Shipman at Anjidiv

The English Factories in India, 1661–1664, William Foster, 1923 · from page 214 · about 28 minutes

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SHIPMAN AT ANJIDIV, 1663

We have seen (p. 140) that in December 1662, Sir Abraham Shipman, with the bulk of the troops that had been sent out to form the garrison of Bombay, left Swally in the Leopard and Chestnut for Kārwār, with the intention of making the little island of Anjidiv his temporary quarters; and that for a time he was held up by the refusal of the Governor of Kārwār to permit him to carry out this plan. On hearing of this, Lord Marlborough proceeded to Kārwār with the Dunkirk, and under the protection of this force, Shipman’s soldiers took possession of the island, in defiance of the Governor’s prohibition. An account of these proceedings is contained in a report made to the Navy Commissioners by Captain John Stevens, of the Chestnut, in a letter dated 14 January, 1663 (P. R. O.: C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 2), who states that, on reaching Anjidiv on 27 December, 1662,

I found the infantry on shoare. I likewise landed mine; but nothing els was landed out of either shipp but what was necessary for the present, untill the arrivall [of] the Earle of Malbrough, which was the 11th instant. The 12th we landed most parte of our ammunition and provision; the 13th the remainer, and spread His Majesties colours upon the iland, [and] mounted six guns ashoare. The shipps discharged severall gunns, as likewise those on shoare. The circumference of the iland is not past two miles or thereabouts, but fortified both by nature and [the] industry of the Portugals. It affords very good water from the rocks in springs abundantly, and likewise a pond or tank made by hand in the iland, which will suffice thousands of people. For fire wood and other wood and long grasse to thetch withall it abounds, and doubtles will produce fruite, hearbs, and salletting, if planted, for there is good mould upon the iland.

A letter from Lord Marlborough to Oxenden of 14 January, 1663, found among the Oxenden Papers, says that on his arrival he found ‘as good as a warr’ between Minors and Shipman, the former protesting against his detention and the latter refusing to have any stores landed, ‘for that hee meant not to stay heere’, owing to the threats of the Governor of Kārwār. ‘I had an evill wellcome a board, and as bad thankes for my sending 6 gunns ashoare, with men of mine owne to mount them, as alsoe the boates mast for a flaggstaff. The ships carpenter had his pate broke ; others of my men well beaten and clapt upon the garde. Sir Abraham Shipman was in noe fault, but rather I or Capt. Browne, for sending a pipe of wine a shoare, which for the present hath made them all mad.’

Stevens’s account of Anjidiv may be supplemented from an illustrated article by Mr. F. J. Varley, I.C.S., published in the Geographical Journal for April, 1904.1 From this we learn that the island is a narrow one, about a mile long, practically inaccessible on the seaward side, though on the other, facing the mainland (which is about two miles away), it has two sandy bays and a good anchorage. Mr. Varley noticed that some of the guns on the old bastions were evidently of British origin, but he could find no trace of the graves of Shipman and his companions. As regards the history of the island, it appears that the Portuguese fortified it at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but deserted it soon after they established themselves at Goa. In 1682 they again took possession of it and raised the fortifications that still exist. For some time the island was used as a penal settlement. It remains the property of the Portuguese government, but only a tiny garrison is maintained, as the island is unhealthy.

By the Earl of Marlborough, who resumed his voyage for England as soon as possession had been taken of Anjidiv, Shipman sent a letter (10 January, 1663) to Sir William Morice, Secretary of State (P.R.O.: C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 1). In this, referring to his negotiations with the Portuguese Viceroy, he says:

I have sinc tryed him againe by another letter, but fynd him more obstinate then formerly . . . I fynd the Viceroy to be an utter ennemy to the English nation, and I am confident will doe no thing in the busines of Bombaim, although you should procure new orders from Portugall. Iff His Majestie intends to proceed any further about it, it must be by sending over more men. A thousand, added to those I have here, may make the King considerable in these parts, and will not only take Bombay but Salsett and other neighboring ilands, which will lardgely recompenc the damadges that they have put the King to; the Portugalls here being very mutenous, saying that there King gives them no protection, and therefore they will obey him no further then it stands with there owne intrest. The Jesuists are the men that governe here, and are owners of Salsett, the iland next adjoyning to Bombaim; which was th’ ocasion that we were not admitted to it, for they feared that, if we had that, there iland with the rest would soone fall into the English handes. Right Honorable, Bombaym and the ilands lying betweene [it and] Bursyne [i. e. Bassein] are the most fruictfull of all India, and supplyes all those parts with sugar, rice, coker nutts, and salt [and] some other manufactures. The harbour of Bombaim is the noblest that ever I see; the ayre healthfull, and is exceedingly well seated for trade, and would in two or three yeares undoe Surat by bringing hither all the trade. For the marchants liveing at Surat are under a very great tyranny, there mony being lyable to be taken away when the Magoll or his Governour pleaseth, and there persons abused. The customes in short tyme would be great.

Shipman then intimates that, if more men be sent, supplies of ammunition, pickaxes, &c. will be needed; also an engineer. ‘Otherwise I shall desyre that His Majestie will call me home.’

The Governor of Kārwār still remained hostile to the occupation of Anjidiv, except on his own terms. Writing to Oxenden on 26 January, Shipman said:

I have indeavoured by all meanes to gaine a peace with the Governor of Carwarre, but cannot obteine it upon any tearmes, unlesse I will admit 6 or 7 men of his to reside upon the island, to receive a custome upon all provisions that shall be brought into the island, and that I shall give him security to leave the island in two yeares time and not to fortifie it at all; none of which his proposalls can I consent to. I have presented him and his servants with about 50l., all which he still keepes and will agree to nothing but upon these condicions, which I can never consent to. Sir, you see into what a labarynth you and your Counsell have throwne me into, being so confident that wee should have his assistance and freindshipp and all things necessary for our sustentation and fortification; and now wee find neither; the raines approaching, and wee have got as yet neither timber nor workeman, nor know when wee shall. Now, if any inconvenience happens, either to the factors or factory [at Kārwār], you are to thank yourselfe.

In a bitter postscript he adds:

I know that you feared that wee might become a trouble to you, and so car’d not whither you sent us, so that you were rid of us. If these people miscarry, I must lay their lives at your dore; for at the first moving of it I told you that without his assistance wee could not stay there; which you assured me wee should have.

After all, the Governor’s demands were not unreasonable. He would naturally fear that the intruders might decide to remain permanently on the island and thus dominate his port. The Kārwār factors, to whom his goodwill was of importance, seem to have regretted Shipman’s attitude (see their letter of 28 January).

That the Governor of Kārwār was at first disposed to be friendly appears from a letter written by Henry Gary from Goa to Lord Marlborough in England, dated 16 February, 1663 (P. R. O.: C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 3). Gary had gone from Goa to Anjidiv to lend Shipman the benefit of his experience and of his knowledge of Portuguese, and he now wrote to acquaint the Earl with what had happened since the latter’s departure. Shipman, he declared, was being well supplied with provisions and other necessaries.

The v[ery ne]xt day after Your Lordshipps departure, the Governor of Carwar, Mahmud Ckaun, sent [him?] a very corteous letter, accompanied with a small present of sugger canes and cock[o nu]ts, shewing therein his readinesse to entertaine and keepe a faire correspondence with him; and commanded one of his servants that brought the letter to tell Sir Abraham privatly that hee would readyly furnish him with lime, tymber, and planke, and as many workemen as hee should desire.

Thereupon Gary went over to Kārwār to see the Governor, but found that he was at Ankola and would not be back for several days. Gary then proceeded to Goa, arriving on 19 January.1 The same evening a Dutch squadron of seven ships arrived at the bar and blockaded the port. They brought with them over 3,800 prisoners from Cochin, whom they promptly set on shore. Gary enclosed in his letter an account 2 of the siege and capture of that city, and mentioned that the Portuguese testified to the humanity shown by the Dutch. Its loss was serious for English trade, he said, since the pepper and cassia lignum procured there fetched in Europe at least three times the cost. The Rāja of Porakād having assisted the Portuguese, the Dutch had declared their intention of making war upon him. Cardamoms would now have to be bought from the Dutch, like all other spices. Rijkloff van Goens, the Dutch Commander, was contemplating an attack upon Diu, and if this should fall, the capture of Damān would probably follow.

This late losse of Cochine and the calamities which so much threatneth to fall uppon them suddenly . . . hath brought so much confusion and distraction uppon these people as that the principalest fidalgos and the whole Councill of this State hath severall times made them of late presse the Vice roy to make an offerr of Bombaim unto Sir Abraham Shipman ; which they all did by wrighting, every man giving in his reasone for the necessity thereof. Butt hee continues styll obstinatt and very ave[rse]. However, they are all in greate hopes that hee will ere long bee brought to give his consent ; which is my oppinion likewise, for I am confident that, unlesse hee lett Sir Abraham pass thither, they will never lett him enjoy any quiet, they having resolved that, yf hee will not deliver upp Bombaim for His Majesties use, to draw upp a remonstrance against him and send it for Europe with all the expedition that may bee.

So great was the discontent that there were whispers of a scheme to rebel and place Goa under the protection of the French King.

Gary had suggested to his informants that it would better serve their interests if they took King Charles for their sovereign instead. The letter went on to solicit Lord Marlborough’s assistance in getting the writer direct employment from the English government as His Majesty’s ‘merchant or factor in India’. Gary was sure that he could do good service, (especially if Bombay were surrendered, in ‘modeling the bussinesse of this custome howse etc.’. His nineteen years of service to the East India Company had been but ill repaid, for he had had the mortification of being passed over for the Surat Council in favour of one (presumably Goodier) who was so illiterate that he ‘cann scarse wright his name right’.

The last letters I received from Angediva communicated that the fortifications there went forwards, there being good store of lime and workemen gone thither from Salsette many dayes since, Capt. Roger Middleton being the principalest person employed in this affaire.

A postscript stated that Gary had just been informed from two credible sources that the Viceroy had decided in Council to make over Bombay to Shipman. A second letter from Gary at Goa to Lord Marlborough, dated 7 March, 1663 (no. 5 in the same series), says :

What I communicated at foote of my said last, touching the Viceroy and Councills determination and resolution to deliver up Bombaim unto Sir Abraham Shipman, was very true, Antonio de Mello de Castro himselfe having declared the same unto me the 23th February, saying at the same time that for his honors sake he could not deliver it otherwise than as deposited untyll theyr Majestys of Greate Britaine and Portugalls orders should come with full determinations what should bee done; likewise that hee would oblidge Sir Abraham to assist him in case of necessity, boath with souldiers and ammunition what hee could spare; and that it should not be long before hee would acquaint him thereof by a person hee intended to send unto him on purpose.

Gary did his best to induce the Viceroy to carry out his resolve, but found that he continually procrastinated. On 3 March, having received a letter from Captain Minors at Cochin which declared that if the English left Anjidiv the Dutch would at once occupy that island, he took it to the Viceroy, having previously

Made a small addition of my owne to the letter (immitating his hand as well as I could) that the Dutch were makeing preparation to pass for Bombaim ; hopeing that that would serve as a spurr to putt him forwards to the accomplishing of what himselfe and his Councill had so many dayes before determined to putt in practize. But contrary to myne and all his Councills and nobilitys expectation and also extraordinary admiration [i. e. surprise], hee remayned mute, not speaking any thing thereof againe ; which makes him to bee looked uppon as a meere weather cock. Certaine it is, My Lord, that a more vitious person than him never came to governe this State : one that spends his time in nothing more than w——g, gaming, and robbing all that ever hee cann.

As soon as Shipman heard that the Viceroy was inclined to make over Bombay, he wrote to him (5 March), urging early action, as this would save the expenditure of large sums on stores and labour at Anjidiv. To the copy of this letter in the Public Record Office (no. 4 of the same series) Gary has added a note that he personally delivered the document to the Viceroy, who afterwards ‘ sent for me and tould me that Sir Abraham should have Bombaim delivered unto him for His Majestys of Greate Brittaines use … But hee never performed his promiss ’.

Gary’s own impression, communicated to his brother [in law ?] in a letter from Surat of 12 August, 1663 (no. 8 in the same series), was that ‘ Bombay will not become the Englishes, without it bee gayned and taken from them [i. e. the Portuguese] by force of armes ’. Doubtless the news that peace had been concluded between Portugal and Holland had helped to stiffen the Viceroy’s attitude. There was now the less reason for securing the support of the English, and the local objections to the surrender of Bombay were allowed the greater weight.

Meanwhile the garrison at Anjidiv had received an accession to its strength. The Convertine, one of Lord Marlborough’s fleet, had taken so long over her outward voyage that she did not reach Swally until 22 January, 1663—a fortnight after Marlborough himself had started for Anjidiv and England. Her commander, Captain Tinker, was thereupon directed by the President and Council to proceed to Anjidiv to land the soldiers he had on board, and then to return to Surat. She sailed accordingly on 3 February, carrying with her Robert Master to be head of the factory at Kārwār. On her return (22 March) she brought with her the Chestnut, in which came Shipman’s secretary. By these vessels Oxenden received two letters, one from Master and his colleagues, dated 27 February, and the other from Shipman, written two days earlier. The former said :

The 15th of this instant arrived here Robert Masters from you, who ever since his arrivall hath indeavoured to compose the differences between this Governor and Sir Abraham, but as yet can doe nothing in the businesse, the cause proceeding rather from Sir Abrahams standing upon some small puntilios then any thing materiall. . . . Sir Abraham has promis’d us not to disturbe this Governors dominions, who is resolved not to provoke him. . . . The Dutch hath added to Cochin the castle of Cannanore, and are now sole masters of the Malabar coast. It will be an easie matter for them to ingrosse all pepper, since they are of such power and force in these parts. It is supposed that the fleet which is before Goa will goe for Busseen or Choul. There hath been severall consultations in Goa since the taking of Cochin for the delivery of Bombay, all men being desirous that it might be delivered and almost ready to mutiny against the Vice Roy. Wee beleive that this newes of Cannanore will doe much, when they are advised of it. It is 20 dayes since it was taken.

Shipman for his part wrote :

I have sent you a bill for 40l. for those things you sent me. I presented most of them to the Governor of Carwarr, which was thought by Mr. Ball and the Banian most proper for him. I added many things of mine owne, as a rich crimson velvet saddle and furniture, a case of pistols, a great looking glasse, six sword blades, and severall things that I gave his servants, hoping to have had a peace with him. But instead of peace he hath commenc’d acts of hostilitie against me, stopping of boates that were comming to me, beating of the people, and threatning that if ever they came to this island againe to cut their throats; and this to people that were not of his countrey. Now, to take my presents and not to doe my businesse was strange; but to use hostilitie much more strange. Sir, I could very easily right my selfe for this injury, were it not for doeing injury to the factors ashoare, who say that if any thing happens they shall be sure to die for it, and likewise the factory and goods of the Company would be lost. Sir, I doe not now weigh his freindshipp, having got such things as I stood in need of from other places with very great trouble. If he had made peace with me at first, he would have done me a kindnesse; now none, for I doe not much care for it. . . .

Some additional light is thrown upon the course of events by the Surat letter to the Company of 6 April, 1663.

The last advices wee had from the southward was the Lord of Marleburgh’s arrivall to Anjedivah. That gave us an accompt of the disatisfi’d condition of the souldiers, that they were setled there, although they give no just reason for it, as hath appeared since; for the island is so fixed that they are supply’d with all manner of provisions and necessaries whatsoever from the north and south shoares in the countrey boates. But they addict themselves to nothing but drunkennesse, and will not so much as take the paines to build themselves shedds or houses to keep the weather from them. The Lord Marleburgh indeavourd to setle them the best he could, and sailed thence the 14 January; and in a few houres Capt. Minors followed, to receive in her lading at Porqua. … Notwithstanding Sir Abraham’s dislike of the place where he is now setled, pretending danger and the want of many things, which, if reall, certainly he would not have parted with his Chesnut pink the Lord of Marleburgh left with him; but he hath sent her hither with a factor and stock to invest and proceed for Bantam, and is now lading with the greatest part cummin seed and wheat, which with some small quantity of ill sorted cloth she is to depart with the 6th instant. What her successe will be there wee presume the Agent etc. will informe you.

The Chestnut duly sailed for Bantam. She returned towards the close of the year, having had little success in her trading operations.

Shipman wrote again to President Oxenden on 16 April. His letter shows that he had provided himself with storehouses and other accommodation, but was still sanguine that his departure from Anjidiv would not be long delayed.

Sir, If it be our good fortune to be removed hence at Michaelmasse or after, I desire to know what is to be done with this island; for, if it may be any advantage to the Company, I shall resigne it up to them, with all the necessarie accommodations now built upon it. For I well remember, when this businesse was first proposed to me, that it was then held to be of great consequence for trade, and that the Company had ordered Mr. Andrewes to expend some 2,000l. or upwards on it. Sir, I am sure the place is much improved in point of fortifications and much in buildings, having good store houses, which may be turned to warehouses, and a very good amunition house for powder and match. Now, Sir, if it may be any advantage to the Company, I tender it to you in their behalves, and desire to receive your answer to it. For I hope, the raines being over, that the Viceroy will bethink himselfe and give up Bombain. . . . [PS.] Sir, I desire that you would communicate this to your Councell, that it may not be said hereafter that I have quit a considerable place.

This letter reached Oxenden’s hands on 28 June, and three days later he convened his Council to consider it. The Company’s positive injunctions on the point (see p. 84) would in any case have prevented the acceptance of Shipman’s offer; but it was declared in addition that the island would be of no benefit to the Company, and that moreover there were no means available for garrisoning it. Further, it was stated that at a consultation with the ‘land and sea officers’ (during the time that Lord Marlborough was at Swally) the island was ‘concluded a fit place for His Majesties future service’. On these grounds it was decided to refuse the offer.

Shipman quite acquiesced in this decision. In a letter to Oxenden of 21 September (Oxenden Papers) he said that the road was too exposed to be safe, and that the island was useless as a centre for trade. The offer and its refusal were reported to the Company in the Surat letter of 14 November, which also stated that, according to report, Shipman had lost the greatest part of his force; ‘it is conceived more by their intemperateness, ill dyett, and want of being well stored with necessaryes then the malignity of the ayre’.

In fact, Shipman’s cheerfulness cannot have been long maintained. When the rains set in, the sufferings of the garrison, badly housed and ill-supplied, must have been intense. The result was seen in heavy losses from sickness. On 22 June Giffard and Ferrand wrote from Goa that two men had arrived from Anjidiv, and had reported that over two hundred had died there, including Shipman’s brother1; while on 25 August the Kārwār factors gave the intelligence that

Sir Abraham Shipman is very well himselfe, but hath buried most of his men. He had a month agoe but 130 men left, of which there were but three of the officers that came out of England; and allmost halfe of them that were left was sick.

The dispatch of the Loyal Merchant down the coast in October, 1663, enabled the Surat Council to forward to Anjidiv a letter from King Charles. This had been sent overland by the Company in October, 1662, with directions that, if the Earl of Marlborough, to whom it was addressed, had already departed, it was to be delivered to Shipman.1 Captain Millett,2 the commander of the vessel, was also the bearer of a sum of 1,000l., which had been sent out by the King to Shipman to defray expenses. In his letter of 5 November, Taylor says that he has delivered the packet to Shipman, whom he found ‘not very well’.

The Public Record Office contains (C.O. 77, vol. viii. no. 143) an undated letter from Shipman which was evidently sent by the Loyal Merchant, addressed to Sir George Carteret, Vice-Chamberlain of the Household. This mentions that

At Goa they are very much overjoyed for the peace made betweene them and Holland.3 They are rigging all the shipps they are able to make, which hath layn these seaven or eight yeares aground; and that towne, which hath tasted the lowest of fortune, is now like to become rich againe. For had the warr continued betweene them, I verily beleive they would not have had any footing left them in these parts in five yeeres. Sir, the Vice Roy very much doubts the losse of his head for not delivering Bombaim, but hee had donne well to have considered that before.

In a second letter to Carteret, dated 18 November, 1663,4 Shipman begs that the King may be informed that he has done his best to avoid expense, and with that object has abstained from appointing fresh officers in place of those who are dead. This has been much to his own detriment, ‘the making [of] officers beeing the greateste proffitt that I could expect here’. As a result, the money intended to last until August, 1663, is likely to suffice for a year beyond that, and he will not have to use the letter of credit sent to him.

Our wintringe here hath binn verry pestelentiall, boath to officers and souldiers, for of 450 wee brought out of the Downes [wee] are now redewced to under 150; and if wee bee forced to stay another winter, and sustaine but a tolerabell loss by mortalety, wee shall bee disenabled to keepe this place, the island being large and wee haveing butt fewe men; the Kinge of Decann being our mortalle enemie and neear naiebour, not much above halfe a mile from us, and is daiely threattning to beate us out. Therefore I desier you with all expedition to procuer us a supplie of men to bee sente us, for, wheather wee staye here or goe to Bombaime, wee shall wante men.

Shipman goes on to declare that no commander ever had such ‘debouste’ officers. Had he himself succumbed, Hungerford, his second in command, would soon have spent all the money available, ‘hee being very much given to drinke’. It is desirable that a Lieutenant-Governor should be sent out from England. Probably Captain Povey’s brother1 will urge the Duke of York to procure the post for him, but he is quite unfit for it or indeed for his present duties. Shipman has had to buy medicines in Goa at a dear rate, and he urges therefore a supply from home, as also of match. Their chaplain is dead and another one is needed. The men of the Chestnut are mutinous, demanding a larger proportion of their pay. She is of little use and a great expense, added to the cost of the sloop. Two or three good lieutenants would be useful. Shipman himself has had two ‘greate fittes of sickneses’, and is still unwell; he begs that the King will sanction his return to England, as he promised to do when Shipman took leave, should his health require it. ‘This buisnes hath more broken mee then 20 yeares paste.’

By the same conveyance Shipman sent a letter to Lord Marlborough (no. 21 in the same series), excusing its brevity on the score of his own ill-health. The mortality among his men had been very high.

At one time wee had not twenty sound men to stand to theire armes to doe there dewtie. . . . If it bee our elle fourtunes to stay another winter, I doe not know what will beecome of us, unless it please God to give helth to our peopell, for if any more dies wee shall bee in a verry sad condition.

On 23 November, 1663, Gary (then at Surat) wrote once more to Lord Marlborough (ibid., nos. 24, 25), saying that the transfer of Bombay was ‘concluded on and voted by three severall councills’ during his stay at Goa, but was frustrated by the Viceroy, who would, he hoped, be suitably punished. He enclosed a copy of a letter received from Shipman, dated 21 September (no. 14 in that volume), expressing a hope that reinforcements would soon arrive and stating his readiness to engage as soldiers any Europeans that could be induced to join him. As regards this, Gary declared that ‘to levy any soldiers heere to recrute him is alltogeather impossible’.

Another letter from Gary to Marlborough, of 25 January, 1664 (ibid., no. 24), shows that little more had been heard at Surat concerning the state of affairs at Anjidiv, except that the mortality there still continued, and that an idea was prevalent that the Earl would return with a fresh squadron to finish his work.

God deliver them from that insalubrious clime, or rather make them moré temperat, for I am perswaded that the major part dyes of surfeits. Every one heere longingly expects Your Lordshipps retourne; and the Brahmens are so comfident of it that many Banians have laid wagers that your arrivall heere will bee before this month bee quite out.

Gary himself would rejoice intensely to see Marlborough arrive; and much much more to see Antonio de Mello de Castro sent home laden with machos [fetters], though they should be of prata [silver]. His guiltie contience makes him tremble at every Englishman that arrives at Goa.

In the meantime the failure of the Portuguese to fulfil their obligations had caused much resentment in England.1 The news was first brought by an overland packet that arrived on 11 May, 1663, and an entry in Pepys’s diary, four days later, shows what a sensation it made. The Secretary of State wrote at once to Sir Richard Fanshaw, ambassador at Lisbon, that the King was ‘in the last resentments against this usage that can be imagined’ and that ‘less than the Viceroy’s head, and satisfaction for all the damages and expense . . . will not suffice to pay His Majesty for this affront’. In passing on these demands to the Portuguese government, the ambassador improved the occasion by suggesting that as a solatium Bassein should be added to the territory to be ceded; but of this the Portuguese would not hear, though they expressed regret for the Viceroy’s action and promised speedy redress. Marlborough himself arrived in England towards the end of June, and about a month later the Portuguese ambassador in London was notified that King Charles insisted upon (1) the punishment of the Viceroy, (2) reparations for the expenses incurred, amounting to at least 100,000l., and (3) the cession of all the territory shown in the map exhibited at the time of the treaty, including Salsette and Thāna. According to Dr. da Cunha (op. cit., p. 249) reply was made that fresh instructions were being sent to Goa, but that the intention of the treaty was to cede the island of Bombay alone.

The letter from the Portuguese King to the Viceroy, dated 16 August, 1663 (N.S.), expressed surprise and regret at his failure to carry out his master’s intentions, and ordered him to surrender Bombay without delay.1 On the English side, to meet one of the Viceroy’s objections, a commission was issued, dated 23 November, 1663, and signed by the King, appointing Shipman his ‘commissary, deputy, and procurator’ to receive the port and island of Bombay, ‘together with the fortifications and other things belonging to Us by the treaty’.2 With a curious lack of foresight, no provision was made for the possibility that Shipman might be dead when the commission arrived, for no authority was given to his successor to act in a like capacity.

This commission was dispatched overland, in a packet which contained also a letter from the Company to their President and Council at Surat, dated 17 November, 1663. In this letter, written at the instance of King Charles, the Governor and Deputy directed that all possible assistance should be afforded to Shipman. In the Public Record Office (C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 18) is a draft of a letter from King Charles to Sir George Oxenden, 31 October, 1663,1 commending Shipman and his soldiers to the President’s good offices; also (ibid., no. 17) a copy of a letter to Shipman of the same date, evidently from the Secretary of State. This transmitted the above-mentioned letter from the Portuguese King to his Viceroy, ordering the immediate surrender of Bombay. Shipman was directed to present the document to the Viceroy and to demand the execution of the instructions it contained; ‘and if in the surrender any thing be deteyned from you that you thinke the article in the treaty … entitles His Majesty to, you are to take what is given and protest against the detention of the rest’. All these documents went out in the same overland packet (see C.O. 77, vol. ix, no. 50).

Notes

  1. 1. See also an article by J. G. da Cunha in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. xi. p. 288.
  2. 1. To this period belongs a letter in C.O. 77, vol. ix (no. 42), written by the Viceroy to Gary on 3 February, 1663 (N.S.), inviting Shipman to spend the winter at Goa instead of at Anjidiv.
  3. 2. For this see no. 142 in vol. viii of the same series ; also Factory Records, Surat, vol. 103, p. 259. Another Portuguese account will be found in C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 43.
  4. 1. John Shipman died 11 April, 1663.
  5. 1. It was only to instruct Lord Marlborough to bring home some cloves and nutmegs to plant in Jamaica (Oxenden Papers).
  6. 2. In his log (Orme MSS. no. 263) Millett records that he anchored at Kārwār 3 November, and that he and Taylor went over to Anjidiv the same day, returning the following. He says that the island is ‘well wooded and watred, butt produces nothing elce benificiall. What cattle theire is was brought by the English, being some 40 cowes and some 70 head of sheep and goats … Of 400 and odd men brought out, not above 120 left alive’.
  7. 3. The treaty was ratified at the Hague on 4 December, 1662 (O.S.), and published three months later. The news reached Batavia on 4 June, 1663 (Dagh-Register, 1663, p. 236), but the Portuguese did not hear till later. The solemn proclamation of the peace at Batavia took place on 30 September, O.S. (ibid., p. 491).
  8. 4. Public Record Office : C.O. 77, vol. ix. no. 20. An undated copy forms no. 144 of the preceding volume.
  9. 1. No doubt this was Pepys’s acquaintance, Thomas Povey, who was Treasurer to the Duke of York.
  10. 1. For fuller information see the introduction (p. xxxviii) of The Court Minutes, &c. of the East India Company, 1660-3; also J. G. da Cunha’s Origin of Bombay, pp. 249, 250, and the authorities there cited.
  11. 1. Portuguese text in Memorias sobre as Possessoēs Portuguezas na Asia, p. 183; English version in Da Cunha, ut supra, and the Bombay Gazetteer, vol. xxvi. p. 12. Copies in both languages will be found in C.O. 77, vol. ix. nos. 9 and 10 (Public Record Office) and in O.C. 3053-4 (India Office).
  12. 2. For the Latin text (with a translation) see Da Cunha, p. 250. The English version is there quoted from the Bombay Gazetteer (ut supra). Copies in English and Portuguese will be found in O.C. 3053-4.
  13. 1. From later evidence it appears that both this and the letter from Lord Arlington were actually dated 26 November. In the previous March, by the King’s directions, a letter had been sent to Oxenden, desiring him to supply Shipman with anything he might need, up to a value of 4,766l. (Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660–7, pp. 508, 511).