The Expedition to Bombay

The English Factories in India, 1661–1664, William Foster, 1923 · from page 123 · about 46 minutes

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The treaty of 23 June, 1661, between the Kings of England and Portugal, providing for the marriage of the former to the sister of the latter, contained several stipulations bearing upon English interests in the East.1 By a secret article appended to the treaty, King Charles undertook to negotiate a satisfactory peace between Portugal and the United Provinces, and, in the event of the latter refusing to make terms, an English force was to be sent to the East Indies to defend the Portuguese territories there against the Dutch. By the eleventh article, with a view to this contingency and for the improvement of English commerce in the East, the Portuguese monarch ceded the port and island of Bombay with all its rights, profits, territories, and appurtenances, and covenanted to yield possession thereof with all convenient speed, with the proviso that the inhabitants should be permitted to remain and to enjoy the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion. By the twelfth article, English merchants were guaranteed the same privileges of trade at Goa, Cochin, and Diu as the Portuguese themselves ; but not more than four English families were to be resident at one time in any of those places. Further, by the fourteenth article, it was agreed that, should the English sovereign at any time recover from the United Provinces any towns or territories which had formerly belonged to Portugal, the latter power would lay no claim to them ; also that should Portugal recover Ceylon, the port of Galle should be ceded to Great Britain ; while if the English should obtain possession of that island, they should make over Colombo to the Portuguese ; in either event the cinnamon trade was to be equally divided between the two countries. To the attentive student of the records of the previous years it might appear that the cession of Bombay was due either to solicitation on the part of the British Government, inspired by the East India Company, or to pressure brought to bear upon the government at Lisbon by the authorities of Portuguese India, alarmed at the relentless encroachments of the Dutch, whose progress it seemed impossible to stay without foreign aid. As a matter of fact, either conclusion would be wrong. To the second a contradiction is supplied by the opposition that was offered in the East to the actual transfer; while, as regards the first, not only is material corroboration lacking, but all the evidence available points the other way. It is true that the Surat factors, exasperated by the treatment they had received at the hands of the Mogul authorities, had some time before urged upon their employers the desirability of securing a stronghold on the western coast, and had even opened negotiations with the Government of Goa for the transfer of Bombay or some neighbouring station for that purpose; while the Company at home had approached the Protector on the subject. But there is no evidence that representations had been made to King Charles upon the point; and indeed Bombay hardly fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Company (see the previous volume, p. 321) that the spot to be made the English head-quarters should be so situated ‘that trade from India might bee brought and drawne downe thereunto’, and that it should be ‘able to defray its owne charge’. There was no reason to think that the island of Bombay would yield at once sufficient revenue to pay the charges of maintaining fortifications and a garrison; while the mainland opposite offered small prospect of trade in itself and was too rugged and too exposed to the depredations of Sivāji’s troopers to encourage the hope that it could be made a channel of commerce. As a matter of fact, in the autumn of 1661 the Company was sounded by Lord Clarendon as to whether it was disposed to take over Bombay, or at least to bear part of the charge; but the Committees decided (Court Minutes, &c., 1660–3, p. 137) that it would not be advantageous to adopt either course, and so they respectfully declined. And again, in November, 1667, when they at last agreed to accept its transfer, they assured the Treasury Commissioners ‘that, if the Portugalls had offered them this island before His Majestie was possessed thereof, the Companie would not have accepted it’.

The real origin of the cession of the island is clear enough. Apart from the matrimonial alliance, which was a long-cherished scheme of the Queen-Regent of Portugal, that country had urgent need of support in its hard struggle against Spain and the United Provinces ; and such support King Charles was ready to give, at all events against further aggression on the part of the latter country. Not only was there in England a feeling of jealous alarm at the growth of Dutch commerce and Dutch sea power, which seemed a threat to the national security, but in addition there was special cause for apprehension in the progress made by the Hollanders in their attacks upon the Portuguese possessions in India. Should these succeed—and there appeared to be little doubt that they would—the Dutch would acquire a complete monopoly of the spice and pepper trade in the East, and the English share in that branch of commerce would be menaced with destruction. Portugal, therefore, was ready to bid high for an English alliance, and for this purpose territorial concessions seemed the most attractive bait. For some time it was rumoured that Goa itself—nay, all the Portuguese possessions in India—were to be ceded. Lord Winchilsea, touching at Lisbon on his way to Constantinople, wrote in November, 1660, to King Charles that Tangier (which was important for the security of English trade in the Mediterranean) was almost sure to be offered ; while to the Lord Treasurer he expressed the opinion that the cession of the Portuguese rights in Ceylon (which could then easily be recovered from the Dutch, either by treaty or conquest) would be of more value than Goa or any other place in India itself.1 Probably, however, the cession of Goa was not seriously considered. It would have been hard to reconcile Portuguese sentiment to such a loss, and moreover the control and defence of so large a slice of territory would have entailed a serious burden on the English Government. All that they really needed was a base in Indian waters, from which effective assistance could be given to the Portuguese, if required ; and for this Bombay appeared to be entirely suitable.

It may be mentioned in passing that the necessity for England to interfere actively in the war was obviated by the conclusion of a peace between Portugal and Holland within a few weeks of the signature of the Marriage Treaty. Had ratification followed quickly, the Portuguese might have been spared the loss of Cochin and Cannanore; but it was not until May, 1662, that the treaty was ratified at Lisbon, and then the Dutch delayed their ratification until the December following, with the result that the news did not reach Batavia until June, 1663.1

Preparations for taking possession of Bombay went on during the closing months of 1661, and on 27 December a committee of the Privy Council, headed by the Duke of York, was formed to look after ‘all affayres relating to Bonne Bay in the East Indies’ (Privy Council Registers, vol. lv. p. 506). The question of the exact limits of the new acquisition, as intended by the treaty, became later the subject of acute controversy; but clearly it was understood in London that the cession comprised not only the island on which Bombay was situated, but also the larger one to the northward, known as Salsette Island. Aungier (infra, p. 134) says that a map, showing all this territory as ceded, was delivered to King Charles during the negotiations; and Pepys, on the authority of Capt. Minors, declares that the Portuguese ‘made the King and Lord Chancellor, and other learned men about the King, believe that that and other islands which are near it were all one piece; and so the draught was drawn and presented to the King, and believed by the King and expected to prove so when our men came thither; but it is quite otherwise’ (5 September, 1663). Further confirmation of the statement as to the map2 is supplied by the letter to the Portuguese ambassadors of 25 July, 1663, referred to on a later page. Moreover, from the instructions given in August, 1661, to Sir Richard Fanshaw, who was about to set out for Lisbon as English ambassador, it appears that King Charles had sought to obtain in addition the town of Bassein, which guarded the channel running round the northern side of Salsette Island and so past Trombay into Bombay Harbour. The passage is as follows:

You shall very earnestly press that Bassine may likewise be put into our hands, which we insisted on in our demand, and understood by the answer made to us that the ambassador had had power committed to him to have consented to the same, but he protesting against having any such power prevailed with us to leave the same out of the treaty. Therefore you shall confer freely with him upon it and let him know that we depend upon him still to assist us in the procuring thereof; and in the managing those instances you shall govern yourself by his advice, and if he doth wish that you should for the present suspend any such demand, as presuming that it cannot be reasonable or effectual, you shall forbear it accordingly.1

For the post of governor of the island and commander of the troops sent thither, the choice fell upon Sir Abraham Shipman, of whose previous career little is known, save that he had served on the royalist side in the civil war.2 To provide the garrison, four new companies were raised, to be commanded respectively by Shipman himself, Col. John Hungerford (third son of Sir Anthony Hungerford), Capt. John Shipman, and Capt. Charles Povey. Sir Abraham was paid 2l. per day, Col. Hungerford 12s., and the other two officers 8s. each. All four received a pound for every man enlisted. Each company had seven subordinate officers, two drummers, and a hundred privates (at 9d. a day each). There was a small detail of artillery attached to each company, besides a chaplain, surgeon, &c., for the whole force. Out of compliment to the house of Braganza, the uniform had sea-green facings.3 To meet the expenses of the force a Treasury warrant was issued on 4 March, 1662, for the payment to Shipman of 10,907l. 4s., which, with 1,200l. previously assigned to him, was estimated to be sufficient to provide eighteen months' pay for all concerned (Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660–7, pp. 372, 375).

Sir Abraham Shipman was provided with a commission from King Charles, appointing him

Governor and Commander in Cheife in and upon Our said Island of Bombay, and of all Our forts and forces raised and to be raised there for Our service, either in the said island or in any other island or part of the firm land in the East Indies, which shall be either conquered by us or be rendred and delivered up to us.1

Of the instructions given to him at the same time we have only a copy2 (made in 1677) from the original draft, which was partly drawn up by Lord Clarendon. Shipman is directed upon arrival to demand and receive the island, ‘with the artillery, amunition, &c.’, and thereupon to put the fortifications into order, and to administer the oath of allegiance to the inhabitants. The document proceeds:

Our maine design in putting Our selfe to this great charge for making this addition to Our dominions being to gain to Our subjects more free and better trade in the East Indies, and to enlarge Our dominions in those parts and advance thereby the honour of Our Crown and the generall commerce and weale of Our subjects, you are with all convenient speed and advice to make use of the best ways and means for incouragment and invitation of Our subjects and strangers to resort and trade there; and you are especially to give all manner of incouragment, helpe, and assistance to the subjects of the King of Portugall in the East Indies, and to protect them, as much as in you lyeth, in their trade and navigation there. You are also to keep a very good correspondance with the Vice King of Goa and all other Portugall Governors, and likewise with the natives of the country, and to do all you can to settle a trade amongst them. . . . You are to give such encouragment as securely you may to such natives and others as shall submit to live peaceably under Our obedience and in due submission to the government of the island; and you are to suffer them to enjoy the exercise of their own religion without the least interuption or discountenance.

Shipman’s force was to be conveyed to Bombay by a squadron of the royal navy, consisting of the Dunkirk, the Mary Rose, the Leopard (a frigate of 44 guns), the Convertine (of 40 guns, captured from the Dutch in 1651), and the Chestnut (a 12-gun pinnace). The command of this squadron was given to James Ley, third Earl of Marlborough, whose earlier career will be found in the Dictionary of National Biography. As the royal treasury was in its usual state of depletion, an arrangement was negotiated with the East India Company, by which that body undertook to victual the ships and to lade them at Surat for the return voyage with merchandise, for which freight was to be allowed at the usual rates. If the amount of freight money thus earned for the government should be less than the sum advanced by the Company, the latter was to be allowed to deduct the difference out of its payments for customs (Calendar of Dom. State Papers, 1660-1, p. 440).

Some apprehension was felt lest the authorities at Goa should refuse to honour the draft made upon them from Lisbon; and it was therefore arranged between the two courts that a fresh Governor or Viceroy should be sent out in the English fleet (Lord Clarendon's autobiography, vol. i. p. 445). The personage chosen for the post was Antonio de Mello de Castro, and the vessel detailed for his conveyance from Lisbon to India was the Leopard, commanded by Captain Richard Minors.1 The instructions2 given (24 January) to Lord Marlborough by the Duke of York (as Lord High Admiral) included an injunction to use force, if necessary, to secure the landing of the Viceroy at Goa. The rest of the document was occupied by the usual directions as to the maintenance of discipline, &c.; and it was laid down that, in the event of Marlborough's death, the command of the squadron was to devolve upon Arnold Brown, the captain of the Dunkirk.

The voyage out, which commenced on 6 April, 1662, was chiefly marked by the inability of Marlborough's ships to keep company. As already mentioned, when Oxenden reached Madeira, he found there only the Dunkirk and the Mary Rose. On the voyage being resumed, the latter dropped behind; but on the other hand, the Leopard joined company from Lisbon, with the Portuguese Viceroy3 on board, and the Dunkirk and she arrived at Johanna (Comoro Islands) on 11 August in safety. After waiting a week for the missing vessels, Marlborough decided to sail, fearing that otherwise he would lose the monsoon. Just before their departure, an unfortunate dispute arose with the Viceroy. The Portuguese had a grievance against the people of Johanna, who had, they alleged, robbed their factory; and De Mello de Castro took advantage of his presence there with two English ships to enforce an accommodation. This involved the surrender of 42 natives, who were claimed as Portuguese subjects, and Marlborough consented to allow these to be taken aboard the Leopard. The King of Johanna, fearing future trouble, asked for a written acknowledgement under the Viceroy's hand that he had received full satisfaction; and Marlborough, who felt some responsibility in the matter, seeing that the fear of his guns had been the chief reason why the islanders had acceded to the Portuguese demands, made this a condition of his undertaking the troublesome duty of carrying the native passengers. The Viceroy, however, stood upon his dignity and obstinately refused to give more than a formal receipt for the negroes, and that only under the hand of one of his officers. Lord Marlborough, on being appealed to, thought this ‘nott att all reasonable, in relation to the country people nor our selves’ (O.C. 2939), and intimated to De Mello de Castro that, unless he would comply with the demand, the passengers would be landed. The Viceroy ‘utterly refused to give any other discharge’, and thereupon ‘all the blackes were sett ashoare againe’, including (according to the Viceroy's account) some who had taken refuge in his cabin. De Mello de Castro was already nettled by the slights he considered that he had received from Captain Minors;1 and this last affront was deeply resented, although for the present he thought it best to make a show of keeping on good terms with Marlborough. Bombay was reached on 18 September, 1662.2 Lord Marlborough was now in a difficulty. There was no sign of the Mary Rose with Sir Abraham Shipman, who alone was commissioned to demand the transfer of the island; but it seemed undignified to wait indefinitely, and, moreover, Marlborough was impatient to be gone. He therefore decided to ask the Viceroy to make over the place at once to Col. Hungerford, Shipman's second-in-command. This request De Mello de Castro refused, with every show of justification. The English admiral had no credentials to produce, and the Viceroy's instructions were to require a letter from King Charles, specifying the person to whom the surrender was to be made.1 De Mello de Castro had thus a good excuse for declining Marlborough's request; and, apart from his own feelings of resentment, he had an urgent reason for adopting this course, in the strong objections entertained by his countrymen at Bombay to the proposed surrender. The Portuguese in India—many of whom were half-castes, while others never expected to see Portugal again—were very lukewarm in their patriotism, and were disposed to question the right of the Lisbon authorities to make over any part of their territory without their consent.2 Bombay had valuable possibilities as a port, and the island was well populated and fairly flourishing. Its Portuguese landowners were naturally up in arms against the proposed surrender; while the ecclesiastics backed them up by representing the wickedness of handing over Catholics to a Protestant power. At Goa, it is true, there was a party in favour of the cession, which would, it was hoped, secure English help against the Dutch, whose operations to the southwards were causing much alarm; but the influence of this party was not strong enough to overcome the opposition.

We turn now to the accounts given in the records of these events. The first is contained in a letter from Lord Marlborough at Bombay to Sir Geo. Oxenden, dated 26 September, 1662: Wee sett sayle from Johanna the 21th of August.... The 18th instant wee came to an ancor here. Not to trouble you or my selfe (who am not very well) with all the perticulars, it shall suffice for the present to tell you that all the art or contest I could use could not perswade the surrender of this paltry island (most basely deserted to the Arabians the last yeare1) till the arrivall of Sir Abraham Shipman; the cause pretended [was] want of a sufficient power given to Col. Hungerford in case of Sir Abrahams miscarriage or absence. Where the fault will light, I know not; the burthen and trouble, I am sure, will come most to my share for the present. I would have landed the souldiers, to have here expected the arrivall of Sir Abraham Shipman, but the souldiers would not land without theire armes, which is denyed by the Vice Roy; so as I am forced to take the souldiers on board againe. And for soe much as the Vice Roy hath declared that he cannot open the letters directed to the Governors of India,2 I am resolved to goe for Goa and deliver those letters; as alsoe the rather for that our men fall sick apace in this roade, neither can wee gett any thing worth the having for our money. I will dispatch from Goa with all hast, and call in here, as I come up, to see if Sir Abraham Shipman be come, and likewise to receive your advise upon the returne of this messenger; resolving to cause Mr. Nowell [see p. 106] to stay here for that purpose, as alsoe that with him I may safely leave such orders as are fitt for mee to give to any of the fleete that may happen to come to this place in mine absence; for there is none that I dare trust upon this place, being such as I feare to our cost wee shall find them.... I would I were with you, or at least from hence, where I can neither eate nor drincke. Our men alsoe fall downe apace.

By the same conveyance went letters from Captain Brown, of the Dunkirk (dated 20 September), and from Gerald Aungier (26 September), giving further particulars. The former, after describing the voyage from Johanna, wrote:

Our admirall was pleased, a while after wee ankored, to goe aboard the Leopard to give the Governour1 the welcome to the port, and to declare to him the reason of our comming to the port was his orders led him hither to receive the island for His Majestys of Englands use by his souldiers, befor [he] proceeded for Goa ; therefore desired he would take it into consideration and take course that the island might bee speedily delivered, that wee might further prosecute our voyage to Goa. But to that (as I understood from My Lord) he gave little satisfaction, saying that he could doe nothing till he was seated in his power at Goa, yett he would speake with the Governors of the places here adjacent. Since which time he hath [done] nothing, butt delayed us ; and hath gott things from aboard the Leopard, and now resolves not to goe to Goa with us, pretending that he hath order from the King of Portingall to visitt those northerne factoryes, and therefore (being here now) he will stay to finnish that worke. . . . This time of our being here I have, by order of our Admirall, employed in sounding and discovering this island of Bombay ; which was most strangely represented to His Majesty our gracious King, with presumption that it conteyned from the bay to the north as farr as the entrance of Bassine, as alsoe to the east all Trombay etc. to the said entrance ; but we find it much contrary, for that that space containes three islands distinctly, vizt., Tanna, the northernmost (next to Bassine), which is the biggest :2 the next to that is Salsett, upon which is the harbour of Trombay, and is a good island : but the island of Bombay lyes not more then nine miles north and south, and narrower east and west, and is about 22 miles in circuite, a faire channell parting it from Salsett. A draught of which I shall make bould to present Your Worship, God sending me to see your face at Surratt. I am heartily sorry to see our expectations soe much shortned by this ; butt more that wee are not like peaceably to enter upon this, nor to land our souldiers in any equipag, through the pride of a perfidious Portingall.

Aungier's account was as follows :

His Lordship made a formall demand of the place, according to articles, the same day wee arrived. The Viceroy spent five dayes in consultation, and at last after many triviall and insignificant pretences, his result [i. e. resolution] was this, that his instructions out of Portugall1 ordered him not to surrender the place without His Majestie of Englands immediate letter, confirmed by his owne hand and seale; adding, morover, that his order was, though Sir Abraham Shipman were arrived with the Kings letter, not to deliver possession before the moonzoone were ended. The first My Lord could but conclude as prudentiall enough, and Your Worship may imagine what answer hee had to make, being soe ill provided (by whose fault I dare not censure) of such authenticke letters and necessary instructions in case Sir Abraham Shipman should not timely arrive. My Lords next demand was that the soldiers in the interim might bee received a shore; to which His Excellencies peremptory answer was that they might come a shore to refresh themselves, but without their armes, and gave this for his reason, that his men aboard the Leopard were not suffred to wear their armes. This pretence (considering the miserable condition of the place and people, the weakness and malice of the argument, and the necessity of delivering the fort to us according to articles) gave My Lord some disturbance. However, being willing to loose noe more time and to comply with the present conjuncture, hee makes this proposall: that the Vice Roy should assigne to the Collonell and soldiers some convenient place, and quarters sufficiently capable of such a nomber of men, wherein they might have roome to exercise their arms, and that, in case any of the soldiers were taken out of the circuit with their armes about them, they might justly bee punished as hee thought good. To this My Lord has received yet noe positive answer, though it bee two dayes since he sent it; soe that at present wee cannot divine what the issue of this affaire will prove. The want of the Mary Rose and Convertine, and espetially Sir Abraham Shipmans orders, putting us all to a stand; so that My Lord is not yet able to resolve what course to take. But I find him inclined to spend some five or six daies more here, in expectation of the ships... and afterwards to fall downe to Goa with the Leopard. But which gives him the greatest disturbance is that the place doth not answer our Kings expectation by four-fifths of what was represented to him; for by the draught which was delivered to His Majestie Bombay, Salsett, and Tanna were included all in one island and all under the name and royalty of Bombay; but Capt. Browne and myselfe, having sailed round this island, doe find it farr otherwise, being in extent scarce one-fifth part of the other two islands, and this is all the Portugalls intend to surrender at last to us; which how it will bee resented in England, I leave Your Worships wisdome to conjecture....

There was nothing to be done but to await the arrival of the Mary Rose with Sir Abraham Shipman. That vessel made her appearance early in October; and Shipman promptly delivered to the Viceroy a letter from King Charles and exhibited his own commission. De Mello de Castro had now no refuge save in quibbling over the validity of Sir Abraham's credentials.1 Writing to him on 5 October, he expressed surprise that the form of these documents should differ from that of those sent to Lisbon and Tangier, and pointed out the following 'defects':

First, that the letter from His Most Serene Majesty of Great Brittan is not subscribed by the Secretary of State, as in Portugall the custome is (without which noe buisnese can be dispatched). Secondly, Your Lordships pattent is not subscribed by the hand of His Most Serene Majesty of Great Brittan, without which, according to the expresse lawes of Portugall, it can have noe force nor power, neither is to be obeyed by any; yea, he is to be punished that giveth obedience thereunto. Thirdly (which is of the greatest consequence), Your Lordship hath not produced any procuration from His Most Serene Majesty of Great Brittan, which ought to be incerted in the instrument to be made upon the surrender of the island, as ... was soe ordered by the instructions of the King my master ... and since this is an especiall clause, upon supposition whereof the King my master hath ordered the delivery of the island, it not appeareing, there is none can doubt that the power to make the surrender is not in me. Wherefore I desire Your Lordship to defferr the receiveing of actuall possession untill such time as a procuration from the Most Serene King of Great Brittan may in due time be brought hither, which, being acknowledged by the Secretary of State at Lisbon, will easily dispell these clouds of doubts. In the meane time I doe promise, in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Brittan, to preserve this island to be hereafter delivered, either to Your Lordship or any other who shall bring the procuration executed in manner as is aforesaid; and upon this condition onely I doe constitute my selfe his Governour, in the same manner as if I had bene actually constituted by His Most Serene Majesty of Great Brittone. And this is all that I can doe in this affayre.

This was of course the merest chicanery. As we have seen, the Viceroy's instructions were to ask for credentials from the English King and to make over the island to the person named therein. Shipman had produced a letter from King Charles to the Viceroy, which gave the necessary information, but De Mello de Castro affected to regard this as a private communication, and demanded the production of a formal procuration. Evidently his intention was to create as much delay as possible, and it was probably with the same object that he inserted the stipulation that the formal procuration should be certified by the Secretary of State at Lisbon. At the same time he was evidently uneasy as to the light in which his action would be viewed by his sovereign, who, as he doubtless knew, was sincerely bent upon fulfilling the conditions of the marriage treaty. To the latter he wrote a long apology, dwelling upon the wrongs he had received from the English and the alleged deficiencies in Shipman's credentials; arguing also that the treaty did not contemplate the transfer of the island until peace was concluded with the Dutch, or absolutely refused by them. He declared that Bombay was 'the best port Your Majesty possesses in India, with which that of Lisbon is not to be compared'; that the English would force its Catholic inhabitants to change their religion; and that the loss of the island would have the most serious consequences for the trade of Portuguese India. In conclusion, he urged that the English claim should be compromised by a money payment (up to a million crusados), asserting that Portuguese India would gladly assist in finding the necessary funds1. The Viceroy also addressed letters to King Charles and Queen Catherine, complaining bitterly of the treatment he had experienced at the hands of Lord Marlborough and Captain Minors, recommending the promotion of the master of the Leopard (who alone had been kind to him), and explaining the impossibility of handing over Bombay in the absence of a formal procuration (Public Record Office: C.O. 77, vol. viii. nos. 137–40).

Thus rebuffed, Marlborough and Shipman decided to quit Bombay, where their continued presence would be at once humiliating and purposeless. Shipman resolved to proceed in the Leopard to Goa, to see whether a more favourable answer could be obtained there; and Marlborough concluded to take the Dunkirk and Mary Rose, with the soldiers, to Swally. The sequel is thus related in the President and Council's letter to the Company of 30 November, 1662:

When wee had proceeded thus farr in our advice, came newes of the Dunkirks arrivall to the Barr foote. It was the 18 October, and the 19th in the evening wee repair'd to the Marine and went aboard to give the Lord Marleburgh a vissitt; and were informed he was quit[e] cast off by the Vice King etc. and were not suffered to land his souldiers, upon pretence that the instrument and letter designed to that purpose by the King of Portugall weer defective and that they could not surrender the island upon such lame consignements. The inclosed letter to your President from My Lord, and the Vice Kings to Sir Abraham Shipman, will give you their last result [i. e. resolution]; by which perceiveing nothing would prevaile, [he] left the place and repaired hither, to refresh his sick men and take in provisions to enable him to comply with his commission in saileing to the Morutious [Mauritius] and English Forrest1 to land his souldiers, keepeing on his way directly for England for further orders. Soe that, although the Hopewell mett them at Bonbay and delivered our letters, yet neither in the one nor the other could wee be complied with, that is, either the ships refraineing to bring up their land men hither or My Lord in the Dunkirk to saile to Curwarr, or send the Mary Rose to take in the goods there, according to directions; but they are both come up, and declare that they are enjoyned to follow commission and that, whilst they cannot dispose of their souldiers, they are not to entertaine any other employment. Sir Abraham Shipman is gonn downe in the Leopard, upon an expression the Vice Roy used that they could not make any surrender, but if the Governors at Goa were willing, hee would bee contented; and this, wee conjecture, is but a further delay, since it may very well bee beleived that they understand one another too well. . . . Which leads us to speak of the Leopard. The Lord Marleburgh hath sent her to Goa; wherein Sir Abraham is gon to take the Governours ultimate result what they will doe concerning the islands surrender; and My Lord saith that he can give us noe answer untill his returne. [So] that wee are much perplext what to doe in your behalfe. If wee draw back (though not totally desist) our provision, and they should afterwards present themselves to bee laden, wee feare what would follow, through the time lapst that they were by articles to resigne themselves. And on the other side, if they should bee forst, in complyance to their commission, to carry the men to the islands, they would be able to take in noe goods; and in such a case you may bee great sufferers by those vast quantities of goods that will necessarily remain with us dead stock.

Fryer tells us (New Account, p. 63) that Marlborough put his soldiers ashore upon the sands at Swally, but did not himself leave the Dunkirk. The former statement is borne out by a passage already quoted at p. 108, and by an entry in Shipman's accounts, which shows that he paid 6l. as compensation for a house at Swally accidentally set on fire by one of his soldiers.

From an account written by Aungier and Gary of their proceedings at Goa (where their attempts to hire out the Leopard to the Portuguese came to nought) we learn that Shipman arrived there on 10 October and at once opened up negotiations with the Governors, but did not succeed in obtaining an answer until twelve days later. When, however, it did come, it was eminently satisfactory. The Governors and their Council, less exposed than the Viceroy to local pressure, made no difficulty about giving their written opinion that the documents brought by Shipman were sufficient warrant for complying with his demand. With renewed hope, Shipman hastened back to Bombay in the Leopard. De Mello de Castro, however, was too deeply committed to change his attitude, and he obstinately maintained his former decision. Sir Abraham had no option but to continue his voyage to Swally, where he reported his failure to Marlborough and Oxenden.

The result of his negotiations is announced in a letter from the Surat Council to the Company of 8 December, 1662, which also carries on the story to that date:

My Lord with Sir Abraham not prevailing upon the Vice Roy and the more emanent inhabitants and owners of the island of Bonbay etc. (who indeed are the Jesuites more particularly and principally, as a place fittest for them to owne and be owners off, in respect of its fruitfullness and pleasantness), Sir Abraham resolved for Goa, if possibley the Governours (appointed by the King to governe that state) would better consider of the instrument and writeings brought from the King of Portugall; who declared them sufficient for the surrender of the island, acquainteing Sir Abraham soe much and also confirmeing what they had said under their hands to this new Vice Roy; which their oppinion was also signed by the Councell of Goa and other the more eminent inhabitants of the citty, reading the contents of the result to Sir Abraham before they closed it.1 With this Sir Abraham returnes back to Bonbay, perswadeing himselfe, from what the Vice King etc. had declared to him, that if the Governors at Goa were concenting and would signifie that the instrument brought out from the King of Portugall were sufficient, it should bee delivered up; but the event made it appeare mere delayes, for Sir Abraham was never the nerer, although hee did produce the Governors letters in his faviour. [So] that hee is also come up hither; where great debates hath binn, amongst the rest the attempteing Danda Rojapoore; but they were noe way willing too it, nor could they be perswaded. The reasons you will better understand at home. The next was how to dispose of the men in this their disapointment. That of transporting them to the Morutious and English Forrest (alias the island of Dom Maskarinous) appeared to them as casting them away. At last they have resolved and pitcht upon Anjedevah, that lyeth in the mouth of Carwarr. Which they were hardly brought too, but raither to continue their quarters here; against which wee strongly objected the jellosies of these people and their unwillingness that they should harbour here any longer. Unwilling they were to remove; but at last they were perswaded by the possitive comands of the Lord Marleburgh, to whome wee in your behalves are much obliged in his willingness to comply in all things that [tend?] to the accomidation of your affayres. Soe that the Leopard is to take them in with their provisions, and to put them a shore on the island.

The choice of Anjidiv was doubtless prompted by some one at Surat, where, as we know from the last volume (p. 332), this island had been at one time considered as one of the spots to which the Presidency head-quarters might be transferred; while its nearness to Goa may have commended it to Shipman as facilitating further negotiations with the Portuguese. The island was uninhabited, and, so far as the English knew, belonged to no one in particular. Lest, however, the King of Bījāpur should have any pretensions to it, the President and Council wrote (6 December) as follows to the factors at Kārwār:

Sir Abraham Shipman, the Comander in Cheife and Governor of the souldiers, is designed to wait the Kings orders for their future proceedings upon Anjedevah. Wee cannot immagine how any Governor or King under whome you live can possibly be offended at it. However, if any such thing shall arise, assure them there is noe ill intended them, but a principall good, and that by letters from your superiors you are required to assure them that the President and Councell intends to make it the most florishing port of India, and that wee doe intend to desert Surratt and bring all the trade thither. But this you must hint warily to one or two of the most emanent persons of them and noe more, encuradgeing them to expect great benifitt thereby.

This allegation that Oxenden and his Council contemplated making Anjidiv their head-quarters, in the near future is not, of course, to be taken seriously. It was merely to be used as a pretext for the temporary occupation of the island.

As we have seen, the Leopard left Swally on 12 December, 1662. From an entry in Shipman's accounts (P. R. O.: C.O. 77, vol. viii. nos. 125, 126) we learn that, before starting, he bought from Sir George Oxenden (for 40l.) a small sloop to be used in fetching provisions to the island.

What ensued is related in a letter from Captain Minors to Oxenden, dated in Kārwār Road, 22 December:

Wee arrived here two dayes since, and meeting with Mr. Masters aboard the Mary Rose (who was ready to saile for Surat), he gave Sir Abraham not only hopes but an assurance that Engediva would on demand be freely surrendred him. But his confidence raised us only to a fictitious Paradise; for Mr. Ball and Captain Middleton having since waited on the Governor of Carwarr (who is some miles up in the countrey) to receive his consent for Sir Abraham's landing with his people on the island, they are this noone return'd with a most unpleasant answer that the Governor will on no tearmes admit it, and if Sir Abraham but attempts it, he will with all his forces indeavour to destroy them, imprison your merchants ashore, and seize all their effects ; affirming that the Dutch have often and earnestly solicited him by letters and messengers, courted him with presents, to get it into their possession, but he would never condiscend thereto. So that now wee are in a very great perplexity, not knowing how to dispose of the souldiers, some of whom are allready dead, many others sick, and doe much pester and annoy the shipp. God preserve us from an infection in this hot bay. This disappointment is a great remora1 to our future proceedings, wee being not at present in a capacity to fit our ship for to saile from hence, till My Lord arrives and eases us of the souldiers ; which wee must patiently attend, it being not possible at present to prosecute your instructions in going for Porca ; which is no fault of mine.

This letter, with another from Shipman to Lord Marlborough, was sent on by Gary from Goa on 27 December, with a short note, saying that John Child, who had brought the packet from Kārwār, was on his way to Surat in a Portuguese vessel, which would carry him as far as Chaul. And here we must break off the narrative for the present, though it may be well to record Gary's views of the situation, as given in two letters (31 December, 1662 and 12 January, 1663) to some personage in London, extracts from which are preserved at the Public Record Office (C. O. 77, vol. ix. nos. 29 and 41). In the first, which was written from Goa, he says :

Bombay hath not bin delivered upp by this new Vice King, Antonio de Mello de Castro, though both the old Governors, vizt. Lewis de Mendouza Furtado and Don Pedro de Lancaster, etc. Councellours of this State, were cleerely for it. But soe farr as I cann understand by information received from many of the principallest fidalgos, with whom I converse daily, the reason that there was noe render made for His Majesties use was (they say) because My Lord of Malberough did not assist them with the fleet under his command for the succor of Cochine, which att present is very streightly beseidged again by the Hollander with 23 tall shipps by sea and 5,000 men by land, who batter it from three severall quarters night and day, they having attempted severall times to take it by storme, but were allwaies valliantly repulsed by the beseidged, who have a most brave and gallant gentleman to their Governor, whose name is Ignacio Sarminto Carvalho, my extraordinary greate freind. But I find by discourse held with the Vice King himself that hee is very much disaffected to our nation in generall and extreamly to Capt. Richard Minors in perticular, pretending not onely to have received ill usage from him whilest hee was on board His Majestys shipp Leopard, but that soe long as hee was in hir hee was afraid of his life, having bin told by somebody in the shipp that the Captain threatned to cutt of his head. That there happned severall differences in the terme of the voyadge between him and the shipps company I heard long before my departure from Surratt; but I am very confident that Capt. Minors is so civill a person and so discreet that hee would never utter any such speeches or use any menacyes as the Voice Roy saith hee did; though I beleive there hath not those bin wantinge on board to doe many badd offices between them, espetially one Anthony Archer, master of the shipp, a verie drunken and desulute man, who most part of the voyage from England did upon severall occasions insinuat many things unto the Vice Roy, telling him all that ever hee heard the Captain say, and many things else out of his own capricio and fancy; for which unworthiness, in my poore judgment, hee deserves to bee seveerely punished. I had not said much of these passages, were it not for that I heard the Vice Roy say that hee would write a letter of complaint against Capt. Minors unto His Majesty, concluding his discourse att that time thus in his own language: Sabera o Capit. Minors que eu sou vassale del Roy de Portugall, e nao estow escravo: Capt. Minors shall know that I am the King of Portugalls subject and not outlawed.1 I understand that hee hath dispeeded an expresse overland with letters to the King of Portugall with his weake reasons for his not delivering upp of Bombay, complayning also against My Lord of Malberough; but I hope, Sir, that, you being preadvised of his evill intentions, you may use some meanes to prevent or att leastwise mitigat His Majesties displeasure (in case of any) against the aforesaid Capt. Minors.2 It is most certain, and therefore not to bee questioned, that the Jesuits of Bandora3 (a place neare adjacent unto Bombain) and the fidalgos of Bagain4 (or Rassin) have carryed a greate stroake with Antonio de Mello de Castro in disswading him to deliver upp Bombay for His Majesties use, they being timorous that His said Majesty, through his vicinitie to them, might in a short space of time make himself master of the said places, which with Caranja 1 (an island in Bombay lying southerly) are the most beneficiall places belonging to the King of Portugall, Bagain yeilding greate quantity of sugars, and the island of Salsett (on which Bandora stands, next adjoyning to Bombay a little northerly) is very fertill and yeilding extraordinary great quantities of rice and other graine, and Caranja much salt (a second St. Ollvall 2), insomuch that these three places are able of themselves to supplye all the ports and townes scituate upon the coast of [Portuguese] India with corne, sugar, and salt. I must confess that Bombain of it selfe will yeild His Majesty little benefitt, because there is but little land belonging to it; and those that represented it in mapps unto His Majesty were not well acquainted with the scituation of it or what land belonged thereunto. But the port is famous and very commodious, and if the English doe settle there, noe question then but His Majesty will reape much benefitt by the customes that may bee raised, for then all the trade of Cambaja and Suratt will bee, with good management, soone drawne thither. If I am not mistaken, Capt. Arnold Browne hath made a draught of all the pretioned places very exactly, which is intended for to bee exposed to His Majesty and His Highness [i. e. the Duke of York] att My Lord of Malberoughs retourne and arrivall into England.

The second letter was dated on board the Leopard, off Anjidiv, and repeats the assertion that the Jesuits of ‘Bandora’ had bribed the Viceroy to withhold Bombay, the amount of the bribe being 40,000 zerafins. Gary promises to assist Shipman to the utmost of his power, as he is ambitious to do His Majesty ‘such service as that some notice might bee taken by him of it’. As for Bombay itself, it is of small value.

But that which our people understand to bee Bombain, in regard of the sound of the word Bombain, which they conster (though falsely) Good Bay (which indeed would bee soe were it called Bombaya), is a bay of att least 60 miles in circumference.

It reaches nearly to Thāna, ‘a towne where many silke stuffs and rare sc[r]utors and cabinets are made’; and on its brink stands a place called ‘Callian Biumdy’ [see p. 10], ‘where all the commodities of Hyndoss[t]an, Decann, and Gulcondah may bee brought downe more facilly and att farr lesser charge then to Surratt or Cambay’. So Bombay might be made very profitable to His Majesty, if he were to appoint some persons to manage the custom-house who are well acquainted with the country. Gary adds:

There came downe a Brahmin with My Lord from Suratt, sent thither to him by the inhabitants of Bombain and townes circumjacent to invite Sir Abraham Shippman thither with his souldiers, assuring him of their readyness to assist him with 1000 small shott, if hee would goe with him to make an attempt upon the place; those people being very much oppressed with the Portugezes that have dominion over them. But whither or noe any thing will bee done in it this yeare, in regard the sommer is allready farr spent, I cannot now resolve you.

These significant overtures are also mentioned in a letter from Sir George Oxenden to Lord Arlington of 6 March, 1665 (P. R. O.: C.O. 77, vol. ix. nos. 93, 101, 102):

When Sir Abraham Shipman first arrived to Bombaim, being informed that the Vice Roy would by no meanes deliver up the island according to the articles, they [i. e. the inhabitants] sent hither a Bramin (or one of their preists, unto whome they entrust their greatest secretts), who came in the name of all the inhabitants, both of Sallsett and Bombaim, to acquaint mee that, if wee would appeare there, they would deliver up the island in spight of the Portugalls, and likewise contrive it in that manner that there should not bee the losse of one mann; desiring, as a gratuity for this peece of service, onely that they and their children might bee free, and they would bee His Majesties most faithfull subjects; for that which most afflicts them is the tyranny of the Jesuites, who have brought them to that subjection that, when the father of a family dieth, what children hee hath are taken from their parents and brought up in the Jesuites colledges, never sufferring them to returne againe to their relations; which is a bondage very greivous to them.

Notes

  1. 1. An English translation of the treaty will be found in Materials towards a Statistical Account of Bombay, vol. i. p. 1 ; also in Sir George Forrest's Selections from the Bombay State Papers, Home Series, vol. ii. p. 367.
  2. 1. Report of the Historical MSS. Commission on the Finch MSS., vol. i. pp. 85, 86.
  3. 1. Batavia Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 236. The treaty is printed in Biker's Tratados, vol. iv. p. 80.
  4. 2. For a fruitless search for this map in 1677 see C.O. 77, vol. xiii. f. 125.
  5. 1. Report of the Historical MSS. Commission on the Heathcote MSS., 1899, p. 18. The instructions include also a suggestion that, if Fanshaw learns that Goa is besieged by the Dutch, he should propose that an English garrison be admitted, pointing out that this would secure the city from capture without impairing the sovereignty of Portugal.
  6. 2. For some particulars see Notes and Queries, series i. vol. vi. p. 419, series x. vol. iii. p. 197, and series x. vol. x. p. 1; also Calendar of Clarendon State Papers, vol. i. pp. 244, 310, 323.
  7. 3. The survivors of the corps formed the nucleus of the 1st Bombay European Regiment of Foot, which was in modern times the second battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The details given above are taken mostly from an article in Notes and Queries (series x. vol. x. p. 1) by Mr. Charles Dalton, based upon the pay lists and muster rolls in the Public Record Office (C.O. 77, vol. viii. nos. 125, 126).
  8. 1. P.R.O.: C.O. 77, vol. xiii. p. 129. This is a copy, made in 1677.
  9. 2. Ibid., p. 131. This and the preceding document have been printed in the Journal of Indian History, vol. i. pt. iii. p. 522. See also A Description of . . . Bombay, 1724, p. 7.
  10. 1. This was the man who had previously commanded for a time the garrison of Fort St. George (see the 1651-4 volume, p. 43, and the 1655-60 one, p. 33). A chance reference in the Batavia Dagh-Register, 1663 (p. 115), informs us that he was brother-in-law to Sir Edward Winter. Since neither married the sister of the other, they must both have married into the same Indian or half-caste family, probably in Madras. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Minors, in a petition to the King in 1669 (Cal. Dom. S. P., 1668-9, p. 229), spoke of his estate, house, and family as being in the East Indies.
  11. 2. Printed in full in The Times of 27 July, 1886. A MS. copy will be found in Home Misc., vol. 60.
  12. 3. It is convenient to use this title, though, as already explained (p. 99), De Mello de Castro was as yet only 'Governor'.
  13. 1. It may well be supposed that De Mello de Castro, considering the rank and dignity of his office, expected that he would be treated with as much deference as if he were being conveyed to his post, as usual, in a royal Portuguese galleon. No special instructions appear to have been given to Minors on the point; and to him, probably, the Viceroy and his suite of eighty persons were simply troublesome passengers, with far too exalted ideas of their own importance.
  14. 2. A Portuguese account of the voyage and of the subsequent negotiations up to [p. 131] December 1662 will be found at p. 3 of the third volume of Biker's Tratados. A brief narrative of the negotiations from the English side is given in P.R.O.: C.O. 77, vol. viii. no. 141.
  15. 1. See O.C. 3053-4, and Biker's Tratados, vol. iii. p. 38.
  16. 2. 'It is averred that Bombaim many years ago was granted by former kings of Portugal to the Jesuits and certain fidalgos as a reward for good services, and that the present king has therefore no right to make it over to another' (Batavia Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 183).
  17. 1. In a letter from Surat to the Company of 26 March, 1667, reference is made to the inhabitants of Bombay not having the courage to withstand ‘a few small vessails sent by the Arabs,’ but fled, leaving the place to be pillaged and ruined by fire, anno 1662’. The same incident is mentioned in Aungier's report of 15 December, 1673 (O.C. 3910): ‘About the midle or center of the fort is the Governors house, built formerly by the Portugalls, but was burnt by the Arabs of Muscat when they surprized and tooke the island from the Portugueze in anno 1661 [sic]. Soe that when the English tooke possession of the island there was litle more then the walls left; but since it cam into the Companies hands it hath bin much repaired.’
  18. 2. Luiz de Mendoça Furtado and Pedro de Lancastre.
  19. 1. De Mello de Castro. Bruce (Annals, vol. ii. p. 126), not understanding that the ‘Governor’ and the ‘Viceroy’ (of the factors’ letters) were identical, concluded that the Governor of Bombay ‘evaded the cession of the island’ and the Viceroy ‘refused to interpose his authority’ ; and this statement has been copied by later historians.
  20. 2. No justification can be found for treating the portion of Salsette which contains Thāna as a separate island.
  21. 1. For the Portuguese text of these see Archivo da Relação de Goa, by L. I. de Avranches Garcia, part ii. p. 531. An English version is printed in Materials towards a Statistical Account of Bombay, vol. i. p. 9.
  22. 1. Among the State Papers, Portugal, at the Public Record Office (vol. vi. f. 214) is a letter from Thomas Maynard, English Consul at Lisbon, saying that he had been shown by the Secretary of State there a paper containing the reasons given by the Viceroy for rejecting the English credentials. These were that in the first place the documents were clearly counterfeits, for the letter from King Charles had evidently been sealed only on the day of delivery, and moreover Marlborough's instructions referred to De Mello de Castro as Viceroy, though they were written nearly a month before he was appointed to that post; in the second place, Marlborough had refused to go to the aid of the Portuguese at Cochin, though assistance against the Dutch was as much a part of the treaty as the surrender of Bombay. Maynard added that he could not say whether these reasons were really given by the Viceroy or whether they were invented at Lisbon. The same letter states that the news of the cession of the island reached Chaul about two months before the English fleet appeared; 'at which the inhabitance of Chaul and Basaim murmured, saying the King of Portugal did not understand what a considerable place he parted with, and that he was deceived by his ministers; therefore they resolved to oppose the delyvery of it to the English, and to that purpose r[a]ise 500 men'.
  23. 1. See Biker's Tratados, vol. iii. p. 4; also Memorias sobre as Possessões Portuguezas na Asia, by G. de M. T. Pinto, ed. by J. H. da Cunha Rivara, p. 174. An English translation is given in J. G. da Cunha's Origin of Bombay, p. 245.
  24. 1. Referred to later by its Portuguese name of Dom Mascarenhas. It is now known as Réunion.
  25. 1. See also the Report of the Historical MSS. Commission upon the Finch MSS., vol. i. p. 243.
  26. 1. Hindrance (Port. remora).
  27. 1. ‘A slave’ is the correct translation.
  28. 2. Minors remained in the Royal Navy and was again associated with Lord Marlborough as his second-in-command on the Old James in the action with the Dutch in June, 1665, when the Earl was killed. Minors was court-martialled for his subsequent management of the ship, but was acquitted.
  29. 3. Bāndra, on the south-west corner of Salsette Island, nine miles north of Bombay city.
  30. 4. No doubt Gary wrote ‘Bazain’ and ‘Bassin’ (Bassein).
  31. 1. Karanja, on the mainland, south-east of Bombay harbour. It still produces much salt.
  32. 2. Setubal (St. Ubes), in Southern Portugal, the centre of a large export trade in salt.