all, but every man to do what he likes, then we may as well transport Corn, Wool, and Fuller's earth out of the Nation, as any other Commodity. And the rich men may engross the Corn and other things of livelihood, into their own hands, and no man may say, Why do you so? But it is hoped no man will desire to have such freedom. Free trade must have its interpretation, or limitation and bounds, which is the Nation's Good. Such freedom we plead for.’2
This passage brings out the prominent characteristics of the Mercantilism of the later half of the seventeenth century. Its supporters took a far deeper view of the effect of the growth of the East India trade and other foreign trades on English national life than has generally been supposed. Their gaze was fixed not upon the money that would flow into the pockets of the East India merchants, but upon the miseries that the trade would inflict upon the nation in general. They regarded the State as an instrument which would rectify all the abuses that had crept in through the unlimited freedom accorded to the East India merchants. It need hardly be added that some of them identified the interests of the nation with the maintenance of their own supremacy, and that Davenant was substantially correct when he denounced the weavers for perpetrating such a fallacy. This does not alter, however, the fact that their appeals had effect mainly because they expressed in a vigorous and terse language what the majority of the English manufacturers were feeling at the time, and that their arguments proved successful only because they were in harmony with the prevailing conception of the theory of the State.
The East India Company were not, however, without adequate representation, and their cause was championed by a series of remarkable writers. The Company’s advocacy of the freedom of trade was not accidental, but logical. As long as it was menaced by the Dutch it clung to the skirts of the Government, and advocated commercial war. The growth of that trade, however, led to attacks upon it under Charles II. Childe and Papillon, as shown in Chapter II, had replied to its critics with considerable effect, and had reduced its opponents to silence. When it was attacked after the Revolution the Company employed the previous arguments of Childe, and deduced freedom of trade from the necessity of importing large quantities of cheap Indian goods into England. They showed that England gained considerably by using cheap Indian goods. They admitted that the Indian goods ‘interfered with the Woollen, Silk, and linen manufactures of this Kingdom’. Nor did they deny that a great part of the Indian goods were consumed in England. But they pointed out that in that case, ‘it may as much be argued that all foreign commerce is prejudicial to the common interest of England, for that without it we should have wherewithal to feed and clothe ourselves, and thereby keep our own people in full employ’.1 It was, they declared, to the interest of England to have silks and linens from the cheapest markets, ‘whereby we impoverish our neighbours by supplying ourselves and them with such goods as work against and beat out their manufactures’. Hence, nothing ought to be done to limit the freedom of trade. ‘For it is an undeniable maxim, and what is the general practice and policy of all trading countries, that trade ought not to be limited or restrained, but left to its free current. Nothing being more visible than that, if it be stopped or dammed up in one part, it will overflow in another.’2
The freedom of trade which the Company desired would, said a writer, make all manner of commodities cheap; ‘the cheapness of commodities empowers our people to work cheaper; the cheapness of work encourages foreign trade; Foreign trade brings wealth; that raises the price of land.’1
The cause of the Company was defended in a series of broadsides, pamphlets, &c., and it is difficult to come across a document of the period dealing with that trade that does not discuss the advantage or disadvantage of Free Trade. It was not an abstract theory, discussed with touching impartiality by ‘men of speculation’, but a burning question of the day, involving thousands of people, and shaping the destinies of many a person in manifold ways. This illustrates strikingly the interest taken by the people in the East India trade. It has been said that at the election of 1700 the two Companies were fought for by many a candidate at the polling booth. Of the writers, however, Davenant was probably the ablest. There is no evidence to suppose that he was a thoroughgoing champion of Free Trade. He asserts again and again in his classical Reports on Public Accounts the necessity of levying impositions upon those foreign articles that competed with English articles. Nor does he deny the efficacy of prohibition in particular cases. He thought that French goods ought to have been prohibited earlier than they actually were, and that the Dutch goods could be prevented from injuring English manufactures only by the imposition of heavy duties upon their importation into England.
As regards the East India trade, he justified the exportation of bullion by the Company on the ground that ‘the returns from India of £200,000, when exported to other countries, must increase the first sum at least fourfold, and perhaps £800,000’.2 He estimated that the Returns of £200,000 in times of peace might probably yield abroad £800,000 and that the Returns of £200,000 at home would yield £800,000. Accordingly, by the exportation of £400,000 to the East, the country would derive a profit. From this have to be deducted various charges. The net profit from the Trade will be £600,000.3 The profit did not all accrue to it, but was national and divided among many thousands of people. Davenant’s line of defence was the same as that of Mun. His figures were naturally different. The accuracy of these figures was brought into question by several writers. His statement that the Nation increased in riches from ‘1656 to 1688’ 2 million pounds per annum, can hardly be accepted without further evidence. Nor are we prepared to say that, of this increase, ‘£900,000 was due to the Plantation Trade, £500,000 to our Products and Manufactures and £600,000 to the East India Trade’. An opponent asserted that he had ‘never seen a collection so generally mistaken. If he had consulted only with men of Speculation, who gather from Paper, he might well run into such mistakes.’1 Davenant’s reply that by the ‘yearly increase of 2 millions a year’, he meant only ‘average increase’, was not conclusive.2 More important is his defence of the exportation of bullion to the East Indies. Childe and Papillon had asserted that ‘money is a commodity, and may in many cases be exported as much to National advantage as any other Commodity’.3 Davenant developed this proposition, and asserted that ‘silver and goods serve as the measure of other commodities and are valuable only in proportion to them. Money is not the Riches of the Nation, for you are not sure you shall purchase with that whatever you have occasion for’.4
To the Mercantilists, however, bullion seemed to be the ‘sinews of war’. ‘For money in a Body Politick is as Blood in the Body Natural, giving life to every part.’5 ‘As our Treasure doth ebb and flow,’ said the author of Interest of Great Britain Considered, ‘so doth our strength, Money being the sinews of State and War.’ John Carey asserted that the ‘Wealth of the Nation was not a bit greater than at the beginning of the century’.6 The East India Company were therefore forced to treat money as a commodity. They could hardly agree with the idea of the Mercantilists that money was treasure. Their increasing exports of money could hardly be defended upon any other ground. Money came to be regarded, therefore, as a measure of exchange. ‘What would happen if a country were isolated, even though it possessed enormous riches.’ The country would be in a miserable condition with respect to its neighbours, who have free commerce.1
North pointed out the absurdity of the idea that money ought to be hoarded and preserved so that the Nation might not get bankrupt. ‘Let not the care of money torment us so much. For a people that are rich cannot want it, and if they make none, they will be supplied with the Coin of other Nations.’2 The main characteristics of money and the various functions it performs were pointed out with a vigour and directness that is still unrivalled. Simon Clemens’s acute analysis of Money, in his Discourse of the General Notions of Money, Trades and Exchanges,3 and his adoption of the historical method, were no doubt an immense improvement. He mentioned the advantages derived from the exportation of bullion to the East. He did not, however, go further. The writer of Some Considerations on the Nature and Importance of the East India Trade4 brought out the essential features of money. The Mercantilists, he asserted, ‘considered Money as the Ancients did the Blood, that all that came in must necessarily be kept in the Body, vainly fancying a perpetual Addition without any Decrease of Circulation.’ ‘But of late men have regarded Silver not only as the measure and stand of Trade, but really as much a Commodity, and as much the subject of Stock Exchange and Traffick, and like them continually fluctuating in its Price, according to the Quantity and demand of it. No Laws can restrain its outlet, no more than they can the circulation of the Air, or the Course of the Tide.’
If gold and silver were commodities, the East India Company were justified in exporting large quantities of bullion. The Company asserted that exportation of bullion resulted in a net profit to the nation. The Company defended its exports of gold and silver on the ground that the amount exported either brought more merchandise in return, or this could be sold in foreign countries for three times the amount of money exported. The nation was, therefore, a gainer by this trade. It was, asserted the author of Considerations upon the East India Trade, an exchange of less for greater value. The export of bullion for Indian manufactures was an exchange of less for greater value. ‘It is to exchange Bullion for Manufactures more valuable, not only to the Merchants, but also to the Kingdom.’ The principal riches, whether of Private Persons, or of whole Nations, ‘are Meat, Bread, Clothes and Houses, &c’. Money itself, thought the author, is secondary and dependent. Clothes and manufactures are real and principal riches. Hence, ‘to exchange Bullion for more manufactures is to exchange the Secondary for more of the Principal Riches than are elsewhere to be had on the same terms.’1
The chief merit of the writer consisted in his extension of the theory propounded by Childe, Clemens, and Barbon. If money is a commodity, as asserted by Childe and others, then, argued the author, it is only a secondary commodity. The principal commodities are houses, meat and clothes. As the East India trade involved the exchange of secondary for principal riches, the nation was a gainer by the trade. Even Simon Clemens would not go so far. He was content to say that ‘if that business (East India Trade) were well managed, we should be able to send so much of the goods brought from thence to our Neighbour Markets as would return us more money, and Money’s worth than what we first sent out for India’.2 His eyes are still fixed on the money that England would get by the exchange. He does, however, consider the possibility of the exchange of Indian goods for foreign goods. The returns of Indian goods sold in foreign countries may be made either in bullion or goods. Clemens defended the sale of Indian manufactures on the ground that the returns were made in bullion. The writer of Considerations argued in its favour for the reason that the exchange led to the acquisition of ‘principal Riches’. The Mercantilists, however, were not satisfied. They argued that the exportation of Indian manufactures to Germany, though it led to the increase of bullion, did not benefit the nation, as the Germans no longer required English cloth, and had, according to Davenant, built up a large industry of their own. Hence, as the balance of trade with Germany was unfavourable, increase in the amount of bullion through the exportation of Indian commodities was detrimental to the kingdom.
The Company opposed the general balance of trade to the particular balance of which the Mercantilists were so fond. Childe had acutely criticized the methods employed at the time, and had pointed out the difficulty of forming a right judgement. ‘The True Measure of any trade’, said he, ‘cannot be taken by the consideration of such trade in itself singly, but as it stands in reference to the General Trade of the Kingdom.’1 He had pointed out that it was impossible to take a true account, as the Custom House books were not true guides. He showed that a number of accidents, as losses at sea, bad markets, increased demand abroad, &c., might render the Custom House books totally unreliable. Nicholas Barbon amplified this statement of Childe, and exposed the dangers involved in the fallacy. He asserted ‘that there is nothing so difficult as to find out the Balance of trade in any Nation’.2
The merit of Davenant lay in his organization of these disparate and disconnected statements into a closely-reasoned plea for freedom of trade. This freedom was not advocated by him either because he recognized its importance in the abstract, or because he was a fervid enthusiast for commercial liberty. He was quite willing to see the Dutch manufactures prohibited, nor was he averse to the prohibition of French manufactures. His advocacy of the theory had its origin in his perception of the impossibility of carrying on the East India trade without freedom of trade. It was the actual state of the East India trade that compelled him to advocate Free Trade measures. The Company had advocated it before, and it had become so familiar that in nearly all the pamphlets written on either side freedom of trade was discussed. Nearly all the economists of the time would be totally unintelligible to us unless we have a thorough grasp of the conditions that occasioned those theories. This is the main cause of the misrepresentation of the seventeenth-century economists by Adam Smith and his followers.
The multiplicity of facts in which these theories are embedded are separated off by watertight compartments from the theories, and the latter are treated either to point out a moral, or to serve as examples of misdirected energies and crude fallacies. Nothing could be more unhistorical and unjust. Their authors were eminently practical men, and their theories summed up the results of their own experiences. Davenant was probably an exception, and was therefore reviled by his opponents as ‘a mere man of speculation’. It is, probably, this quality in Davenant that saved him from the fate which has overtaken his critics. He possessed in an eminent degree just those qualities which the economists so sadly lacked—a charming literary style, breadth of view, deep insight into the relation of the various trades to one another, and fertile imagination. All these qualities were exhibited in his exposition of the fundamental principles underlying the prominent commercial phenomena of the day.
The criticisms of Childe and Barbon of the balance of trade theory were skilfully transformed into a cogent plea for freedom of trade. He showed that it was difficult to rely on the well-known statistics of Sir William Petty, ‘as the farmers, in their several contracts, had never been obliged to give in a real statement of the Accounts, and a true produce of their respective Counties’.1 But the calculation of a balance of trade was far more difficult than ‘political arithmetick’. ‘It is’, he said, ‘utterly impossible exactly to state the balance between one country and another.’ He then showed the dangers of prohibition and imposition. He agreed that ‘we might safely prohibit, or put a clog upon, the traffic of that country where we think ourselves the losers’, but this was to be done with the utmost caution, as high duties and impositions not only broke ‘some of the links in the chain of trade’, but generally ended in a war between those nations where they were made use of frequently.2 Hence, laws to compel the consumption of some commodities and prohibit the use of others may do well enough where trade is forced and artificial, as in France, but in England they are needless and artificial. It was admitted by Davenant that the East India trade hindered the consumption of English manufactures. Nor did he deny that the exportation of bullion to the East proved injurious to Europe. He asserted, however, that it was the interest of Englishmen to be the carriers of the world. ‘There is no trade so advantageous as that of buying goods in one Country to sell them in another, and it is the original and chief article of great wealth in Holland.’1 He denounced injurious restrictions on trade, and declared that the natural way of promoting the woollen manufactures was not ‘to force its consumption at home’, but by wholesale laws to the contrary, that it might be bought cheaper. ‘Trade’, said Davenant, ‘is in its nature free, finds its own channel and best directs its own course, and all Laws to give it Rules and Directions, and to limit and circumscribe it, may serve the Particular Ends of Private Men, but are seldom Advantageous to the Nation.’2 Hence the necessity of freedom of trade. Davenant thought that England should concentrate on the exportation of her manufactures to foreign parts, because her geographical position and her ‘Dominion of the Seas’ eminently fitted her to perform that rôle. This advice remained a counsel of perfection for about a hundred years, and it was not till the Industrial Revolution that England assumed that rôle which she has maintained since, and which Davenant had urged nearly a hundred years before. Sir Dudley North carried out the ideas of Davenant to their logical conclusion. He had revolutionized the theory of foreign trade by showing that it was nothing else but a barter of commodities. He now showed in his Considerations on the East India Trade3 ‘that England was fitted by nature to be the greatest carrying nation in the world’. He developed these ideas with characteristic thoroughness. He bade England concentrate on the exportation of her manufactures to ‘foreign parts’; showed the loss sustained by the nation through wasteful employment of a number of persons; and proved the advantages of the division of labour with a vividness and insight which even Adam Smith might have envied.
| Year | TOTAL VALUE SENT EACH YEAR. | BOMBAY, SURAT, AND PERSIA. | FORT AND BAY. | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value |
| 1689 | 3 | 1,878 | £ 21,404 | 2 B | 1,218 | £ 15,896 | 1 F | 660 | £ 5,508 |
| 1690 1691 | 5 | 1,078 | 801 | 1 B 1 S & F | 348 | 165 | Blank | ||
| 1692 | 6 | 3,285 | 180,925 | 2 S | 1,080 | 82,591 | 1 F | 200 | 701 |
| 1693 | 6 | 3,380 | 193,473 | 1 S 1 B | 1,400 | 79,591 | 1 | 670 | 38,665 |
| 1694 | 11 | 4,073 | 450,394 | 4 S 2 P | 1,363 940 | 105,255 108,573 | 1 F & B 1 Coast | 750 | 127,114 |
| 1695 | 4 | 1,585 | 212,786 | 1 S | 210 | 41,032 | 1 F | 720 | 90,062 |
| 1696 | 10 | 3,975 | 398,992 | 4 S 1 P | 1,550 780 | 218,788 47,229 | 1 F 1 for Spices | 575 90 | 61,558 1,766 |
| 1697 | 12 | 5,355 | 494,416 | 4 B 1 B & Mosoo } | 2,060 | 177,717 | 2 F | 920 | 56,177 |
| 1698 | 14 | 5,465 | 624,414 | 1 B 2 B S 1 C & S 1 P } | 1,720 450 | 200,619 40,653 | Blank | ||
| 1699 | 13 | 5,130 | 601,531 | 3 B | 1,600 | 169,744 | 2 F & St. Helena | 730 | 80,693 |
| 1700 | 12 | 4,600 | 682,898 | 3 B | 750 | 77,960 | 4 Fort Bengall 2 | 1,975 975 | 282,444 194,979 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Coast and Bay. | China. | Bencoolen. | St. Helena. | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value | No. of Ships | Tonnage | Total value |
| Blank | £ | Blank | £ | Blank | £ | Blank | £ | ||||
| Blank | Blank | 1 | 350 | 636 | Blank | ||||||
| 2 | 380 Madagascar and Bombay | Blank | |||||||||
| C & B | 2,005 | 97,633 | Blank | Blank | Blank | ||||||
| C & B | 1,310 | 75,217 | Blank | Blank | Blank | ||||||
| 1 B | 700 | 73,554 | 1 | 200 | 33,189 | Blank | 1 | 120 | 2,709 | ||
| C & B | 655 | 81,692 | Blank | Blank | Blank | ||||||
| F & B | 860 | 66,051 | Blank | 1 | 120 | 3,600 | Blank | ||||
| C & B 1 B | 975 7,501 | 142,189 53,574 | 2 | 650 | 64,759 | Blank | Blank | ||||
| C & B 1 B | 2,345 450 | 291,366 36,299 | 1 | 280 | 37,554 | 1 | 220 | 7,925 | and St. Helena | ||
| 4 B 1 C | 1,550 400 | 222,911 45,677 | 2 | 600 | 76,206 | 1 | 250 | 6,300 | Blank | ||
| Blank | 3 | 900 | 127,517 | Blank | Blank | ||||||
| 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
Notes
- 1. Instructions for Agent and Council of Bengal, January 1686.
- 2. 'We resolve to have you set upon the manufacturing those goods, and do order that you give encouragement to the Painters by taking off their hands all they make, and giving them full employment. . . . If you could produce fine Indigo, it will be a very noble Experiment, and yield good profit here.' MS. Letter Book, no. 10, p. 22, 26th Jan. 1698.
- 1. Bruce, Annals, vol. iii, p. 179.
- 2. Dispatch to Lt. General, Surat and Bombay, 27th Oct. 1693. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, p. 294.
- 1. 'It would be of mighty advantage to this Kingdom if the Court of Persia could be persuaded and prevailed with to let the Armenians bring all their silk for Europe by sea in our English shipping.' A dispatch, dated 25th Sept. 1691, says, 'We have not for many years past been served by any of the Agents, but if it please God to preserve the life of your own honest Agent, Mr. Gladman, we hope highly to improve that trade for the Publick Good of this Kingdom especially the trade of English Broad-Cloth'. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, India Office Record Dept.
- 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, dispatch to Persia dated 25th Sept. 1691.
- 3. Ib., p. 306.
- 1. Reply on behalf of the East India Company to a Paper of Complaints, commonly called Thirteen Articles, delivered by their Adversaries, to Members of House of Commons, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi, Bundle 1, containing documents of the period 1689–1700.
- 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, 24th May.
- 3. Ib.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, Persia, General, 6th June 1694, p. 375.
- 2. Ib., no. 10.
- 3. Ib.
- 4. Ib., no. 8, September 1686.
- 5. Dispatch to Bengal, 13th Feb. 1685.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 8, dispatch, January 1687, p. 245.
- 2. Childe's Letter, dated 22nd July 1692, Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. A. 303.
- 3. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, dispatch, 18th Jan. 1691. Compare the following: ‘You cannot send too many goods.’ They required 100,000 Romalls of all sorts in 1693. Coloured Ginghams were as popular as ever. ‘You cannot send us too many goods. At this time, you can send us nothing that will not turn to very good account, and therefore send us all you can meet with of any kind or sorts, named before, or others.’ Dispatch to Bengal, 10th April 1693, MS. Letter Book, no. 9. The popularity of Bengal Silk, and the remarkable increase in the sale of Indian commodities in England, come out strikingly in a dispatch to Bengal: ‘Bengal silk is the very best commodity that can now be sent from India, it being at an excessive rate, by reason of the obstructions which the present war hath given to the Turkey trade.’ Ib., Dispatch to Bengal, p. 297.
- 1. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34123, ff. 30–40.
- 1. Ff. 30–40.
- 2. Trade Reports from Fort St. George, 1678–95, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34123.
- 1. Manuscripts of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, 1695–7, Paper e. The Leeward Islands Papers, p. 20.
- 2. ‘Sindi and muslin goods are in the greatest request, and will turn to great profit here, if you can procure quantities of them.’ MS. Letter Book, no. 10, 6th April 1697, p. 567.
- 3. Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 3.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 10, 1698, p. 115.
- 2. Ib., no. 7, p. 154.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, dispatch to Surat, 20th May 1693.
- 2. Ib., no. 9.
- 3. Ib., no. 9.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
- 2. Reasons Humbly Offered against establishing by Act of Parliament, &c., Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 2.
- 3. MS. Letter Book, no. 10,
- 4. Ib., no. 10, p. 55.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 10, 26th Jan. 1698, p. 22.
- 2. Ib., no. 10, p. 22.
- 3. Ib., no. 10.
- 1. Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658. Compare: ‘The cargoe of Sarah Gally, arrived from China, July 1700; it contains a number of Lacquered Wares, and 16,005 Bales of Raw Silk.’ ‘The cargo of 4 ships, the Nassau, the London Frigatt, the Armenian Merchant, and the Amity in 1696 contained a number of Bengal goods.’ Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 2902, Fols. 146, 149.
- 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 8.
- 3. MSS. of the House of Lords, Inspector General's Account, vol. iv, New Series, p. 444.
- 1. Reasons Humbly Proposed for Asserting and Securing the Right of the subjects to the Freedom of Trade, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 2b.
- 2. Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi, 11th Oct. 1692.
- 1. Reply to Childe's Discourse of Trade, India Office Tracts, vol. 268, pp. 8–9.
- 2. Calendars of State Papers Domestic, William and Mary. There are several petitions.
- 3. Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 112.
- 4. MSS. of the House of Lords, Historical MSS. Commission. Appendix to the Fourteenth Report, part vi, vol. l, p. 370.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 8, dispatch to Bombay.
- 2. Ib., no. 9, List of Goods to be provided at the Bay for the Year 1696.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 10, p. 120, 28th Oct. 1698.
- 2. Ib.
- 1. Dispatch dated 28th July 1686, MS. Letter Book, no. 8, India Office Records Dept.
- 1. Surat General, MS. Letter Book, p. 415, dispatch dated 6th March 1695.
- 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
- 3. Dispatch dated April 1697, MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
- 4. Dispatch to Surat, 10th March 1698, MS. Letter Book, no. 10.
- 5. MS. Letter Book, no. 10, dispatch dated 20th Dec. 1699.
- 1. Court Minute Book, no. 37, 30th April 1697, India Office.
- 2. MSS. of the Duke of Portland, First Appendix to the XIIIth Report, Hist. MSS. Commission, vol. ii, p. 246, 20th Oct. 1696.
- 3. Report of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, to the House of Lords, MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. iv, 1699–1702 pp. 450–1.
- 1. Compare the following dispatch: ‘Their Majesties have obliged us, by the New Charter, by which we are obliged to send out greater value in Woollen Manufactures than we formerly did, and it is absolutely impossible to dispose of so great a quantity as we are obliged to send, considering the market that there is for these commodities in Persia; except we should send over quantity of cloth to India, sell part of it, and give away the rest, or suffer it to lie in the Godowns till it be eaten by white ants, and other insects, by which we have exceedingly suffered in India heretofore.’ Dispatch to Persia, 3rd Jan. 1694, MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
- 2. The Profit and Loss of the East India Trade considered, Brit. Mus., op. cit.
- 1. See Chapters I, II, and III.
- 2. Davenant's Complete Works, by Whitworth, vol. v, pp. 347–643. Whitworth's edition seems to me to be unsatisfactory. A number of pamphlets [p. 270] by Davenport have been left out, while the edition suffers from a lack of necessary notes, &c.
- 1. Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 3.
- 1. England's Almanac, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (92).
- 2. Printed in MacCulloch's Scarce and Valuable Tracts on Money, p. 247.
- 3. Thomas Prior, author of List of Absentees of Ireland, in Observations on Coin in General, in MacCulloch's Tracts on Money, pp. 391–8. A very remarkable pamphlet. It is vigorous, lucid, and accurate.
- 1. Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. A. 303, no. 134.
- 2. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. iv, p. 431; Davenant, First two Reports on Public Accounts, op. cit.
- 3. p. 455.
- 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, vol. iv, p. 91, 12th Feb. 1700.
- 2. Ib., vol. v.
- 3. Shaw, History of Currency, 1896, p. 231.
- 4. Shaw, op. cit., p. 22.
- 1. Childe, Supplement to the East India Trade, 1689.
- 2. Reasons for the East India Company’s sending out Twelve Ships to India, about the 15th of January next, 7th Dec. 1692, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 37.
- 3. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. x, pp. 541, 710, 711.
- 4. MS. Letter Book, no. 9, p. 439.
- 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 10.
- 2. Compare England's Almanac, Brit. Mus., op. cit.; A Short Abstract of the Case, &c., Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 11. ‘There are now gone to the East Indies and China 50 ships, computed at near 400 tons per ship, by a modest computation, reckoning to have carried with them 2 million sterling or £40,000 per ship.’ Compare the following with regard to the crews: ‘We have for many years had great complaints of the miscarriage of persons employed in your country ships, and others in the Permission Trade from Bombay, Surat, to Bengal. Your Country Commanders and other officers paying no respect to our Agent and Council, quarrelling and fighting with the Natives in their drink, giving great disturbance to our affairs, and raising the prices of goods.’ Dispatch to the Lt.-General of Bombay, 1st May 1693. MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
- 1. The Profit and Loss of the East India Trade Compared, Brit. Mus. 100. m. 46, pp. 10–12; Reasons Humbly offered for the passing a Bill, &c., Brit. Mus., 1697, p. 7. Compare the following: ‘As to our Exportation, it has been a great hindrance of our Exports to Holland and our West India Colonies, that we have enjoyed the one for 100 years, and the other for a long time. We had a very considerable Trade to those places in commodities made of Wool, Silk and Wool for Women’s Wear and Use, and that no European Merchant could ever get this trade from us, these being natural to England.’
- 2. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. iv, Report of the Commissioners, pp. 450–1.
- 3. Accounts Laid before House of Commons on Thursday, 13th Jan. 170 3/4. Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 3.
- 1. Davenant, Essay on East Trade, p. 22.
- 2. An Answer, &c., Brit. Mus., 816. m. 11 (91), no. 2; A Reply to a Paper delivered to the Rt. Honble the Lords, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 142; An Answer to the Most Material Objections of the Linnen Drapers, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 139.
- 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, vol. ii, New Series, pp. 242–3.
- 2. England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures, India Office Tracts, vol. lxxxiii, p. 11.
- 1. Reasons Humbly offered, British Museum.
- 2. England's Danger by Indian Manufactures, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 32.
- 3. Ib.
- 4. Queries, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (128); Querical Demonstrations, ib. (129).
- 1. Considerations relating to a Bill for Restraining the Wearing of India Wrought Silks, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (134).
- 2. Reasons Humbly offered for Restraining the Wear of Wrought Silks, op. cit.
- 3. MSS. of the House of Lords, vol. iv, p. 48.
- 4. Mr. Sheldon's paper, marked Q, MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, p. 49, 1st April 1696.
- 5. The Silk Weavers were specially bitter on the advantages the Company derived by its privileged position. It was, said a writer, the English that first set the Indians on that vast increase of Silkworms ‘and to that great excess they now are of Throwing, Dyeing, and Weaving, when both they and
- 1. Davenant, Essay on East India Trade; Eleven Queries Humbly [p. 282] Tendered, Brit. Mus.; An Answer to Mr. Carey's Reply, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 143; The Linnen Drapers' Answer, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 141; Reasons against Prohibiting, &c.; Five Queries Humbly Tendered Relating to the Bill, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13, no. 133; The Weavers' Twelve Queries Answered, Brit. Mus.
- 1. England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures; Reasons Humbly Tendered; A Brief State of the East India Trade, as it relates to other Branches of the British Commerce; A Reply to an Essay (by Davenant); Considerations relating to the Bill for Restraining, &c.; A Reply to a Paper; An Answer to the Most Material objections of the Linnen Drapers; The Linnen Drapers' Queries Answered. All these pamphlets are in the British Museum.
- 2. Essay on the East India Trade, p. 9.
- 1. In his Survey of Trade.
- 2. Dr. Davenant’s Accounts laid before the House of Commons, Jan. 1703.
- 3. Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (83).
- 4. A True Representation of the Manufacture of Wool, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (83).
- 5. A Second Humble Answer from the Poor Weavers to Ladies, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (84).
- 1. Compiled from a SUPPLEMENT by Childe, to his ESSAY, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 10122, pp. 3–49; Egerton MSS. 518.
- 2. To the Rt. Hon. the House of Commons and Lords, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (107).
- 1. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. xi.
- 2. Journals of the House of Lords.
- 3. Ib., 20th and 22nd Feb. 1697.
- 4. Lords’ Journal, vol. xvi, pp. 116, 128, 129, 132. Commons’ Journals, vol. xi, pp. 720, 742, 752, 755, 756. Compare the following account by William Fleming: ‘There is a Bill depending in our House for prohibiting the wearing of East India Silks, which should have been read yesterday, but the House being engaged in the Capitation Bill, it was put off till Monday week, too long a day if all our House were hearty for it, but many are not.’ 21st Jan. 1697. MSS. of S. H. Fleming, Appendix to the 12th Report, part vii, p. 346.
- 1. The Case of several thousand Poor of the Wool Manufacturers, ruined by the Printing and Dyeing of Linnens in England, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (87).
- 2. Compare A Reply to a Paper; Answer to Mr. Carey's Reply; Linnen Drapers' Answer to Mr. Carey; an Answer to the Material objections of the Linnen Drapers; Weavers' Twelve Queries Answered; Answer to some of the Linnen Drapers' objections. All of them are in the British Museum series known as 816. m. 13.
- 1. An Answer to some of the Linnen Drapers' Objections, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (143).
- 2. An Answer to the most material objections of the Linnen Drapers, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (139).
- 3. A Reply to a paper delivered to the Rt. Hon. the Lords, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 142).
- 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, p. 242.
- 2. Ib., April 1696.
- 1. ‘4, or 5,000 weavers’ wives, and great many joining with them,’ went down to the House of Commons on 21st Jan. 1697. Mr. Fleming called Massam, ‘who was coming behind him, to shut the door, which he did. Three,’ continues the narrator, William Fleming, ‘got by me, and two by him, but the rest I stopped, and satisfied to return. So we stopped their passage that way, and locked the lowest door. But they being got into the lobby, pressed so hard to go into the House that they had much ado to keep them out; the doors were forced to be locked up. . . . Those Members that had been against the Bill were in great fear, but those that were for it might pass and repass at pleasure.’ MSS. of S. H. Fleming, Appendix to 12th Report Hist. MSS. Comm., part vii, p. 346.
- 2. Luttrell, Brief Relation, vol. iv, p. 200; Macpherson, p. 158.
- 3. Observations on the Bill, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13.
- 4. A List of several sorts of Silks and Calicoes usually imported from the East Indies and prohibited by Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (132).
- 1. Davenant, Complete Works, by Whitworth, vol. v, containing his priceless Reports on Public Accounts, pp. 347-463.
- 2. Ib., pp. 430-1.
- 3. Ib., p. 33.
- 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, p. 44.
- 1. Reasons Humbly offered, pp. 20–1.
- 2. The Answer to the Most Material objections, op. cit.
- 3. See the Works of Butler cited in Chapter III.
- 4. Reasons Humbly offered, pp. 20–1.
- 1. England’s Danger by Indian Manufactures, Bodleian Library, op. cit.
- 2. Reasons Humbly offered, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 2.
- 1. An Answer to the Most Material objections against the Bill restraining the East India Wrought Silks, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 54.
- 2. Reasons showing that the Desires of the Clothiers will not be prejudicial to the Grower, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (92).
- 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, p. 52.
- 2. East India Company's paper delivered to the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, p. 52.
- 1. An Answer to Mr. Carey’s Reply, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (143).
- 2. Essay on the East India Trade, p. 16.
- 3. Ib., p. 53.
- 1. An Answer to a Late Tract, Brit. Mus. 8245. a. 15. See also the following replies to Davenant: England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures; Reasons Humbly Offered for the Hindering the Home Consumption of East India Silks.
- 2. Some Reflections on a pamphlet entitled ‘England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures’.
- 3. See Chapter II of this Thesis. For a discussion of the function of money, see my treatise on ‘Indian Banking and Currency’, 1920.
- 4. Some Reflections on a pamphlet entitled ‘England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures’.
- 5. Reasons, op. cit., pp. 8–10; India and England, op. cit.
- 6. Carey, Discourse concerning the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 8245. b. 14.
- 1. North, Discourse on Trade; MacCulloch's Early English Tracts, 1691.
- 3. Brit. Mus. 8224. c. 24.
- 2. Essay, &c., p. 53.
- 4. Brit. Mus. 11399. g. 4, pp. 16–31.
- 1. Considerations on the East India Trade; MacCulloch's Collection of Economic Tracts, pp. 549–629.
- 2. Simon Clemens, General Notions of Money, Trades, and Exchanges, Brit. Mus. 8224. c. 24, p. 15.
- 1. New Discourse of Trade, chap. ix, p. 152.
- 2. Discourse Concerning Coining, p. 34.
- 1. An Essay on Ways and Means, part I, chap. i, pp. 127–50.
- 2. Two Reports on Public Accounts, vol. v of Complete Works, pp. 379–80.
- 1. Davenant, Essay on the East India Trade, p. 35; The Weavers' Twelve Queries Answered, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (122). Compare the following: ‘The Encouragement of English Trade could be effected only by leaving the Trade free, and sheltering it against all Prohibitions.’ The Linnen Drapers' Answer to Mr. Carey, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (141).
- 2. Essay, p. 23.
- 3. MacCulloch, Collection, op. cit.
- Note. Notes : Blank means no ship sent in the year. Contractions : B, in column 5, means Bombay ; S, Surat ; and P, Persia. The same applies to columns 8 and 11.