I.—The Baroda Administration in 1874 (Reply to Parliamentary Blue Books)

Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings, Dadabhai Naoroji, 1887 · from page 382 · about 205 minutes

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THE BARODA ADMINISTRATION IN 1874.

(A Statement in reply to Remarks in the Baroda Blue Book of 1875, concerning Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and his Colleagues, submitted to the Secretary of State for India, to be published as a Blue Book, Bombay, November 25, 1875.)

Blue Book* No. 1.

On reading all the Numbers of the Baroda Blue Book of this year, I find the amount of misunderstanding, misrepresentation and falsehood regarding me and my colleagues as something awful. To attempt to explain or refute them all in detail would be like trying to cut down a swarm of mosquitos with a sword. Moreover it will be now an utterly unprofitable thing to enter into a minute examination of the details of every day work of administration, and for which, besides, I should have the Baroda Records before me. It will be sufficient for me to say, as it will be apparent hereafter, that from the very beginning, Colonel Phayre has taken a jaundiced view of my and my colleagues' motives and actions. I confine myself to an exposure of only the most glaring misrepresentations and falsehoods, leaving as to who is guilty of them, to be settled between Colonel Phayre and his "highly respectable" and "honorable" informers on whom he relied. It will also be for Colonel Phayre to say whether the various messages from and reports about him which I have given hereafter require any correction.

Colonel Phayre in his letter of 1st January, 1874, (page 59) says, with reference to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 31st December, 1873, "The difference of tone of this khareeta not only contr asts strongly with His Highness' last one of 25th October last, but with the strong determination expressed by Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee as to the reforms he was about to initiate at once." I shall now first give the history of the khareeta of 25th October 1873, as reported to me by Mr. Bapoobhoy and other old Durbarees. This Bapoobhoy is one, as will be seen hereafter, who has been pronounced "respectable" by Sir R. Meade's Commission, and considered very highly of by the Colonel himself.

When Colonel Phayre found that the Viceroy took the appointment of the Commission into his own hands and left him (the Colonel) to play a subordinate part, he was very much displeased, told the Durbarees that the "Calcuttawalas bachá lòk haé, kuch nahi samajtè," (the Calcuttawalas are mere children, don't understand anything) and suddenly turned very sympathetic towards the Gaekwar, encouraging him in his desire to remonstrate against the appointment of the Commission. He then so far showed his cordiality that the draft of the khareeta received a perusal and some fostering and suggestive care at his hands; and the khareeta contains the following high praise for the Colonel from the Gaekwar, with whom his relations had hitherto been anything but of a friendly or sympathetic character.

(Page 50) "I am deeply obliged to Colonel Phayre, whom I consider as my best friend and well-wisher of the State, * * * and further being backed in my endeavours at reform by a zealous and energetic officer and Resident like Colonel Phayre, who is only (I am happy to say) too glad to assist me with his advice, and to the best of his power, in carrying out these views, as well as those affecting the grandeur, honor, and stability of my State, and whose appointment at such a time as Resident at my Court, I have therefore reason to congratulate myself upon, what need then is there for the appointment of a Commission, when I am sincerely willing, and have resolved to carry out thoroughly this work of 'State reform,' by the advice and co-operation of Colonel Phayre?"

How significant is all this when read by the light of its little history, and it is no wonder that Colonel Phayre should look fondly back to the khareeta of 25th October.

Now with regard to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 31st December 1873, any body who reads it will see that there is nothing improper in it, but only a respectful representation of the then position of the Gaekwar, nor is there anything to contrast with my determination to initiate reforms at once. For I do not see why I may not be able to represent the just rights of the Gaekwar to Government and at the same time introduce any reforms in the State. This representation against me has gone to Government, within three weeks of the Colonel's assurance to me, when I had first seen him on the day of my arrival at Baroda, of his cordiality and support, and of his taking credit to himself that my going to Baroda was the successful result of his exertions for reform!

Colonel Phayre further says, "I was privately and confidentially informed by a highly respectable person who was present in Durbar when this khareeta was signed, that His Highness hesitated to attach his signature, saying that it required consideration. He was, however, overruled by Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee, the acting Dewan." This information is simply false, neither had His Highness shown the least unwillingness to send such a khareeta, nor had I overruled him. His Highness was particularly desirous to make such a representation.

Colonel Phayre says in his letter (page 21) to the Bombay Government of 18th August 1873, “I am always kept well informed of Durbar proceedings.” Judging from this case and from what I shall show hereafter, it appears that the Colonel’s “highly respectable” informers generally fed him upon misrepresentations and falsehoods. In spite of the above misleading and false statements in the Colonel’s letter, (page 61) His Excellency the Viceroy gives the khareeta of 31st December a courteous reply and calls it “Your Highness’ friendly letter.” The letter of the Bombay Government to the Indian Government, of 5th March 1874, referring to my interview with His Excellency the Governor, says:—

(Page 64) “He fairly admitted that he had not had the slightest practical experience in public affairs, though he had made them the subject of much study. He likewise stated that the present Dewan would remain about the person of the Gaekwar under the title of Pritinidhe, and that the four Parsee* gentlemen from Bombay, to whom he proposed to entrust the four Chief departments of the Government, would have associated with them the Ministers who are at this moment in charge. It would be difficult to imagine a worse arrangement.”

His Excellency the Governor (who I think hardly knew much about me) had, no doubt, every right to object to my want of practical experience. I might say here, on the other hand, what some persons in high position as well as some princes, who knew me well, and whose opinions would be, I think, generally respected, had thought of my selection at the time. But it is enough that the Bombay Government itself admit in the previous paragraph of the same despatch, “This gentleman stands high in the estimation of many persons both here and in England, and would no doubt make every effort in his power to introduce a better system of Government;” and Mr. Tucker, the first Councillor in the Bombay Government, says in his minute (page 71), “Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee is without administrative experience, but he is a man of some culture and intelligence, and with a constitutional form of Government, I see no reason why he should not be tried,” and “I am not able to suggest anyone at the moment who would seem likely to have a better chance of success in such a difficult position.”

Now about his Excellency’s objection to Nanasaheb remaining near the Gaekwar, and the old Ministers remaining with the new, being urged as reasons against me, I have, I submit, just grounds to complain. The Bombay Government were well aware of what had already passed between them and the Indian Government. The Bombay Government in their letter of 29th August 1873 to the Indian Government (page 18) say : “ But his Excellency feels precluded from entertaining any such expectations, and fears that the Gaekwar will be unable, even if desirous of so doing, to introduce and maintain a proper system, or to check and punish the evil practices of his Ministers and confidential retainers, some of whom are known to have been his evil advisers during the reign of his late brother. And I am, therefore, directed to apply for the authority of the Government of India to instruct the Resident to demand from the Gaekwar the immediate suspension of the Dewan, and the Revenue Sir Soobah with his deputy, Narayen Bhai ; the last, a man of bad character, dismissed from the service of this Government in the Rewakanta. The suspension for the present of these officers is the more essential, as I am further instructed to solicit from the Government of India, authority to appoint a British Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the system of revenue administration, and the alleged practice of the abduction of females from their families for the purpose of converting them into loundis. This Government attaches the greatest importance to the appointment of this Commission ; and as the Gaekwar will be expected to render it every assistance in the prosecution of its inquiry, it is obviously desirable that his efforts to that end should not be thwarted during its progress by the Ministers whom I have mentioned.”

This pressing application of the Bombay Government to suspend three of the old Ministers was replied to by the Government of India as follows (letter 19th September 1873).

(Page 31) “The Government of Bombay have suggested that the Gaekwar should be advised to suspend or remove the Dewan, the Revenue Sir Soobah and his deputy, but the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it would be better to await the result of the enquiry before demanding their suspension or removal.”

Now in the face of this, the Government of Bombay expect from me, what they themselves could not do, because the Viceroy, under a sense of justice, would not allow it to be done. I may further complain that while talking upon this subject, His Excellency the Governor did not express to me his decidedly adverse opinion of the arrangements, or I would have pointed out the above reply of the Viceroy and explained to him its temporary necessity, and also that the real power, however, was left in the hands of my colleagues. On the contrary, while talking of the various difficulties in my way, Mr. Lee Warner encouraged me with the remark, that the British Government had taken 60 years to do what they had done in this Presidency, and that much yet remained to be done, and His Excellency himself, at my parting, in a most kindly way told me "go on quietly." Had I dismissed or suspended any of the old Ministers, as matters are now disclosed by the Blue Book, Colonel Phayre would have turned round upon me, to denounce me on my back, as having insulted the Viceroy by doing what the Viceroy had expressly desired was not to be done. Again while the Bombay Government object to Nanasaheb having been allowed to remain as Pritinidhi near the person of the Gaekwar, they forget that they themselves not only allowed him to remain so, but even as the Dewan, by not recognising my appointment and thereby not only retaining but aggravating the very evil they complain of. The Bombay Government having thus made up their mind to object to my appointment, without expressing it to me or to the Gaekwar, not only gave me no moral support, but refused to me the aid of Government officials which I solicited and very much needed, and by also refusing to recognise me as Dewan, largely impaired my position and usefulness, in the eyes of the public. This gave the "highly respectable" persons of Colonel Phayre, opportunities of misrepresenting and maligning me and my colleagues to him for their own private ends, and he, as now appears from the Blue Book, was only too willing to hear them, and to turn their information to account against us without any inquiry into their truthfulness. It was a curious vicious circle in which the affairs then moved. The Bombay Government would not recognise me, or give me any aid. My position being thus weakened and rendered uncertain as to the intentions of Government in the eyes of the public, I myself would not like to ask good hands to come to serve under me, nor would they like to come, though very willing. Thus though weakened by the action of the Bombay Government itself, and being compelled to go on with the old hands as best I could, they turned round upon me, for keeping on these old hands, besides forgetting that the Viceroy would not allow them to be dismissed or suspended.

Mr. Tucker says, (page 71)—"I disapprove altogether of the existing arrangement by which there are virtually two Ministers, and neither has, I imagine, any real power." To this objection I have already replied above. Further, —" I was present at Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee's examination before the Indian Finance Committee of the late House of Commons last year, and was not then impressed with the accuracy of his knowledge of the subjects upon which he was examined or of his readiness in applying what he did know."

I cannot blame Mr. Tucker for his impression. My examination has a little history of its own, which this is not the proper occasion to discuss. I need only say that Mr. Ayrton, the chairman, did his best to prevent me from giving my evidence upon the subjects for which I was prepared and which I had proposed in a letter to be examined upon ; and he dragged me, against my remonstrances, into questions with which I had nothing to do. I had, previous to appearing before the Committee, shown my notes to an influential and active member of it, and he had told me that the subjects I had selected were just some of those most important to be brought forward before the Committee. But Mr. Ayrton evidently thought otherwise, and at the end of my first day's examination, to which Mr. Tucker's remark applies, another member of the Committee told me that my that day's troubles were owing to my being a little too ambitious in the subjects I proposed. I then understood the cause of my unusual treatment. The next day, when Mr. Ayrton was not in the chair, I had some fair treatment given me. Be this as it may ; I am not the less thankful to Mr. Tucker for his opinion which I have already quoted before.

It is true, as Mr. Gibbs remarks in his minute of 28th May 1874 (page 350) after doing justice to the honesty and good intentions of myself and my colleagues, that the old Durbarees were then making efforts to thwart us, though they had been only nominally associated with my colleagues. But these Durbarees began to take heart, and lead back the Maharaja to his old bad ways, because the Bombay Government refused to aid or recognise me, and thereby were generally understood to be against me, because Colonel Phayre kept up open opposition to me and my colleagues, and gave his ear and encouragement to men like Bapoobhoy who knew well how to turn such power and opportunities to account, and because somehow or other Damodar entirely escaped any remark from Sir R. Meade's Commission, though Colonel Phayre was always talking loudly against him as the Maharaj's worst evil genius.

The long delay in the decision on the Report of Sir R. Meade's Commission also unfortunately contributed largely towards encouraging the old Durbarees and giving time for the development of their intrigues. They took much advantage of the delay by getting up "gups" from time to time, at first that the Report of the Commission was favourable to the Gaekwar, and latterly that the decision on the report was to be all right for the Gaekwar ; and with the aid of such gups they tried to lead the Gaekwar into their own ways again. In short, for what M . Gibbs complains, the Government and Colonel Phayre have themselves been the principal cause.

BARODA BLUE BOOK No. 2.*

Colonel Phayre, in his letter to the Bombay Government (page 15) of 9th May with a P.S. of 11th May, with reference to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 9th May, makes some remarks about me. Before noticing the most glaringly false statements in it, I may here state a circumstance, which if true, throws a clear light upon Colonel Phayre's whole future conduct towards me. Messrs. “the respectable” Bapoobhoy and Govindrao Mama reported, that on the receipt of the khareeta, the Resident became exceedingly angry, and that at a subsequent interview two or three days after, he said that the khareeta had been written by me and that (“suiting the action to the word” with a strong emphasis and gesture of hands) he would “girengá or giráengá” (fall or throw down) me. When this was reported to me by Nanasaheb, I took it only as a bit of the Colonel's big talk, and thought no more about it. But the Blue Book now discloses that he seems to have exerted all his might and main to make good his vow of “giraoing” me, and I can only account by such vow for the strangely virulent attacks against me, and the persistent dinning into the ears of the Government several misrepresentations about me, even though in some matter he had both public and personal explanations from me as to the true state of the cases.

Colonel Phayre, referring back to my having written the precedence khareeta of 5th December 1872, alludes in an insinuating way to my obtaining Rs. 50,000 for the writing of it and for the agitation of the question, though he knew the true state of the case from myself personally as well as from the public explanation I had already given. I shall have to say more about this matter further on.

Colonel Phayre calls me a “thoroughly disappointed man,” “unanimously pronounced to be a failure here as an aspirant to the office of Minister not having been able up to the present time to effect any reform, &c.”

I do not know how the Colonel found out my disappointment, whatever that means, unless it be that the wish was father to the thought, and it is no matter of surprise that his “whighly respectable” informers, or perhaps the “respectable” Mr. Bapoobhoy, (who, we now find, was himself an aspirant to the office of Dewan, and was considered fit by the Colonel,) should have opined that I was a failure and made no reforms ; and that Colonel Phayre with his desire to “girao” me or at least with his bias against me, should welcome such opinion and make a special note of it to Government.

The fact simply being that some of the Durbarees were then endeavouring to thwart us under the circumstances I have already mentioned in connection with Mr. Gibbs' minute, and they took advantage of the Colonel's inclinations against me.

Colonel Phayre says that Nanasaheb repudiated the obvious direct meaning of the words "much as I already suffered in dignity and authority from the Resident's open hostility to my administration," &c. First of all the obvious meaning of this is simply a fact, there was nothing to repudiate. And next, if Nanasaheb made any show of repudiating a single word of the khareeta, or as the Colonel further on says, "he also expressed his disapproval of the general tone of the khareeta by saying that such a production would never have emanated from any of the old Durbaree servants, and appeared to express anxiety as to whether it would be despatched to-day or to-morrow," he told a false hood. For the Gaekwar, Nanasaheb and all the old Durbarees, approved of the khareeta, and none more so than Nanasaheb himself. In fact it was at the desire of the Gaekwar and Nanasaheb that a khareeta of the kind should be sent, that I wrote it out, as I and Mr. Wadia agreed that this desire was reasonable. Colonel Phayre says that he had "heard from independent sources that the withdrawal of the khareeta was actually mooted in the Durbar." This is either false information, or I know nothing of such mooting.

Of the Colonel's poor tactics of making capital out of representing me as a "mischievous political agitator" I need take no notice. When I am conscious of being actuated in all my public acts only by a simple sense of duty, I can afford to treat this and other such miserable clap-trap and devices with contempt.

Colonel Phayre says "facts like these prove the utter unfitness of Mr. Dadabhoy for the work of reform." As are the premises, so is the conclusion. The so called "facts" being all fiction, there is no need to say what the worth of the conclusion is. And a question naturally arises, what is the Colonel's own fitness to judge of the fitness of others? The present Blue Book and the Sind-resolution of 1872, answer this question. Moreover, some criterion may be formed of the Colonel's own judgment, by ascertaining who are his fit men. This I shall have to speak about further on. It is quite enough for me to say here that his ideal being "the respectable" Bapoobhoy, there is no wonder in his opinion about my unfitness. I may, before finishing with the Colonel's letter under comment, make a remark here once for all, that the Colonel's power of speaking Hindustani is indifferent, and I had several times to interpret his Hindustani to the Maharaja. Heaven knows how much mischief may have arisen from the Colonel's misunderstanding and being misunderstood by others.

All the above clap-trap and abuse of me seem to have gone for nothing, for His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, instead of foolishly rushing into motives, &c. looked to the khareeta itself, and in a becoming reply, endeavoured, according to His Excellency's views, to explain the Resident's conduct, and ended his explanation with the courteous conclusion, “ I feel sure that your Highness, with this explanation before you, and being thus made acquainted with what had passed between the Resident and your Ministers, will perceive that the former acted in obedience to his instructions and will acquit him of any intention to offer you a public insult.”

Some time after this answer was received from His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, Colonel Phayre sent me a message with Mr. Bapoobhoy, in Hindustani, “ give Dadabhai my compliments and tell him to secure his passage in the steamer as Government has decided to turn him out.” What to say or think of this, what now appears to be simple impudence and a false use of the name of Government, I do not know; or is it an invention of the “ respectable ” Bapoobhoy.

I find from this Blue Book (page 23) some expression of disapprobation against His Highness on the part of the Viceroy, with reference to the correspondence upon the subject of the insult and especially about His Highness's yad of 7th May 1874, to the Resident. I do not at present undertake to controvert His Excellency's views. I need simply say that as far as I remember, this disapprobation has not been communicated to the Gaekwar, and there was, therefore no opportunity of giving any explanation, and that with regard to the yad of 7th May, it so happens that though I do not say we objected to it, it was suggested and dictated in Marathi by one of the old Durbarees, approved of by all the others, and simply translated by us. Did the Colonel's “ respectable” informers tell him this ?

BLUE BOOK No. 4.*

This number contains a great deal of correspondence upon the question of redressing a variety of complaints. Instead of wading through each case it will be sufficient to give a general explanation for the whole. The “honorable” gentlemen who had the Colonel's ear, had organized a regular system by which the people were kept up in a continued state of agitation. The mode of operation was this;—with regard to the cultivators, a number of vakeels went about the districts telling people they were going to manage through the Saheb to get the assessment reduced half or more, that the ryots should resist payment and complain loudly at the least real or imaginary coercion by the authorities. Then either the vakeels or ryots would first complain at once to the Resident, then come to me, Mr. Kazi or to both of us, make insolent demands from us, and the moment we commenced any question or inquiry, they would refuse to answer, threaten us they would go back to the Saheb and complain that their complaints had not been heard or redressed, and away they would walk off to the Saheb. I explained this to the Resident several times but to no effect. He would take it for granted that we paid no attention to the complaints, hurl vexatious yads to us and write letters to Government inclosing petitions, or statements taken by himself, containing all sorts of falsehoods and exaggerations. In short either we should give all that everybody chose to demand with the Saheb at their back, or we were at once pronounced as deaf to the complaints of the people and having no intention to carry out the recommendations of the Commission, &c. &c. In this way was the farce of coming to us and getting no redress, and a continued agitation was kept up among all classes of complaints. It was simply impossible for us to come to any reasonable settlement with any complainants. They always showed clearly and openly that they were conscious of their strength that the Saheb would get them all they wanted. With regard to the Sirdars especially, it was a common report that they had advice from the Colonel himself to remain thoroughly combined and not to come to any terms directly with the Gaekwar, and a case has come to my knowledge lately that, after a certain individual obtained redress directly from the Durbar, he found the doors of the Residency shut against him for any visits. In the case of two or three settlements made by me, the parties in a day or two withdrew from the arrangements and were again among the crowd of complainants meeting at the Residency. It is useless now to go into all the details of the long correspondence in the 4th Number of the Blue Book. I would only glance at some important matters.

With reference to the long and fussy correspondence about the Sirdars, the whole pith of it is contained in one sentence of Colonel Phayre's yad, (page 17) No. 1965 of 19th October 1874, viz. “also whether, referring to my yad No. 1502 C. 7, dated 12th August 1874, any, and if so, what steps have been taken by your Highness towards settling the grievances of this class.”

Now in connection with this subject of the Sirdars while he is writing to Government about my inexperience and my inability to grasp general principles, &c., the following will explain his own actual conduct in the matter. To the above question put by him, a reply was sent, but somehow that reply does not make its appearance in the Blue Book; or that reply would have shown the character of the Colonel's proceedings and tactics. As I have not got the Baroda records at command, I write from memory. The facts are these. Soon after I commenced working with Colonel Phayre, I proposed to him as the most practicable and shortest way of settling all the claims brought before the Commission, and chiefly those of the Sirdars, that he would kindly give me his own views after a fair consideration of each case, as to how it should be settled; that I would endeavour to carry out at once such views as I could agree to, and that for all those cases in which we differed, I would draw up a statement of my views to be submitted with his remarks upon them for the consideration and final advice of Government. To this proposal he agreed, and gave me a statement of his views on some cases. Then he stopped, and whenever I pressed for more, he told me he was very busy and with one reason or other further progress stopped. And while it was thus with him that the cause of delay rested and in the face of the arrangement between us he suddenly turned round and asked the question quoted above. The Gaekwar's reply then naturally was a reminder of our arrangement, and the Colonel was red-hot angry with me when I visited him the next day after the reply was received by him, for telling him in the reply that the cause of delay was himself. After he cooled down he said he would take up the cases, and would give any assistance he could, and if I remember right, he wrote so in his reply also. But little or nothing further, I think, was done, and when one day he blurted out, “I am not going to shew you my hand,” I gave up hopes of any further assistance from him, and my colleagues and myself set to work to prepare our own proposals to be submitted to Government. To come to any reasonable settlement direct with the complainants themselves was out of the question, as long as they entertained the hope that the Saheb, who had fought so hard for them before the Commission, was sure to get them all they asked. Our proposals were subsequently forwarded to Government in a khareeta. The above explanation and the khareeta will shew first that there was no want of desire on our part to settle the claims on some reasonable basis, and secondly, that the matter required a much wider and juster consideration than the Colonel would allow with his great statesmanlike grasp. Thus it will be seen that the Colonel himself was the chief cause of the delay in the settlement of the Sirdars' cases, and yet he makes so much artful fuss about my inexperience, inability, &c. &c. to Government.

In his letter of 11th August, (page 23) Colonel Phayre says, "His Highness has long wanted to part from Mr. Dadabhai himself, but he fears, as I before reported to Government, his home influence, and that he will give him a bad name." Whether the Colonel has known this from his "highly respectable" informers, or from the Gaekwar is not mentioned. The Gaekwar knew very well and I had often told him, that if he desired a change at any time I would never be in his way for a moment, and I never held out to him any of my supposed "home influence," or even of any exertion on my part to do him harm if I left him. I had always told him openly to consult his own best interests only, and that I would go out at his desire just as I had gone in at his urgent request. Was the Colonel ever told this?

The Colonel says "Mr. Dadabhai, I am reliably informed, went so far a day or two ago as to draw up an agreement of 25 articles to the effect that the Maharaja was to make over the Raj to him and his party, in order to effect the reforms specified in His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General's khareeta of 25th ultimo." As I have to notice this misrepresentation further on when it is again repeated, I pass on to the next statement with the simple remark, that it betrays a ridiculous credulity to suppose that I could ask the Maharaja to "make over the Raj" to me and my party. But he had "reliable" information, of course, from his "highly respectable" informers!

The Colonel says, "when consulted I gave my decided opinion that Mr. Dadabhai and his party had not the knowledge, ability, experience or weight of character sufficient to carry out the reforms needed in every department of the State." Certainly, the Colonel is quite right. We were not his men. His ideal was the "respectable" Mr. Bapoobhoy, and the report was that men like Mr. Narayan Wasudew Kharkar were considered by him a hundred thousand times better than us; and Nanasaheb said he was in favour again and could manage to get the Dewanship for himself, offering to one of my colleagues the Naeb Dewanship, which was declined. Men like "the honourable and perfectly reliable" the Bhaoo Poonekar, to whom I am told the Colonel has given a flaming certificate, and whose transcendent merit he has also recorded in the Residency, and the "highly respectable" informers of the proceedings of the Durbar, who, traitors to their master, also managed to sell the Colonel for their private ends, were men to the Colonel's heart. By-the-bye what should be thought of an English gentleman fraternising with and encouraging men in the confidence of their master to become his informers? What wonder then that we, not possessing the knowledge, ability, experience and weight of character, and other extraordinary merits of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy and "the hundred thousand times better than us" Mr. Kharkar, were discarded by the Colonel as worthless?

Had we only shown the extraordinary merit of the policy of "please the Saheb," we would have turned out the greatest administrators and reformers in all India. But unfortunately our schools taught us one or two naughty lessons, such as to look to both sides of every question, to do our duty, &c., and so of course we must suffer the consequence of such pernicious teaching, and be denounced unfit and unequal to the superior men of the Colonel's heart! The Colonel has, several times, dinned into the ears of Government about our inability, &c. &c. I shall not repeat the above remarks, but simply note the statement hereafter.

The Colonel says "that none of the people from the Sirdar downwards had the least confidence in them." I suppose this is also the information from his "highly respectable" informers. I am speaking in no spirit of boastfulness, but I may say, that the mark we have left and the confidence we have inspired among all classes of the people, (except the harpies, the intriguers and their dupes), by showing the difference between pure and impure justice in general administration, and between honesty of purpose and shams and intrigues, and by the progress we actually made in a short time, and against tremendous difficulties, will take a r time to be forgotten. This statement is not intended to be a history of our work, but only a notice of the matters mentioned in the Blue Book with reference to us. I may therefore only give a few broad facts. We have to clean an eugean stable besides introducing new systems. The Nazrana system in judicial cases, which in plain English means selling justice to the highest bidder, was put down by us against great opposition. This was the very question which first brought us into collision with the Gaekwar and the old Durbarees, and the “respectable” Mr. Bapoobhoy was most active in promoting the very first case of Nazrana-justice that cropped up before me.

From the day Mr. Bal Mangesh took charge of the Court, the proceedings of the Court underwent, what to the people was, an extraordinary change. Instead of the hole and corner arrangements between the Vakeels and the Judges for the amount of the Nazrana to the Gaekwar and bribes for the Judges and other Durbarees, a thorough investigation of each case in open Court and decisions based entirely upon merits, without any private interviews with the Judge, may well inspire the confidence which should take long to be forgotten.

In Mr. Wadia’s Court a similar change was simply astonishing to the people, to see Vahivatdars and Fozdars and other officials (supposed to possess influence at high quarters) accused of corruption or oppression, tried in open Court or thoroughly cross-examined as witnesses, and made to feel the weight of law and justice when found guilty.

Sir L. Pelly testifies (No. 6, page 42) that “Until purged by the administration of Mr. Dadabhoy, the criminal and civil administration of justice was notoriously venal and corrupt.”

Messrs. Mangesh and Wadia had under my direction nearly prepared the Penal Code and the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, on the basis of the English Codes with such modifications as were adapted to the wants and circumstances of the State. Mr. Kazi Shahabudin, doing his best to meet all pressing evils that wanted immediate redress or attention, was recasting the revenue system. Re-organisation of Courts of Justice, Police, the Revenue system, the Municipality and Public Works, &c., was all being prepared, and the financial condition was fully placed by me before Sir L. Pelly. I had also then pointed out to Sir L. Pelly, that Baroda was a most promising state. That it would do credit even to ordinary management, provided that the management was honest, and that its chief want, and that most indispensable one, was good men and a thorough though gradual change of personnel in all departments. Its revenue was capable of being much increased even with diminished incidence of taxation, and that even as the condition of the revenue then was, ordinary, careful and honest administration and check of extravagance should leave a large surplus, with a liberal administrative expenditure. But the great want was the men to carry out all the plans of reform settled upon by us. Only four of us had to slave the whole routine work till nearly the time we left. At first, the Bombay Government refused us the aid of the officials we asked, till the Viceroy's decision on the report of Sir R. Meade's Commission should be known, and latterly we lost nearly another three months before we at last got some men.

Thus therefore the obstacles to rapid progress was the Resident's open opposition, the passive opposition of the Government, and the encouragement thereby given to the old Durbarees to lead the Gaekwar back to their own ways. A fair moral and direct support from the Resident and the Bombay Government would have produced far more satisfactory results. I think, I may say that it was surprising, we were able to do what we did against such great odds. Enthusiasm and faith in the right cause alone enabled us to stand the high-pressure and harassing work we had to do and we did, and had I had the necessary time to carry out our plans of reform, I had fair hopes of showing that my appointment was not a mistake.

Again, notwithstanding that Colonel Phayre was fully aware of the nature of the obstacles I have mentioned above, and especially that I had not yet obtained the aid of men I wanted to carry out the reforms, and that I could not have had any fair trial, he endeavours to mislead Government (page 24), " that judging from the fair trial which Mr. Dadabhai has had for the last nine months, and Mr. Kazi Shahabudin for five, together with the results of that trial, I saw no hope of the requisite work being done by them." Of course not! It would not suit him to see anything of the kind in us, because his men (persons like Bapoobhoy) and he did not want us. But even the Bombay Government, with all their desire to support him, could not swallow this, and admitting partly the true causes, I find them telling him it could not with certainty be stated that we had a fair trial.

The Colonel says "that I doubted if men of ability and character from British districts would serve under Mr. Dadabhai." Certainly the Colonel may well doubt that his men of character and ability like Mr. Bapoobhoy would like to apply to serve under me lest they may not be accepted. As to men like Messrs. Mahadev Govind Ranade, Nana Morojee, Dosabhoy Framji, Gopalrao Hurri Desh Mook, The Honorable V. N. Mandik, Mr. Pestonji Jehangir, Mr. Shambhooprasad and others, they of course do not, I suppose, possess any character and ability in the Colonel's eyes. If I said that Sir T. Madava Row might not have objected to serve under me, would be of no avail. None of these can reach the high standard of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy whom he proposed in this very letter as one of the Provisional Government in our place, and who was somehow discovered by the Colonel to be already then "really doing the Dewan's work," i.e., my work, even when I was still the Dewan! After this what absurdities would not the Colonel believe and say!

The Colonel says "as might naturally be supposed Mr. Dadabhai and his friends are indignant at my having expressed such an opinion regarding them." The Colonel, I suppose, either took this as a matter of course, or his respectable informers told him this. The fact is that when we heard that the Colonel was against us, we plainly told His Highness that we did not care a straw, if he thought it would be to his interest that we should leave. I reminded him especially that he knew well that it was not love of power, position or pelf that had taken me there, but only his urgent request for his and his State's good; and that he had therefore to make up his mind as he thought best and only express his wish, and we would be out of his way at once. All this the Durbarees knew, but the Colonel did not get this information, I suppose!

In his letter (page 28) to the Bombay Government of 13th August 1874, the Colonel, while objecting to the Gaekwar's proposal to make Nanasaheb Pratinidhi, drags me in as follows:—"'That if this was the kind of reform His Highness was going to carry out under Mr. Dadabhai'sadministration, it could only end in one result, and that very shortly.' Now as a mere matter of opinion I should have taken no notice of this especially as the Bombay Government have told him how wrong he was in the way in which he objected to the Pratinidhiship. But this short sentence pours a flood of light for which I was not prepared, and I see the Bombay Government have been struck with it, and in their mildest manner notice it as "injudicious." But they could have hardly realised the full import of this blurting, as I cannot help reading it in conjunction with the reports and events of the time.

The Colonel was reported to have made his vow to "girao" me in May as I have already mentioned, but as matters now appeared, taking a turn contrary to his wishes and as his clients (the complainants before the Commission) began teasing him that, after all, the Gaekwar was going to have his own way in the appointment of his Minister and a trial for 17 months, Colonel Phayre was then reported to have said that he would bring down my administration within 2 or 3 months by raising all Baroda territory up against it. I had laughed out this report at the time. I had taken it to be a bit of the constant braggardism of Bhaoo Poonekar and others, and whatever I may have thought of Colonel Phayre's weaknesses, and of the charm his "honorable" friends were exercising upon him, I never believed that an English gentleman of Colonel Phayre's position and education would degrade himself to such a plot to gain a triumph over me. But reading the "injudicious," out of place and illogical sentence as it is; looking back to the devices with which the Sirdars were made to rise, and the ryots kept up in a state of agitation and passive rebellion (which with the spark of a single hasty step on my part might have burst out into a conflagration); also calling to mind that only 2 days before he wrote his letter under comment, he had sent among other messages to the Gaekwar, with his "respectable" Bapoobhoy and Govindrao Mama, that my appointment would be war and not peace and that it would bring about His Highness' ruin in 3 months; and remembering the way in which the Colonel had once blurted out to me that the Gaekwar had narrowly escaped a general rising, and as if I might have still to look out for it; I think I cannot be blamed to be inclined to believe the report. The Colonel can say whether it was true or not, but one thing seems certain, that the rascals, I beg their pardon, the "respectable" and "honorable" men around him took every advantage and made splendid capital and mischief out of his blind side and weakness of great self-esteem. This same remarkable letter, containing the prophecy of my administration coming to an end "shortly," also discloses another remarkable fact; a touching wail of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy, and the Colonel's sympathy therewith. The Colonel communicates to Government, "and at last Bapoobhoy himself remarked that everything appeared to have been turned upside down, that he who was recommended by the Commission has been rejected, and that Nanasaheb who has been rejected was to have promotion." Goodness knows how Sir R. Meade's Commission made out Bapoobhoy, the respectable man out of the whole lot of the Durbarees, and I wonder what the Gaekwar and Nanasaheb would have to say to this, remembering how Bapoobhoy was telling them every day of the valiant fights he was fighting for them with the Resident. Verily Bapoobhoy is a remarkable man, devoted to and in the confidence of his master, and yet “respectable” and beloved among his master's opponents and enemies ! Discovered by the Commission mainly under the guidance of Colonel Phayre's opinion, to be the only respectable man, amidst all the scamps of Durbarees, was it not unkind of that Commission not to have recommended that such a “respectable” person should at once be rescued from such bad company and sent out of Baroda, a consideration he so well deserved !

About the great offence (page 29) I am supposed to have committed in calling the Colonel “toom,” and which in fact was an oversight on the part of the Furnis, I have already made penance, by immediately withdrawing and altering the yad when the Colonel mentioned his objection. This somehow does not appear in the Blue Book. I had no more idea of insulting him in this or any other way than of taking his place, though the Colonel gave me the credit of calling this a manœuvre on my part for some sinister object. About the second “manœuvre” with which I am credited as having said that when advice is wanted it will be asked for, and which the Colonel supposes to be “put forward in order as far as possible to prevent my (Colonel's) seeing real reforms carried out and the orders of Government respected,” I need not take any notice, as the Bombay Government has discharmed him of his delusion by telling him that his objection was “most unreasonable” and “it is difficult to see what other answer the Gaekwar could have been expected to give.”

Now comes the Colonel's highest effort to dislodge me and my party ; his letter of 15th August 1874 (page 31) which requires some detailed notice. I pass over his third or fourth dinning into the ears of Government about my and my party's incapability to effect reforms. Repetition seems to be in the eyes of the Colonel a grand argument. The statement in the second para. that it was under my advice the Gaekwar had refused to go to Bombay during the Viceroy's visit, is untrue. The statement that I persuaded the weak minded Malharrao to appoint me his agent in England, is untrue. And the Colonel can have no excuse of being misinformed on this subject. Not only had I publicly* denied this some twelve months before, but I had personally told him at my first visit to him that I had never asked to be, nor had been, appointed an Agent of the Gaekwar in England. That the Residency Parsee head

the country, he would now emphatically repeat this in order that there might be no misunderstanding or misapprehension on that point. There was absolutely no condition, no promise, no hope, held out that the donors should have any personal interest or benefit from the efforts made by the Association in England. He wished it to be distinctly understood that there were no more conditions attached to the donations than to the ordinary yearly subscriptions or donations of any of the members present, except that the gifts were princely, as became the gifts of princes. Any contrary opinion would seriously endanger the position of the Association, and therefore he wished to set the matter at rest at once and, he hoped, for ever In further explanation, he might add that in his journey through Western India, he visited the Court of Baroda in March last year, to solicit support, but his Highness was not inclined to do anything. Some months afterwards, however, he received a letter inviting him to return, and when he went, his Highness asked his advice and assistance on certain private affairs. He accordingly undertook the performance of certain work for His Highness, without having any idea of expecting anything like pecuniary remuneration. But His Highness urged that the service performed was of great value to him, and—finding that a personal recompense would not be acceptable—he insisted upon making a provision for his (the speaker's) children to the extent of Rs. 50,000. (Hear, hear.) He (the speaker) felt the great delicacy of the position he held as regards the East India Association, and hence his first resolve to accept no pecuniary recompense even in the form so considerately urged by His Highness. Subsequently, however, he consulted with some of his best friends in India—friends who would, he knew, care more for his honour than his pocket—that they told him that, in their opinion, he need not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the provision for his children,—(hear, hear)—especially as he had earned it by honest and valued labour. (Hear, hear). Still, he was undecided in the matter, and he had since consulted some of his English friends in England, who, after hearing all the circumstances of the case, one and all said as strongly as possible that he should not have the slightest hesitation in the matter, and that he was bound to allow his children the benefit of his work. (Hear, hear). He would not have troubled the meeting with this explanation about a private affair, but a public character had been given to the circumstance, and it was also supposed that he had undertaken some agency of his Highness, and had come over to England to fight his cause or to excite the East India Association to do so, and to advance his personal interests. This was altogether wrong. (Hear, hear). He had heard in Bombay that certain high officials had entertained misapprehensions of the kind to which he referred: and only the other day, when in the Committee-room of the House of Commons, a gentleman high in authority, and for whom he had respect, said “If you are going to give any evidence about Native Princes, I should look out for you.” [This gentleman afterwards explained to me that he meant no reference to the report about my accepting agencies, but simply to my views about Native States.] This confirmed his suspicion that some misapprehension existed. It was to dispel this misapprehension that he held an agency, that he had ventured to trespass on the time of the Association in making this explanation, and he would distinctly repeat that he had always felt his position in regard to the Association to be so peculiarly delicate, that, although it was probable that he might have experienced little difficulty in making two or three lacs if he had chosen to undertake agencies, he had throughout maintained strictly his resolve that his character and conduct should be entirely above suspicion, and therefore to all such offers he had always replied that he had a broader work to do, and that he could not serve God and Mammon at the same time. He hoped that as long as he was the Honorary Secretary of this Association, he should ever do anything which would in the slightest degree, compromise the Association, or which would be calculated to produce any prejudice against its work. (Journal of the East India Association. Vol. VII., No. 2, page 622). clerk had given me aid or information is untrue. This “manœuvre” comes with very ill grace indeed from the Colonel who himself tells Government “I am always kept well informed of Durbar proceedings” and who had “highly respectable” persons of the Durbar to keep him “well informed.” Others may be wrong for doing such things, but in a Resident perhaps it may be all right!

About the matter of the Rs. 50,000 which the Colonel misrepresents in the 4th para. for the second or third time, I have the same complaint. As I have already said before, not only had I given a public* explanation of this matter, but I had personally explained to him my whole previous connection with the Gaekwar; and yet the Colonel has thought proper to take every opportunity of misrepresenting this matter. To the public explanation I may add here, that had I followed my own impulse, and had I not been pressed by the Gaekwar, and strongly persuaded by friends, I would have simply declined the offer as I at first did, and the matter would have ended. That this is not an after-thought may be judged from the facts that I had declined similar offers before of 25,000 and 30,000 Rupees from two other princes, that if I had chosen, I could have entered into an arrangement with a third prince to become his Agent with 30 or 40,000 Rupees cash down, and a lac or so in prospect. Moreover, not in any of these cases was there any promise of exerting influence in high quarters. It was all the service of personal brain-work. During the last thirty years I have given such brain-work to many persons without remuneration.

I again pass over the Colonel’s remarks in the 5th para. about my unfitness &c. As to the long list of counts in his indictment against me in this para., viz. the “deliberate neglect of the recommendations of the Commission for eight months, the increasing injustice done to British subjects, the continued oppression of the ryots, the systematic resistance to all reasonable demands of the British Government as represented in the large number of cases still pending; there is the neglect to take notice of Government references of the most urgent kind; there is the injury done to our trade, and the direct act of disrespect shown to the Resident in the opium case” and others; I have only to say that all these are creations of his imagination. I really wonder how Colonel Phayre could think of writing such nonsense. He might just as well have proceeded to say that I was going to set fire to the ocean, or still better, to drink it all up. What strange impulse or desire must have made him write all such things!

In the 6th para. (page 32) comes again that ridiculous story of my party turning the advice of the Governor-General in his khareeta of 25th July 1874, to our own account by endeavouring to induce the Gaekwar to sign ‘‘an agreement’’ to the general effect that the administration should be placed in our hands for a certain period; or as he says in another place ‘‘an agreement of 25 articles,’’ ‘‘to make over the Raj’’ to me and my party; and that my proposal for His Highness signing an agreement ‘‘to make over Riasat to any one whatever except the British Government’’ was ‘‘an offence against the sovereignty of the paramount power.’’ Where on earth had the Colonel’s common sense fled when he seriously wrote all this stuff of my ‘‘taking over the Raj’’ and ‘‘offending against the sovereignty of the Paramount Power!’’

My colleagues did not then require any binding for a fix period. They had been originally engaged for three years; with the provision that if the Gaekwar dispensed with their services before that period, they were to receive half of the salary for the balance of the period. At this time, instead of asking for a fixed period, they were actually giving up their places of their own accord. As to myself, I had never asked a binding for any fixed period. My only condition with the Gaekwar from the very beginning was, and of which the Colonel was well informed by me, that as long as I had the Gaekwar’s confidence and I felt myself useful, I serve; and when the confidence and usefulness cease, I make my salam and go. I never attached the slightest importance to any bond or signature of the Gaekwar on this matter. I went only on a call of duty, and I cared not to remain longer than I could perform that duty. I may give here a brief sketch of the facts about the extraordinary ‘‘agreement’’ by which I and my party were deposing the Gaekwar, and making the Raj our own; our threats to leave Baroda, and what is most ridiculous and racy, my taking Damodar into my counsels and aid.

Under the causes I have already mentioned the old Durbarees began their pranks to lead back the Gaekwar to his old way, by first reviving the practice of deciding judicial cases by Nazránás. After remonstrating and opposing this step for some time, about the beginning of July (the Viceroy’s khareeta of 25th July being received by us on 3rd August) we let His Highness know, that if he was bent on reviving the Nazráná and relapse into some other old practices, he might please himself and we should go. This message, communicated both in writing and verbally by Mr. Wadia, led to a discussion between us and His Highness, which went on for more than a fortnight. During this time Damodar had once seen me on some business, when he also communicated to me a message from the Gaekwar upon the subject of the remonstrance I had made. I then told him that His Highness had to consider carefully the course he was taking. He said he would communicate the message to His Highness, but I saw no more of him afterwads, and this is magnified into taking him into my counsels and aid, and to make my connection with him effective with Government and to shew my company, the Colonel has taken particular care to describe him as “the notorious Damoderpunth, the present favourite of the Gaekwar, the panderer to his grossest vices, the oppressor of women, &c.,” though somehow Sir R. Meade's Commission did not get any information to say a word about this man, when all other evil-advisers were denounced.

Our discussion with the Gaekwar was for a few days interrupted on account of Mr. Wadia's absence to Bombay. When he returned, and we found that neither His Highness nor his Durbarees appeared to understand our remonstrances, I sent word with Mr. Wadia that we must go and that he was simply wasting time and words, and was much mistaken if he thought we would care a straw for our places, and allow him and his mandal to go back to their old ways.

He was now fairly roused and earnestly requested Mr. Wadia to ask me to make a memo. of what I wanted. This was on the 29th July. This request of the Gaekwar led to what Colonel Phayre calls an “agreement of 25 articles” to “make over the Raj to us,” and which proved such a nightmare to him, in his anxiety for the sovereignty of the paramount power, but which in reality was simply a letter from myself to the Gaekwar to let him see clearly what we considered necessary for preventing the old abuses from creeping in again, and for making proper reform, if we were to serve him in our respective positions. As I have already said, I never cared for any signed bond or agreement, as it would both be no use if he did not observe it, nor would I care to serve under such circumstances. I give below* translation of the monstrous “agreement” of 25

* To His Highness Shrimant Sirkar.

Ajam Hormusjee has communicated to me all that Sircar said to him in Shrimant Nanasaheb's house; after that Sircar sent to me Nanasaheb and Rajeshree Damodarpunt. I told them to communicate to Sircar that if the substance of what Sircar told Ajam Hormusjee be as stated below, I cannot carry on the work.

  • 1. Nobody can ever alter Sircar's orders.
  • 2. Sircar will give orders as he likes.
  • 3. Sircar will spend as much as he likes altogether.
  • 4. To take Sircar's sanction in every matter.
  • 5. Orders are to be from Sircar and power for Dadabhai.†

Of the above matters, Damodarpunt took a note to communicate to the Sircar, and promised to get a reply from him, but no reply has been received.

After that I sent word to Sircar, that I could not carry on the administration of the Raj. We should therefore be allowed leave to go with willingness. Thereupon Sircar told Ajam Hormusjee to bring a memo. of what Dadabhai Sett wanted.

Now if Sircar determine to continue in the same views which he expressed to Ajam Hormusjee, I cannot carry on the administration. Had I known such views at the commencement, I would not have undertaken the work; and if the Sircar's present views remain the same, I have then no hope that my views would be accepted. But as Sircar has desired to let him know my views, I cannot but accede. My simple object is the Sircar's, and Sircar's State's welfare, otherwise I have no business here. The chief foundation of the State must be laid upon justice and fairness.

And Sircar giving me his confidence, should assist in and sanction my work with a sincere heart. Bearing this object in mind, I state below what I ask.

  • 1. Written orders should be sent to all departments, that orders written in the name of the Sircar or Hazoor and countersigned by Dadabhai are only to be obeyed. No other orders should be obeyed.

First Explanation. The necessity for my counter-signature is only this, that the order to be made coming to my knowledge, I may be able to give my opinion or advice, or make any inquiry that may be necessary, and should there be any mistake or misunderstanding, I may be able to explain it. So that proper orders alone may be given.

Second Explanation. Sircar says that if on some occasion, under a pressure from the Raneesaheb, the Sircar gave direct orders without my knowledge, I should not object to that. About this I have to submit with every respect, that if on even a single occasion Sircar would give a direct order, people will bring recommendation to Sircar and Raneesaheb and constantly interfere with the regular course of business. “Bandobust” is such a thing that if one link is broken the whole chain is rendered useless. With one irregular instance Sircar will lose all his praise. ‡

  • 2. All “chities” or orders for payment on the State Banks must be initialled by me. Without that no payments should be made from the “Dookans”—such order must be made to the “Dookans.” §
  • 3. A certain amount should be fixed for Sircar's private expenditure, including that of his “Kangi Mandal” or private friends and attendants. ‖ articles which scared the gallant Colonel so much, and in which I had adopted the same principles which I had recommended to His Highness the Holkar, during his negociations with Sir T. Madava Row, viz., that in all matters to end in permanent results, the voice of the sovereign should prevail, the Dewan giving his best advice; that in all ordinary every-day administration, the Dewan should be left free and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, a large latitude should be left to the Dewan to introduce the necessary reforms, as the responsibility of the extent and result of the reforms would be chiefly on the head of the Dewan, and as in this case it was an especial feature that it was mainly for the purpose of reforms that I had been invited.
  • 4. It is necessary to engage the services of several new fit men, and to increase the salaries of fit men already in the service, and to make several reforms and alterations. For this purpose I should have permission to spend five lakhs per annum more for three years, than the present (administration) expenditure; (of course) expenditure will be incurred as necessary only*.

Like the above His Highness the Holkar has arranged with Sir T. Madava Row.

  • 5. What I am not to do without the sanction of the Sircar.
  • 1. To give land or village to anybody.
  • 2. To incur any new charitable or religious expenditure, or to make a present of more than Rs. 500 to anybody.
  • 3. To bestow a charitable, or other annuity on anybody.
  • 4. To make new laws.
  • 5. To entertain or dismiss servants of salary exceeding Rs. 500 per month.
  • 6. To alter the rates of assessment.
  • 7. To do any public work costing above Rs. 1,000.

Explanation. Sircar should give these sanctions personally; it is hoped that Sircar reposing confidence in me will give sanction quickly. Delay or inconvenience in the sanction, would produce disappointment and a check to hearty work. For taking such sanction Sircar should fix a place and time, to enable me to have private interviews for a certain time every day.

  • 6. Nothing should be done contrary to the existing Revenue, Civil and Criminal laws, till altered by new laws.
  • 7. All correspondence with the British Government to be carried on according to the satisfaction and sanction of the Sircar.
  • 8. No Nazrana whatever should be taken in matters of justice, or of appointments or dismissal of officials.

Explanation. In no case, old or new, should any Nazrana be taken by anybody. The cases of Vaso and Rajmoodar must be inquired into and decided according to justice.

  • 9. Several high officials ought to be made to resign their Durbaree posts.
  • 10. Should Sircar have to make any appointment in state service, I should be consulted.

Explanation. Moteram Dulpatram had once applied to me for service. I had refused. Sircar knew this, and yet without asking me, Sircar has engaged him to

The Memorandum, asked by the Gaekwar, was at once prepared in the shape of the letter from me given at foot of pages 404 to 406, and the Gaekwar entered into a fair discussion of the conditions proposed; but while this discussion was going on, we received the Viceroy’s khareeta on 3rd August. Colonel Phayre, however, makes out the “agreement” as being proposed by us a day or two before his letter of 11th August, and as being “one of our first efforts” to turn the advice contained in the khareeta to our own account, by snatching away the Raj; and the old Durbarees, for the nonce, suddenly become good men in the eyes of Colonel Phayre, as being solicitous to save their master from the clutches of the monsters who were going to devour the Riasat! When the Viceroy’s khareeta of 25th July arrived on 3rd August, its consideration engrossed the attention of the Gaekwar, and the “agreement” fell into the background altogether. New intrigues started on their feet under pressure of Colonel Phayre’s, what the Bombay Government call “determined personal opposition to me,” and his encouragement to Bapoobhoy and to Nanasaheb as I had then heard.

When this came to our knowledge, we at once actually gave in our resignations on the 9th of August, so that the Gaekwar was left completely free to act as he liked without any difficulty or discussion from our part, and get rid of us by simply accepting our resignations. But he would do nothing of the kind, and on that very same day he brought such a pressure of entreaty upon us not to leave him, that we felt ourselves forced to withdraw our resignations. When Colonel Phayre must have heard that His Highness would not allow us to go, Bapoobhoy and Govindrao-mama brought a message from the Colonel to the Gaekwar on the 11th of August, that His Highness should not appoint me, should turn all four of us out, that he (the Colonel) was ready to say this to our face ten times over, that Manibhoy, Boevey, and Kharkar were a hundred thousand times better than I, that he would shut up the bangalow if I was appointed Dewan, that my appointment would be war and not peace, and that it would bring about His Highness’ ruin in three months, &c. &c. Further in the evening we heard that Bapoobhoy was also one of the Colonel’s contemplated Cabinet. We again told His Highness that the Colonel was really strongly against us, and that though we thought that if he (the Gaekwar) was sincere and loyal in his promises of reform, and showed that sincerity unmistakably by his actions, no harm would come to him from the British Government, and especially the present Viceroy, who had so clearly shown his consideration and justice towards him, we still desired that he should consider carefully before he decided upon my continuing in my Dewanship. The Gaekwar, however, made up his mind and sent the yad for military honors to be accorded to me as Dewan, on the 14th of August. This yad brought forth this letter of 15th August, which I am commenting upon, and which is a tissue from beginning to end of misrepresentations and false statements. Of the rest of the letter from para. 7 and of another string of hallucinations and abuses, and of further dinnings about my unfitness, &c., I need not take any notice. They are of a piece with the rest of the letter; all false and imaginary.

Almost all the above misrepresentations, &c., and further repeated dinnings about my unfitness, want of grasp &c. are repeated in Colonel Phayre’s Report of 2nd November 1874. But it is sickening and useless to go through them again. I shall notice just a few things that are new and important. I may give an instance of what is either his extraordinary gullibility and carelessness, or his desire to misrepresent me.

(Page 60) “The salary,” says he, “of the new Dewan, Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee, has been fixed at a lakh of Rupees per annum.” Certainly a matter like this should be expected to be known to and described by a Resident more accurately. He could have easily ascertained this as well as many other truths by asking me, instead of writing all sorts of untruths behind my back. Now my salary proper was only 63,000 Baroda Rupees, then equal to about 53,000 Bombay Rupees. Out of the rest of the “lakh,” Rupees 31,000 was simply the pay for a Paga, serving in the contingent, which was proposed to be transferred to my name, (but which I had not allowed so to be transferred, as the then holder of it had represented to me a grievance upon the subject); and 6,000 Rupees were for the maintenance of an elephant and for other state ceremonial requirements for the Dewan, 1,000 of them being “palkhi” allowance.

The report of 2nd November is in itself the best proof of the undue and vexatious interference of the Colonel which most seriously interfered with my regular work, and of either his utter want of thought, or intentional ignoring, that reforms and redresses could not be made without men and time to inquire and to act, and that to very nearly the time of this very report we had not received the aid of British officials we had asked for. Even the Bombay Government recognised this necessity and recommended that 3 months more should be allowed in the probation on account of the delay; viz. "to extend this term from the 31st of December 1875 till the 31st March 1876" (page 75).

In para. 145 of this report (page 60), the Colonel writes as a matter of complaint against me, that "Again in a khareeta written by Mr. Dadabhai to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th April 1874, acknowledging the receipt of the report of the Commission, he stated that he was preparing a full reply to the Report." Even if I had said so, there would have been nothing wrong, had I been of the opinion that a reply should be made. But what should we think of this statement, after reading its following short history. The Gujaratee saying "últo Chór Kotwál ne dandé" (The thief fining the magistrate instead) is well verified in this instance. The Report of the Commission was received at Nowsaree. I and Mr. Wadia went there on 13th April. After reading and explaining the report, a short khareeta was prepared the next day,* as the Gaekwar desired and we approved. This was copied fair, signed and sealed on the 15th April. The next morning Nanasaheb took it to Colonel Phayre. On reading his own copy of it, the Colonel flung the paper away, and said this was no reply. It was only a trick of mine to seat myself firmly, and to leave the old Durbarees out in the cold. A full reply should at once be made to the Report. The khareeta was brought back, the Resident himself so suddenly turning over a new leaf and sympathisingly recommending a full and immediate defence. I need not say that I had not the remotest idea of the motive imputed to me in the above message which Nanasheb brought and which was repeated by Bapoobhoy. Now with the Resident's recommendation, the old Durbarees became strong in their advice to defend at once. We two gave a decided "no." We explained, that though the Report of the Commission was open to some exception and attack, it would be simply suicidal on the part of His Highness to make any such attempt, and that we should not be surprised if Colonel Phayre took hold of it to shew to the Viceroy that the Gaekwar had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and that he was still incorrigibly bent on his old ways which the Commission had so unmistakably condemned. To me, I said it was quite puzzling, that Colonel Phayre should suddenly become so solicitous about the character of those very people whom he was himself most instrumental in getting denounced. However, be the Colonel's motive what it may, we said we were decidedly against making any defence at all, especially then, till something more was known of the Viceroy's mind, and that we should not mar the friendly spirit that was shown in the Viceroy's khareeta.

His Highness took time to consider and agreed with us. Another khareeta, with certain additions to meet his wishes to some extent, was prepared, adopted, copied fair on the usual gold paper and ready for signature. But during this time the old Durbarees were at it again. Had not even the Resident recommended that a defence should be made, and that at once, so at last the Gaekwar turned round and refused to sign the khareeta and determined to defend at once. We repeated our advice distinctly. We would not have any defence at all, at least not any then, and left him to please himself. The stakes, large as they were, were his, and we had discharged our duty to give him our best advice. The Resident's recommendation and sympathy carried the day. A telegram was prepared to be sent at once to the Viceroy and a corresponding alteration was made in the khareeta, as follows. In the rejected khareeta, the paragraph was :—

“As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I reserve, for the present, the question of the opinion of the Commission about my general administration, and more particularly even about my personal conduct and that of my Dewan from which I should naturally desire to clear ourselves at an early opportunity. I need only say at present that I have an earnest desire, &c.”

For this was substituted (page 343, No. 1)—“As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I have telegraphed to your Excellency that should the opinions and recommendations of the Report of the Commission be likely to influence your Excellency adversely to my rights, I request your Excellency to postpone determining upon the friendly advice to be given to me till my reply to the Report is received by your Excellency. I am preparing this full reply to the Report. In the meantime, &c.” With this alteration the khareeta was sent on 19th April 1874, and to which the Colonel refers in a way, as if I had done something very wrong and encouraged the Gaekwar to give a full reply. Now, be my advice sound or mistaken, it is strange that Colonel Phayre who is himself the cause of the complaint he makes, fathers it upon me and in a way to insinuate a prejudice against me in the mind of the Viceroy. Or did his “respectable” Bapoobhoy, Nanasaheb and others invent the message from him that he strongly advised a full immediate reply. And I may also ask whether his “highly respectable” informers who “kept him well-informed of the proceedings of the Durbar,” had told him or not that we were all along openly against making any defence, or at least then, against the Report of the Commission, and that it was entirely owing to his advice being thrown in the scale that an immediate defence was determined upon. If the Colonel really recommended the reply, and then made the offer to reply, as a matter of complaint, it was, to say the least, most disingenuous on his part. I can hardly even now persuade myself that Colonel Phayre could have stooped to such conduct. If not, it is a pity that his and others’ eyes should be opened when too late to his blind faith in his “respectables” and “honorables” and the injustice and mischief that must have been caused thereby.

I may here ask the Colonel whether his friend ever informed him or not that from the very first day I came in contact with the Gaekwar, I always, on every necessary occasion, used to impress upon His Highness that however strong his treaty-rights might be, and that though I would represent them from his side to Government to the best of my ability, he should never expect to preserve his rights safe, unless he performed his duties of a good ruler. These were not hole and corner conversations; they were almost always open and in the presence of the Durbarees. While I have, on the one hand, done my best to serve the Gaekwar faithfully and to take care of his legitimate rights and interests, I have never, on the other hand, failed in or shirked my duty to advise him, and to have done my best to lead him to the performance of his duties towards his subjects. But such things the Colonel never learnt.

(Page 63) Colonel Phayre’s insinuation that by the terms of our appointment we were entirely subject to the will of the Gaekwar, implying as if we were bound to allow the Gaekwar to perpetrate any injustice or enormity he liked, is ridiculous and absurd. Now nothing was more well known and noised abroad than the fact that we would not allow the Gaekwar to do as he willed, but at once protested against and prevented any irregular or undue interference with the administration. Why, that monstrous “agreement” which frightened the Colonel so much was the result of this very position that we would not submit to allow the Gaekwar or his Durbarees in his name, to do anything wrong. That was our chief and continued struggle with the Durbar. Colonel Phayre and all the Durbarees knew this well, and yet this attempt to misrepresent us! It is simply a libel to say that the gentlemen who were with me would agree or that I would agree or ask them to serve on such conditions.

After thus briefly noticing some of the most glaring misrepresentations and falsehoods in Colonel Phayre’s writings, I pass over without notice his remarks upon the Gaekwar’s khareeta of 2nd November 1874, as, first, they are mostly a repetition of what had been stated by him before, and upon the glaring portion of which I have already commented; and secondly, the Indian Government have done sufficient justice to the khareeta in their despatch to the Secretary of State, of 27th November 1874.

The despatch (page 104) says “the Gaekwar has addressed the Viceroy a khareeta in which His Highness has in temperate language begged for the removal of Colonel Phayre.” * * “We are constrained to admit (apart from certain objections raised by Colonel Phayre to the accuracy of the Gaekwar’s statement of two particular instances of interference) the general correctness of His Highness’ complaints of Colonel Phayre’s proceedings.”

Again the Indian Government in their despatch to the Secretary of State, (No. 5, page 4) of 15th April 1875, say, “In his communications with the Gaekwar and with Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee, the Minister whom the Gaekwar had selected, Colonel Phayre was wanting in consideration.”

Lord Salisbury in his despatch of 15th April 1875 (No. 4, page 106) says, “His (Colonel Phayre’s) character was little fitted for the delicate duties with which he had been recently charged, and his departure from the orders he had received was too serious to be overlooked.”

Again in their despatch of 29th April 1875, (No. 5, page 43) to the Secretary of State, the Indian Government do me the justice (for which I feel thankful) to say “shortly after Sir Lewis Pelly’s arrival, Mr. Dadabhai Naorojee, the Minister in whom Mulhar Rao professed to place confidence, and who, so far as we could judge, had been honestly desirous of reforming the administration,* resigned office, and no explanation has been afforded to us of the reason for his resignation."

With regard to our resignation the Secretary of State also in his despatch of 3rd June 1875, (page 52) to the Indian Government, says, “Almost the last incident in the history of his reign, before it was closed by his arrest on the charge of poisoning, was the mysterious resignation, without reason given, of the reforming Minister who had been appointed under the pressure of Sir R. Meade's report.”

Our resignations were communicated to the Gaekwar on 21st December 1874, when nothing was known to us of His Highness being implicated in the poison-case. This was first mentioned to me on 23rd December by Sir Lewis Pelly, after I had communicated to him our reasons for our resignation. On 25th December, I repeated those reasons at an interview, at the Residency between His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly and myself. 1st, I reminded His Highness that I had undertaken the duties of the Dewan at his pressing request, that I had plainly given him my condition in acceding to his request that as long I had his confidence and I was useful, I serve, and that when that confidence was withdrawn and my usefulness impaired, I make my salam and go; that we had on two former occasions withdrawn our resignations at his pressing and earnest solicitations, and that notwithstanding all this, he had, during the past week or so allowed himself to play in the hands of his old Durbarees, and forgotten that he had requested me to become his Dewan and not a karkoon merely to obey his biddings. 2nd, that after showing long and sufficient forbearance and giving a long trial to the old Durbarees to mend their ways, we had found it absolutely necessary that they should be sent out of Baroda, and I gave a list of Damodar, Bapoobhoy, Govindrao Mama, Kharhar, Hurybadada (Nana Saheb having himself offered to leave Baroda for some time), and several other names. His Highness in reply expressed his regret at my first complaint and promised me every confidence, but my second demand he pressed me to waive. I then expressed our determination not to withdraw our resignations. When I decided to resign, all the 8 or 9 officials from the Bombay Government, besides my 3 colleagues, who had wilfully and readily agreed and come to serve under me, also decided to resign with me, though they had been hardly a month or two in their new posts. This is a strange commentary upon Colonel Phayre's views that no officials of weight and character from the British districts would like to serve under me, and that my selections would agree to serve under the old Baroda ways.

I pass over Colonel Phayre's last shot, (No. 6, page 9) fired a day after he received the private intimation to resign;—"a day or two after this, Mr. Dadabhai Nowroji made his false and malicious attack upon me in the khareeta of the 9th May." This was as much imaginary as many other things I have already noticed, if not the effect of the irritation of the previous day's intimation. In connection with No. 7 of the Blue Book, it is enough for me to extract the letter I addressed, at the close of the last Commission, to the Times of India.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES OF INDIA.

Sir,—As I have not been put into the witness-box either by the prosecution or the defence, I hope you will allow me to say a few words about some matters concerning me personally which were referred to at the enquiry.

It is true that I received the resolution of May 1872. The history of the affair is simply this. Mr. Hurrychund Chintamon, who is at present in England as His Highness's agent, obtained a copy, and I believe honestly, from an English friend in England. It was when he sent it to me about last June that His Highness, myself and my colleagues came to know of it. Mr. Hurrychund brought the existence of this resolution to the notice of Lord Salisbury on the 24th June last. The document was given to the defence by me, as I had received it. In the course of a conversation I mentioned the resolution to Sir Lewis Pelly. He asked for a copy of it and I gave it.

Colonel Phayre says I made no complaints to him about his course of proceedings Colonel Phayre may have forgotten, but as a matter of fact I did complain to him several times. Colonel Phayre says he gave me all the assistance in his power Had I been so fortunate as to have received that assistance, no necessity would have arisen to write the khareeta of 2nd November. Colonel Phayre says I more than once acknowledged the assistance he had given me in the matter of the Sirdar cases and others. True; but I am only sorry that the occasions were few and far between. I had more occasions to thank Sir Lewis Pelly in one week than I had for thanking Colonel Phayre in three months, and I was able to do more work both towards introducing new reforms and redressing old complaints in one week with Sir Lewis Pelly, than I was able to do in three months with Colonel Phayre.

Colonel Phayre says the facts of the two instances given in the khareeta of 2nd November are not correctly stated. I have not yet learned what was incorrect in them. For my part I can say that every fact is correctly stated.

Yours faithfully, DADABHAI NAOROJI.

I close this painful task with the hope that it may open the eyes of Government to the mischief and iniquity of the present system of the political department, of receiving secret reports and acting thereon.

DADABHAI NAOROJI.

II.

CONDITION OF INDIA.

(Correspondence with the Secretary of State for India, 1880.)

I.

32, Great St. Helens, London, 24th May 1880.

To The Right Honourable THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON, The Secretary of State for India, India Office.

My Lord, I beg to submit a series of tables, working out in detail the total production of the Punjab, for the year 1876-7. My objects in troubling your Lordship are as follows :—

In 1876 I read some papers on the Poverty of India before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association of London. These papers are published in the Journals of the Association, and I send herewith a copy. At pages 237 to 239* I have explained how the mode of taking the averages adopted in the various Administration Reports of India, was quite wrong. When preparing my Papers on the Poverty of India, I had not sufficient time to work out all the averages for all the Provinces in detail. I have now worked out in detail the averages of all the production Tables of the Administration Report of the Punjab for 1876-7. I request now that the different Governments in India may be directed to supply their tables of production, as fully as are prescribed by the Statistical Committee of Calcutta, that the averages may be correctly taken, as I have done in the enclosed tables, and that in addition to the tables prescribed, may also be given a summary of the total agricultural production like the one given at page 21 of my tables, a summary of the whole production (agricultural, manufactures and mines) like that at page 23, and a table of the absolute necessaries of life for an agricultural labourer, like that at pages 26 to 28.

It is only when such complete information is furnished by the Indian authorities, that any true conception can be formed of the actual material condition of India from year to year, and our British rulers can only then clearly see, and grapple with effectually, the important problem of the material condition of India, and the best means of improving it.

I have also to solicit your Lordship to submit my tables to the Statistical Department of the India Office, and to direct to oblige me by pointing out any mistakes of facts or figures there may be in them.

In troubling your Lordship with these requests, I have no other object than to help, as far as my humble opportunities go, to arrive at the real truth of the actual material condition of India. For it is only natural that without the knowledge of the whole truth on this most important subject, all efforts, however well and benevolently intentioned, must generally result in disappointment and failures.

I also earnestly desire and solicit that your Lordship will kindly take into your consideration the representations I have urged in my papers on the Poverty of India.

I remanin,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

DADABHAI NAOROJI.

ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF PUNJAB 1876-7.

Page 77, "Upon the whole the character of the weather during the year 1876-7 was favourable for agriculture."

I have taken 1 seer equal 2·057 lbs. from the Compilation entitled "Prices of food grains throughout India—1861-76, compiled in the Financial Department of the Government of India—Calcutta, 1878."

The prices I have adopted are the average of the prices given in the Report for 1st January 1876, 1st June 1876, and 1st January 1877— the last being the latest price that is given in the Report.

For all such particulars or figures as are not given in the Report, I have consulted a Punjab farmer, and adopted such information as he has given me.

There are some figures in the report which are evidently some mistakes and are much in excess of probability. But I have not altered them, though by retaining them as given in the report, the quantity and value of some of the articles become much higher than what they must most probably really be.

Excepting such mistakes, the farmer thinks the tables of the Report give a fair representation of the produce of Punjab—the averages being worked out in the right way they should be, and not as they are given in the Report, worked on a wrong principle.

ADMINISTRATION REPORT—PUNJAB 1876-7.

TBL-103 · FOLIO 435Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Rice.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per 1 Re.Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
1 Delhi... ...27,90092025,668,00013·7118,72,210
2 Gurgaon ...1,5917201,145,52019·259,662
3 Karnàl ...53,1131,15261,186,17621·9427,88,795
4 Hissar ...10,5067457,826,97023·313,35,777
5 Rohtak ...5,3266703,568,42025·371,40,655
6 Sirsa... ...8,2858697,199,66521·943,28,152
7 Umballa ...117,941880103,788,08019·8852,20,728
8 Ludhiàna ...3,9631,0964,343,44816·452,64,039
9 Simla ...1,8756201,162,50018·5162,804
10 Jullundar ...9,1921,0859,973,32016·456,06,281
11 Hoshiarpur ...28,83575221,683,92017·8212,16,830
12 Kàngra ...147,76641561,322,89029·4820,80,152
13 Amritsar ...20,12897419,604,67218·5110,59,139
14 Gurdáspur ...81,58375561,595,16515·7739,05,844
15 Siálkot ...74,1001,02976,248,90030·8524,71,601
16 Lahore ...22,41586119,299,31530·176,39,685
17 Gujránwála ...9,9257597,533,07519·883,78,927
18 Firozepore ...6,5437955,201,68520·912,48,765
19 Ráwalpindi ...1,0939701,060,21012·3485,916
20 Jhelum ...233943219,71911·6518,860
21 Gujrát ...6,9695864,083,83417·822,29,171
22 Shahpur ...990790782,10022·6334,560
23 Mooltan ...9,8007507,350,00013·715,36,105
24 Jhang ...12728135,68713·712,603
25 Montgomery... ...7,8701,1459,011,15013·716,57,268
26 Mazaffargarh ...10,1788528,671,65616·455,27,152
27 D. I. Khan ...1,366196267,73612·8520,835
28 D. G. Khan ...14,0015137,182,513183,99,028
29 Bannu ...125880110,00012·858,560
30 Peshàwar ...10,3258949,230,55013·456,86,286
31 Hazára ...12,2741,15214,139,64828·84,90,960
32 Kohát ...2,3611,5073,558,02714·832,39,920
Total...708,699Average. 796564,054,551Average. 20·422,76,17,270

I take produce of rice as 25 fold, and deduct 4 per cent. for seed. The quantity will then become lbs. 541,492,369 and value Rs. 2,65,12,580. Again the price of rice given in the Report is for “1st sort” only. The medium or 2nd sort forms the bulk and there is lower sort still. 2nd sort is generally about 75 per cent. of the 1st sort. I take upon the whole 85 per cent. The value then for the whole bulk will be Rs. 2,25,35,693.

Wheat.

TBL-104 · FOLIO 436Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Wheat.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per Re. 1Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
1159,900913145,988,70053·8227,12,536
2132,425856113,355,80049·3722,96,046
3113,1101,319149,192,09048·6830,64,751
439,04854821,398,30448·344,42,662
599,42873272,781,29649·3714,74,200
656,31025514,359,05049·022,92,922
7296,3221,000296,322,00051·2557,81,892
8137,0121,013138,793,15651·0827,17,172
93,6105501,985,50038·3951,719
10269,0101,339360,204,39049·3772,96,017
11349,863692242,105,19648·6849,73,401
12144,17046066,318,20037·0217,91,415
13263,2651,038273,269,07052·1152,44,081
14325,529856278,652,82450·7454,91,778
15197,000910179,270,00049·0236,57,078
16368,000557204,976,00050·3940,67,791
17203,745793161,569,78550·7431,84,268
18241,180736177,508,48058·9730,10,148
19424,135776329,128,76068·947,76,905
20480,273933448,094,709·64·4569,52,594
21268,316736197,360,57657·4234,37,139
22199,325790157,466,75058·6226,86,229
23186,040655121,856,20041·8329,13,129
24161,169674108,627,90649·3722,00,281
25263,4941,252329,894,48853·4861,68,558
26201,3631,248251,301,02443·8857,27,006
27176.055777136,794,73569·4219,70,537
28156,594765119,794,41044·5726,87,781
29262,728523137,406,74488·2815,56,487
30232,975600139,785,00057·4724,32,312
31100,57099399,866,01058·9716,93,505
3297,53381679,586,92870·8911,22,682
Average. 840·4Average. 53·48
Total...6,609,4975,555,014,08110,38,75,022

I take produce of wheat 25 fold, and deduct 4 per cent. for seed. The quantity will be lbs. 5,332,813,517, and value will be Rupees 9,97,20,021. The price given in the report is for 1st sort only. The 2nd sort forms the bulk, and is generally about 12 per cent. lower in price. I take only 8 per cent. lower for the whole bulk.

The value of the whole will then be Rs. 9,17,42,419.

TBL-105 · FOLIO 437Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Makai (Indian Corn).
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per Re. 1.Total Value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
113,9001,50020,850,000722,89,583
21,344„2,016,00075·4226,730
36,215„9,322,50067·191,38,748
489„133,50051·422,596
573„109,500†
6466„699,000†
7100,736„151,104,00062·424,21,538
862,802„94,203,00066·5114,16,373
91,282„1,923,00045·9441,859
*1086,3921,544*133,389,24863·0821,14,604
11105,6511,500158,476,50055·5428,53,375
1265,093„97,639,50039·7724,55,104
*1344,4261,412*62,729,51265·149,62,995
1449,9771,50074,965,50053·4814,01,748
1533,000„49,500,00058·288,49,450
1634,150„51,225,00065·827,78,258
1716,535„24,802,50061·024,06,465
1842,428„63,642,00081·597,80,022
1966,392„99,588,00094·6210,52,504
202,423„3,634,50064·4556,392
2116,507„24,760,50068·573,61,098
22884„1,326,00063·0821,020
23142„213,00050·054,255
242,317„3,475,50065·8252,803
252,512„3,768,00049·3776,321
26
2717„25,50090·85280
2830„45,000†
2937,069„55,603,500124·274,47,441
3080,542„120,813,00084·4214,31,094
31198,025„297,037,50095·0931,23,751
3212,920„19,380,00097·921,97,916
* 130,818Average. 1,499·17196,118,760Average. 68·42,37,64,323
953,5211,5001,430,281,500† add for 853,500 lbs.12,478
Total...1,084,3391,626,400,2602,37,76,801

For makai I take 50 fold and therefore deduct 2 per cent. for seed. The total quantity will then be lbs. 1,593,872,255, and value will be Rs. 2,33,01,265.

TBL-106 · FOLIO 438Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Jow (Barley).
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per 1 Re.Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
161,29050330,828.87073·024,22,197
2197,145”99,163,93569·9414,17,842
329,856”15,017,56872·682,06,625
430,312”15,246,93683·651,82,270
542,353”21,303,55975·422,82,465
6101,408”51,008,224108·334,70,859
735,787”18,000,861722,50,011
8106,202”53,419,60686·396,18,354
93,134”1,576,40250·7431,068
1025,211*85621,580,61675·422,86,139
1121,60250310,865,80676·791,41,500
1256,831*25014,207,75052·112,72,649
1336,50950318,364,02784·342,17,738
14123,635”62,188,40563·089,85,865
15122,000”61,366,00083·657,33,604
1657,181”28,762,04382·963,46.697
1764,082”32,233,24688·453,64,423
18195,298”98,234,894100·19,81,367
1943,383”21,821,64977·482,81,642
2017,879”8,993,13776·111,18,159
2167,094”33,748,28282·284,10,163
2215,657”7,875,47178·161,00,760
2311,832*8009,465,60059·651,58,685
246,0835033,059,74974·7440,938
2521,802”10,966,40669·941,56,797
2610,987*6797,460,17360·341,23,635
2719,2035039,659,10994·281,02,451
285,925”2,980,27560·4249,325
29 .26,282”13,219,846133·798,876
30238,161”119,794,983104·3011,48,561
3170,079”35,249,737102·983,42,296
3210,014”5,037,042109·2846,092
Total...1,874,217942,700,207Average. 82·761,13,90,053

For barley I take 16 fold. Deducting for seed 1/16th, the total quantity will be lbs. 883,781,444—and the value will be Rs. 1,06,78,175.

Gram.

TBL-107 · FOLIO 439Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Gram.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per Re. 1.Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
157,50064537,087,50072515,104
2101,184* 62062,734,08071·65875,562
3119,935* 68081,555,80072·3411,27,395
476,53464549,364,43080·22615,363
5119,240* 79094,199,60078·1612,05,214
637,76264524,356,490102·85236,815
7175,094”112,935,63076·1114,83,847
8171,984”110,929,68077·8214,25,464
95”3,22551·0863
1065,158* 1,23380,339,81473·3710,94,995
1146,32464529,878,98061·024,89,658
12370,802* 290107,532,58051·0821,05,179
13103,350* 1,394144,069,9008417,15,117
1431,34764520,218,81573·372,75,573
1521,500”13,867,50074·051,87,272
16171,216”110,434,32089·8212,29,507
1731,682”20,434,89083·652,44,290
18255,898”165,054,21096·6817,07,221
1938,263”24,679,63576·793,21,391
2034,115”22,004,17565·143,37,798
2134,728”22,399,560683,08,194
2223,817”15,361,96574·052,07,453
238,404”5,420,58057·2594,682
2412,026”7,756,77073·371,05,721
2581,616”52,642,32077·486,79,431
2612,679* 1,94224,622,61855·544,43,331
2711,9226457,689,69095·1380,833
281,961”1,264,84547·7426,494
2953,037* 28615,168,582106·281,42,722
30947645610,81544·0513,866
31222”143,19061·712,320
321,984”1,279,68070·3618,187
Average.Average.
Total......2,272,2366451,466,041,86975·891,93,16,062

I take gram 30 fold. Deducting for seed accordingly, the total quantity will be lbs. 1,417,173,807, and the value will be Rs. 1,86,72,194.

TBL-108 · FOLIO 440Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Inferior Grains (as noted below.)†
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per 1 Re.Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
1114,67752259,861,39466·858,95,458
2404,175447180,666,2256627,37,367
3196,787521102,526,02764·7915,82,436
41,256,158393493,670,09476·7964,28,833
5441,437412181,872,04464·7928,07,100
6680,22511880,266,550104·397,68,910
7195,893680133,207 24066·1620,13,410
8214,1111,355290,120,40568·9142,10,135
93,4065201,771,12040·1144,156
10165,76739565,477,96562·0510,55,245
11111,93368576,674,10558·4113,12,687
1230,36636210,992,492*
1371,93759042,442,83067·886,25,262
14154,30664899,990,2884820,83,131
1594,07074570,082,15065·1410,75,869
16141,57937452,950,54669·947,57,085
17123,51544955,458,23564·458,60,484
18477,728608290,458,62482·1135,37,433
19287,941554159,519,31492·9117,16,923
20209,379722151,171,63870·2821,50,990
21239,640632151,452,48080·9118,71,863
2268,819110075,700,90066·1611,44,209
2398,84746846,260,39651·089,05,646
2455,47421812,093,33260·172,00,986
2563,88368643,823,73855·547,89,048
2676,96969353,339,51749·3710,80,403
2743,61848521,154,73089·132,37,346
28178,113640113,992,32054·1721,04,344
29105,48853656,541,568111·425,07,463
30107,18355058,950,65059·489,91,100
3152,07496049,991,04074·056,75,098
3269,46577053,488,050112·284,76,380
Total...6,534,963Average. 510·53,335,968,007Average. 69·78 Add4,76,46,800 1,57,530
4,78,04,330

Seed required per acre. for acres.

† Joár per acre 40 lbs. × 2,221,535 Bájri ... ... 16 ,, × 2,339,796 Kangni ... 8 ,, × 58,434 Chína... ... 16 ,, × 74,842 Moth ... ... 24 ,, × 982,208 Matter ... 20 ,, × 106,865 Mash ... ... 16 ,, × 213.465 Mung ... 16 ,, × 263,324 Masur ... 32 ,, × 187,544 Arhar ... 16 ,, × 86,950

6,534,963

It should be noted that the prices of Jowár, Bájrá, Másh, Mung and Arhar are nearly the same generally, but of the remaining 5 kinds of grain, viz. Moth, Kangni, China, Matter and Masur, the prices are generally nearly 25 per cent. lower. The prices I have used in the table are as given in the Report for Jáwar and Bájrá only—though the acreage of the lower priced grains is 1,409,893 acres out of 6,534,963 acres, or above 20 per cent. If the allowance for the lower price of the 5 kinds of grains mentioned above were made, the value will evidently be much lower than I have given above. It requires also to be noted that out of the inferior grains a portion goes for the feed of animals in about the following proportions :—

TBL-109 · FOLIO 441Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
GrainProportion for human use.Proportion for animal's use.
Bájrá½½
Jowár⅓⅔
Moth¼¾
Másh⅔⅓
also Jow¼¾
Gram½½

So that out of the total acreage of grains of all the above kinds, viz.

TBL-110 · FOLIO 441Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Gram2,272,236 × ½= 6,000,512 acres are for animal use, or nearly three-fifths of the total acres 9,903,457.
Bájrá2,339,796 × ½
Jowár2,221,535 × ⅔
Jow1,874,217 × ¾
Moth982,208 × ¾
Mash213,465 × ⅓
9,903,457

And out of the whole acreage of all kinds of grains, i.e. 19,083,971 acres, about 30 per cent. is used for producing food for animals.

Poppy (Opium).

TBL-111 · FOLIO 442Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Poppy (Opium).
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.
lbs.lbs.
73,6201865,160
869
92443732
10578
11163
121,53934,617
138771916,663
14278
15140
1677053,850
17147101,470
18263
195315795
2081141,134
21336155,040
222,1821021,820
23256150
242710270
25949846
264011440
27238184
285352010,700
2915
30673201
3118291,638
Average.135,710 for 10,842 acres.
Total...12,34812·51add 18,840 „ 1,506 „ { for which no crop per acre is given, at 12·51 average.
154,550 „ 12,348

Government pay Rs. 5 per seer or Rs. 2½ per lb. to the producer. The total value will therefore be Rs. 3,86,375.

The additional value at which Government sells opium is a part of the national income as it is chiefly paid by a Foreign Country as profit of trade, and therefore (as I have done in my “Poverty of India”) the net opium Revenue will have to be added to the total production of the country. The particular provinces only from which this revenue is derived, viz. Bengal, Bombay and other opium producing places, cann ot be credited with this income. It belongs to the whole nation, as every place is not quite free to cultivate opium.

Tobacco.

TBL-112 · FOLIO 443Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Tobacco.
Districts.Acres.Per acre.Total quantity.Price per Re. ITotal value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
I7,4728886,635,1365·1412,90,882
22,4246001,454,40014·41,01,000
3917525481,42516·4529,266
42,8125821,636,58416·4599,488
51,851514951,41416·4557,836
6381850323,85014·423,489
74,6615602,610,16012·342,11,520
81,5509251,433,75027·2552,614
9*58464,2309·6440
102,7931,5614,359,87324·681,76,656
113,7821,7336,554,20619·883,29,688
12776532412,83212·3433,454
132,1699842,134,29618·511,15,305
143,9731,0404,131,92016·452,51,180
155,7859175,304,84516·453,22,483
163,4604611,595,06016·4596,964
173,2596692,180,27117·141,27,203
185,8796513,827,22913·032,93,724
191,3801,0801,490,40016·4590,601
20622792492,62417·8327,628
212,3895931,416,67712·341,14,803
228381,7001,424,60012·341,15,445
231,8396561,206,3846·511,85,312
241,173820961,86012·3477,946
258511,042886,74216·4653,872
26978780762,84015·0950,552
272,0296151,247,83512·6898,409
28783740579,4207·2879,590
29452870393,24020·619,089
301,2508801,100,00021·8550,343
312748012,96017·83726
32*3,3078462,797,72210·972,55,033
Total...71,867Average. 84660,804,785Average. 12·5848,32,541

No deduction is made for nursery or seed. The average of 12·58 lbs. per rupee is rather a high price. It is considered, 12 seers or 24 lbs. per Rupee would be nearer the average. I have, as above, kept the Report's price, though it is considered so high.

Turmeric.

Neither produce per acre, nor price is given in the Report. I take 10 maunds for green, which gives 2 maunds dry or 164 ℔s. dry per acre. The price is taken say 10 ℔s. per 1 Rupee.

4130 acres × 164 ℔s. = 677,320 ℔s.—at ℔s. 10 per rupee = Rs. 67,732.

Coriander Seed.

As above neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take as follows :—

Acres 6934 × 330 ℔s. dry per acre = 2,288,220 ℔s. at 16 ℔s. per Rupee=Rs. 1,43,014.

Ginger.

As above.

286 acres × 205 ℔s. per acre (dry)=58,630 ℔s. at 7 ℔s. per Rupee = Rs. 8376.

Chillies

TBL-113 · FOLIO 444Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Produce per acre given for 4 districts only, viz :—
No. 2 acres774 × 600 ℔s. =℔s. 464,400The average of 808 ℔s. is applied to the rest. The
13611 × 410 ,, =250,510total quantity then is 19,003,502 ℔s. of green
183,604 × 924 ., =3,330,096crop. Dry quantity will
3077 × 640 ,, =49,280be one-fifth or 3,800,700 ℔s. and at 8 ℔s. per Rupee,
Total...5,066 — Average. 8084,094,286the value will be
Add for18,452@ ,,14,909,216Rs. 4,75,100.
23,51819,003,502

Other kinds of Drugs and Spices.

These are chiefly Ajmá, Bádián, Jeree, and Sowá. Neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take as follows :—

Acres 35,074 at 330 ℔s. per acre=11,574,420 ℔s. at average of 14 lbs. per Rupee, Rs. 8,26,744.

Oil Seeds.

TBL-114 · FOLIO 445Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Oil Seeds.
Districts.Acres.Per AcreTotal quantity.
lbs.lbs.
110,2602933,006,180The price of these seeds is not given in the
211,5062372,726,922Report.
313,0185006,509,000I take as follows :—
421,5822425,222,844Linseed and } Rs. 3 per maund or 27 lbs.
512,3042973,654,288Sarso } per Re. 1.
679,160* 806,332,800Til seed, Rs. 4 per maund or 20 lbs. per Re. 1.
727,22956015,248,240Taramira, Rs. 2½ per maund or 32 lbs. per
811,1726687,462,896Re. 1.
9The quantity of these seeds is about in
1011,3927158,145,280proportion of 55 per cent. of Linseed & Sarso.
1125,9113108,032,41015 " " Til.
1218,4423526,491,58430 " " Taramira.
1335,99658220,949,672The price then will be
1424,92340810,168,584lbs.
1523,80677718,497,26255 per cent. by 27=1,485 ) Average 27·45
1681,89426021,292,44015 per cent. by 20= 300 } -lbs. per Re. 1.
1717,9523075,511,26430 per cent. by 32= 960 )
1870,31560142,259,315
1969,29431121,550,434Taking 27 lbs. per Re. 1, the total value
2060,16948128,941,289will be Rs. 1,22,83,423.
2150,37529114,659,125For seed,
224,7127503,534,000per acre.
239,5414624,407,942Linseed... 6 lbs } Sarso ...8 " } by 55 per cent.. } Average Till ......6 " by 15 " } 7·15 lbs. Taramira 8 " by 30 " } per acre.
243,473252875,196
2529,07647713,869,252
2624,4532887,042,464
2717,6604648,194,240Taking 7 lbs. of seed required per acre—
2820,47349210,072,716for produce of 392 lbs. gives 56 fold. De-
294,004136544,544ducting 56th part, the total quantity will
3030,24446013,912,240become lbs. 325,730,071, and total value will
3121,00553311,195,665become Rs. 1,20,64,076.
325,3482511,342,348
Total846,689Average. 392331,652,436

Cotton.

TBL-115 · FOLIO 446Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Cotton.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price per Re. 1Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
124,5651864,569,0906·517,01,857
247,8551647,848,2206·5112,05,563
321,5101403,011,4006·434,68,336
420,323871,768,1016·172,86,564
549,073703,435,1107·24,77,098
677644,9286·17798
727,332721,967,9046·343,10,395
811,48885976,4806·341,54,019
9
1026,0931223,183,3465·146,19,328
1124,4201363,321,1205·496,04,940
126,73322148,1265·1428,818
1323,597641,510,2085·652,67,293
1437,474501,873,7005·143,64,533
1511,42565742,6255·651,31,438
1625,3051383,492,0905·496,36,082
1733,3761294,305,5045·497,84,244
189,6801581,529,4406·172,47,883
1933,7451284,319,3604·469,68,466
2025,5571223,117,9545·275,91,642
2124,716431,062,7884·632,29,543
2226,029501,301,4505·492,37,058
2316,550821,357,1005·652,40,194
2416,881871,468,6475·272,78,680
2515,8381492,359,8625·314,44,418
2629,6321243,674,36866,12,394
2711,1751151,285,12562,14,187
2829,739842,498,0765·74,38,259
297,54473550,7125·361,02,744
3016,468* 1051,729,1405·233,30,619
318,280100828,0004·112,01,460
326,396121773,9164·411,75,491
Total..668,876Average 10570,013,890Average 5·661,23,54,344

The average of 105 lbs. per acre is evidently too high. 80 lbs. will be nearer the mark. If so, the above quantity and value are nearly 36½ per cent. above the right quantity and value.

Very probably some of the figures of produce per acre are for uncleaned or seed cotton. The report uses the word “cotton” only in the column of produce per acre, while in the column for prices it uses the words “Cotton (cleaned).”

Hemp.

TBL-116 · FOLIO 447Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Hemp.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price lbs. per Re. 1.Total value Rs.
lbs.lbs.
12,100* 1,1582,431,800The prices are not given in the Report. I take ordinarily prepared fibre as 20 lbs. per Rupee. The value of 18,770,866 lbs. at 20 lbs. per Rupee will be Rs. 9,38,543.
251611659,856
31,085450488,250
42,788153426,564
516,1464657,507,890
71,619220356,180
81,637305499,285
103,6553981,454,690
116,4241921,233,408
125,2633121,642,056
131,002444444,888
141,622352570,944
153,205177567,285
16537306164,322
17355406144,130
181,649218359,482
1941712050,040
2020336073,080
21971286277,706
222250500
25† 253669,150
30392409,360
Total...51,260Average 36618,770,866

In the Report the figures of crop per acre are given under the heading " Fibres." In the columns per 'acres cultivated '—Cotton and Hemp are given under the heading of " Fibres ;" and as produce per acre of cotton is given separately, the produce per acre under the heading " Fibres " applies to Hemp.

Kassamba (Safflower).

Neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take 40 lbs. per acre of dry prepared stuff—and price 2½ lbs. per Re. 1. Acres 24,708 by 40 lbs. = 988,320 at 2½ lbs. per Re. 1, gives Rs. 3,95,328.

Indigo.

TBL-117 · FOLIO 448Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Indigo.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.Price lbs. per Re. 1.Total value Rs.
lbs.lbs.
1100303,000
2561005,600The price is not given in the Report. I take annas 12 per lb. which will give the total value to be Rs. 30,53,205.
35883017,640
4* 785
5* 1,526
71,79862111,476
82,4673387,351
107544130,914
111,1624451,128
182624624
21471014,747
2375,364261,959,464
2422958
25820160
2620,603501,030,150
2823,99929695,971
Total...129,465Average. 31·44 * add3,998,283 72,658
4,070,941
TBL-118 · FOLIO 449Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Vegetables.
Districts.Acres.Per AcreTotal quantity.Price per Re. 1Total value.
Ibs.fbs.lbs.Rs.
I11,7004,75355,610,10043·8812,67,322
2* 9,387* 6,00056,322,00028·819,55,625
38464,7534,021,03039·771,01,107
43,485,,16,564,20528·85,75,146
5920,,4,372,76035·651,22,658
6677,,3,217,78127·431,17,308
73,495,,16,611,73535·654,65,967
87,560,,35,932,68030·1711,91,006
97,,33,27160·34551
107,731,,36,745,44327·4313,39,607
113,586,,17,044,25832·915,17,905
126,551,,31,136,90349·376,30,684
1315,175,,72,126,77536·3419,84,776
146,790,,32,272,87027·4311,76,553
153,000,,14,259,00032·914,33,272
165,746,,27,310,73824·6811,06,593
1756,988,,270,863,96439·7768,10,761
18* 4,274* 2,0158,612,11032·912,61,686
194,6604,75322,148,98040·455,47,564
203,709,,17,628,87731·545,58,937
2121,904,,104,109,71228·836,14,920
2211,072,,52,625,216
2329,239,,138,972,96726·7451,97,194
2423,203,,110,283,85920·5753,61,393
251,423,,6,763,51927·432,46,574
263,095,,14,710,53521·256,92,260
27803,,3,816,65933·421,14,202
28794,,3,773,88220·571,83,465
294,152,,19,734,45645·254,36,120
303,631,,17,258,14332·055,38,475
31598,,2,842,29445·2562,813
32599,,2,847,04731·4590,526
Total.256,800Average 4,7531,220,573,777Average 30·983,77,02,970 for lbs. 1,167,948,561

The prices I have taken above are given in the Report for potato only—and the average comes to say 31 lbs. per Re. 1. This is a high average price. The average price of potato will be nearer 60 than 31 lbs. I take however the average of 31 lbs.

Now out of the vegetables grown, about one-eighth only will be potato and seven-eighths other kind of general vegetables.

This will give, out of lbs. 1,220,573,777—seven-eighths of general vegetables=lbs. 1,068,002,055.

The price of vegetables is not given in the Report. It may be taken as 1½ maunds per Re. 1 or 124 lbs., say 100 lbs. per Re. 1—which will give the total value of vegetables to be about Rs. 1,06,80,020.

Again the average of 4,753 lbs. is of vegetables, but potato will be only about 30 maunds or lbs. 2,460 per acre, and as potato will be about ⅛th of the acreage planted with vegetables, or about 32,100 acres, the total quantity of potato will be 32,100 × 2,460=78,966,000 lbs. This at the price of 31 lbs. per Re. 1 will give Rs. 25,47,290.

I make no deduction for seed potato, or seed for vegetables.

Tea.

The produce per acre is given for 1 district only. But the Report at page 78 takes the general average to be the same, viz. 96 lbs. The price is not given. I take 3 lbs. per Re. 1.

TBL-119 · FOLIO 450Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Districts.Acres.
975
127,985
19468
30356
Total...8,884 × 96 lbs. = lbs. 852,864—at 3 lbs. per Re. 1, will give Rs. 2,84,288.

Sugar.

TBL-120 · FOLIO 451Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Sugar.
Districts.Acres.Per Acre.Total quantity.1st sort Price per Re. 1.Total value.
lbs.lbs.lbs.Rs.
134,881*†1,50052,321,5005·4995,30,328
21,125646726,7506·681,08,795
314,309"9,243,6147·0313,14,881
434"‡ 21,964
533,324"21,527,3048·1426,44,631
66* 3892,3346·34368
725,540* 2807,151,2005·8312,26,620
814,400* 6619,518,4006·8613,87,521
1043,963* 53123,344,3536·5135,85,922
1142,015* 59725,082,9556·5138,52,988
128,139* 4944,020,6666·436,25,297
1336,57964623,630,0347·1133,23,492
1441,375* 36014,895,0005·6526,36,283
1529,00964618,739,8146·5128,78,619
162,527"1,632,4425·652,88,927
1726,625"17,199,7507·225,27,743
181,916* 410785,56061,30,926
192,3816461,538,1266·342,42,606
20414"267,4445·8345,873
217,221* 6604,765,8606·517,32,082
221,312646‡ 847,552
233,726"2,406,9966·173,90,112
24260* 26167,8605·9111,482
2511364672,9986·1711,831
264,355"2,813,3305·834,82,560
2788"56,8485·6510,061
2855"35,5305·236,793
295,443"3,516,1785·366,56,003
309,914"6,404,4446·0810,53,362
31561"362,4065·4966,022
3220"12,9205·742,250
Total.391,630Average 646253,012,132Average 6·343,97,74,378

The average price, as obtained on the basis of the prices given in the Report, is, for “1st sort” or what is called Misri. But there are different qualities of sugar, viz. Gol, Red Sugar, ordinary 2nd sort sugar, and best or 1st sort sugar. Taking the price of 1st sort as averaging 6 lbs. per Rupee, the prices of the other kinds are :—

Gol ... ... 24 lbs. per Rupee ) Of these the first two form nearly Red Sugar ... 16 ,, ,, } 2/3rds and the last two form 1/3rd Ordinary 2nd 7 ,, ,, } of the whole quantity. 1st sort ... 6 ,, ,, ) Taking in this ratio we get 2/3rds at 20 lbs. = 13 1/3 } or 15 1/2 or say 15 lbs. per Rupee. 1/3rd „ 6 1/2 „ = 2 1/6 }

The whole quantity, being 253,012,132 lbs., will at 15 lbs. per Rupee give the total value Rs. 1,68,67,475.

For seed, to deduct cane equal to 40 lbs. of sugar per acre.

This gives 16 fold, and taking the higher average of 646 lbs., I deduct say 6 per cent.

The whole quantity is then lbs. 237,831,405.

And the whole value is then Rs. 1,58,55,427.

If, as I have pointed out above, the average of Delhi (1) were taken 500 lbs. instead of 1,500 lbs., which would make the average produce of the whole of the Punjab 487 lbs. instead of 646, the above quantity and value will prove some 30 per cent. higher than they should be.

It may be noted here, that the Report itself makes the average 449 lbs. only, on the fallacious principle of simply adding up and dividing by the number of districts, while when properly calculated the figure should be 646 instead of 449. This is an instance of how misleading and incorrect the averages are as they are generally calculated in the Administration Reports.

TBL-121 · FOLIO 453Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Summary of Produce of all Districts.
Produce.Acres.Total quantity.Average per Acre.Total value.Average price per Re. 1
lbs.lbs.Rs.lbs.
Rice708,699541,492,3697962,25,35,69320·42
Wheat6,609,4975,332,813,517840·49,17,42,41953·48
Makai (Indian corn)1,084,3391,593,872,25515002,33,01,26568·4
Jow (Barley)1,874,217883,781,4445031,06,78,17582·76
Gram2,272,2361,417,173,8076451,86,72,19475·89
Inferior grains6,534,9633,169,169,607510·54,54,14,11469·78
Poppy (Opium)12,348154,55012·513,86,375·4 { 2½ Rs. per lb paid by Govt.
Tobacco71,86760,804,78584648,32,54112·58
Turmeric4,130677,320164 (dry)67,73210
Coriander seed6,9342,288,220330 "1,43,01416
Ginger...28658,630205 "8,3767
Chillies23,5183,800,700 (dry){ 808 (green) } { 161·6 (dry) }4,75,1008
Other kinds drugs and spices35,07411,574,4203308,26,74414
Oil seeds846,689325,730,0713921,20,64,07627
Cotton...668,87670,013,8901051,23,54,3445·66
Hemp51,26018,770,8663669,38,54320
Kassamba (Safflower)24,708988,32040 (dry)3,95,3282·5
Indigo129,4654,070,94131·4430,53,2051 1/8
Vegetables256,800{ 1,068,002,055 78,966,0004753 24601,06,80,020 25,47,290100 Green vegetables. 31 Potato.
Tea8,884852,864962,84,2883
Sugar391,630237,831,4056461,58,55,42715 { Average of 4 qualities.
Total...21,616,42027,72,56,263
TBL-122 · FOLIO 454Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Manufactures.
Goods.Value given in the Report.Deduct for raw Material already calculated and included in the produce, or imported and paid from produce.Balance representing labour.
Rs.Rs.Rs.
Silks19,62,049Say half for Material (imported)9,81,0249,81,024
Cottons1,75,05,556" 40% per " "70,02,2221,05,03,334
Wool9,42,3299,42,329
Fibres6,41,578" 20% " "1,28,3155,13,263
Paper1,58,565" 25% " "39,6411,18,924
Wood67,28,68667,28,686
Iron43,26,132" ⅓rd " "14,42,04428,84,088
Brass and Copper6,38,573" 40% " "2,55,4293,83,144
Building43,22,86743,22,867
Leather63,21,80263,21,802
Gold and Silver lace56,27,054" ⅔rd " "37,51,37018,75,685
Dyeing7,38,926Material not stated.7,38,926
Oil12,45,966" ½rd or say ½ Material6,22,9836,22,983
Shawls8,96,507" 1/12th Material imported74,7098,21,798
Other Manufactures30,81,205Not described30,81,205
Total......4,08,40,058

Mines.

There is no clear statement of the value of the produce of Mines given in this Report. The chief article is Salt. The report does not give any account of the cost of Salt.

Parl. Return No. 176 of 1878 gives (page 30) "The quantity manufactured, excavated or purchased" during the year (1876-77) as Maunds 1,795,956. In the statistics published by the Government of India (1875) at Calcutta—part III., page 79, it is said "Since 4th July 1870, one anna per maund has been charged as the cost price of the salt in addition to the duty." At this rate the above production of Salt, viz. Maunds 1,795,956 will cost Rs. 1,12,247. Duty is paid from the produce of the country.

For other minerals I can get no estimate. I roughly and as a very outside estimate put down the whole product of mines at Rs. 3 lacs.

Stock.

I am unable to make any estimate of the annual addition to stock during the year. All that portion however which is used for agricultural or manufacturing purposes need not be estimated, as its labour, like that of the agriculturer and the manufacturer himself, is included in the agricultural or manufacturing produce. The portion of the annual produce or addition, which is used for other than agricultural and manufacturing purposes, such as carriage and food and milk, needs to be added to the production of the year. Though I cannot estimate this, still it will not matter much, for, as I have shown in the table for inferior grains, a certain portion of them goes in the feed of animals— and as this portion supplies the feed of the whole stock that requires grain, and not merely that of the annual addition, the non-estimate of that portion of the annual addition to the stock which is used for carriage and for food may be more than covered by the value of the grain used for animals. Moreover, as I also give a margin upon the total estimate for any omission, any such item will be fully provided for.

TBL-123 · FOLIO 455Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Summary of the total production of Punjab.
Value.
Agricultural ProduceRs. 27,72,56,263
Manufactures" 4,08,40,058
Mines" 3,00,000
Rs. 31,83,96,321

In order to meet any omissions (fish, &c.) I allow a further margin of above 3½ crores of Rupees, making say, the whole produce of Punjab 35½ crores of Rupees, or at 2s. per Re. = £35,330,000, which, for a population of 17,600,000, gives £2 per head per annum at the outside for the year 1876-7.

The approximate estimate I had made out for the year 1867-8 in my paper on The Poverty of India was 49s. 5d., showing that either my calculation for the year 1867-8 was too high or the production of the province has diminished in value. The truth most likely is between both.

At all events unless any error of importance is pointed out, it seems clearly established that the value of the production of one of the best Provinces of India is Rs. 20 per head per annum at the outside.

Food Produce.

TBL-124 · FOLIO 456Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Food Produce.
GRAIN.Total Quantity. lbs.
Rice541,492,369
Wheat5,332,813,517
Makai (Indian corn)1,593,872,255
Jow (Barley)883,781,444
Gram1,417,173,807
Inferior grains3,169,169,607
Total...12,938,302,999

Quantity raised for animals.

about Gram lbs. 1,417,173,807 × ½ = 708,586,903 Jow „ 883,781,444 × ¾ = 662,836,083 Jowár acres 2,221,535 × ⅔ = 1,481,023 lbs. per Bájrá „ 2,339,796 × ½ = 1,169,898 acre less Moth „ 982,208 × ¾ = 736,656 seed Másh „ 213,465 × ⅓ = 71,155 (510-26)

Total... 3,458,732 × 484 = 1,674,026,288

Total... 3,045,449,274

Balance remaining for } 9,892,853,725 human use.

Or 562 lbs. per annum or lb. 1 oz. 8·65 per day per head for a population of 17,600,000.

Even taking the whole quantity of grain as for human use and thus not allowing any portion at all for animals (which would of course not be right to do) the quantity per annum will be 735 lbs. or 2 lbs. per day per head.

In the value I have calculated for grain, I have taken the whole grain, i. e. including the portion for animals.

Vegetables.

General Vegetables.

Total quantity 1,068,002,055 lbs. gives 60·7 lbs. per annum or 2·66 oz. per day per head.

Potato.

Total quantity 78,966,000 lbs. gives 4·48 lbs. per annum or ·2 oz. per day per head.

TBL-125 · FOLIO 457Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
LAND REVENUE OF THE PRINCIPAL PROVINCES OF INDIA FOR 1875-6.*
Revenue.Population.Revenue per head.
Rs.Rs. a. p.
Bengal3,77,65,06760,502,8970100
Punjab2,00,15,26017,611,498122
N. W. Provinces4,24,57,44430,781,204160¾
Madras4,54,50,12831,672,6131611
Bombay (including Sind)3,69,43,56316,302,173243

Food.

Man.

TBL-126 · FOLIO 458Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Cost of absolute Necessaries of life of an agricultural labourer.—(Punjab, 1876-7.)
Items.Quantity per day.Quantity for 1 year.Price for Re. 1.Cost for 1 year.Remarks.
Seers.Seers.Seers.Rs.a.
Flour ... ...136525149The price in the Report is 20 seers for 1st sort; I have taken 25 per cent. lower price for lower quality.
Rice ... ...1⁄4911370The price in the Report is 10 seers for 1st sort; I take 30 per cent. lower price for inferior quality.
Dal ... ...1⁄8451828The price in Report is 16 seers; I take it 12 per cent. lower.
Salt ... ...1 oz.119 1⁄213The price of the Report—which is Government sale price.
Ghee ... ...1 "113311The price in the Report is less then 2 seers. In taking 3 seers, I lower it above 50 per cent., or rather to the price of oil. The quantity 1 oz. is also rather low for a Punjabee.
Condiment ...2 pies worth.............313These are regarded as under the mark.
Tobacco ...1 1⁄2 "............214
Vegetables1 "............18
Total.....................372Without any meat, sugar, milk or any drink or any kind of luxury whatever.

Woman.

All the above items will be nearly the same, except tobacco. Deducting tobacco, it will be Rs. 34-2 as., say Rs. 32.

2 More Members in a Family.

1 Young person, say between 12 and 18—Say Rs. 26—though there will not be so much difference,

1 " " under 12 Say " 0 though this cannot be the case generally.

Cost of absolute Necessaries of Life of an agricultural labourer— (continued).

TBL-127 · FOLIO 459Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
CLOTHING FOR 1 YEAR.
Man.Woman.Remarks.
Rs. a.Rs. a.
2 Dhotees ... ... 1 02 Pajamas ... 1 0
2 Pairs shoes ... ... 1 01 Gagra ... ... 2 0No holiday cloth-
1 Turban ... ... 1 02 Chadars ... 1 8ing, nor for occasions
2 Bandis for warm and cold weather ... ... 1 84 Cholees... ... 1 0 Bangles... ... 0 8of joy and sorrow, are reckoned.
2 Kamlees ... ... 4 02 Pairs shoes ... 0 8
1 Small piece of cloth for langootee, &c. ... ... 0 4Hair Dressing ... 0 3
1 Chadar ... ... 0 12
1 Pajama ... ... 0 12
Total...... 10 46 11

For 1 young person, say Rs. 6—for the 2nd, say nothing.

TBL-128 · FOLIO 459Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
FAMILY EXPENSES IN COMMON.
Cottage, Rs. 60 Say Rs. 4 0 for 1 year.Calculated on
Repairs ... ... ... 3 0the lowest scale
Cooking and other utensils. 3 8without any fur-
Firewood, ½ anna per day. 5 11niture—such as
Lamp oil, 1 oz. per day, at 3 seers per Re. 1 ... ... 3 12cots or mats, or stools or any
thing.
Total... 19 15
TBL-129 · FOLIO 459Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Taking 4 in the family.
Food.Clothing.Family expenses.Total.
Rs.Rs. a.Rs. a.
Man ... ... ...3710 4
Woman ... ...326 11
Youth (12 to 18) ...266 0
Child (under 12) ............
9522 1519 15137 14—say Rs. 136.

Which will be Rs. 34 per head per annum in a family of 4—against the production of Rs. 20 per annum at the outside. No wedding, birth, and funeral expenses calculated, nor medical, educational, social and religious wants, but simply the absolute necessaries for existence in ordinary health, at the lowest scale of cost and quantity.

The prices this year are the lowest during 10 years.

The Report says—page 83—"Salt and tobacco show a rise in price." This is a mistake into which the writer is led by the mistake of the clerk in taking his totals and division by the number of districts. The figures in table 45 (page clxxvii) in the line of the "General Average" of tobacco viz. 4-5 and 5-7 are wrong. And so also in the line of Salt 7 and 7-5 are wrong. I do not mean these figures are wrong on account of the fallacious principle of the report in taking averages, but in taking the average according to the report's own method, i. e. of adding up the columns and dividing by the number of districts.

2

Memorandum on Mr. Danvers's papers of 28th June 1880 and 4th January 1879.

Mr. Danvers says :—"In examining Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's paper, it appears that in his calculations he has omitted to make any allowance for the value of straw, and he has made no attempt to estimate the value of the increase of Agricultural stock, but he has added an arbitrary sum for the latter and for other omitted items."

I have omitted not only straw, but also Grass, Cotton seed, and any fodder or other food for animals which I have not taken in my tables; and further, I should also omit all that portion of the inferior grains which I have shown in my table at page 9—of about 30 per cent. of the whole acreage of grains, and which is grown for the food of animals.

The reason is this. The principle to be considered is :—1st—Either the whole gross annual production of the country may be taken (including straw, grass, &c. &c.) and from this gross production, before apportioning it per head of human population, a deduction should be made for the portion required for all the stock—which in the case of the Punjab are above 7,000,000 large cattle and near 4,000,000 sheep and goats ; or 2nd —All straw, grass and every production raised for animal food should be left out of calculation, and only the rest of the production which is and can be turned to human use, should be apportioned among the human population. Mr. Danvers may adopt either of the above two methods —whichever he may consider would give most correctly the actual production for human use. It would not be correct to include the produce raised for animal use and then not to make the necessary deduction for such use. I would put this matter in another form.

Suppose on the 1st of Janaury 1880, we have in India a certain amount of material wealth in all its various forms, and we take complete stock of it; that during the year following the country works in all its varieties of ways, consumes for all its various human, animal and instrumental wants from the store existing ou the 1st January 1880; and that after the end of the year, on 1st January 1881, we gather together or take stock of every possible kind of material production (agricultural, mineral and manufacturing and addition from profits of foreign trade) during the year: 'This production during the year will have to meet all the wants of the next year. If this production prove less than what would be wanted for the next year, then there would be a deficiency, and either the original wealth or capital of the country will have to be drawn upon, or the people will be so much less supplied with their wants in some shape or other; in either way showing a diminution of prosperity—both as property and capacity. If on the other hand, the whole material production of the year prove more than what would be necessary for the next year for all ordinary or usual wants, then a surplus would accrue, and so far in some permanent form, add to the capital of the country and increase its prosperity.

I request therefore that Mr. Danvers may be asked to work out the total production and wants of India, for say the last dozen years, on correct principles of calculations, from such materials as are already available at the India Office, supplementing such information as may be deficient by asking from India and from experienced retired officials who are now in this country. Such tables will show what the actual material condition of the country is, and whether it is increasing or diminishing in prosperity. Unless such information is obtained, the Government of the country will be blind and in the dark, and cannot but result in misery to India, and discredit to the Rulers, their best intentions notwithstanding. It is hopeless to expect intelligent government without the aid of such important information annually.

I am glad Mr. Danvers has made an estimate of the annual increase of agricultural stock in his paper of 4th January 1879, and as I have to say something upon this paper further on, I do not say anything here upon the subject of stock.

Mr. Danvers says :—"Mr. Dadabhai has adopted the principle of equally apportioning the value of agricultural produce and manufactures as ascertained by him from the statistics available, amongst the whole population, without distinguishing how many are agriculturists, how many mechanics, and how many belong to other trades or professions, or possess property, and whose incomes therefore are derived directly neither from agriculture nor from manufactures. Thus he omits all reference to railway wealth, Government stock, house property, profits of trade, salaries, pensions, non-agricultural wages, professional incomes, and returns to investments, and all other sources from which a man who does not grow food himself may obtain the means of purchasing it."

"From the Census Report of 1871 it appears that, out of a total population of 17,611,498 under British Administration, in the Punjab 9,689,650 are returned as agriculturists, 1,776,786, adult males, equivalent to about 4,500,000 of population as engaged in industrial occupations, thus leaving a population of nearly 3½ millions directly dependent neither upon agriculture, manufactures, nor mining, and who must therefore derive their means of subsistence from other sources."

I take each of the items ;—

1st—"Railway wealth." I am not sure what Mr. Danvers means by ‘Railway wealth.’ In his paper of 4th January 1879 he regards railways "enhancing the value of food grains and adding, protanto, to the wealth of the districts through which they run." If he means in the above extract, by "railway wealth" something different, then that needs to be explained. In the mean time I adopt the interpretation as I make out with the aid of his paper of 4th January 1879.

Suppose 100 maunds of wheat exist in the Punjab, and its cost to the producer, say, is Rs. 100—suppose that this wheat is carried by railway to Bombay and its value at Bombay is Rs. 125. Does Mr. Danvers mean that this circumstance has added Rs. 25 or anything at all to the existing wealth of India ?

If so, then no such thing has happened. The 100 maunds of wheat existed in the Punjab, and the Rs. 125 existed in Bombay, before the wheat was moved an inch. After the movement, the only result has been change of hands. The wheat has gone to Bombay and the Rs. 125 are distributed between the owner at Punjab, who receives Rs. 100, and the railway owners and workers, and the merchant who carried through the transaction, who between them divide the Rs. 25. By the mere fact of the removal of the wheat from the Punjab to Bombay, not a single grain of wheat nor a single pie of money is added to what already existed in India before the wheat was touched. Such "railway wealth" does not exist. If the mere movement of produce can add to the existing wealth, India can become rich in no time. All it would have to do, is to go on moving its produce continually all over India, all the year round, and under the magic wheels of the train, wealth will go on springing, till the land will not suffice to hold it. But there is no Royal (even railway) road to material wealth. It must be produced from the materials of the Earth till the great discovery is made of converting motion into matter. I should not be misunderstood. I am not discussing here the benefits of railways, whatever they are, to any country or to India. To show that the people of India are not deriving the usual benefits of railways, I give hereafter a short separate section. Here it is enough for me to state that railways are in a way an indirect means of increasing the material production of any country, but that whatever that "means" is, its result is fully and completely included in the estimate of the actual annual production of the country, and that there is nothing more to be added to such actual material production of the year.

2nd—"Government Stock." Suppose I hold a lakh of rupees of Government 4 per cent. Rupee paper. It does not from itself produce or create or make to grow out any money or food or any kind of material wealth for me. It simply means that Government will give me Rs. 4,000 every year, and that, not by creating anything by any divine power, but from the revenue of the country; and this revenue can be got from only the actual material production of the year. So in reality my income of Rs. 4,000 from "Government Stock" is nothing more nor less than a share out of the production of the country, and is therefore fully and completely included therein. No addition has to be made from "Government Stock" to the actual material production of the year. No such addition exists at all.

3rd—"House Property." Suppose I have taken a house at a yearly rent of Rs. 1,000. The house does not grow or create the rent by the mere fact of my occupying it. I have to pay this amount out of my income of the Rs. 4,000 from Government Stock, and so the house-owner receives through me and the Government his share out of the production of the country. The discussion of the other items further on will show that, be my income from any of the various sources Mr. Danvers suggests, it is ultimately and solely derived from and is included in, the yearly production of the country, and the owners of "House Property" simply take their share, like everybody else, from this same store.

4th—“Profits of Trade.” I take first foreign trade. Mr. Danvers is quite right that the foreign trade of a country adds to its annual income or production.* But unfortunately the case with India is quite otherwise. The present system of British Administration not only sweeps away to England the whole profits of the foreign trade, but also drains away a portion of the annual production itself of the country. So India, instead of making any addition from its “profits of foreign trade” to its yearly production, a deduction has to be made from such production in estimating the actual quantity that ultimately remains for the use of the people of India. A portion of the actual production, through the channel of foreign trade, goes clean out of the country to England, without an atom of material return. The manner in which the foreign trade of India becomes the channel through which India’s present greatest misfortune and evil operate, I treat further on in a separate section, to avoid confusion. It is enough for me to say here, that as matters actually stand, instead of there being, as should be, any addition from foreign trade to the annual production of India, there is actually a diminution or drain of it, clean out of the country to England, to the extent of some £18,000,000 a year, together with and over and above all its “profits of trade.” I grieve, therefore, that I have nothing to add from “profits of trade” as Mr. Danvers suggests, but much to subtract.

I take next the internal trade. Resuming the illustration of the 100 maunds of wheat at Punjab, say a merchant buys at Rs. 100 and sends it to Bombay, where he gets Rs. 125. The result simply is, that the wheat is still the same 100 maunds, and the Rs. 125 that existed in Bombay are still Rs. 125, but that out of Rs. 25, the merchant receives his “profit of trade,” and the railway its charges for carrying. Not a single atom of money or wheat is added to the existing wealth of the country by this internal trade ; only a different distribution has taken place. I should not be misunderstood. I am not discussing here the usefulness of internal trade whatever it is. I am only pointing out that any increase in the material income of the country by the mere transactions of the internal trade, is a thing that does not exist, and that whatever benefits and “profits of trade” there are from internal trade, are fully and completely included in the ultimate result of the actual material production of the year.

5th—"Salaries and pensions." These will be official and non-official. Official salaries and pensions are paid by Government from revenue, and this revenue is derived from the production of the country; and so from that same store are all such salaries and pensions derived. For non-official salaries or pensions, the phenomenon is just the same. I pay my clerks or servants, either from my profits of trade, or interest of Government stock, or from rent of my house property, or from any of the sources which Mr. Danvers may suggest, but one and all of these incomes are drawn from the same store,—the annual material production of the country. All salaries and pensions are thus fully and completely included in the estimate of the production.

But this is not all. In these salaries and pensions, &c. do we come to the very source of India's chief misfortune and evil, which, as I have already said, works through the medium of the foreign trade. It is the salaries and pensions, and all other expenditure incident to the excessive European Agency, both in England and India, which is India's chief curse, in the shape of its causing the exhausting drain which is destroying India. In the ordinary and normal circumstances of a country when all the salaries, pensions, &c. are earned by the people themselves, and remain in the country itself to fructify in the people's own pockets, there is no such thing as an addition to the annual production of the country from " salaries and pensions." But as far as India is concerned, the case is much worse. All salaries and pensions &c. paid to Europeans in England and India beyond the absolute necessity of the maintenance or supervision of British rule, are actually, first, a direct deprivation of the natural provision for similar classes of the people of the country, and second, a drain from the property and capacity of the country at large. So, unfortunately, is there nothing to be added, as Mr. Danvers asks, from " salaries and pensions," but much to be subtracted, that is, either spent in England or remitted to England from the resources of India, and for which not a particle returns, and what is enjoyed in India itself by the Europeans.

Mr. Danvers may kindly consider his own salary. It is derived from the production of India. It is brought to England and not a farthing out of it returns to India. Even if it returned, it would be no addition to the wealth of India, but as it does not return, it is so much actual diminution from the means of the subsistence of the people. I should not be misunderstood. That for a good long time, a reasonable amount of payment for British rule is necessary for the regeneration of India, is true, and no thinking native of India denies this It is the evil of excessive payment that India has to complain of. But what I have to point out here is that salaries and pensions, even to the natives themselves, are no addition to the wealth, aud much less are those which are not paid to the people of the country. The increase supposed by Mr. Danvers does not exist. There is, on the contrary, much diminution.

6.th—“ Non-agricultural wages.”

A person, employed by a farmer, say as a labourer, upon building his house, is paid from the farmer’s agricultural income. A person employed by a merchant, a house holder, a stock holder, a pensioner, or a salaried man, or on a railway, is paid from their income, which, as I have explained, is derived from the only great store—the annual material production of the country. In short every labourer—mental or physical—has his share for his subsistence, through various channels, from the only one fountain-head,—the annual material production of the country. There is no source, outside the production (including any addition to it from profits of foreign trade) from which any individual derives his means of subsistence.

7.th—“ Professional incomes.”

I consult a doctor or a solicitor. The mere act of my consulting these professional gentlemen does not enable me to create money to pay them. I must pay them from my income as an agriculturist, or a miner, or a manufacturer, or a stockholder, or a householder, &c. &c., and my such income is all and solely derived from the material production of the country.

I need not now go any further into a repetition of the same argument with regard to.

8th.—“Returns to investments, and all other sources from which a man who does not grow food himself may obtain the means of purchasing it;” or leaving a population “directly dependent neither upon agriculture, manufactures, nor mining, and who must therefore derive their means of subsistence from other sources.”

There do not exist any such “other sources,” except profits of foreign trade. But unfortunately for India, instead of foreign trade bringing any profits, it is actually the channel by which, in addition to all such profits, a portion of the production itself is also swept away. So India exhibits the strange phenomenon, that her people cannot get any benefit from profits of foreign trade, and cannot enjoy for their subsistence even their own production fully or adequately. The result of all the different influences, forces, labour, knowledge, land, climate, railways or all other kinds of public works, good government, justice, security of property, law, order, and all the above 8 and other so-called sources of income, is fully and completely comprised in the ultimate resultant of all of them, viz. the actual material income of the year. Its increase or decrease every year, is in fact the test of the ultimate and full result of all the above direct and indirect means of the production of a country. If the material income of the year does not suffice for all the wants of the whole people for the year, the existing "capital" wealth of the country is drawn upon, and so far the capital and the capacity for annual production are diminished.

I submit therefore that Mr. Danvers' argument of the "other sources" has to be laid aside.

Mr. Danvers says, "Mr. Dadabhai makes out the total value of the agricultural produce of the Punjab to be Rs. 27,72,56,263, and that from manufactures and mines Rs. 4,11,40,058. To this he adds, to meet any omissions, a further margin of 3½ crores, making the whole produce of the Punjab 35¼ crores of Rupees, "which for a population of 17,600,000 gives Rs. 20 per head per annum at the outside for the year 1876-77," to which year the figures he has taken refer. At page 27 of his tables he shows that the cost of absolute necessaries of life of an agricultural labourer is Rs. 34 per annum, but he omits to explain how, under these circumstances, the people of the Punjab managed to live, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions how, with only Rs. 20 per annum, he can provide for an expenditure of Rs. 34."

Why, that is the very question I want government to answer,—how they can expect people to manage to live, under such circumstances, without continuously sinking in poverty. The first real question is,— are these facts or not? If not, then what are the actual facts of the "means and wants" of the people of India? If they are, then the question is for Mr. Danvers and government to answer how people can manage to live. The answer to the question is however obvious, viz that as the balance of income every year, available for the use of the people of India, does not suffice for the wants of the year, the capital wealth of the country is being drawn upon, and the country goes on becoming poorer and poorer, and more and more weakened in its capacity of production; and that the American War, for a little while, gave, and the various loans, give a show of prosperity to end in greater burdens, and great destruction by famines.

These facts of the insufficiency of the means for the wants go to prove late Lord Lawrence's statements made in 1864 as Viceroy and in 1873 before the Finance Committee. In 1864 he said that India was on the whole a very poor country and the mass of the people enjoyed only a scanty subsistence; and in 1873 he repeated that the mass of the people of India were so miserably poor that they had barely the means of subsistence, that it was as much as a man could do to feed his family or half feed them, let alone spending money on what might be called luxuries or conveniences. Such then is the manner in which the people of India manage to live; scanty subsistence, and dying away by millions at the very touch of drought. In the case of the Punjab as the latest British possession and least drained, and from other circumstances noted below,* the people have had as yet better resources, in their "Capital" wealth to draw upon. But taking India as a whole, Lord Lawrence's words are most deplorably but too true.

I need not discuss Mr. Danvers's paper of 28th June 1880 any further. The fallacy of "other sources," besides agriculture, mines, manufactures, and foreign trade, pervades his whole argument, and in the latter part of the paper, 2 different matters are mixed up, a little misapprehension has taken place as to my meaning, and some part is irrelevant.

The whole question now before us is simply this.

  • 1st—What the whole actual, material, annual income of India is, as the ultimate balance of all sources and influences, that is available for the use of the whole people of India.
  • 2nd—What the absolutely necessary wants, and the usual wants of all classes of the people, are; and
  • 3rd—Whether the income of India is equal to, less, or more than such wants.

By carefully ascertaining these facts every year, shall we ever be able to know truly, whether India is progressing in prosperity, or sinking in poverty, or is in a stationary condition. This is the whole problem, and it must be boldly faced and clearly answered, if the mission of Britain is the good of India, as I firmly believe it to be.

As to the question, how and by whom, directly or indirectly, the income is actually produced, and how, and by whom, and through what channels, this income is distributed among the whole people, is entirely a different matter, and though important in itself and involving much legislation, is quite separate from the first and fundamental question of the whole total of the means and wants of India.

I may explain the misapprehension to which I alluded above. In my tables for consumption, in taking “the cost of absolute necessaries of life of an agricultural labourer,” I meant him, as merely representing the lowest class of labourers of all kinds, so as to show the lowest absolute necessary wants of the people.

I am under the impression that there is a Statistical Committee at Calcutta existing for the past 20 years, and I hope it will adopt means to give complete tables of the means and wants of India.

As I am requesting His Lordship, the Secretary of State for India, that Mr. Danvers be asked to work out the means and wants of the people of India during the last 12 years, and that the Government of India may adopt means to perfect the machinery for getting complete information for the future, I submit a few remarks on Mr. Danvers’s tables of 4th January 1879, so kindly sent to me. As I have my Punjab tables only, for comparison, I examine Mr. Danvers’s Punjab tables only.

In his table of quantities of all the inferior grains, Mr. Danvers has taken the crop per acre of only some of the grains whose average is 510 lbs. per acre. But the produce of makai and gram, which are included by Mr. Danvers in the inferior grains, is larger, and the result is a large error. The acreage of makai is 1,084,339 acres, and the average produce per acre is 1,500 lbs., so that this produce is under-estimated to the extent of taking only about one-third of the actual quantity. The average produce of gram is 645 lbs. per acre, and the acreage is 2,272,236 acres. On this large acreage, there is nearly 26 per cent. of under-estimate. The result of the whole error in the table of inferior grains is, that the total quantity is taken by Mr. Danvers as 6,504,880,162 lbs., when it actually is 7,371,110,343 lbs., or above 866,200,000 lbs. more.

In the prices of inferior grains it is necessary to make proper allowance for the lower prices of such grains as Moth, Kangni, Chìnà, Mater, aad Masur, which are nearly 25 per cent. lower than the other grains— Jowár, Bájrá, Másh, Múng, and Arhar. This makes an over-estimate of £240,000. The price for makái, jow, and gram are given in the report, and separate estimates should, therefore, be made of the values of these grains, to obtain all possible approximation to truth and accuracy.

The total under-estimate by Mr. Danvers is £1,300,000 in the value of inferior grains.

In “other crops,” the value assumed by Mr. Danvers is nearly only one-fourth of what I make, by taking every item separately, i. e. I make Rs. 19,16,294 against Mr. Danvers’s Rs. 4,73,200.

In the following articles, Mr. Danvers has adopted the average given in the report, which, as pointed out by me on previous occasions, are taken on the fallacious principle of adding up the produce per acre of the districts and dividing by the number of districts, without any reference to the quantity of acreage of each district.

TBL-130 · FOLIO 470Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Produce.Incorrect average.Correct average.Error.
Produce.Incorrect average.Correct average.Correct average.
Produce.Incorrect average.Correct average.More per cent.Less per cent.
Vegetables4,0084,75318½...
Sugar*44964644...
Cotton*1021053...
Tobacco8258462½...
Fibres32236613¾...
Indigo4731...33
Opium1012·525...

In the case of Indigo, Cotton, Tobacco, and Hemp, the error has not been large, as the incorrect average is adopted by Mr. Danvers for a few districts only I notice such differences, as 2½ and 3 per cent. also, because in dealing with figures of hundreds and thousands of millions, these percentages, singly as well as collectively, seriously disturb the accuracy of results. It is very necessary to avoid, as much as possible, all avoidable errors, large or small, so that then reliance can be placed upon the results.

The report gives the price of 1st sort sugar only, but which, applied to the whole quantity of all kinds, makes the value of nearly ⅔rds of the whole quantity, quite 2½ times greater than it actually is—the over-estimate comes to near £1,800,000.

The price of Indigo, as ascertained by me (Rs. 60 per maund), is nearly 20 per cent. higher than that assumed by Mr. Danvers (Rs. 50 per maund).

Mr. Danvers has taken seer=2 lbs. when in reality it is nearly 6 per cent. of a lb. larger, which becomes a serious error in the large amounts to be dealt with.

Mr. Danvers has adopted the prices of 1st January 1877 only, instead of taking an average of the prices of the 4 periods given in the Report, to represent the whole year.

In his remarks at page 16, Mr. Danvers makes no allowance for seed, which is an important item. He includes straw, all inferior grains, and cotton seed, and yet makes no allowance at all for the feed of animals, (some 7 millions large cattle and near 4 millions sheep and goats) before apportioning the produce per human head. Grass being not taken, makes some allowance for animals so far.

I cannot say on what grounds, (page 16) 4 per cent. is assumed for annual increase of large cattle and 15 per cent. of sheep and goats. I have not got the report for 1878-9, when the next quinquennial enumeration of stock must have been made, but on comparing the numbers of the last two enumerations of 1868-9 and 1873-4, the result is as follows :—

TBL-131 · FOLIO 472Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
1868-9.1873-4.Increase.Decrease.Per cent.
Cows, Bullocks and Buffaloes* ... ...6,797,5616,570,212...227,3493 1/2
Horses ... ... ...96,22684,639...11,58712
Ponies ... ... ...51,30251,39593......
Donkeys ... ... ...257,615288,11830,503...11.8
Camels ... ... ...148,582165,56716,985...11.4
Total ... ... ...7,351,286 — 7,159,931=191,355
Sheep and Goats ...3,803,8193,849,84246,023...1 1/5

From this comparison, it appears, that in the important items of cows, bullocks and buffaloes, instead of any increase, there is actually decrease of 227,349 or 3 1/2 per cent. during the 5 years. In horses also, there is a decrease of about 2 1/2 per cent. every year instead of 4 per cent. increase. In ponies the increase is hardly 1/5 per cent. in 5 years, in donkeys about 11 per cent., and in camels about 11 per cent., in all the 5 years, or about 2 1/4 per cent. per year instead of 4 per cent. In sheep and goats, the increase is hardly 1 1/5 per cent. in 5 years instead of 15 per cent. per year. For cows and bullocks, and sheep and goats, there is one allowance to be made, viz. for what are killed for food. To make out the increase in cows, &c. of 4 per cent. every year, nearly 4 3/4 per cent. must have been killed every year for food, and for sheep and goats the percentage of killed should be nearly 14 3/4 per cent. per annum. Is it so?

Mr. Danvers has assumed ghi, produced in the Punjab, as 4 times as much as imported (52,303 maunds) into it, and he thus makes the quantity produced to be 209,212 maunds. Now the value of the imported ghi is also given in the report, as Rs. 9,64,028 which, taken 4 times, would be £385,611. But Mr. Danvers has overlooked this actual price and adopted the fallacious average of the table of prices in the report, which makes the price 1s. 12c. per Rupee. At this incorrect price, the value will be £478,198, or nearly 25 per cent. more than the actual value given in the report. But not only has there been this incorrect increase thus made, but by some arithmetical mistake, the value put down by Mr. Danvers, is above 3 times as much as even this increased amount, i. e. instead of £478,198, Mr. Danvers has put down £1,501,096. If this be not merely an arithmetical mistake, it requires explanation.

Mr. Danvers has taken the import of ghi from "foreign trade" only, and has overlooked a further quantity of import "inter-provincially" of 16,312 maunds of the value of £34,741, which, taken 4 times, would be £138,964, making up the total value of the assumed produce of ghi in the Punjab to be £385,611 + 138,964 = £524,575.

Working upon Mr. Danvers's own assumption, and what information I have been at present able to obtain, it appears that the assumption of 4 times the import—or £525,000, will be an under-estimate by a good deal. I am not at present able to test the accuracy of Mr. Danvers's assumption of the produce of milk, nor of the information I am using below, but I give it just as I have it, to illustrate the principle. I adopt Mr. Danvers's assumption of 10 per cent. of the whole cattle to be milch animals. The number then will be 657,000. Of these, cows may be taken, I am told by a Punjabee, at 75 per cent., and buffaloes 25 per cent. This will give 164,250 buffaloes and 492,750 cows. Each buffalo may be taken, on an average, as giving 6 seers of milk per day for 6 months in the year, and each cow about 3 seers. The

TBL-132 · FOLIO 473Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
quantity of milk will then be 164,250 × seers 6 × days 180 =177,390,000seers.
492,750 × 3 × 180 =266,085,000„
Total ..443,475,000„

Mr. Danvers assumes for milk used in the province to be about Rs. 10 per annum from each of the 10 per cent. of the cattle, and taking the price of milk to be 16 seers per Rupee, the quantity of milk used would be 657,000 × 160 = 105,120,000 seers. This, deducted from the above total produce of milk, will give (443,475,000—105,120,000) 338,355,000 seers as converted into ghi. The produce of ghi is about 1/5 to 1/10 of milk, according to quality. Assuming 1/12 as the average, the total quantity of ghi will be about 28,196,250 seers = 704,906 maunds, or allowing a little for wastage, say 700,000 maunds, which; at the import price (Rs. 13,11,445 for 68,615 maunds) of Rs. 19 per maund, will give about £1,339,300, or nearly 2¾ times as much as Mr. Danvers has assumed. I have endeavoured in a hurry to get this information as well as I could, but it can be obtained correctly by the officials on the spot. My object, at present, was simply to show that, calculated on Mr. Danvers's assumption of milch-cattle and milk used, how much ghi should be produced in the country, if the information I have used be correct.

For hides and skins, the export only is taken into account, but a quantity must be consumed in the province itself, which requires to be added.

The value assumed, Rs. 100 per horse, is rather too high. Rs. 60 or 70, I am told, would be fairer, so also for ponies, Rs. 25 to 30 instead of Rs. 35, and camels, Rs. 60 or 70 or 75 instead of Rs. 100. For sheep, &c. Rs. 1½ instead of Re. 1, would be fairer.

But as I have said above, officials in India can give all this inform a tion correctly for every year, and I do not see any reason why this should not be done. I urgently repeat my request, that the wants and means of the last 12 or 15 years may be ordered by His Lordship, the Secretary of State, to be carefully worked out, as far as practicable, and that future reports should be required to give complete information.

Railways.

I may take railways to represent Public Works. The benefits generally derived from Railways are these. They distribute the produce of the country from parts where it is produced or is in abundance, to the parts where it is wanted, so that no part of the produce is wasted, which, otherwise, would be the case if no facility of communication existed. In thus utilising the whole produce of the country, the railway becomes directly a saving agent, and indirectly, thereby, helps in increasing the production of the country.

It brings the produce to the ports at the least possible cost for exportation and commercial competition for foreign trade, and thus indirectly helps in obtaining the profits of foreign trade, which are an increase to the annual income of a country.

Every country in building railways, even by borrowed capital, derives the benefit of a large portion of such borrowed capital, as the capital of the country, which indirectly helps in increasing the production of the country. Excepting interest paid for such borrowed capital to the foreign lending country, the rest of the whole income remains in the country. But the result of all the above benefits from railways, is ultimately realised and comprised in the actual annual income of the country.

The misfortune of India is that she does not derive the above benefits as every other country does.

You build a railway in England and, say, its gross income is a million. All the employès, from the Chairman down to the common labourer, are Englishmen. Every farthing that is spent from the gross income, is so much returned to Englishmen, as direct maintenance to so many people of England, and to England at large as a part of its general wealth. Whether the shareholders get their 5 per cent. or 10 per cent. or 1 per cent. or 0 per cent. or even lose, it matters not at all to the whole country. Every farthing of the income of the million is fully and solely enjoyed by the people of the country—excepting only (if you borrowed a portion of the capital from foreign parts) the interest you may pay for such loan. But such interest forms a small portion of the whole income, and every country with good railways, can very well afford to pay. All the benefits of railways are thus obtained and enjoyed by the people of the country.

Take the case of the United States. India and the States are both borrowers for their railways (the latter only partially), and they both pay interest to the lending countries. They both buy, say, their rails, machinery, &c. from England, the States buying only a portion. So far they are under somewhat similar circumstances. But here the parallel ends. In the United States, every cent of the income of the railway (excepting the interest on the Foreign loan) is the income of the people of the country—is a direct maintenance for the people employed on it, and an indirect property of the whole country and remaining in it.

In India the case is quite different. First, for the Directors' home establishments, Government Superintendence, and what not in England, a portion of the income must go from India; then a large European staff of employés (excepting only for inferior and lowest places or work left for natives) must eat up and take away another large portion of the income, and to the rest, the people of the country are welcome, with the result, that out of their production which they give to the railways, only a portion returns to them and not the whole, as in all other countries (except interest on foreign loan); and the diminution lessens so far the capacity of production every year. Such expenditure, both in England and India, is so much direct deprivation of the natural maintenance of as many people of India, of similar classes, and a loss to the general wealth and means of the people at large. Thus, the whole burden of the debt is placed on the shoulders of the people of India, while the benefit is largely enjoyed and carried away by the people of England, and yet Englishmen raise up their hands in wonder, why India should not be happy, pleased, and thankful! Some years ago, I asked Mr. Danvers to make a return in his annual Railway report, of the salaries and every kind of disbursement on Europeans, both in England and India. If I remember right (I cannot just now lay my hands on the correspondence) he was kind enough to promise he would try. But I do not know that this information has been given. Let us have this information, and we shall then know why India does not derive the usual benefits of railways; how many Europeans displace as many natives of the same class, and deprive them of their natural means of subsistence (some 3,600 in India and all those in England), and what portion of the income the people of India do not see or enjoy a pie of.

Instead, therefore, of their being any ‘railway wealth’ to be added to the annual production or income of India, it will be seen that there is much to be deducted therefrom to ascertain what really remains for the use of its own people. For the income of railways is simply a portion or share of the production of the country, and what is eaten up and taken away by Europeans, is so much taken away from the means of the people.

It is no wonder at all, that the United States have their 70,000 or more miles of railways, when India, under the British Government, with all its wonderful resources, with all that good government can do, and the whole British wealth to back, has hardly one-tenth of the length, and that even, with no benefit to the people of the country. In short, the fact of the matter is, that as India is treated at present, all the new departments, opened in the name of civilization, advancement, progress, and what not, simply resolve themselves into so much new provision for so many more Europeans, and so much new burden on exhausting India. We do pray to our British rulers, let us have railways and all other kinds of beneficial public works, by all means, but let us have their natural benefits, or talk not to a starving man of the pleasures of a fine dinner. We should be happy too and thankfully pay for such European supervision and guidance as may be absolutely necessary for successful work; but do not, in heaven’s and honesty’s names, talk to us of benefits which we do not receive, but have on the contrary to pay for from our own. If we are allowed to derive the usual benefits of railways and other public works, under such government as the British—of law, order and justice,—we would not only borrow 200, but 2,000 millions and pay the interest with as many thanks, with benefits both to ourselves and to England, as India would be then her best and largest commercial customer.

The real important question, therefore, in relation to public works, is, not how to stop them, but how to let the people of the country have their full benefits. One of the most important part of England’s great work in India, is to develop these public works, but to the people’s benefit and not to their detriment—not that they should slave and others eat.

Foreign Trade.

Resuming our illustration of the 100 maunds of wheat from the Punjab, arriving at Bombay, costing to the Bombay merchant Rs. 125, we suppose that this merchant exports it to England. In ordinary course and natural conditions of trade, suppose the Bombay merchant, after two or three months, gets his net proceeds of Rs. 150, either in silver, or as a bale of piece-goods, which could be sold at Bombay for Rs. 150. The result then of this “foreign trade” is, that before the wheat left Bombay, there were 100 maunds of wheat costing Rs. 125 at the time of export; and after the operation, India has either Rs. 150, or a bale of cotton goods worth Rs. 150. There is, thus, a clear “profit of trade” of Rs. 25, or in other words, an addition of Rs. 25 worth either in silver or goods, to the annual income or production of the country. This, in ordinary commercial language would be, India exported value Rs. 125 in the shape of wheat, and imported value Rs. 150 in the shape of silver or merchandise, or both, making a trade-profit of Rs. 25.

Under ordinary natural circumstances, such is the result of foreign trade to every country. I shall take the instance of the United Kingdom, and we may see what its ordinary foreign trade-profits are during a few past years, say, from 1871 to 1878.

PROFITS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

TBL-133 · FOLIO 478Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
PROFITS OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.
IMPORTS.EXPORTS.Foreign Trade Profits.Per cent.
Years.Merchandise.Treasure. (Gold and Silver.)Total.Years.Merchandise.Treasure. (Gold and Silver.)Total.
£££££££
1871331,015.48038,140,827369,156,3071871283,574,70033,760,671317,335,37151,820,936
1872354,693,62429,608,012384,301,6361872314,588,83430,335,861344,924,69539,376,941
1873371,287,37233,599,231404,886,6031873311,004,76528,899,285339,904,05064,982,553
1874370,082,70130,379,188400,461,8891874297,650,46422,853,593320,504,05779,957,832
1875373,939,57733,264,789407,204,3661875281,612,32327,628,042309,240,36597,964,001
1876375,154,70337,054,244412,208,9471876256,776,60229,464,082286,240,684125,968,263
1877394,419,68237,152,799431,572,4811877252,346,02039,798,119292,144,139139,428,342
1878368,770,74232,422,955401,193,6971878245,483,85826,686,546272,170,404129,023,293
Grand Total...3,210,985,926Grand Total...2,482,463,765728,522,161 =29·34

The result of the above table is, that during the 8 years, the United Kingdom has received as trade-profits 29·34 per cent. This result requires the following further consideration. It includes the results of all money-trade, or loans to and from foreign countries. Suppose England has lent a hundred millions to foreign countries; that forms a part of Exports. Suppose it has received in interest, say, £5,000,000— that forms a part of the imports, and unless any portion of the Principal of the loan is returned, the whole or balance (if a portion is paid) of the loan remains outstanding, and is so much more to be added to the above figure of trade-profits. Again, there is the political profit from India of some £27,000,000 a year (as shown further on). That forms a part of the import, and has to be deducted from the figure of trade-profits. England contributes to the expenses of the Colonies. This is a part of its exports. Thus the formula will be :—

£728,522,161 + outstanding balance of loans of the 8 years—the political drain from India to England (£216,000,000) + contributions to the Colonies = the actual profits of all commercial and monetary transactions with the world, or in other words = the actual profits of the Foreign Trade of the 8 years.

Now the figure £728,522,161 is 29·34 per cent. The Political drain of India forms nearly 9 per cent. out of this. There remains, above 20 per cent. + the amounts of balance of loans, and contributions to the Colonies, as the actual rate of profits of the Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom.

I may fairly adopt this rate, of at least 20 per cent. for the profits of the Foreign Trade of India. But to be quite under the mark, I adopt only 15 per cent

Now we may see what actually happens to India—taking the same period of 1871-8.

The actual Exports (excluding Government stores and treasure).

TBL-134 · FOLIO 479Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Merchandise and Gold and Silver.........͜ 485,186,749
Take profits only 15 per cent.......͜ 72,778,012
The Imports as they ought to be......͜ 557,964,761

Actual Imports (excluding Government stores and treasure.)

TBL-135 · FOLIO 479Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Merchandise and Gold and Silver.........£ 342,312,799
Deficit in Imports, or what is drained to England ...£ 215,651,962

i. e. nearly 27 millions a year.

TBL-136 · FOLIO 480Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Again taking actual Exports.........£ 485,186,749
And actual Imports............£ 342,312,799
Abstraction from the very produce of the country (besides the whole profits), is.........= 142,873,950 in 8 years or nearly £18,000,000 a year or 29·4 per cent.

Thus, with all the advantages of good Government, law, order, justice, &c., railways, and every other influence of a civilized rule, the actual result is, that not only does India not get a single farthing of the 15 or 20 per cent. or whatever it be, of the profits of her foreign trade, but actually has a further amount of nearly 30 per cent. of her exports kept away from her. This is not all. There is, moreover, the halter round her neck of the accumulated railway debt of nearly a hundred millions, held in England, (from which her people have not derived the usual benefits); about 60 millions of public debt (out of £134,000,000— mostly owing to wars) held in England, and £5,000,000 spent in England on account of State Public Works; and yet Englishmen wonder why India is poor, and her finances inelastic! Good God, when will this bleeding-to-death end!

Keeping as much as possible on the right side, we find some £18,000,000 from the production itself, swept away from India, besides all her profits, and besides what Europeans enjoy in India itself, to the so much exclusion and deprivation of her own people. But this item of £18,000,000 would be found much under the mark. For instance, all duty-articles imported into India, are, I believe, valued 10 per cent. more than their laying down value. If so, roughly taking, the customs, revenue being 2½ millions, represents roughly a duty at 5 per cent. on £50,000,000—and to make up this £50 millions, with 10 per cent. extra, require an addition to the actual value of imports of about £5,000,000. If so, then there will be this much above £18,000,000— taken away from the actual production from India, besides the whole trade profits, maintenance of Europeans in India, debts, &c.

The real abstraction from the very produce of the country is most likely much above £20,000,000 a year, and the whole loss above £30,000,000 a year—besides what is enjoyed in India itself by Europeans.

Under such circumstances it is no wonder at all, that Famines and Finance should become great difficulties, and that Finance has been the grave of several reputations, and shall continue to be so, till the discovery is made of making 2 and 2 equal to 5, if the present unnatural treatment of India is to continue.

Far, therefore, from there being anything to be added to the annual income of India, as Mr. Danvers thinks, from the "profits of trade," there is the deplorable fact of much to be deducted in the case of India, and the consequences of such abstraction, in impoverishment and destruction by famines &c., lay mostly at the door of the present unnatural policy of the British Administration. Let our rulers realise this fact intelligently and face it boldly in a way worthy of the British moral courage and character, and the whole scene will be entirely changed— from deplorable poverty to prosperity; from the wail of woe to joy and blessing. Our misfortune is that the great statesmen of this country have not the necessary time to see into Indian matters, and things are allowed to drift blindly; or England would never become, as she unwittingly is at present, the destroyer of India. Her conscience is sound.

It is natural that in all discussions on Finance, curtailment of expenditure and economy are, at first blush, recommended :—to cut the coat according to cloth. But, unfortunately, no one asks the question, why the cloth is short; why, under such rule as that of the English, India should not do well, if not quite as well as these Islands, but should be only able to pay the wretched revenue of some 6s. a head, and that even after "wringing out the last farthing."

No doubt, vigilance for economy will always be a necessity in the best of states (not excepting England, as debates in Parliament testify) as long as the world lasts. But the real question, the most important question of all questions at present, is not how to get £60,000,000 or £100,000,000 for the matter of that, if that be necessary, but how to return to the people what is raised from them.

There is no reason whatever, why India with all her vast resources, the patient industry of the people, and the guidance and supervision of British high officials, should not be able to pay 2 or 3 times her present wretched revenue, say a hundred or hundred and fifty millions, for efficient administration by her own people under British supervision, and for the development of her unbounded material resources. Is it not unsatisfactory or even humiliating, that British statesmen should have to confess, that they have hopelessly to depend, for about a sixth of the net revenue, on supplying opium to another vast human race; and to ask despairingly, what they were to do to get this amount of revenue from India itself. Then again, nearly as much more income has to be raised by an oppressive and heavy tax on salt, so that between a third and a fourth of the net revenue has to be derived, a part, by pinching and starving the poor millions of India in one of the absolute necessaries of life, and the other part, by poisoning and demoralising the millions of China. Surely a great people like the English, with their statesmanship of the highest order and with all their genuine desire to do good to, and to advance mankind, should not be able to get the necessary revenues from India from her own healthy and natural prosperity, is a strange phenomenon in this advanced age.

Only restore India to her natural economical conditions. If as in England the revenue raised from the people, returned to the people; if the income of railways and other public works taken from the people, returned to the people, to fructify in their pockets,—then will there be no need for anxiety for finance or famines, nor for pinching in salt, nor poisoning with opium, millions of the human race. India will then pay with ease a hundred or two hundred millions of revenue, and will not be the worse for it. It would be far better also, which would then be the case, that India should be able to purchase a pound or two worth a head of British manufactures, and become England's best and largest customer, instead of the wretched one she is at present.

I repeat, therefore, with every earnestness, that the most important question of the day is, how to stop the bleeding drain from India. The merit or good of every remedy, will depend upon and be tested by its efficacy in stopping this deplorable drain, without impairing the wants of the Administration, or checking India's natural progress towards prosperity.

There is a deep conviction among educated and thoughtful natives, that, if there is any one nation, more than another, on the face of the earth, that would, on no account, knowingly do a wrong to or enslave, degrade or impoverish a people, and who, on feeling the conviction of any injury having been unintentionally done by them, would, at once and at all reasonable sacrifice, repair the injury without shrinking,—that nation is the British nation. This conviction keeps the thinking natives staunch in their loyalty to the British rule. They know that a real regeneration, civilization and advancement of India, materially, morally and politically, depends upon a long continuance of the British rule. The peculiarly happy combination of high civilization, intense love of liberty and nobility of soul in the British, cannot but lead them to the desire of the glory of raising a vast nation, instead of trampling upon them. This noble desire has found expression from some of their best men.

The English people have a task before them in India, for which there is no parallel in the history of the world. There has not been a nation, who, as conquerors, have like the English considered the good of the conquered as a duty, or felt it as their great desire, and the natives of India may, with the evil of the present drain stopped, and a representative voice in their legislation, hopefully look forward to a future under the British rule, which will eclipse their greatest and most glorious days.

May the light of heaven guide our Rulers.

DADABHAI NAOROJI.

32, Great St. Helens, London, 13th September 1880.

India Office, S. W., 15th October 1880.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th September, which, together with its enclosure, has been duly laid before the Secretary of State for India.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, LOUIS MALLET.

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji.

3

32, Great St. Helen's, London, 16th November 1880.

Sir Louis Mallet, The Under Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, S. W.

Sir,

Thanking you for your letter of 15th ultimo, informing me that my letter of 13th September with enclosure had been duly laid before His Lordship the Secretary of State for India, and hoping that the same kind attention will be given to it as to my previous letter, and that if I am wrong in any of my views I would be corrected, I beg to submit for His Lordship's kind and generous consideration the accompanying Memorandum No. 2, on the Moral Poverty of India and Native Thoughts on the British Indian Policy.

I am, Sir, Your obedient servant, DADABHAI NAOROJI.

The Moral Poverty of India,

and

Native Thoughts on the Present British Indian Policy.

In my last paper, I confined myself to meet Mr. Danvers’s line of argument, on the question of the material destruction and impoverishment of India by the present British Indian policy. I endeavoured to show that this impoverishment and destruction of India was mainly caused by the unnatural treatment it received at the hands of its British rulers, in the way of subjecting it to a large variety of expenditure upon a crushing foreign Agency, both in India and England, whereby the children of the country were displaced and deprived of their natural rights and means of subsistence in their own country. By what was being taken and consumed in India itself and by what was being continuously taken away by such agency clean out of the country, an exhaustion of the very life-blood of the country was unceasingly going on. That till this disastrous drain was not duly checked, and till the people of India were restored to their natural rights in their own country, there was no hope for the material amelioration of India.

In this Memorandum I desire to submit for the kind and generous consideration of His Lordship the Secretary of State for India, that from the same cause of the deplorable drain, besides the material exhaustion of India, the moral loss to her is no less sad and lamentable.

With the material wealth go also the wisdom and experience of the country. Europeans occupy almost all the higher places in every department of government, directly or indirectly under its control. While in India they acquire India’s money, experience and wisdom, and when they go, they carry both away with them, leaving India so much poorer in material and moral wealth. Thus India is left without, and cannot have, those elders in wisdom and experience, who in every country are the natural guides of the rising generations in their national and social conduct, and of the destinies of their country—and a sad, sad loss this is!

Every European is isolated from the people around him. He is not their mental, moral or social leader or companion. For any mental or moral influence or guidance or sympathy with the people, he might just as well be living in the moon. The people know not him, and he knows not, nor cares for the people. Some honorable exceptions do, now and then, make an effort to do some good they can, but in the very nature of things, these efforts are always feeble, exotic, and of little permanent effect. These men are not always in the place, and their works die away when they go.

The Europeans are not the natural leaders of the people. They do not belong to the people. They cannot enter into their thoughts and feelings; they cannot join or sympathise with their joys or griefs. On the contrary, every day the estrangement is increasing. Europeans deliberately and openly widen it more and more. There may be very few social Institutions started by Europeans in which, Natives, however fit and desirous to join, are not deliberately and insultingly excluded. The Europeans are and make themselves strangers in every way. All they effectually do, is to eat the substance of India, material and moral, while living there, and when they go, they carry away all they have acquired, and their pensions and future usefulness besides.

This most deplorable moral loss to India needs most serious consideration, as much in its political as in its national aspect. Nationally disastrous as it is, it carries politically with it its own Nemesis. Without the guidance of elderly wisdom and experience of their own natural leaders, the education which the rising generations are now receiving, is naturally leading them (or call misleading them, if you will) into directions which bode no good to the rulers, and which, instead of being the strength of the rulers as it ought to and can be, will turn out to be their great weakness. The fault will be of the rulers themselves for such a result. The power that is now being raised by the spread of education, though yet slow and small, is one that in time must, for weal or woe, exercise great influence. In fact it has already begun to do so. However strangely the English rulers, forgetting their English manliness and moral courage, may, like the ostrich, shut their eyes by gagging acts or otherwise, to the good or bad influences they are raising around them, this good or evil is rising nevertheless. The thousands that are being sent out by the Universities every year, find themselves in a most anomalous position. There is no place for them in their mother-land. They may beg in the streets or break stones on the roads, for aught the rulers seem to care for their natural rights, position and duties in their own country. They may perish or do what they like or can, but scores of Europeans must go from this country to take up what belongs to them, and that, in spite of every profession for years and years past and up to the present day, of English statesmen, that they must govern India for India's good, by solemn acts and declarations of Parliament, and above all, by the words of the August Sovereign Herself. For all practical purposes all these high promises have been hitherto, almost wholly, the purest romance, the reality being quite different.

The educated find themselves simply so many dummies, ornamented with the tinsel of school education, and then their whole end and aim of life is ended. What must be the inevitable consequence? A wild spirited horse, without curb or reins, will run away wild, and kill and trample upon every one that came in his way. A misdirected force will hit anywhere and destroy anything. The power that the rulers are, so far to their credit, raising, will, as a nemesis recoil against themselves, if with this blessing of education they do not do their whole duty to the country which trusts to their righteousness, and thus turn this good power to their own side. The nemesis is as clear from the present violence to nature, as disease and death arise from uncleanliness and rottenness. The voice of the power of the rising education is, no doubt, feeble at present. Like the infant, the present dissatisfaction is only crying at the pains it is suffering. Its notions have not taken any form or shape or course yet, but it is growing. Heaven only knows what it will grow to! He who runs may see, that if the present material and moral destruction of India continued, a great convulsion must inevitably arise, by which either India will be more and more crushed under the iron heel of despotism and destruction, or may succeed in shattering the destroying hand and power. Far, far is it from my earnest prayer and hope that such should be the result of the British rule. In this rule, there are every element to produce immeasurable good, both to India and England, and no thinking native of India would wish harm to it, with all the hopes that are yet built upon the righteousness and conscience of the British statesmen and nation.

The whole duty and responsibility of bringing about this desired consummation, lies upon the head and in the hands of the Indian authorities in England. It is no use screening themselves behind the fiction and excuse, that the Viceroys and authorities in India are difficult to be got to do what they ought, or that they would do all that may be necessary. `They neither can nor will do this. They cannot go against acts of Parliament on the one hand, and on the other, the pressure of European interests, and of European selfishness and guidance, is so heavy in India, that the Viceroys in their first years are quite helpless and get committed to certain courses; and if, in time, any of them, happening to have sufficient strength of character and confidence in their own judgment, are likely to take matters in their own hands, and with any moral courage to resist interests, hostile or antagonistic to the good of the people, the end of their time begins to come near, their zeal and interest begin to flag, and soon they go away, leaving India to roll up Sisyphus's stone again, with a new Viceroy. It is the highest Indian authority here, the Secretary of State for India, upon whom the responsibility wholly rests. He alone has the power, as a member of and with the weight of the British Cabinet, to guide the Parliament to acts worthy of the English character, conscience and nation. The glory or disgrace of the British in India, is in his hands. He has to make Parliament lay down by clear legislation, how India shall be governed for “ India’s good,” or it is hopeless for us to look forward for any relief from our present material and moral destruction, and for future elevation.

Englishmen sometimes indulge the notion, that England is secure in the division and disunion among the various races and nationalities of India. But even in this, new forces are working their way. Those Englishmen who sleep such foolish sleep of security, know precious little of what is going on. The kind of education that is being received by thousands of all classes and creeds, is throwing them all in a similar mould; a sympathy of sentiment, ideas, and aspirations is growing among them; and more particularly a political union and sympathy is the first fruit of the new awakening, as all feel alike their deprivation, and the degradation and destruction of their country. All differences of race and religion and rivalry are gradually sinking before this common cause. This beginning, no doubt, is at present insignificant, but it is surely and steadily progressing. Hindus, Mahomedans, and Parsees are asking alike, whether the English rule was to be a blessing or a curse. Politics now engross their attention more and more. This is no longer a secret, or a state of things not quite open to those of our rulers who would see. It may be seen that there is scarcely any union among the different nationalities and races in any shape or ways of life, except only in political associations. In these associations they go hand in hand with all the fervour and sympathy of a common cause. I would here touch upon a few incidents, little as they are, still showing how nature is working in its own quiet way.

Dr. Birdwood has brought to the notice of the English public certain songs now being spread among the people of Western India, against the destruction of Indian industry and arts. We may laugh at this as a futile attempt to shut out English machine-made cheaper goods against hand-made dearer ones. But little do we think what this movement is likely to grow into, and what new phases it may take in time. The songs are at present directed against English wares, but they are also a natural and effective preparation against other English things when the time comes, if the English in their blindness allow such times to come. The songs are full of loyalty, and I have not the remotest doubt in the sincerity of that loyalty. But if the present downward course of India continue, if the mass of the people at last begin to despair for any amelioration, and if educated youths, without the wisdom and experience of the world, become their leaders, it will be but a very, very short step from loyalty to disloyalty, to turn the course of indignation from English wares to English rule. The songs will remain the same; one word of curse for the rule will supply the spark.

Here is another little incident with its own significance. The London Indian Society, a political body of many of the native residents of London, had a dinner the other day, and they invited guests. The three guests were, one Hindu, one Mahomedan, and one Parsee. The society itself is a body representing nearly all the principal classes of India. It is small and may be laughed at as uninfluential and can do nothing. But it shows how a sympathy of political common cause is bringing the different classes together, and how, in time, such small seeds may grow into large trees. Every member of this little body is carrying back with him ideas, which as seeds may produce crops, sweet or bitter according to the cultivation they may receive at our rulers' hands.

I turn to one bright incident on the other side. True to their English nature and character, there are some Englishmen who try to turn the current of native thought towards an appreciation of English intentions, and to direct English thought towards a better understanding of England's duty to India. The East India Association is doing this beneficent work, more especially by the fair and English character of its course of bringing about free and full discussion upon every topic and from every point of view, so that by a sifting of the full expression of different views, truth may be elicited. Though yet little appreciated by the English public, the English members of this Association are fulfilling the duty of patriotism to their own country and of benefaction towards India. How far their good efforts will succeed is yet to be seen. But they at least do one thing. These Englishmen, as well as public writers like Fawcett, Hyndman, Perry, Caird, Knight, Bell, Wilson, and others, vindicate to India the English character, and show that when Englishmen as a body will understand their duty and responsibility, the natives of India may fairly expect a conduct of which their's is a sample —a desire and deed to act rightly by India. The example and earnestness of these Englishmen, though yet small their number, keep India's hope alive ;—that England will produce a statesman who will have the moral courage and firmness to face the Indian problem, and do what the world should expect from England's conscience, and from England's mission to humanity.

I have thus touched upon a few incidents only, to illustrate the various influences that are at work. Whether the result of all these forces and influences will be good or bad, remains, as I have said, in the hands of the Secretary of State for India.

In my last paper, I said, the thinking natives were as yet staunch in their loyalty to the British rule, as they were yet fully hopeful of the future from the general character and history of the English people. They believe, that when the conscience of the English nation is awakened, it will not be long before India receives full and thorough redress for all she has been suffering. While thus hopeful of the future, it is desirable that our rulers should know and consider, what about the past is passing in many a thinking native mind.

They are as grateful as any people can be, for whatever real good of peace and order and education has been done for them. But they also ask what good upon the whole England has done to India. It is sadly poor and increasing in poverty, both material and moral. They consider and bewail the unnatural treatment India has been receiving.

They dwell upon the strange contrast between the words and deeds of the English rulers. How often deliberate and solemn promises are made and broken. I need not here instance again what I have at some length shown in my papers on the Poverty of India under the heading of

“Non-fulfilment of Solemn Promises.” *

I would refer here to one or two characteristic instances only. The conception for an Engineering College in London was no sooner formed than it became an accomplished fact; and Mr. Grant Duff, then Under Secretary of State, in his place in Parliament, proclaimed what great boons “we” were conferring on the English people, but quite oblivious at whose sacrifices. It was an English interest, and the thing was done as quick at it was thought of. On the other hand, a clause for native interests, proposed in 1867, took 3 years to pass, and in such a form as to be simply ineffectual. I asked Sir Stafford Northcote at the time of the proposal to make it in some way imperative, but without effect. Again, after being passed after 3 years, it remained a dead letter for 7 years more, and might have remained so till doomsday for aught any of the Indian authorities cared. But thanks to the persevering exertions of one of England’s true sons, Sir Erskine Perry, some steps were at last taken to frame the rules that were required, and it is now, in the midst of a great deal of fine writing, making some, though very slow progress. For such even as it is we are thankful, but greater efforts are necessary to stem the torrent of the drain. Turning to the uncovenanted service, Sir Stafford Northcote’s despatch of 8th February 1868 declared that Europeans should not be allowed in this service to override “the inherent rights of the natives of the country.” Now in what spirit was this despatch treated till very lately? Was it not simply, or is not even now, almost a dead letter?

In the matter of the load of the public debt of India, it is mainly due to the wars of the English conquests in India, and English wars abroad in the name of India. Not a farthing has been spent by England for its British Indian Empire. The burden of all England’s wars in Asia, has been thrown on India’s shoulders. In the Abyssinian War, India narrowly and lightly escaped, and in the present Afghan War, her escape from whatever portion she may be saved, is not less narrow. Such though the character of nearly the whole of the public debt, (excluding for public works) being caused by the actions by which England has become the mistress of a great empire and thereby the first nation in the world, she would not move her little finger to give India any such help as is within her power without even any material sacrifice to herself, viz. that of guaranteeing this public debt, so that India may derive some little relief from reduced interest.

When English interests are concerned, their accomplishment is often a foregone conclusion. But India’s interests always require long and anxious thought—thought ˙that seldom begins, and when it does begin, seldom ends in any thorough good result. It is useless to conceal that the old pure and simple faith in the honour and word of the English rulers is much shaken, and were it not for the faith in the conscience of the statesmen and people in this country, any hope of good by an alteration of the present British Indian policy would be given up.

The English rulers boast and justly so, that they have introduced education and western civilization into India, but on the other hand, they act as if no such thing had taken place, and as if all this boast was pure moonshine. Either they have educated or have not. If they deserve the boast, it is a strange self-condemnation, that after half a century or more of such efforts, they have not yet prepared a sufficient number of men fit for the service of their own country. Take even the educational department itself. We are made B. As. and M. As. and M. Ds., &c. with the strange result that we are not yet considered fit to teach our countrymen. We must have yet forced upon us even in this department, as in every other, every European that can be squeezed in. To keep up the sympathy and connection with the current of European thought, an English head may be appropriately and beneficially retained in a few of the most important institutions. But as matters are at present, all boast of education is exhibited as so much sham and delusion.

In the case of former foreign conquests, the invaders either retired with their plunder and booty, or became the rulers of the country. When they only plundered and went back away, they made no doubt great wounds, but India with her industry revived and healed the wounds. When the invaders became the rulers of the country, they settled down in it, and whatever was the condition of their rule, according to the character of the sovereign of the day, there was at least no material or moral drain from the country.* Whatever the country produced, remained in the country. Whatever wisdom and experience was acquired in her services, remained among her own people. With the English the case is peculiar. There are the great wounds of the first wars in the burden of the public debt, and those wounds are kept perpetually open and widening, by draining away the life blood in a continuous stream. The former rulers were like butchers hacking here and there, but the English with their scientific scalpel cut to the very heart, and yet lo ! there is no wound to be seen, and soon the plaster of the high talk of civilization, progress, and what not, covers up the wound ! The English rulers stand sentinel at the front door of India, challenging the whole world, that they do and shall protect India against all comers, and themselves carry away by a back-door the very treasures they stand sentinel to protect.

In short, had England deliberately intended to devise the best means of taking away India's wealth, in a quiet continuous drain, without scandalising the world, she could not have hit upon a more effectual plan than the present lines of policy. A Viceroy tells,—the people of India enjoy but scanty subsistence—and this is the outcome of the British rule.

No doubt, the exertions of individual Europeans at the time of famines may be worthy of admiration ; the efforts of Government and the aid of the contributions of the British people to save life, deserve every gratitude. But how strange it is, that the British rulers do not see that after all they themselves are the main cause of the destruction that ensues from droughts ; that it is the drain of India's wealth by them that lays at their own door the dreadful results of misery, starvation, and deaths of millions. England does not know famines, be the harvest however bad or scanty. She has the means of buying her food from the whole world. India is being unceasingly deprived of these means, and when famine comes, the starving have to be taxed so much more to save the dying.

England's conduct in India is in strange contrast with her conduct with almost any other country. Owing to the false groove in which she is moving, she does violence to her own best instincts. She sympathises with and helps every nationality that struggles for a constitutional representative Government. On the one hand, she is the parent of, and maintains the highest constitutionalism, and on the other, she exercises a clear and, though thoughtlessly, a despoiling despotism in India, under a pseudo-constitutionalism in the shape of the farce of the present Legislative Councils.

Of all countries in the world, if any one has the greatest claim on England's consideration, to receive the boons of a constitutional representative government at her hands, and to have her people governed as England governs her own,—that country is India, her most sacred trust and charge. But England, though she does every thing she can for other countries, fights shy of, and makes some excuse or other to avoid, giving to the people of India their fair share in the legislation of their country. Now I do not mean to say that India can suddenly have a full blown Parliament and of such widespread representation as England enjoys. But has England made any honest efforts to gradually introduce a true representation of the people, excepting some solitary exceptions of partial municipal representation? I need not dwell upon the present farce of the nomination system for the Legislative Councils, and of the dummies that are sometimes nominated. I submit that a small beginning can be well made now. I would take the Bombay Presidency as an instance. Suppose the present Legislative Council is extended to 21 members, 13 of these to be nominated from officials and non-officials by the government, and 8 to be elected by the principal towns of the Presidency. This will give government a clear majority of 5, and the representative element, the minority, cannot do any harm, or hamper Government. In England the majority determines the Government. In India this cannot be the case at present, and so the majority must follow the Government. It would be, when something is extremely outrageous, that the minority would, by force of argument and truth, draw towards it the Government majority, and even in any such rare instance, all that will happen will be that Government will be prevented from doing any such outrageous things. In short, in such an arrangement, Government will remain all powerful, as it must for a long time to come, while there will be also independent persons actually representing the people to speak the sentiments of the people, thereby giving Government the most important help and relieving them from much responsibility, anxiety, and mistakes. The representative element in the minority, will be gradually trained in constitutional government. They will have no inducement to run wild with prospects of power. They will have to maintain the reason of their existence, and will therefore be actuated by caution and good sense. They can do no harm but a vast amount of good both to the Government and the governed. The people will have the satisfaction that their rulers were doing their duty and endeavouring to raise them to their own civilization.

There are in the Bombay Presidency the following towns of more than 50,000 population. Bombay having by far the largest, and with its importance as the capital of the Presidency, may be properly allowed three representatives.

The towns are :—

TBL-137 · FOLIO 494Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
* Bombay.Poona.Ahmedabad.Surat.Karachi.Sholapore.
644,405118,886116,873107,14953,52653,403.

Thus Bombay having 3—the Gujarati division of the Presidency will be represented by Ahmedabad and Surat, the Maratha portion by Poona and Sholapur, and Sind by Karachi, making altogether 8 members— which will be a fair though a small representation to begin with. Government may with advantage adopt a larger number ; all I desire and insist is, that there must be a fair representative element in the councils. As to the qualifications of electors and candidates for election, government is quite competent to fix upon some, as they did in the case of the Bombay Corporation, and such qualifications may from time to time be modified as experience may suggest. With this modification in the present Legislative Council, a great step will have been taken towards one of the greatest boons which India asks and expects at England's hands. Without some such element of the people's voice in all the Legislative Councils, it is impossible for Englishmen, more and more estranged and isolated as they are becoming, to be able to legislate for India in the true spirit and feeling of her wants.

After having a glorious history of heroic struggles for constitutional government, England is now rearing up a body of Englishmen in India, trained up and accustomed to despotism, with all the feelings of impatience, pride, and high-handedness of the despot becoming gradually ingrained in them, and with the additional training of the dissimulation of constitutionalism. Is it possible that such habits and training of despotism, with which Indian officials return from India, should not, in the course of time, influence the English character and institutions ? The English in India, instead of raising India, are hitherto themselves descending and degenerating to the lower level of Asiatic despotism. Is this a nemesis that will in fulness of time show to them, what fruit their conduct in India produced ? It is extraordinary how nature may revenge itself for the present unnatural course of England in India, if England, not yet much tainted by this demoralisation, does not, in good time, check this new leaven that is gradually fermenting among her people.

There is the opium trade. What a spectacle it is to the world. In England, no statesman dares to propose that opium may be allowed to be sold in public houses at the corners of every street, in the same way as beer or spirits. On the contrary, Parliament, as representing the whole nation, distinctly enacts “opium and all preparations of opium or of poppies” as “poison,” to be sold by certified chemists only, and “every box, bottle, vessel, wrapper or cover in which such poison is contained, be distinctly labelled with the name of the article and the word poison, and with the name and address of the seller of the poison.” And yet, at the other end of the world, this Christian, highly civilized, and humane England, forces a “heathen” and “barbarous” power to take this “poison,” and tempts a vast human race to use it, and to degenerate and demoralise themselves with this “poison.” And why,—because India cannot fill up the remorseless drain, so China must be dragged in to make it up, even though it be by being “poisoned.” It is wonderful, how England reconciles this to her conscience. This opium trade is a sin on England’s head, and a curse on India for her share in being the instrument. This may sound strange as coming from any natives of India, as it is generally represented, as if India it was, that benefited by the opium trade. The fact simply is, as Mr. Duff said, India is nearly ground down to dust, and the opium trade of China fills up England’s drain. India derives not a particle of benefit. A ll India’s profits of trade, and several millions from her very produce, (scanty as it is and becoming more and more so), and with these, all the profit of opium, go the same way of the drain to England. Only, India shares the curse of the Chinese race. Had this cursed opium trade not existed, India’s miseries would have much sooner come to the surface, and relief and redress would have come to her long ago. But this trade has prolonged the agonies of India.

In association with this trade, is the stigma of the salt tax, upon the British name. What a humiliating confession to say, that after the length of the British rule, the people are in such a wretched plight that they have nothing that Government can tax, and that Government must, therefore, tax an absolute necessary of life to an inordinate extent. The slight flash of prosperity during the American war, showed how the people of India would enjoy and spend, when they have anything to enjoy and spend—and now, can anything be a greater condemnation of the results of British lines of policy, than that the people have nothing to spend and enjoy, and pay tax on, but that they must be pinched and starved in a necessary of life.

The English are, and justly and gloriously, the greatest champions of liberty of speech. What a falling off must have taken place in their character, when after granting this boon to India, they should have even thought of withdrawing it. This act, together with that of disarming the people, is a clear confession by the rulers to the world, that they have no hold as yet upon the affection and loyality of the people, though in the same breath, they make every profession of their belief in the loyalty of the people. Now which is the truth? And are gagging and disarming the outcome of a long benign rule?

Why do the English allow themselves to be so perpetually scared by the fears of Russian, or any other foreign invasion? If the people of India be satisfied, if their hearts and hands be with England, she may defy a dozen Russias. On the other hand, do British statesmen think that however sharp and pointed their bayonets, and however long-flying their bullets, they may not find the two hundred millions of the people of India, her political Himalaya to be pierced through, when the present political union among the different peoples is more strengthened and consolidated?

There is the stock argument of over-population. They talk, and so far truly, of the increase by British peace, but they quite forget the destruction by the British drain. They talk of the pitiless operations of economic laws, but, somehow, they forget that there is no such thing in India, as the natural operation of economic laws. It is not the pitiless operations of economic laws, but it is the thoughtless and pitiless action of the British policy, it is the pitiless eating of India's substance in India, and the further pitiless drain to England,—in short, it is the pitiless perversion of economic laws by the sad bleeding to which India is subjected, that is destroying India. Why blame poor nature, when the fault lies at your own door. Let natural and economic laws have their full and fair play, and India will become another England, with manifold greater benefit to England herself than at present.

As long as the English do not allow the country to produce what it can produce; as long as the people are not allowed to enjoy what they can produce; as long as the English are the very party on their trial;— they have no right, and are not competent, to give an opinion, whether the country is over-populated or not. In fact, it is absurd to talk of over-population, i. e. the country's incapability, by its food or other produce, to supply the means of support to its people, if the country is unceasingly and forcibly deprived of its means or capital. Let the country keep what it produces, and then, can any right judgment be formed, whether it is over-populated or not. Let England first hold hands off India's wealth, and then there will be disinterestedness in, and respect for, her judgment. The present cant of the excuse of over-population is adding a distressful insult to agonising injury. To talk of over-population at present, is just as reasonable as to cut off a man's hands and then to taunt him, that he was not able to maintain himself or move his hands.

When persons talk of the operation of economic laws, they forget the very first and fundamental principles. Says Mr. Mill, “Industry is limited by capital.” “To employ industry on the land, is to apply capital to the land.” “Industry cannot be employed to any greater extent than there is capital to invest.” “There can be no more industry than is supplied by materials to work up and food to eat. Yet, in regard to a fact so evident, it was long continued to be believed, that laws and governments, without creating capital, could create industry.” And while Englishmen are sweeping away this very capital, they raise up their hands and wonder why India cannot have industry.

The English are themselves the head and front of the offending, and yet they talk of over-population, and every mortal irrelevant thing, but the right cause, viz. their own drain of the material and moral wealth of the country.

The present form of relations between the paramount power and the princes of India, is un-English and iniquitous. Fancy a people, the greatest champions of fair play and justice, having a system of political agency by which, as the princes say, they are stabbed in the dark; the Political Agents making secret reports and the government often acting thereon, without a fair inquiry or explanation from the princes. The princes, therefore, are always in a state of alarm, as to what may befall them unawares. If the British authorities deliberately wished to adopt a method by which the princes should always remain alarmed and irritated, they could not have hit upon a more effective one than what exists. If these princes can feel assured that their treaty rights will be always honourably and faithfully observed, that there will be no constant nibbling at their powers, that it was not the ulterior policy of the British to pull them down gradually to the position of the mere nobles of the country, as the princes at present suspect and fear, and if a more just and fair mode of political agency be adopted, I have not the least hesitation in saying that, as much from self-interest alone, as from any other motive, these princes will prove the greatest bulwark and help to perpetuate British supremacy in India. It stands to reason and common sense, that the native princes clearly understand their interest, that by a power like the British only, with all the confidence it may command by its fairness as well as strength, can they be saved from each other and even from themselves. Relieved of any fear from the paramount power, they will the more readily listen to counsels of reform which they much need. The English can then exercise their salutary influence, in advising and helping them to root out the old corrupt regimes, and in making them and their courtiers to understand that power was not self-aggrandizement, but responsibility for the good of the people. I say from personal conversation with some of the princes, that they thoroughly understand their interest under the protection of the present paramount power.

It is useless for the British to compare themselves with the past native rulers. If the British do not show themselves to be vastly superior, in proportion to their superior enlightenment and civilization, if India do not prosper and progress under them far more largely, there will be no justification for their existence in India. The thoughtless past drain we may consider as our misfortune, but a similar future will, in plain English, be deliberate plunder and destruction.

I do not repeat here several other views which I have already expressed in my last Memorandum.

I have thus given a general sketch of what is passing in many natives’ minds on several subjects. It is useless and absurd to remind us constantly, that once the British fiat brought order out of chaos, and to make that an everlasting excuse for subsequent shortcomings, and the material and moral impoverishment of the country. The natives of the present day have not seen that chaos, and do not feel it, and though they understand it, and very thankful they are for the order brought, they see the present drain, distress, and destruction, and they feel it and bewail it.

By all means, let Englishmen be proud of the past. We accord them every credit for the order and law they brought about, and are deeply thankful to them, but let them now face the present, let them clearly realise and manfully acknowledge the many shortcomings of omission and commission, by which, with the best of intentions, they have reduced India to material and moral wretchedness: and let them, in a way worthy of their name and history, repair the injury they have inflicted. It is fully in their power to make their rule a blessing to India, and a benefit and glory to England, by allowing India her own administration under their superior, controlling and guiding hand—or in their own oft-repeated professions and words, “by governing India for India’s good.”

May the God of all nations lead the English to a right sense of their duty to India, is my humble and earnest prayer !

16th November 1880. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

4

32, Great St. Helens, London, 4th January 1881.

Sir Louis Mallet, The Under-Secretary of State for India. India Office, London, S. W.

Sir, I beg to request you to submit the accompanying Memorandum, No. 3, on some of the Statements in “the Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1880,” to his Lordship the Secretary of State for India, and I hope His Lordship will give his kind and generous consideration to it.

I remain, Sir, Your obedient servant, DADABHAI NAOROJI.

Memorandum on a Few Statements in the Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1880.

Part II., Chapter I., Section VII. treats of Incidence of Taxation.

I submit that the section is fallacious, gives an erroneous notion of the true state of the matter, and is misleading.

We shall see what the reality is.

The income of a country consists of two parts—

  • 1. The internal total annual material production of the country (Agricultural, Manufactures, Mines and Fisheries).
  • 2. The external annual profits of Foreign Trade.

There is no other source of income beyond these two, excepting, in the case of British India, the tributes, and contributions of Native States of about £700,000.

The incidence of taxation of any country means that a certain amount or portion is taken out of this income for purposes of Government. Call this portion revenue, tax, rent, service, contributions, blessing, curse or by any name from A to Z in the English vocabulary. The fact simply is, that the country has to give a certain proportion out of its income for purposes of government. Every farthing that the country has thus to contribute for government, has to be produced, or earned from Foreign trade, or, in other words, has to be given from the annual income. No portion of it is rained down from heaven, or produced by some magic by the government of the country. The £24,000,000 which the Commissioners call “other than taxation,” do not come down from the heavens, nor are to be obtained from any other source than the annual income of the country, just the same as what they call taxation proper. And so also what the Commissioners call “rent,” with regard to the revenue derived from land.

Whatever plans, wise or unwise, a government adopt of distributing the incidence of the revenue among different classes of people ; from whatever and how-many-soever different sources, government may obtain its revenue ; by whatever hundred-and-one names may these different items of revenue be called ;—the sum total of the whole matter is, that out of the annual income of the country, a certain portion is raised for the purposes of government, and the real incidence of this revenue in any country, is the proportion it bears to the actual annual income of the country, call the different modes of raising this revenue what you like.

Now England raises at present for purposes of government about £83,000,000. The income of the United Kingdom is well nigh £1,000,000,000* a year. The proportion therefore of the revenue of £83,000,000 or even £84,000,000, is about 8½ per cent. out of the annual income.

Now India’s income, as I have first roughly shown in 1870 in my paper on the Wants and Means of India,† and subsequently in my papers on the Poverty of India,‡ is hardly £300,000,000 per annum, This statement has not been refuted by anybody. On the contrary.

Mr. Grant Duff, though cautiously, admitted in his speech in 1871, in these words:—"The income of British India has been guessed at £300,000,000 per annum." And Lord Mayo quoted Mr. Grant Duff's speech soon after, without any contradiction, but rather with approval. If the fact be otherwise, let government give the correct fact every year. Out of this income of £300,000,000, the revenue raised in India for purposes of government is £65,000,000 or very near 22 per cent.

Thus, then, the actual heaviness of the weight of revenue on India, is quite 2½ times as much as that on England. This is the simple fact, that out of the grand income of £1,000,000,000—of only 34,000,000 of population, England raises for the purposes of government only 8½ per cent., while out of the poor, wretched income of £300,000,000 of a population of nearly 200,000,000—two and a half times more, or nearly 22 per cent., are raised in India for the same purpose, and yet people coolly and cruelly write that India is lightly taxed. It must be further realised, what this disproportionate pressure, upon a most prosperous and wealthy community like that of England, and the most wretched, and poverty and famine-stricken people of India, means. To the one, it is not a fleabite, to the other, it is starvation and death of millions, under her present unnatural treatment. For, this is not all. A far deeper and worse depth lies behind.

Let me then once more repeat that out of the grand income of £1,000,000,000 a year, England gives only 8½ per cent. for government purposes, while out of the wretched poverty of India of an income of £300,000,000—she gives 22 per cent. for purposes of government. Now comes the worst evil of the whole, to which English writers, with few exceptions, always shut their eyes.

Of the £83,000,000 of revenue, which is raised in England, every farthing returns in some shape or other to the people themselves. In fact, England pays with one hand, and receives back with the other. And such is the case in every country on the face of the earth, and so it must be—but poor India is doomed otherwise. Out of the £65,000,000, taken out of her wretched income, some £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 are never returned to the people, but are eaten up in the country, and taken away out of the country, by those who are not the people of the country —by England, in short. I pass over this mournful topic here, as I have to refer to it again further on.

I may be taken to task, that I am making a very indefinite statement, when I talk of "some £30,000,000 or £40,000,000—as being eaten up and taken away by England." The fault is not mine, but that of government. In 1873, Sir D. Wedderburn moved for a return for the number, salaries, &c. of all the services. The return was ordered in July 1873. It is now past 7 years, but has not been made. Again 1879—Mr. Bright moved for returns (salaries, &c. 19th June '79) and Sir D. Wedderburn moved for Returns (East India Services—20th and 23rd June '79), and (East India Services—24th June '79). These returns have not yet been made. I hope they are being prepared. When these returns are made, we shall know definitely and clearly what the amount is, that, out of the revenue of £65,000,000, does not at all return to the people of India, but is eaten up in, and carried away from, India every year, by England. Such returns ought to be made every year. Once it is made, the work of succeeding years will be only the alterations or revision for the year, or revised estimates every 2 or 3 years even will do. To government itself, a return like this will be particularly useful. They will then act with clear light, instead of groping in darkness as at present, and though actuated with the best of intentions, still inflicting upon India untold misfortune and miseries. And it will then see, how India, of all other countries in the world, is subjected to a most unnatural and destructive treatment.

The next sections VIII and IX on Trade and Railways, are pervaded with the same fallacies as those of Mr. Danvers's Memo. of 28th June 1880, and to which I replied with my letter of 13th September 1880. I, therefore, do not go over the same ground here again. I need only refer to one statement, the last sentence of para. 4 of Section VIII:—

"As to the other half of the excess, which is due to the cost of English Administration, there can hardly be room for doubt that it is to the advantage of India, to pay the sum really necessary to secure its peaceful government, without which, no progress would be possible; and so long as this condition is not violated, it does not seem material whether a part of the charge has to be met in England or not."

A statement, more wrong in its premises and conclusion, can hardly be met with. Let us see.

By "the other half of the excess" is meant £8,000,000.

The Commissioners tell the public that India pays £8,000,000 for securing peaceful government. This is the fiction. What are the facts? England, of all nations on the face of the earth, enjoys the utmost security of life and property of every kind, from a strong and peaceful government. For this, England “pays” £83,000,000 a year.

In the same manner, India “pays” not £8,000,000, but £65,000,000 for the same purpose, and should be able and willing to “pay” twice or thrice £65,000,000, under natural circumstances, similar to those of England.

Thus, England “pays” £83,000,000 and India “pays” £65,000,000 for purposes of peaceful government. But here the parallel ends, and English writers, with very few exceptions, fight shy of going beyond this point, and misstate the matter as is done in the above extract. Let us see what is beyond.

Of the £83,000,000 which England “pays” for security of life and property, or peaceful government, every farthing returns to the people themselves. It is not even a fleabite or any bite to the people of England that they “pay” £83,000,000 for peaceful government. They simply give with one hand and receive back with the other. The country and the people enjoy the full benefit of every farthing they either produce in the country or earn with foreign trade.

But with India, the fact is quite otherwise. Out of the £65,000,000 which she “pays” like England for peaceful government, £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 do not return to the people of the country. These £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 are eaten up in the country, and carried away from the country, by a foreign people. The people of India are thus deprived of this enormous amount, year after year, and are, as a natural consequence, weakened more and more every year in their capacity for production, or, in plain words, India is being simply destroyed.

The romance is, that there is security of life and property in India. The reality is, that there is no such thing.

There is security of life and property in one sense or way, i. e. the people are secure from any violence from each other or from native despots. So far, there is real security of life and property, and for which India never denies her gratitude. But from England’s own grasp, there is no security of property at all, and as a consequence no security for life. India’s property is not secure. What is secure and well secure is, that England is perfectly safe and secure, and does so with perfect security, to carry away from India and to eat up in India, her property at the present rate of some £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 a year.

The reality therefore is, that the policy of English rule as it is (not as it can and should be), is an everlasting, unceasing and every-day-increasing foreign invasion, utterly, though gradually, destroying the country. I venture to submit, that every right-minded Englishman, calmly and seriously considering the problem of the present condition and treatment of India by England, will come to this conclusion.

The old invaders came with the avowed purpose of plundering the wealth of the country. They plundered and went away, or conquered and became the natives of the country. But the great misfortune of India is, that England did not mean, or wish, or come, with the intention of plundering, and yet events have taken a course which has made England the worst foreign invader she has had the misfortune to have. India does not get a moment to breathe or revive. ‘More Europeans,’ ‘more Europeans,’ is the eternal cry, and this very report itself of the Commission is not free from it.

The present position of England in India has, moreover, produced another most deplorable evil, from which the worst of old foreign invasions was free. That with the deprivation of the vital, material blood of the country, to the extent of £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 a year, the whole higher “wisdom” of the country is also carried away.

I therefore venture to submit, that India does not enjoy security of her property and life, and also moreover, of “knowledge” or “wisdom.” To millions in India, life is simply “half feeding” or starvation, or famines and disease.

View the Indian problem from any point you like, you come back again and again to this central fact, that England takes from India every year £30,000,000 or £40,000,000 worth of her property with all the lamentable consequences from such a loss, and with a continuous diminution of the capacity of India for production, together with the moral loss of all higher wisdom.

India would be quite able and willing to “pay,” as every other country, or as England “pays,” for peaceful government. But no country on the face of the earth can stand the deprivation of property that India is subjected to, without being crushed to death.

Suppose England were subjected to such a condition at the hand of some foreign; power and would she not to a man clamour, that far better would they fly at each other's throat, have strifes in streets of civil wars, or fights in fields for foreign wars, with all the chances of fame or fortune on survival, than to submit to the inglorious, miserable deaths from poverty and famines, with wretchedness and disease in case of survival. I have no hesitation in appealing to any Englishman to say, which of the two deaths he would prefer, and I shall not have to wait long for the reply.

What is property worth to India, which she can only call her own in name, but not in reality, and which her own children cannot enjoy? What is life worth to her that must perish by millions at the very touch of drought or distress, or can have only a half starving existence?

The confusion and fallacy in the extract I have given above, therefore, consists in this. It is not that India pays for peaceful government some £8,000,000. She pays for it £65,000,000, just as England pays £84,000,000. But there is one feature peculiar to India. She needs British wise and beneficent guidance and supervision. British aid of this kind can, under any circumstances, be but from outside the Indian family, i. e. foreign. This aid must be reasonably paid for by India. Now, if the whole foreign agency of European men and materials, required under the direct and indirect control of government, both in India and England, in every shape or form, be clearly laid down, to be confined within the limit of a fixed "foreign list" of say £5,000,000, or even say £8,000,000, though very much, which the Commissioners ask India should pay; India could very probably pay, without being so destroyed as at present. But the present thoughtless and merciless exhaustion of some £30,000,000, or £40,000,000, or may be even much more, is crushing, cruel, and destructive.

In fact, leaving the past alone as a misfortune, the continuance of the present drain will be, in plain English, nothing less than plunder of an unceasing foreign invasion, and not a reasonable price for a beneficent rule, as the Commissioners wrongly and thoughtlessly endeavour to persuade the public.

The great misfortune of India is that the temptation or tendency towards selfishness and self-aggrandisement of their own countrymen, is too great and blinding for Englishmen (with few exceptions) connected with India, to see that power is a sacred trust and responsibility for the good of the people. We have this profession to any amount, but unless and till the conscience of England, and of English honest thinkers and statesmen, is awakened, the performance will remain poor or nil as at present.

Lord Ripon said—India needs rest. More true words cannot be spoken. Yes—she needs rest—rest from the present unceasing and ever-increasing foreign invasion, from whose unceasing blows she has not a moment allowed to breathe.

I said before that even this Famine Report was not free from the same clamour, “more Europeans, more Europeans.”

Whenever any question of reform arises, the only remedy that suggests itself to English officials’ minds, is, “apply more European leeches, apply more European leeches!”

The Commission suggests the institution of an Agricultural Department, and a very important suggestion it is. But they soon forget that it is for India this is required, and that it is at India’s expense it has to be done, that it is from India’s wretched income has this expenditure to be provided, and that India cannot afford to have more blood sucked out of her for more Europeans, and deprive so much her own children; in short, that native agency, under a good English head or two, would be the most natural and proper agency for the purpose. No, prostrate as India is, and for which very reason, the Commission was appointed to suggest a remedy, they can only say, “more Europeans”—as if no such thing as a people existed in India.

Were any Englishman to make such a proposal for England,—that French or German youths be instructed at England’s expense, and that such youths make up the different public departments, he would be at once scouted and laughed at. And yet, these Commissioners thoughtlessly and seriously suggest and recommend to aggravate the very evil for which they were expected to suggest a remedy.

I appeal most earnestly to His Lordship, the Secretary of State for India, that though the department suggested by the Commissioners is very important, His Lordship would not adopt the mode which the Commissioners have suggested with good intentions, but with thoughtlessness, about the rights and needs of India. That with the exception of some thoroughly qualified necessary Europeans at the head, the whole agency ought to be native, on the lines described by the Commissioners. There can be no lack of natives of the kind required, or it would be a very poor compliment indeed to the Educational exertions of the English rulers during the past half a century.

A new danger is now threatening India. Hitherto India’s wealth above the surface of the land has been draining away to England. Now the wealth under the surface of the land, will also be taken away, and India lies prostrate and unable to help herself. England has taken away her capital. That same capital will be brought to take away all such mineral wealth of the country as requires application of large capital and expensive machinery. With the exception of the employment of the lower classes of bodily and mental labourers, the larger portion of the produce will, in several shapes, be eaten up and carried away by the Europeans, first as servants and next in profits and dividends, and poor India will have to thank her stars, that she will get some crumbs, in the lower employments of her children. And great will be the sounding of trumpets of the wealth found in India, and the blessings conferred on India, just as we have sickeningly dinned into our ears, day after day, about Railways, Foreign Trade, &c.

Now, this may sound very strange, that knowing full well the benefits of foreign capital to any country, I should complain of its going to India.

There is, under present circumstances, one great difference in the modes in which English capital goes to every other country and India. To every other country, English capitalists lend, and there is an end of their connection with the matter. The people of the country use and enjoy the benefit of the capital in every way, and pay to the capitalists their interest or dividend, and as some capitalists know to their cost, not even that. But, with India, the case is quite different. English capitalists do not merely lend, but with their capital, they themselves invade the country. The produce of the capital is mostly eaten up by their own countrymen, and after that, they carry away the rest in the shape of profits and dividends. The people themselves of the country do not derive the same benefit which is derived by every other country from English capital. The guaranteed Railways, not only ate up everything in this manner, but compelled India to make up the guaranteed interest also from her produce. The remedy then was adopted of making State Railways. Now under the peculiar circumstances of India's present prostration, state-works would be, no doubt, the best means of securing to India the benefits of English capital. But the misfortune is that the same canker eats into the state-works also,—the same eating up of the substance by European employés. The plan by which India can be really benefited would be, that all kinds of public works, or mines, or all works, that require capital, be undertaken by the state, with English capital and native agency, with some thoroughly competent Europeans at the head, as may be absolutely necessary.

Supposing that there was even extravagance or loss, government making up any deficiency of the interest of the loans from general revenue, will not matter much, though there is no reason why, with proper care, a native agency cannot be formed good enough for efficient and economic working. Anyhow, in such a case, the people of India will then really derive the benefit of English capital, as every other country does, with the certainty of English capitalists getting their interest from the government, who have complete control over the revenues of India, and can without fail provide for the interest.

For some time, therefore, and till India, by a change in the present destructive policy of heavy European agency, has revived and is able to help herself in a free field, it is necessary that all great undertakings which India herself is unable to carry out for developing the resources of the country, should be undertaken by the State, but carried out chiefly by native agency, and by preparing natives for the purpose. Then will India recover her blood from every direction. India sorely needs the aid of English capital. But it is English capital that she needs and not the English invasion, to come also and eat up both capital and produce.

As things are taking their course at present with regard to the gold mines, if they prove successful, great will be the trumpeting of India's wealth being increased, while it will all be being carried away by England.

In the United States the people of the country enjoy all the benefits of their mines and public works with English capital, and pay to England her fair interest; and in cases of failures of the schemes, while the people have enjoyed the benefit of the capital, sometimes both capital and interest are gone. The schemes fail, and the lenders of capital may lament, but the people have enjoyed the capital and the produce as far as they went.

I have no doubt that in laying my views plainly before the Secretary of State, my motives or sentiments towards the British rule will not be misunderstood. I believe that the result of the British rule can be a blessing to India and a glory to England,—a result worthy of the foremost and most humane nation on the face of the earth. I desire that this should take place, and I therefore lay my humble views before our rulers without shrinking. It is no pleasure to me to dwell incessantly on the wretched, heart-rending, blood-boiling condition of India. None will rejoice more than myself if my views are proved to be mistaken. The sum total of all is, that without any such intention or wish, and with every desire for the good of India, England has, in reality, been the most disastrous and destructive foreign invader of India, and under present lines, unceasingly and everyday increasingly continues to be so. This unfortunate fact is to be boldly faced by England; and I am sanguine that, if once England realises this position, she would recoil from it and vindicate to the world her great mission of Humanity and Civilization among mankind. I am writing to English gentlemen, and I have no fear but that they would receive my sincere utterances with the generosity and love of justice of English gentlemen.

In concluding these remarks, I feel bound to say that as far as I can judge from Mr. Caird's separate paper on the Condition of India, he appears to have realised the abnormal economical condition of India, and I cannot but feel the true English manliness and moral courage he has displayed, that, though he went out an avowed defender of the Indian government, he spoke out his convictions, and what he saw within his opportunities. India needs the help of such manly, conscientious, true-hearted English gentlemen to study and probe her forlorn condition, and India may then fairly hope for ample redress ere long, at England's hands and conscience.

32, Great St. Helens, London, 4th January 1881. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

Notes

  1. *. [C—1203. 1875.]
  2. *. Not all Parsees,—One Parsee, one Hindu and one Mahomedan.
  3. *. [C.—1249.]
  4. *. [C.—1251.]
  5. *. Annual Meeting of the East India Association, August 6, 1873. Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said that, before the vote of thanks to the Chairman was proposed, he desired to make some brief explanations to the members, and this perhaps was the most fitting opportunity. With regard to the donations given by the Princes of India, there was, it appeared, some misapprehension. Although the Council had clearly and unequivocally shown that these donations had been given entirely upon public grounds, and simply for the general good of
  6. *. See Note on pages 399 and 400.
  7. †. This, I had explained, was unintelligible to me. It was meant, I suppose, that I was only to execute orders given by the Gaekwar.
  8. ‡. One additional important reason was that the Durbarees and even Jasoods would now and then take advantage of giving orders in the Gaekwar's name.
  9. §. Without this arrangement irregular expenditure could not be checked.
  10. ‖. Without this it was impossible to bring Finances into order.
  11. *. Under the circumstances of the time, when the old Durbarees always endeavoured "to thwart" reforms, this latitude as well as that of the sub-clause 5 of clause 5 became an absolute necessity. [p. 406] do some secret Political work. This is against my views. He should not be retained in the service. I now most earnestly request that if Sircar would order to conduct the administration according to the above clauses, it is most essentially necessary for the Sircar to make a thorough determination, not to disturb it afterwards. It is my duty to preserve intact the rights and increase the fame of Sircar, and I shall not fail to do all I can in that way. Dated 31st July 1874. (Signed) Dadabhai Naoroji
  12. *. "I have received with pleasure your Excellency's friendly khareeta of 31st March 1874, with a copy of the Report of the Commission. In my khareeta of 31st December 1873, I had requested to be furnished with a copy of this Report in order that I might be able to express my views upon it before your Excellency determined upon any friendly advice to be given to me. As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I shall take the opportunity of expressing my views upon the Report, when I shall reply to your Excellency's friendly Khareeta containing that advice. I beg to express, &c. &c.
  13. *. The italics are mine.
  14. *. Pages 161 to 163 of this book.
  15. *. In the report crop per acre is given for 2 districts only marked *. The average for these two, viz. 1499·17—say 1,500 lbs. is applied to all other districts by me.
  16. †. No price is given in the report for the 3 districts marked †. The average of the others, viz .68·4 lbs., is applied to these.
  17. *. Crop per acre is given for only these 4 districts, the average of which for 104,861 acres is 503 lbs., and this average is applied to all the other districts for 1,769,356 acres.
  18. *. Crop per acre is given for these districts only. The average from them is applied to others, viz. 645 lbs.
  19. *. for which price is not given.
  20. †. The total of the products of these =168,694,604, divided by the total 6,534,963 of acres, will give an average of 26 lbs. per acre of seed for a crop of average 510 lbs.—say 20 fold. Deducting then 5 per cent. for seed, the total quantity will be lbs. 3,169,169,607 and total value will be Rs. 4,54,14,114.
  21. *. The produce per acre for these is not given in the report. I have applied the average of the other districts, viz. 846 lbs. to these.
  22. *. This evidently is some mistake. It may be 280.
  23. *. The produce per acre for this is not given in the Report. The average of the others (652,408 acres) is applied to this.
  24. *. This is apparently a mistake. The figure is too high.
  25. †. The crop per acre for this district being not given in the Report, I have given it the average 366.
  26. *. For these (2,311 acres) produce per acre is taken of the average for the thers, viz. 31·44.
  27. *. Produce per acre is given for vegetables for these two districts only, and the average of these viz., 4,753, is applied to all others.
  28. ‡. for lbs. 252,142,616 ex.cluding the 2 quantities marked ‡
  29. *. For these districts only is the produce per acre given in the Report. I have applied the average of these to others.
  30. †. This is evidently a mistake. Though other districts, such as Ludhiana (8) are better than Delhi—and while 661 lbs. is considered a fair average for Ludhiana, 1,500 for Delhi cannot be correct. It is more likely 500 than 1,500. If 500 be adopted the average will become 487 instead of 646 lbs. And it is also considered, that an average of about 489 will be near the mark. I have allowed the figure 1,500 to remain, though this increases the average above 487 lbs. nearly 32 per cent.
  31. *. I have taken 1875-6, for, on account of the Famines in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies in the year 1876-7, a comparison for the year 1876-7 will be an unfair one.
  32. *. Taking the aggregate wealth of the world, Foreign Trade even adds nothing. It simply then becomes Internal trade, and is mere change of hands, as explained further on.
  33. *. The Punjab is favoured by nature and by circumstances. By nature, inasmuch as it is one of the most fertile parts of India. It is "Punj-aub," the land of the 5 waters, and it has both natural and artificial irrigation. It is favoured by circumstances, inasmuch as that (excepting Bengal in its special fortunate circumstances of the permanent settlement, Punjab pays the least land revenue— viz. the Punjab pays Rs. 1-2-2 per head per annum, the North West Provinces pay Re. 1-6, Madras Rs. 1-7, and Bombay Rs. 2-4-3 (see my tables, page 25). I have taken these figures for 1875-6. Those for 1876-7 would be unfair and abnormal on account of the Bombay and Madras Famines. Further, the Punjab has been further favoured by other circumstauces in the following way:— The Administration Report of 1856-8 says—"In former reports it was explained how, the circumstance of so much money going out of the Punjab, contributed to depress the agriculturists. The native regular army was Hindoostani. To them was a large share of the Punjab revenue disbursed, of which a part only they spent on the spot, and a part was remitted to their homes. Thus it was, that year after year, lakhs and lakhs were drained from the Punjab and enriched Oudh. But within the last year the native army being Punjabi, all such sums have been paid to them and have been spent at home. Again many thousands of Punjabi soldiers are serving abroad. These men not only remit their savings but also have sent a quantity of prize property and plunder, the spoils of Hindustan, to their native villages. The effect of all this is already perceptible in an increase of agricultural capital, a freer circulation of money, and a fresh impetus to cultivation." It will be seen that the Punjab has more capital to draw upon, and has some addition to its resources at the expense of the other provinces, to make up some of its deficiency of its production.
  34. *. For some probable errors in these two articles in the Report, I have already given my views in my tables.
  35. *. In the report of 1868-9, the heading is only “cows and bullocks,” while in 1876-7, it is given as “cows, bullocks and buffaloes.” Now if buffaloes are not included in 1868-9, the diminution in cattle will be very much larger. Most probably buffaloes are included in 1868-9 figures. But this must be ascertained. It is a serious matter.
  36. *. The Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State for India, said in his speech of 11th March 1869 with regard to the employment of Natives in the Covenanted Service :—“I must say that we have not fulfilled our duty or the promises and engagements which we have made.” See page 245 of this book.
  37. *. Sir Stafford Northcote, in his speech in Parliament on 24th May 1867, said :— “ Nothing could be more wonderful than our empire in India, but we ought to “ consider on what conditions we held it, and how our predecessors held it. The “ greatness of the Mogul empire depended upon the liberal policy that was “ pursued by men like Akbar availing themselves of Hindu talent and assistance, “ and identifying themselves as far as possible with the people of the country. “ He thought that they ought to take a lesson from such a circumstance, and if “ they were to do their duty towards India, they could only discharge that duty “ by obtaining the assistance and counsel of all who were great and good in that “ country. It would be absurd in them to say that there was not a large fund of “ statesmanship and ability in the Indian character.”—Times of 25th May 1867.
  38. *. Statistical abstract of British India—1879, page 21.
  39. *. The Westminster Review of January 1876 gives the National production for 1875 of the United Kingdom as £28 per head of population. I do not know whether profits of trade are included in this amount. Mr. Grant Duff, in 1871, took £800,000,000—or roundly £30 per head of population. The population is above 34,000,000,—which, at £28, gives £952,000,000.
  40. †. Page 97 of this book.
  41. ‡. Page 160 of this book.