(Read before a Meeting at the Society of Arts, London, Wednesday, February 15th, 1871. Sir Bartle Frere, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., in the Chair.)
The commerce of India is one of the most important subjects that can engage the attention of the public of England. I do not think the audience before me needs to be told the reason why. They know well enough how the prosperity of this country, as of any other, depends chiefly upon its commerce, and how important it is to them that the vast continent of India, with its teeming population, should be opened up for their commercial enterprise. It is a calamity to India, and a great loss to this country, that the subject of the commerce of India is not fully considered by the public or press of England, aud that even the merchants and manufacturers do not give to it the attention it demands. I am constrained to say, after my residence in this country for fifteen years, that the knowledge of the public here about India is not only imperfect, but in some matters mischievously incorrect. But why should I blame the English public or others, when those who ought to know best, and upon the information furnished by whom the public must depend, the past India House itself has made statements entirely at variance with facts? I do not wish to blame anybody, but set it down with grief to the misfortune of India. The Parliamentary return No. 75 of 1858, gives “A Memorandum (prepared at the India House) of the Improvements in the Administration of India during the last thirty years.” This return, at page 11, gives a paragraph entitled “General Prosperity.” In the part referring to the commerce of India, after giving figures for exports and imports of India, at the interval of twenty-one years (from 1834 to 1855) the paragraph ends, in relation to the commerce of India for these twenty-one years, with the strange words, “The great excess of exports above imports (of merchandise) being regularly liquidated in silver.” It also states that the exports of merchandise increased 188 per cent., and imports 227 per cent., during the same twenty-one years.
I cannot trouble you at present with several other fallacious statements in this paragraph. I confine myself at present to those I have mentioned about the trade of India. It is a wonder to me how this statement about the liquidation in silver of the excess of exports over imports could have issued from the India House. A return (No. 369) made by the India House itself, on Mr. Bright’s motion, in the year 1853, gives the total imports and exports of India. The total exports, according to this return, including all treasure for the first fifteen years (1834 to 1850) out of the twenty-one to which the return of 1858 refers, are given as a little above 231,000,000l., and the total imports of India, including all treasure, a little above 163,500,000l., leaving a difference of 67,500,000l. of excess of exports above imports, for which, neither in the shape of silver nor of any other goods, has there been any import whatsoever into India. So far, therefore, for the first fifteen years' "regular liquidation in silver" for 67,500,000l. of excess of exports was simply a creation of imagination.
Now, let us see about the remaining six years. The return (No. 3891 of 1867) gives the total of exports, including treasure, about 125,500,000l., and the total of imports, including treasure, about 105,000,000l. These imports include the loan for railways remitted up to the year 1856. I take this remittance to be only 10,000,000l., as a low figure, as I cannot get from official returns the exact amount. Deducting this, and not making any allowance for any remittances on account of public debt made during the same period, the total amount of imports is about 95,500,000l., or "the excess of exports above imports" of about 30,000,000l. which was not liquidated either in silver or in any other goods. Thus we have a total of about 97,000,000l.; and allowing, to some extent, for the amount of public loans raised in England and remitted to India during the twenty-one years under consideration, an "excess of exports above imports" of above 100,000,000l. which was never liquidated in silver or in other goods. To this must be added about 30,000,000l. of profit on exports, thus making about 130,000,000l. for which India has received no return in imports. And yet the India House coolly told the English public, in the year 1858, that during the twenty-one years previous to 1856, "the great excess of exports above imports was regularly liquidated in silver." I appeal to you, gentlemen, to say whether there ever was a more misleading statement made; and is it a wonder that the English public are indifferent to the complaints of India? The India House would have been correct if it had said that the great excess of exports above imports of India, during the twenty-one years, amounting to above 130,000,000l., was retained for the benefit of England. Now I would not have alluded to a statement made twelve years ago, were it not that I have seen its mischievous effects to the present day. So far as my reading goes, I have not come across a single statement in the subsequent Parliamentary returns which distinctly and directly corrects it, and in my conversation generally, except in very few instances, I have found that this misleading statement has led to the almost universal belief that India is rich and prosperous, when it is not so. No more have the imports, with all silver included, been equal to exports after 1856. Notwithstanding the so-much-talked-of wealth poured in during the American war, the total figures are, for 1856 to 1869,* exports (including treasure), about 588,000,000l.; imports (including treasure), about 545,000,000l. Out of these imports, about 72,000,000l. (the total expended till end of 1869 being 82,000,000l., of which I have taken 10,000,000l., the total to 1856) are railway loans, about 27,000,000l. are public loans raised in England, and about 15,000,000l.† of registered debt of India, transferred to this country, leaving the actual imports in exchange for exports about 431,000,000l. This gives an excess of exports above imports of about 157,000,000l. during the last thirteen years, which is not liquidated either in silver or in any other goods. Add to this the profits of the export, say about 60,000,000l., making a total of above 210,000,000l., for which there is no commercial imports into India.
Now, instead of a misleading statement, that the “great excess of exports over imports was liquidated in silver,” if the English public were told that during the past thirty-four years exports for about 260,000,000l. have had no corresponding material return in imports, nor the ordinary commercial profits of these thirty-four years, to the extent of some 90,000,000l., had been returned to India, its attention would be naturally directed to the strange phenomenon; for everyone knows that in the ordinary course of commerce every country gets a full return with some profit for its exports, and that it is simply impossible for any country to carry on such a commerce as that of India without being impoverished, unless special means are adopted to counteract the evil.
I propose to consider, 1st, the real extent of the commerce of India; 2nd, the reason why it is extremely limited, notwithstanding the progress it has to some extent made; 3rd, what suitable remedies should be adopted for such an unsatisfactory state of affairs. First, we may see what the extent of the real commerce of India is. I take the latest year for which I can get returns. The table for exports from India, as given in return C., 184 of 1870, including treasure, gives the amount for the year 1868-9 about 53,700,000l., and imports including treasure, about 51,000,000l. Now, we must examine whether these figures repretent the commerce of India. I have no doubt every gentleman here reads the little paragraph in the money articles of the daily newspapers, about the bills drawn by the Secretary of State for India. I would not undertake to say how many readers of that little paragraph understand its full significance, or care to do so. I am afraid the number is not large. The total of these bills for the last official year was estimated at about 7,000,000l. What are these bills drawn for? Certainly not for any commercial purpose. What is the operation of these bills? It is simply this, that out of the proceeds of the exports from India the Indian Secretary keeps 7,000,000l. here, and India receives no corresponding commercial import for the amount. In this manner, what are called "the charges in England on the revenues of India" are paid, that is, India exports about 7,000,000l. worth of produce to pay for these charges.* You will therefore see that out of the so-called exports of India, about 7,000,000l. are not commercial exports at all. Next, in India there are about 2,500 English civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted, about 5,000 English military officers, and some 60,000 soldiers. All these naturally remit to this country, for the education of their children, and for the support of their families and dependent friends, and bring with them their savings. The total of their pay is about 9,000,000l., and I put down what an English friend, who ought to know well, tells me is a low estimate, about half for the remittances I have alluded to. There are, besides, certain English goods especially wanted for the consumption of Europeans in India. If I, therefore, take 5,000,000l. as the exports of India for all these purposes, to say nothing of remittances by non-official Englishmen, such as barristers, solicitors, doctors, merchants, planters, &c., making up a large sum, I shall be found much under the mark. Thus, then, we have a total of about 12,000,000l., out of the so-called exports, which do not form a part of the commerce of India at all, whatever else they may be. I cannot discuss what they really are, or what their significance is, before this Society. I may just tell you that Sir George Wingate calls this item the "tribute" India pays to England; or that another intelligent Englishman calls it the "salary of England" for ruling over India. Be that as it may, one thing is clear, that these 12,000,000l. are not a part of the commerce of the country, and for which there is no liquidation either in silver or any other goods. India must send out annually at least 12,000,000l. worth of produce, whether it will or no, without any corresponding commercial return. Besides the above two items, there is another which strictly is not commercial. I mean the remittance of interest from India on railways, irrigation, and other such loans. I must not be misunderstood, however. I consider these loans as one of those things for which India is under special obligations to this country. I do not allude to this item in any spirit of complaint. Far from it. On the contrary, I always think of it with great thankfulness. It is a blessing both to the receiver and the giver. I only mean that the interest, even supposing it to be all earned by the railways, though forming a part of the exports of India, is not a part of the commerce of India. This item is about 4,000,000l., making altogether about 16,000,000l. of exports from India which are not commercial. The balance of the exports representing the real commerce of the country is therefore about 37,000,000l. for 1868-9.
Let us now analyze the imports. The total is about 51,000,000l. We must deduct the following items as not commercial :—Railway loan for the year, about 5,000,000l.; irrigation, State railways, and other loans which I have not been able to ascertain, say about 2,000,000l.; Government stores, about 1,500,000l.; payment on account of the Abyssinian expedition, about 1,250,000l.; leaving about 41,250,000l. as commercial imports. So we have roughly considered about 37,000,000l. exports and 41,000,000l. imports. This shows something like a national commercial profit of about 4,000,000l. But as, on the other hand, India has had to pay to this country 12,000,000l. for its administration, the real balance of India's profit and loss account is some 8,000,000l. on the wrong side for the year.
Leaving the question of the nature and consequences of this balance alone for the present, we have this remarkable fact, that while the exports of the produce of the United Kingdom are nearly 6l. 10s. a head of population, of British North America about 3l. a head, and of Australia about 19l. a head, for 1868, those of India are scarcely 4s. a head, or altogether, including political and non-commercial remittances to this country, about 5s. a head. Even deducting the gold exports, the other exports of Australia are about 11l. per head.
I may remark here, that just as the India House liquidation in silver of excess of exports is incorrect, so does its assertion of the increase of 188 per cent. in exports, and 227 per cent. in imports, require explanation. From what I have already said, you may have seen that a good portion of this increase is owing to causes other than commercial, viz. increase of political charges in England, of national debt, and the increasing remittances of official and non-official Europeans.
The question is often asked, why India does not take largely of British manufactures? Why is it that, with a population of 200,000,000, there are only about 17,500,000l. worth of British manufactures, or less even than 2s. a head, exported to India, while Australia, with a population of less than 2,000,000, takes about 13,000,000l., or more than 6l. a head, and British North America, with its population of about 4,500,000, about 5,000,000l., or about 25s. a head? Before I proceed to a discussion of this scantiness of the export of British manufactures into India, I must clear away two misapprehensions. On account of such misleading statements as those of the India House, and a quantity of silver being actually imported into India, it is a general impression here that India is a great sink for silver, that there is great hoarding, and that it is rich. The fact is, first, that India has not imported as much silver as the India House statement leads one to believe; and secondly, that under the British administration, silver has naturally become a necessary commodity. The revenue having to be paid in cash, a great demand arose for coins, and silver not being produced in the country, its importation became a necessity. Besides coins, it must also be remembered that, as in all countries, several social customs require the use of a certain quantity of the precious metals. I am not at all here taking into consideration the withdrawal of the treasure from India that had taken place in the earlier times of the East India Company. And yet, see what the gross total amount of bullion is which India has retained during the whole period of the last seventy years, from the commencement of the present century. I think you would hardly believe me when I say it is only about 34s.* a head. Conceive, gentlemen, 34s. a head, not per annum, but in the whole course of seventy years, for all purposes, commercial, social, and political, for circulation, wear and tear, for remittances, for railway and other loans, and to fill up the drain of former periods—in short, for every possible purpose.
Why, in the United Kingdom, for the last twelve years only, from 1858 to 1869 (there are no earlier returns for imports), you have retained for your national uses nearly 30s. a head, besides leaving about 18,000,000l. in the Bank of England intact at the ends of 1857 and 1869. There may be some little hoarding by some men, as the means of investment and circulation in India are not yet developed; but may I ask whether there is any gentleman now present, who has not some hoarding about him of several pounds in his watches, pins, &c.? However, here is the whole quantity of bullion imported into India during seventy years, 34s. per head. Now, in discussing the question why India takes less than 2s., or about 1s. 9d., a head of British manufactures, you will see that the general cry of large imports of silver being the cause is not correct. The wonder is that 34s. a head, received in the whole period of seventy years, could be sufficient for all necessary wants and wear.
The second misapprehension which requires explanation is the notion that wages and prices have risen enormously, and that therefore India is very prosperous. This notion is not only an exaggeration, but it is also incorrect to a great extent. It would be impossible for me to discuss it to-night, as it would require a long time to do so clearly. I need simply say, what I think I am able to prove from actual facts and official documents, that though there is some general rise in prices (not, however, to the extent usually supposed), it is not an addition to former sufficiency, but a return from a low ebb, to which it had gone down before, and that it only indicates some progress towards, but not actual, sufficiency, much less prosperity. There is much confusion of ideas on this subject. For instance, while some writers point to rise in prices as a proof of prosperity, the India House return, in the same paragraph to which I have already referred, speaks of "the cheapening of agricultural produce" as a matter to boast about. Now, the "enormous" or "unexampled" rise in prices or wages, about which so much noise is made by some writers, is no more true than that because there may be a few millionaires in London, therefore all Londoners are millionaires. The phenomenon is simply this, that in special localities, where railway and other public works are being constructed, money congests, and prices and wages for a time go very high, because, on account of imperfect communication, neither labour nor food is drawn there in sufficient quantity to equalize or moderate wages or prices. And because at some of these special localities prices and wages rise very high, a general conclusion is hastily drawn, as if prices and wages had gone up enormously all over India. I shall give hereafter a few instances of prices, which will show that the notion of enormous general rise in prices is incorrect.
I must now return to the question of the causes of the miserable extent to which the natives of India take British manufacture. Do not, gentlemen, for a moment suppose that a native does not wish to put on a better coat—or rather a coat at all—if he can get it. You should seriously ask the question why India does not afford to English industry and enterprise a field commensurate with its vast extent, population, and natural resources, though it is under your own control and administration. If this country could export of its produce only 1l. a head of India’s population, it will be as much as you now export to all parts of the world.
There is no question of the vastness and variety of India’s resources. The number of principal articles it exports to this country is above fifty, many of them in great varieties, and some two or three dozen of minor importance. Much more can this number be increased. Why should not India alone supply to this country cotton, coffee, sugar, tea, silk, seeds, fibre, or anything else, in any quantity wanted? The causes of this unsatisfactory state of affairs are various, both moral and material. The moral cause, I am sorry I cannot discuss before this Society; I shall only mention them. As long as a people have no reasonable voice, or have only a farce of a voice, in the legislation and taxation, municipal or imperial, of their own country, it is simply impossible there can be that watchful care and attention to its wants which those most interested alone can give. So, also, as long as the people of a country have no fair share in its administration, the powerful stimulus of patriotism and self-interest cannot come into action. Moreover, this want of a proper share for the native in the administration of the country produces one deplorable moral evil: as long as the English are officials, their mouths are shut. All the wisdom acquired by their experience is of no use in guiding the natives. The moment they are non-official they leave the country, and thus drain poor India of wisdom also. After coming to this country, the majority of these retired English officials forget India. Here, for instance, is Lord Lawrence. I congratulate the London School Board on such an acquisition, but there is also another side of the picture. What does this mean to India? Here is wisdom of above thirty years, I suppose, acquired in India, and it is all now lost to it. When and how will India have its own Lawrences, its Freres, Trevelyans, &c., to guide the nation towards progress, enlightenment, and prosperity? This is most deplorable for India that natives are not allowed a due share in the administration, to acquire the necessary wisdom of experience to become the guiding spirits of the country.
One more moral cause I would just touch upon, is the want of adequate education. Most sincerely thankful as I am for even the small extent to which education has progressed, I need simply say just now that education, both high English and professional for the higher classes, and vernacular and industrial for the mass, is far from being adequate, and yet Government are committing the political suicide of discouraging English education in Bengal.
Having thus simply stated the three moral causes, I now come to the material. What, I wonder, would you say to the following fact? I have been studying for the past six months the administration reports of the different Presidencies of India. From these and other sources (thanks to Mr. Grant Duff, and other gentlemen in the India Office, for lending me any books I wanted), I have myself worked out, as a rough outside estimate, the total gross produce of all cultivated land in the average good season of 1867-8 :—Central Provinces, North-West Provinces, Madras Presidency, Bengal Presidency, and Oudh, less than 40s. a head of their respective population ; Punjab produced less than 50s. a head ; and the Bombay Presidency, with all the advantages of the late American war, railway loans, and three lines of railway converging into it, produced 100s. a head. But even Bombay, I am afraid, on account of disastrous losses during the last five years, is gradually lowering its level. The average of all British India will be a good deal under 50s. a head per annum, or say 1s. a head a week. If I put 80s. a head per annum, or 1s. 6d. per week per head, as the total production of all kinds (agricultural, manufacturing, mineral, &c.) of the country, I shall be, I cannot help thinking, guilty of exaggeration or over-estimate.
With this low production we must bear in mind that a larger proportion goes for the consumption of the Europeans in India, of the higher and middle classes of natives, 12,000,000l. a year are to be exported to this country, and a portion is to be reserved for seed, and then we may ask how much of this 1s. 6d. a week a head could go to the share of the poor mass, from whose labour, after all, must all production be raised. Is not this one cause alone quite enough to explain the whole problem why India is such a poor and wretched customer of England ? Is it any wonder, then, that Lord Lawrence deliberately stated, in 1864, that “India is, on the whole, a very poor country ; the mass of the population enjoy only a scanty subsistence ;” and that Mr. George Campbell, in h is paper on “Tenures of Land in India,” published by the Cobden Club, quotes from an official authority a report made so late as 1869, about the Madras Presidency, as follows :—“The bulk of the people are paupers. They can just pay their cesses in a good year, and fail altogether when the season is bad. Remissions have to be made perhaps every third year in most districts. There is a bad year in some one district, or group of districts every year." Lastly, I would refer to an incidental remark made in the Calcutta correspondence of 'The Times,' published as late as the 12th December last. It says :—" But an ordinary native can live comfortably on about 2d. a day. He only needs a few rags for clothing, a little rice, and pulse or bean, and 'curry stuff.' "
Now, I ask you, gentlemen, whether it is from such men, who are obliged to be satisfied with 2d. a day, a few rags, and wretched hovels, that you can expect to raise 50,000,000l. of annual revenue (nearly one-fourth of which has to be remitted to this country); or even 1l. a head, or 200,000,000l. of commerical exports, receiving large imports of your British manufactures in return? Pray do not suppose the native would not like to be better fed, clothed, and lodged. Such a supposition will be simply contrary to human nature and to fact. Let us examine a little more closely. Insufficient as the whole production is, and scanty as must be the share of it for the great bulk of the population, perhaps hardly 1s. a head a week, the mischief is further aggravated by imperfect distribution, so that the plenty of any one part is not available for the scarcity or famine of another. The best test of this is the difference in the price of food in different parts. If wheat sold at 50s. in one part of this country, and 70s. or 80s. in another part, I wonder how long this Society, or the English public, would allow such a state of things to endure? In Punjaub, in 1869, the average price in Delhi was 52 lbs. of wheat per rupee, while at Mooltan, 34 lbs., and at Peshawar, 30 lbs.
In the Madras Presidency, in the year 1867-68, a good season year, at Cuddapa, the price of rice is 492 rupees per garce (9,256¼ lbs.), at Vizagapatam it is 203 rupees, and Godavery, 222 rupees. In the North-West Provinces, for the month of June, 1868, as the month of average plenty, at Meerut, wheat is 54 lbs. for 1 rupee, but at Allahabad and Mirzapore only 34 lbs. In the Central Provinces, in 1867-68, an average good-season year, rice, at Hoosingabad is 5 rupees for 1 maund (80 lbs.), while at Rypore and Belaspore it is only 1 rupee ; at Sumbulpore, 1 rupee 2 annas. In the Bombay Presidency, for February, 1868, as a month of average plenty, at Dharwar, the price of jowaree is 84 lbs. for 1 rupee, while at Thanna it is 27 lbs. per 1 rupee. Again, bajree at Dharwar is 80 lbs. per 1 rupee, while at Dhoolia only 26 lbs., and at Broach and Thanna only 24 lbs. (These prices are taken from administration reports and the 'Bombay Government Gazette.')
In Bengal, the ‘Calcutta Gazette’ gives, for June, 1868, average good time, what are described for rice of cheapest sort, the “ordinary prices at this season,” and what do we see? At Maunbhoom 50 seers or 100 lbs. for 1 rupee, and at Bancorah, 47 seers or 94 lbs. per rupee; while close by at Singbhoom, it is only 20 seers or 40 lbs. for 1 rupee; at Patna, 13 seers or 26 lbs.; in the 24 Parrugnas, 16 seers or 32 lbs.
But there is another deplorable test.
Now, what better proof can you have than that, when, in the year 1861, while British India exported to the United Kingdom alone, at the distance of thousands of miles, more than 3,000,000 cwt. of rice, at about 12s. a cwt. here, after paying all charges of freight, profits, &c., or at about 6s. to 8s. a cwt. at the ports of shipment; and to all parts of the world grain worth 3,500,000l., or say about 6,600,000 cwt., the North-West Provinces lost a quarter of a million of lives and immense property by famine.
In the year 1866, the United Kingdom imported above 2,000,000 cwt. of rice from British India, at about 6s. to 8s. a cwt. at the ports of shipment: and all parts of the world imported grain from British India worth 5,250,000l., or say, above 10,000,000 cwt., while Orissa and Madras lost nearly a million of lives and millions worth of property.
Again, the last two years, Rajpootana lost a million of lives, says the Calcutta correspondent, on the authority of Rev. Mr. Robson, in ‘The Times’ of 27th December last, while the exports of rice to the United Kingdom has been 4,000,000 cwt. in 1868, and I think as much in 1869; and of grain to all parts of the world worth 2,600,000l., or above 5,000,000 cwt. each year. Thus in India, for want of proper communication, and therefore of easy distribution, famine destroys millions of lives and property. Good God, when will this end?
The question may be put by you, what it is I want to suggest. I ask, gentlemen, only for some good English common sense, both political and economical, that common sense which destroyed monopolies and cornlaws, upset the mercantile theory, and established free-trade; and I trust the desire of Englishmen, which is no less mine, and I believe of all educated and thinking natives, that British rule should endure long, would be fairly accomplished—a blessing to India and a benefit to England. Like the causes, the remedies I wish to be applied are also moral and material. About the moral remedies, the statement I have already made of the causes suggests also the remedies. There are, Sir John Shore said eighty years ago, certain “evils inseparable from the system of a remote foreign dominion ;” and I say that these evils must be counteracted if that foreign dominion is to endure, and be based on the contentment and loyalty of the people. These evils can be stated in four words, “ material and moral drain.” The first I have already shown to be at present 12,000,000l. a year. The moral one is that of the wisdom of administration brought over to this country on the retirement of every English official, to whom alone both practical legislation and higher administration are chiefly confined. These two drawbacks political common sense requires should be remedied, or the people cannot be satisfied. It is no use thwarting nature, however strong your arm may be. Nature will avenge every departure from truth and justice. Thus simply touching on the moral remedies, I come at once to the material ones. The very first question suggests itself, Why should India have to remit 12,000,000l. a year to this country ? This, to a certain extent, is inevitable. If India is to be regenerated by England, India must make up its mind to pay the price. The only thing I have to say is, that England, on its part also, should act justly towards India ; the financial relations between the two countries should be equitably adjusted. No unreasonable burdens should be imposed on India because it is at your mercy ; and the revenues of India should be administered with economy, wisdom, and the sense of responsibility of a great trust. I appeal to the conscience of English statesmen and thinkers to give a careful consideration to this subject. Here, however, I must leave this point, hoping that England will do justice to India in this matter.
The other, and still more important material remedies, I must discuss at some length, as falling within the province of this Society. It is again a little economical common sense that is required. The most obvious remedy for the very poor production of the country, and its extra-political wants, is to increase production and facilitate distribution. It is no discovery of mine. Irrigation to increase production, and cheap communication are the crying wants of a country like India. These re-act upon each other. Irrigation will supply traffic for communication. Cheap communication will re-act by stimulating production, opening up new markets, and equalizing distribution. This certainly sounds very common-place, and an oft-told tale, but it is this common-place remedy upon which the material salvation of India depends, and it cannot be told too often till it is accomplished. Well, you may say the Indian Government don’t deny this. I grant they are as loud in their acknowledgment of this necessity as anyone else. Then where is the hitch ? That is just the question.
In order to avoid confusion and save time, I give you at once my own views, without entering into a discussion of the present policy of Government. The expenditure on public works may be divided into two sorts —on repairs and on original works. For repairs, by all means pay from the revenue, for it would be unjust to saddle posterity with any debt for them. The “original works” are divided by Government into “ordinary” and “extraordinary.” Ordinary are those which do not pay directly, such as barracks, buildings for civil administrations, and common roads. These do not bring direct returns certainly, like railways, but repay indirectly, in the saving in rent, and in many other ways.
Now, nobody will contend that these works are only useful for the day, and that posterity, or even one or two generations after the present can have no interest in them. Is it just, then, not to say anything of the want of economical common sense, that the present generation, so little able to bear the burden, should be pressed to furnish the whole means, without any distribution of the burden with the next one or two generations ? I maintain that Government should adopt the just as well as the economical policy of distributing the burden of these ordinary works over say fifty years or two generations by means of terminable loans. By adopting this policy, the other most injurious effects of stopping works from time to time, according to the condition of the revenue, will be avoided. What is of the utmost importance is, that these works once decided upon should be carried out vigorously, and completed as soon as possible. I repeat, then, that I ask for only common sense in this matter. When a large load is to be raised, a common, unintelligent labourer tries to raise it directly by his hands, an intelligent labourer tries a lever, and a man of knowledge uses a system of pulleys or some machinery. What is the whole secret or aim of all mechanical science ? Simply to distribute weight. Use, I say, the same common sense in financial matters. Use suitable financial machinery, and distribute the weight. Don't waste time, energy, and means in trying to raise the heavy load directly.
It looks almost ridiculous before an English audience to insist on this, but the Indian Government somehow or other does not do this. The mischief of this policy of making revenue pay at once for the ordinary original works is threefold—uncertainty, delay, and the consequent waste in the works themselves ; the intolerable pressure of taxation upon the people, and their dissatisfaction ; and lastly, what is still worse, the withdrawal of so much capital, which at present is very dear, and insufficient for the ordinary wants of the production and commerce of the country, Government using capital worth 9 per cent. and upwards, when it can easily get the same for 4 or 5 per cent., causing thereby to a poor country like India a serious loss, and shutting out England from safe investments in a country which is under its own control. Paying for these ordinary works from revenue, or from terminable loans, makes the whole difference to the people between being crushed by a load or carrying it with the greatest ease. It must be also borne in mind that any increase in the communications of the country, and the better attention to the wants of the country, will make the future generation better able to bear greater burdens than the present.
I next come to extraordinary public works, such as railroads, irrigation works, canals, &c. In the case of these works, Government has fortunately adopted the policy of borrowing; but somehow or other, there is some hesitation in going vigorously and boldly into the matter.
The hesitation for borrowing is grounded mainly, as far as I can make out, on one reason. It is said England's tenure in India is uncertain, and that if, after England lent a large sum, she should have to leave India, she may lose her loans. This is a very fair question, and must be fairly discussed. Now what is the best guarantee the English can have? As a native of India, I may answer, the loyalty and affection of the people. But as Englishmen you may say, “Well, we fully appreciate loyalty and gratitude; but after all, it will not be prudent to depend upon that guarantee alone.” Well, then, I ask, what is the best thing you can have? Can you have anything surer than a sufficiently strong English army? And if by the same policy which may enable you to have a strong army, you can also secure the loyalty and gratitude of the people, how much more will yonr security be increased. How can you have a sufficiently large English army without a sufficiently large revenue, and how can you have a large revenue unless the people are able to pay it, and pay it without feeling crushed by it? If, on the one hand, the present political drain continues, and the country is not helped to develop its resources, the result is evident. The people must get poor, and revenue must diminish. If revenue must diminish, you cannot provide for a sufficient military expenditure, the guarantee for your rule is impaired, and still more so by the discontent of the people. On the other hand, if the Government went boldly and vigorously into the prosecution of all necessary public works by sufficient cheap loans, the production and commerce of the country and the ability of the people to pay taxes will increase, Government will be able to raise with ease larger revenue, and will be able to keep up the necessary strength of the army, the security by which will be further enhanced a hundredfold by the contentment and loyalty of the people.
The most absolute wants of any country, in the undeveloped condition of India, are irrigation and railroads, canals and other cheap communications. Even now, the only or chief bright spot in the administration of the past fifteen years, for which Government claims, and justly receives, the greatest credit, for which India is most thankful to the English public, and which has opened a hopeful day for it, is even with all the waste and jobbery, the railways, canal, and irrigation works already built by English loans. I beseech, therefore, that Government should pursue with vigour this hopeful path, for on this alone do the material salvation of India, and the strength and benefit of English rule depend. There is one more question in connection with loans which requires a fair discussion. It is the opinion of many that the loans should be raised in India. The reasons assigned are, either the fear of uncertain tenure of English rule, or that India may not have to remit interest to this country. The first, I have already answered, is suicidal. With regard to the second reason, I say, if India is able, by all means raise the loans there. I am very glad that Government have succeeded in inducing some of the native princes to lend money to build railways. But I have shown you already that India does not at present produce enough for its ordinary wants, much less can it save or spare capital for these loans. The very fact that capital is worth 9 per cent. ordinary interest in India shows its insufficiency, even for its very limited commerce.
The idea of making India raise loans is like ordering water to run up a hill. Raise loans in India, the result will be still the same. Water will gravitate to the lowest level. Beyond a certain amount needed in India for investments of trusts, retired persons, banks, unenterprising zemindars, &c., the rest will be bought up by this country. Be this as it may, the test is a very easy one. Let Government open loans at 4 per cent., both in India and England, at the best prices capitalists would give for this interest, and in such a way that the notes be easily negotiable both in India and England, and that the interest may be also obtainable in both countries without unnecessary trouble; and the natural laws of capital will settle the rest. If the English public have confidence enough, and if the 4 per cent. sterling loan is now at a premium, why should the Indian Government not allow India the benefit of these loans, and the capitalists of England an investment under the control of the British themselves ? It is said that if Government resorted to loans, the future debt of India would be very large. But why such should be the case I cannot understand. As to the ordinary works, the very fact of terminable loans means contributions from the revenue, and limit to the duration of the loan, the great advantages being “distribution of weight.” With regard to extraordinary works, they are paying works, and even if they fail in paying the whole interest, the prosperity of the country will easily yield increased resource to make up for any deficit of interest. All progressing countries are building their public works by loans, and come to this country for borrowing, while poor India, with all her material and moral drawbacks, and struggling for her very existence, is tortured by all sorts of vexatious local and imperial cesses and taxes.
When I ask Government to build the works vigorously themselves, I should not be misunderstood as being in any way against true private enterprise ; in fact, the principal articles of present export, except cotton and rice, owe their productions mostly to English private enterprise. Who are the producers of the greater part of tea, coffee, indigo, silk, &c., and even in the case of cotton, how much is owing to Manchester constantly knocking at the door of the India House to build roads, canals, &c.? If English capital is encouraged in a reasonable manner, to open up new sources of production, what great benefit may be the consequence, both to England and India. England’s benefit would be double; the profits of the investors will ultimately come over here, and consumption of British manufactures will be extended, with the greater ability of the natives to purchase them. The administration reports of the different governments give us figures of many millions of acres of culturable waste land. If Government only did the ordinary duty of opening up these lands by providing necessary communication, and, wherever practicable, necessary irrigation, what a vast store of treasure would be brought out, and what prosperity bestowed upon poor India.
Natives also would do a great deal, if properly guided and encouraged. I am afraid encouraging natives to look out does not seem to be much in the line of officials. I know of an instance, in which one Mr. Rustomjee Bomanjee, a Parsee of Bombay, has been running about for two years from collector to commissioner, and from one official to another, to be allowed to undertake, on his own account, an irrigation project near his property in Bassein, without, I fear, any result. I do not know whether anything has been lately decided. I don't wish to blame anybody. I cannot say what Government's ideas in the matter may be, but such dancing as this persevering gentleman has had is, I think, sufficient to discourage anybody. Moreover, scanty, if any, encouragement is given to natives to enter the engineering service.
I would just sum up the remedies I have been discussing in a few words of Lord Lawrence, as Commissioner of Punjab, and which are quite as applicable now for all India :—" Let means of export, the grand desideratum, be once supplied, everything will follow.... Then money will be abundant, prices will recover their standard, and the land revenue will flourish." *
Before finishing the discussion of these remedies, I must urge one on the English public, which I sincerely believe to be an important one. The great misfortune of India, and consequently a great loss to England also, is that its real condition is not known here, and very little cared for. Every institution in this country has its independent body or society to watch its interest; for India, also, some such machinery is absolutely necessary. The India Reform Society, under the leadership of Mr. Bright, aided by the exertions of Mr. J. Dickinson and others, did at one time good service. Latterly, the East India Association has been formed for this purpose. I think it very essential, if England is to derive the full benefit of its Indian Empire, and be at the same time a blessing to it, that this East India Association, or some such body, whose object is to make India better known here, and to watch all Indian and English interests, be well supported by the English public. The result of my fifteen years' observation in this country is, that some such institution is absolutely necessary, or England cannot do its duty to India, and poor India must continue to suffer from the want of an independent watchfulness of the administration over it. I can only appeal to the existence of this very Society, and of many others, without which I do not know how much good would have remained undone, and how much mischief would have continued unchecked. At present the want of unity among the different interests produces its usual consequences of weakness and failure. As each interest, such as tea, or coffee, or cotton, or manufacturers, planters, commercial, civil or military, or any other, English or native, attacks the India Office in its small detachment, it is easily repulsed. But should all these interests combine together, and with the strength of the union of a powerful body, propose well-considered measures calculated to be beneficial to all interests, the India Office, less able to resist such action, will most probably welcome it to aid in its administration, and Parliament will be better guided in any efforts it may make, from time to time, to do its duty to India.
Now, gentlemen, whatever attention you may think my address worth, I am sure that on one point we should all agree,—that the subject of the commerce of India is one of those most important ones for the attention of the English public, whether for duty to India or for their own interest. You are aware that the East India Association has resolved to petition for a select committee of Parliament, and that Mr. Fawcett, having last session moved for a committee, the Right. Hon. the Prime Minister has shown a disposition to be favourable to the motion when made this session. I sincerely trust the Council of the Society, in the way that may seem most suitable to them, will help in asking for the committee, and in getting it to institute a searching inquiry into the great questions why India's commerce is so miserably small, and not commensurate with its vast resources, extent, and population. Is it correct or not that the total production of the country is with all the progress said to be made, yet so wretched as 1s. 6d., or say even 2s. per week per head; and, if so, is such a state of affairs creditable to British administration? Are the British rulers practically adopting a policy which would justify their declarations in the report of the material and moral progress for 1868-69, that “the State has now publicly announced its responsibility for the life of the least of its subjects,” or the noble sentiment expressed by Lord Mayo, “The coils that she (England) seeks to entwine are no iron fetters, but the golden chains of affection and of peace”? Will the next ten years be free from the heartrending, destructive famines of the past decade; and cannot the people of India be rendered so contented and loyal as to make Russia's ambition for the conquest of India a mere dream to be laughed at?
In submitting my views at present, and asking the help of this powerful Society in obtaining and utilizing the select committee, nothing is further from my mind than any hostile feeling to the Indian Government both at home and in India. I only desire to see the right administration of the country, and I wish to point out that, just like all the interests of this country itself, those of India also require intelligent, independent investigation by select committees of Parliament at reasonable intervals, and the watchfulness of some independent, well-organized body. The Prime Minister himself has given the strongest reason last session:— “And the fact, which we must all deplore, that it is not easy to secure adequate attention within these walls to Indian affairs, is an additional reason for having a committee to inquire into the matter.”
It is, gentlemen, my deep conviction that the future elevation of the 200,000,000 of the people of India cannot be in better hands than those of the British nation. I only beseech you to do the good which is in your power, both to yourselves and to India, crowned with the blessings of a sixth of the human race.
Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, in replying (after the discussion), said he felt exceedingly thankful for the way in which his paper had been received and discussed; and, notwithstanding that some few remarks had been made, as was supposed, in opposition to his views, he could not but congratulate himself that his main points had been maintained and developed much more forcibly by other speakers than by himself. . He had, however, been, in one or two instances, slightly misunderstood, as he would endeavour to explain. He had purposely avoided drawing any comparison between the past and present, and had introduced the statistics showing the excess of exports over imports merely to show how fallacious were the statements sometimes put forth on the highest authority; and although this was, no doubt, unintentional, it was none the less misleading. In a question of commerce, in which figures were the basis of the whole argument, it was absolutely essential that they should be accurate, and he must therefore be excused for saying that a great deal more care than was usually given was required in drawing conclusions from the statistics to which he had referred. He had never denied that some progress had been made during the last fifteen years, but upon this point also he would venture to use the following illustration :—A strong man knocked down a weaker one, and, to use the words of Mr. Grant Duff, almost ground him to dust, and then, after giving him a glass of water to revive him, said, “See how I have benefited you; I have given you a good glass of water, and now you are ever so much better.” Down to 1850,* India was being continually impoverished, and then the Government themselves, being aghast at the results, began to look about to see what could be done. They soon struck upon the right path, which was, to send back to India the wealth which had been drained from her during seventy years, to the extent of hundreds of millions. 100,000,000l. had been lent for the purpose of constructing railways, but this was not enough. England had drawn from India twenty times as much as she had yet lent her. He did not claim that it should be returned, he simply asked for a loan of so much money as would enable India to supply herself with necessary public works, and it should all be repaid, with a thousand thanks for England's good government. When India was lying in the dust, exhausted and helpless, only just reviving a little, it was no use saying to her, "You must help yourself." If no other feeling prompted such action—though he contended there could be no higher object of ambition than to raise up a nation of 200 million souls—selfishness alone should lead Britain not to drain India entirely dry. Many speakers had mistaken his views, but all had agreed that India required further help; and in replying to the charge which had been made against him in some quarters, of not doing justice to the good services which England had rendered to India, he had simply to submit a Dr. and Cr. account which he had sketched out, and to which he believed no exception could be taken.
Cr.—In the Cause of Humanity.—Abolition of suttee and infanticide.
Destruction of Dacoits, Thugs, Pindarees, and other such pests of Indian society.
Remarriage of Hindoo widows, and charitable aid in times of famine.
Glorious work all this, of which any nation may well be proud, and such as has not fallen to the lot of any people in the history of mankind.
In the Cause of Civilization.—Education, both male and female. Though yet only partial, an inestimable blessing as far as it has gone, and leading gradually to the destruction of superstition, and many moral and social evils. Resuscitation of India's own noble literature, modified and refined by the enlightenment of the West.
The only pity is that as much has not been done as might have been in this noble work; but still India must be, and is, deeply grateful.
Politically.—Peace and order. Freedom of speech and liberty of the press. Higher political knowledge and aspirations. Improvement of government in the native States. Security of life and property. Freedom from oppression caused by the caprice or avarice of despotic rulers, and from devastation by war. Equal justice between man and man (sometimes vitiated by partiality to Europeans). Services of highly-educated administrators, who have achieved the above-mentioned good results.
Materially.—Loans for railways and irrigation. (I have been particularly charged with ignoring this, but I consider it one of the greatest benefits you have conferred upon India, inasmuch as it has enabled us to produce more than we could before, though there is not yet enough for all India's ordinary wants, and I have said this in my paper.) I cannot ascertain the exact amount of investments in irrigation works, but I take them to be about 10,000,000l., making the total 110,000,000l. The development of a few valuable products, such as indigo, tea, coffee, silk, &c. Increase of exports. Telegraphs.
Generally.—A slowly-growing desire of late to treat India equitably, and as a country held in trust. Good intentions.
No nation on the face of the earth has ever had the opportunity of achieving such a glorious work as this. I hope in this credit side of the account I have done no injustice, and if I have omitted any item which anyone may think of importance, I shall have the greatest pleasure in inserting it. I appreciate, and so do my countrymen, what England has done for India, and I know that it is only in British hands that her regeneration can be accomplished. Now for the debit side.
Dr.—In the Cause of Humanity.—Nothing. Everything, therefore, is in your favour under this head.
In the Cause of Civilization.—As I have said already, there has been a failure to do as much as might have been done, but I put nothing to the debit. Much has been done, or I should not be standing here this evening.
Politically.—Repeated breach of pledges to give the natives a fair and reasonable share in the higher administration of their own country, which has much shaken confidence in the good faith of the British word. Political aspirations and the legitimate claim to have a reasonable voice in the legislation and the imposition and disbursement of taxes, met to a very slight degree, thus treating the natives of India not as British subjects, to whom representation is a birthright.
[I stop here a moment to say a word as to a mistake into which my friend, Mr. Hyde Clarke, fell, in supposing that I desired the government of India to be at once transferred to the natives. In my belief a greater calamity could not befall India than for England to go away and leave her to herself.]
Consequent on the above, an utter disregard of the feelings and views of the natives. The great moral evil of the drain of the wisdom of practical administration and statesmanship, leaving none to guide the rising generation. (Here, again, have I been misunderstood. I complain not of Englishmen returning to their own country, but of the whole administration being kept entirely in English hands, so that none of the natives are brought up to and taught the responsibilities and duties of office, so that we have none amongst ourselves to guide us as our elders, and to teach us our duties as citizens and as moral beings. A foster mother or nurse will never supply the place of the real mother, unless she shows more kindness and attention to her charge than the real mother, and the natives will therefore naturally follow their own leaders, unless you prove more kind, humane, and considerate. Draw these leaders on your side.) The indifference to India, even of a large portion of those who have had an Indian career, and who are living on Indian pensions. The culpable indifference of a large portion of the people, the public press, and Parliament of this country to the interests of India; therefore, periodical committees of inquiry are absolutely necessary, for the knowledge that such will take place would be a check on careless administration. With regard to the native States, though their system is improving, it is most unjust that their cases should be decided in secret. The frequent change of officials is a constant source of disturbance in policy, and though it may be unavoidable, it is none the less hard upon India.
Financially.—All attention is engrossed in devising new modes of taxation, without any adequate effort to increase the means of the people to pay; and the consequent vexation and oppressiveness of the taxes imposed, imperial and local. Inequitable financial relations between England and India, i. e. the political debt of 100,000,000l. clapped on India’s shoulders, and all home charges also, though the British exchequer contributes nearly 3,000,000l. to the expenses of the colonies. The crushing and economically rude and unintelligent policy of making the present generation pay the whole cost of public works for the benefit of the future, instead of making the political like all other machinery, and distributing the weight so as to make a small power lift a large weight by the aid of time. The results of trying to produce something out of nothing, of the want of intelligent adaptation of financial machinery, and of much reckless expenditure; in financial embarrassments, and deep discontent of the people.
Materially.—The political drain, up to this time, from India to England, of above 500,000,000l., at the lowest computation, in principal alone, which with interest would be some thousands of millions. The further continuation of this drain at the rate, at present, of above fit of its power and credit, as to enable us to pay, without starving or dying by famine, the tribute or price for the rule. 2. How to satisfy reasonably the growing political aspirations and just rights of a people called British subjects, to have a fair share in the administration and legislation of their own country. If the Select Committee solve these two problems, before which all other difficulties, financial or others, are as nothing, they will deserve the blessings of 200,000,000 of the human race.
Notes
- *. ‘Parliamentary Return’ 3891 of 1867, and C. 184 of 1870.
- †. ‘Parliamentary Return’ 258 of 1869.
- *. The "charges on the revenues of India," disbursed in England, are, for 1869-70, above 7,700,000l.; and those for 1868-69 about 7,350,000l. I put down, say 7,000,000l. Return 234 of 1870.
- *. Return 133 of 1864 and [C. 184] of 1870.
- *. 'Select Government of India,' No. xviii., p. 30.
- *. Sir A. Cotton told me, after the meeting, that I was quite right, that about 1850 the poor people were very wretched.