1. First Attempts, and the Factories on the Coromandel Coast
We must now turn to the development of the relations of the Dutch and English Companies with India and the countries farther to the West. The design of the earliest voyages was, as we have seen, in no way concerned with India, but Dutch merchants had not been long in the East before they were forced by experience to realise that, in order to trade profitably, India must be included in their scheme of operations. The necessity arose from the fact that pepper and the other spices which they sought were ordinarily obtained from the producers by bartering Indian-made cotton cloth. The first Dutch ventures were organised on the basis of the information which had been collected regarding the commercial methods of the Portuguese. The Lisbon practice was to send out chiefly silver, and accordingly the Dutch carried their capital mainly in money, together with a miscellaneous assortment of merchandise; but the precedent was not really applicable, for the silver from Lisbon went to India, while the Dutch carried silver to Java, and experience soon showed that while they could procure a cargo of pepper in this way, the transaction was commercially unsound. The trade at Bantam was in the hands of Chinese dealers, who bought up pepper from the producers at the harvest, and stored it until the arrival of ships to carry it to China: being sure of this old-established market, they were not particularly eager to sell elsewhere, and consequently the Dutch had to pay whatever price was asked, or in the alternative risk the success of their voyage by waiting in harbour until the next crop should come forward. The risk was very great: the mere running cost of maintenance was by no means negligible, but of much more importance was the injury to the ships from the worms with which the harbours were infested, and, most of all, the appalling mortality among the crews, aggravated as it was by the disorderly living for which the seaports offered every facility. A prolonged stay in port might render a ship unfit to return to Europe, or might lead to its loss on the homeward voyage for want of men; and the Dutch quickly realised that, in order to establish a profitable business, they must adapt themselves to the methods of the country, leaving factors or agents on the spot to buy direct from the producers at harvest-time, and supplying the factors in advance with the cotton cloth required for their transactions, so that the ships might remain in port only for the time required to take on board the cargo which had been provided. The conditions in Achin were generally similar to those which prevailed in Bantam, with the additional risk of outbursts of lawlessness among the people, or of greed or tyranny on the part of the king. In the Spice Islands the position was even more difficult, for money was not yet generally current, though such of the inhabitants as knew its use were willing to take it in payment; and here, too, it was necessary for successful business to be in the market at harvest-time with a stock of Indian cloth. Such cloth could be bought from middlemen in Achin or Bantam, but only at exorbitant prices, and we need not be surprised that such keen merchants as the Dutch should have determined after very little experience to buy at firsthand, and save the large profits of the middlemen.
The first recorded attempt to enter the cloth markets in India was made at the end of the year 1601, when two Dutch factors took passage on a ship which was returning to Gujarat from Achin. They were welcomed in Surat and wrote encouraging reports, but they were tempted, or perhaps decoyed, to Calicut by promises of trade, and at Calicut they were handed over to the Portuguese, carried to Goa, and there executed. The story of the next few years is not on record, but apparently other factors were sent to Gujarat, and it is clear that a Dutch agency was in existence at Surat in 1606; it came to an end in the following year when van Deynsen, the only survivor of the party, was driven to suicide by the intrigues and persecution of the Portuguese. After this, the Dutch left Gujarat alone for some years; the potential value of its trade was recognised, but the authorities were now intent on concentrating their resources on the struggle for the Spice Islands, and for the time they bought Gujarat goods in the market at Achin.
Gujarat was, in fact, less important than the Coromandel coast for the supply of cotton goods to the spice markets, and by this time the Dutch had secured a footing at Masulipatam. A junior merchant was already resident there in 1605, but the formal establishment of factories dates from the following year, when an agreement was concluded with the king of Golconda, and the merchants set to work at Masulipatam itself and at the neighbouring town of Nizampatam, then more generally known as Petapoli. Here they quickly learned that the delta of the Kistna was not the best place to provide all the requirements of their trade. The local produce consisted chiefly of plain cloth or calico, bleached or dyed, but some markets, the Molucca Islands in particular, required what are spoken of in contemporary records as pintados, or “painted” goods, and the chief seat of this specialised industry lay farther south, in the vicinity of Pulicat and S. Thomé.1 Extensions to the southward were consequently found to be desirable, and in the next two or three years we hear of factories near Tegnapatam, which appears on modern maps as Fort St. David ; but the most important development was the grant by the king of Chandragiri of a site in Pulicat itself. The Dutch established themselves here in 1610, and the factory was made the headquarters of all their business on the coast ; it was taken from them by the Portuguese of S. Thomé in 1612, but was recovered shortly afterwards, and was made sufficiently strong to resist further attack by land.1 Henceforward trade on the coast progressed steadily. The requirements of Eastern commerce were supplied ; such goods as could be sold were imported ; and in time direct trade was opened up with Persia and with Europe.
The English settled at Masulipatam and Petapoli in the year 1611, but their trade did not develop to the same extent as that of the Dutch, probably because they had not an equally extensive market in the Farther East. Coromandel supplied goods which they bartered for pepper in Java and Sumatra, or could dispose of at Macassar, and in time it contributed to their trade with Europe and Persia ; but throughout our period the larger business of the Dutch gave them a definite predominance in the markets, and as a rule the English merchants were content to follow. Masulipatam remained their headquarters in the north. In the south they were admitted to the Pulicat settlement in 1621 under the agreement made between the Companies in Europe; but here, as elsewhere, the conditions of residence in a Dutch fortress proved to be intolerable, and in 1626 they moved to Armagon at the northern end of the Pulicat lagoon, having been granted favourable terms by the local nayak or chief. Armagon served its purpose for a time, but as a centre of commerce it had many drawbacks, and in 1640 the factors established themselves in what is now Madras, where a fort was built under an agreement with the nayak in possession of this part of the coast. These arrangements continued for the remainder of our period, the Dutch having their headquarters at Pulicat and the English at Madras, while both Companies maintained factories at Masulipatam and other places in the neighbourhood, and also traded in the various markets along the coast.
2. The Factories in Western India
We have seen that the early efforts of the Dutch to establish themselves on the West Coast terminated on the death of van Deynsen in 1607: a year later, an English ship arrived off Surat, and, when the preliminary negotiations had been completed, the development of commerce with Gujarat began in earnest. At this point we meet with a new motive. The English intended, as the Dutch had intended, to obtain cotton goods from Gujarat for employment in the Eastern trade, but they hoped also to extend the scope of the Company's operations by establishing direct commerce between India and England. The need for extension was being felt as early as the year 1603; the European demand for pepper was urgent but not insatiable, and when English and Dutch supplies arrived in quantity there was something like a glut. A few years later the English merchants at Bantam were instructed to send any commodities rather than pepper, though pepper would be preferable to an empty ship; and it was obviously to the interest of the Company to find new Asiatic markets, where English manufactures could be sold and goods suitable for England could be procured. How little was at that time known of the potentialities of India may be gathered from the instructions issued with this object to the commander of the Third Voyage in the year 1607. The markets of the Red Sea were thought to be more hopeful than those of India, and, if the season served, the fleet was to try for trade at Aden, and, on its way thence to Bantam, make inquiries regarding the Gulf of Cambay. If, however, Aden could not be reached in the trading season, the fleet was ordered to make for Gujarat, and if possible open trade: India, in fact, was regarded as a "second string." The fleet was too late to attempt the Red Sea trade, and it was owing to this fact that Hawkins in the Hector anchored off Surat in August, 1608.
In order to understand his reception by the local authorities, it is necessary to take into account the position occupied in Surat by the Portuguese. They had no territorial settlement in the town, but for nearly a century they had dominated its sea-borne trade: they were established in strength at Diu and Damān, from which stations they collected licence-fees on the ships leaving all the ports of Gujarat; their coasting-fleets (kafila) carried a large proportion of the merchandise exported from the province; and their fighting craft policed the coastal waters, which were not protected by the Moguls. The local officials lived in terror of the Portuguese commanders who visited the port from time to time, and who could threaten to burn the shipping if their wishes were disregarded. The Dutch had just been deprived of the foothold they had obtained in Surat; and when Hawkins arrived, the local prestige of the Portuguese was probably at its highest point, while their determination to maintain their position was uncompromising. The English were, however, by no means daunted by the hostility they experienced, and when the local officials declared that the settlement of a factory required the sanction of the Emperor, Hawkins promptly set out for the Court of Jahangir at Agra in order to negotiate an agreement for regular trade. His reception was favourable, but his somewhat boisterous diplomacy proved to be ineffective against Portuguese intrigue, and after prolonged negotiations he left Agra without having achieved his object.
The English Company continued to send ships to Surat while waiting for news of the results obtained by Hawkins. In 1609 the Ascension arrived off the coast, but was wrecked on a shoal, and this loss, together with the misconduct of some of the survivors on land, probably injured the prospects of the English already in the country. In 1611 Sir Henry Middleton reached Surat, but found the Portuguese influence still too strong; in the following year Best had a more favourable reception, and concluded an agreement under which the
English were permitted to establish factories in Gujarat. The motives which led to this change of front are not on record, and it is dangerous to speculate regarding the course of Oriental diplomacy, but apparently one of the contributory factors was the injury to Portuguese prestige which resulted from the failure of their attacks on Best's ships. The Moguls, having themselves no strength on the water, had come to regard the Portuguese naval forces as invincible, and the successful defence of the English against a greatly superior fleet, in actions some of which were witnessed from the land, probably suggested the idea of playing off one nation against the other, and thus loosening the Portuguese grip on the commerce of the country. Middleton's activities in the Red Sea, which had involved interference with Gujarat shipping, had already shown that the English were formidable on the water: probably also the news of Dutch successes in the Eastern seas was by this time opening the eyes of the Mogul authorities to the fact that the Portuguese supremacy was no longer unchallenged; but, whatever the motives at work, the fact is clear that Best's defence was followed by the formal delivery to him of what purported to be an Imperial farmān or rescript, confirming the terms of agreement which had been settled provisionally with the Mogul officers in Gujarat.
The issue of this rescript was considered by the English to justify them in establishing factories in Gujarat, and action was taken accordingly, but it is clear that the Mogul diplomatists, who presumably desired English trade but did not wish to commit themselves for the future, had the best of the negotiations, for the supposed farmān proved to be a document of little value; for the moment, however, it served, and regular English trade at Surat may be said to date from the beginning of the year 1613.1 The precarious footing so secured was improved, at least temporarily, by the outbreak of war between the Moguls and the Portuguese. Hostilities continued for two years, the Moguls besieging Damān by land, while the Portuguese caused much injury to Gujarat shipping, and eventually an inconclusive peace was arranged; but this very fact tended to emphasise the rapid decline of Portuguese prestige, while, so long as hostilities lasted, merchants of other European nations were obviously more likely to be welcomed than when Portuguese agents were active throughout the country.
The reappearance of the Dutch at Surat is probably to be explained by this cause. In the year 1614 the local authorities at that port wrote to the Dutch factory at Masulipatam to say that the merchandise left by van Deynsen was still in their possession; they suggested that the Dutch should reclaim it, and hinted at the same time that they might care to take Diu or Damān from the Portuguese. This letter was, I have no doubt, meant as a semi-official invitation to the Dutch to send a fleet against the Portuguese, the offer of the abandoned property being a mere formality;1 but the Dutch took it literally, and in the following year a factor named van Ravesteyn came to Surat with a small party overland. As was only to be expected, he recovered very little of the property which he sought, but he learned much of politics as well as commerce, notably the Mogul's fear of the Portuguese sea-power. They might hope to capture Damān by assault from the landward side, but they could not starve out the garrison so long as provisions could arrive by sea, and in the meantime their own seaports lay open and unprotected: the Moguls, he was told, did not fight upon the sea; the Imperial Court knew nothing of maritime affairs; and since a truce with Portugal had just been made, the priests were likely to regain their former influence at the Court. Van Ravesteyn recognised the great possibilities of the commerce of Gujarat, but he realised also the drawbacks, and he insisted that a very comprehensive agreement would be necessary before the Dutch could open business with any hope of success.
Van Ravesteyn argued at length from the experience of the English, which in the later months of 1615 was certainly discouraging. The position is described fully in the Journal of Sir Thomas Roe, who arrived while van Ravesteyn was at Surat; the attitude of the local authorities was very nearly intolerable, and unless it could be altered, there was no hope of establishing regular commerce. Roe's diplomatic efforts at the Court of Jahangir were not entirely successful, but his influence brought about a decided improvement; the English factors settled down to buy and sell; in spite of some unpleasant experiences, their objects were attained; and, while Bantam was supplied with its requirements, the direct trade between Surat and London increased rapidly in importance.
Shortly after van Ravesteyn's mission, the Dutch arrived in earnest. Their plan of buying Gujarat goods in Achin broke down in the year 1616 when their factory there was closed, and the Governor General in Java decided, against the advice of the factors on the Coromandel coast, that direct trade with Surat must be established. With this object he deputed Pieter van den Broecke to conduct the necessary negotiations. The growing prestige of the Dutch in Eastern waters facilitated his efforts, reasonable terms settled with the Gujarat officials were confirmed in due course by the Court, and a factory was opened in 1617; but at first the available capital was scanty, and the factory became important only in 1621, when van den Broecke returned as resident Director, and began to push the Dutch trade with vigour and success. For the remainder of our period, English and Dutch traded side by side in Surat and throughout the towns of Gujarat. In this region neither Company had any possessions such as the fortresses on the Coromandel coast; the factors lived merely as foreign merchants, on the strength of the terms which they obtained from the Imperial Court.
Van den Broecke's charge extended to the commerce with Persia and the Red Sea, regions which were intimately connected with the markets of Gujarat. At this period the trade of the Red Sea was concentrated at the port of Mocha, where goods from India and other Eastern countries were sold for transport to Egypt and the Mediterranean markets. Both Dutch and English were tempted to obtain a share of this trade by the fact that most of the goods sold were paid for in gold and silver, the commodities in most demand in India; but it cannot be said that the results answered their expectations. Political and administrative difficulties arose occasionally at Mocha, leading to temporary suspensions of business, while the market proved to be very uncertain; the trade was maintained with some interruptions throughout the greater portion of our period, but it cannot be classed among the most profitable ventures of either Company.
The story of their enterprises in the Persian Gulf is different. At the beginning of the century, the Gulf trade with India was closely controlled by the Portuguese, by whom it was regarded as most remunerative. Persia sent out horses, dried fruits, rosewater, and a variety of luxury goods, while the imports consisted mainly of spices and cotton cloth, and the balance of trade was settled by remittances of silver to India. Silk, however, the outstanding commercial product of Persia, scarcely entered into this trade, as practically the whole surplus production was carried by land to the Mediterranean, and the developments during our period resulted mainly from the transfer of this commerce from land to sea. Shah Abbas objected to his enemies, the Turks, profiting by the transit of his silk through their territory, and he was at some pains to persuade various European nations to send shipping to the Gulf; the English merchants eventually took the matter up, and the first consignment of silk was shipped from Jask at the end of the year 1618. The Portuguese naturally resented the appearance of the English in what they regarded as their particular domain, and they sent out a war-fleet to assert their claims, but it failed to do so effectively, and in 1622 the English joined with the Persian forces in a successful attack on the Portuguese fort of Ormuz; as the result of this action, Ormuz ceased to exist as a seaport or market, and its commerce was transferred to the Persian mainland at the port of Gombroon, known also as Bandar Abbas. The Dutch had declined to take part in the attack on Ormuz, but, when the fortress had fallen, they were quick to claim a share in the silk trade, and from about 1623 onwards both nations were actively engaged in exporting to Europe. In one way the trade was simple, for silk was a royal monopoly, and merchants could expect reasonable treatment so long as their position at Court was maintained. I think the Dutch were on the whole better served by their agents at the Court, but in any case they had a very great commercial advantage over the English in their ability to supply the Persian market with spices, the commodities in most demand; the English, being unable to offer spices, were frequently in difficulties as to laying down saleable goods in adequate quantities, and the Dutch certainly secured the larger proportion of the silk trade. For a time it was highly remunerative, but at the close of our period the European demand was falling, while the produce of Bengal was beginning to compete in the market, and by the year 1655 the English Company had ceased to buy silk in Persia.
Surat was the centre for extension of trade to a large portion of India as well as to the countries farther West. The production of the town itself was not of very great importance, and almost as soon as the merchants had settled there they established factories throughout Gujarat, at Ahmadabad, Broach, Baroda, and occasionally elsewhere, in order to maintain close touch with the producers of indigo and cotton goods. Indigo was at first regarded as the “prime commodity” for the trade with Europe, and English buyers were promptly sent northwards to Agra to secure supplies from the neighbourhood of Biana, the produce of which was familiar in distant markets, and was superior in point of purity to that of Gujarat. The Dutch in their turn established themselves at Agra as soon as their organisation in Surat had become effective, and at once took the leading position in the indigo trade. The buyers did not, however, confine their attention to a single commodity, and when it was found that Europe would buy cotton cloth, they explored the possibilities of Northern India, so that as early as the year 1620 we hear of English factors at Samana (now in the Patiala State), and at Patna in Bihar. These particular factories were not maintained for long, because experience showed that Gujarat could supply the European demand; but when its productive resources were temporarily destroyed by the famine of 1630, which will be described in a subsequent chapter, extensions northward became necessary, and large purchases of cloth were made in the neighbourhood of Agra, while an English factory was established at Lucknow as a collecting depot for the products of Oudh. The country between Surat and Agra was of course well known to the factors who traversed it with frequent consignments of goods, and the fact that they did practically no business in it must be taken to show that it had no attractions for them. The only intermediate factory was at Burhanpur, which was maintained for some time for the sale of imported goods to the large Mogul army concentrated there for the conquest of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, but the business was not of sufficient importance to justify a permanent establishment.
A share in the trade of Sind was one of the earliest objectives of the English merchants. This trade centred in the town of Tatta and its port of Lahari Bandar, whence goods were exported mainly to the Persian Gulf, or sent southwards along the coast to Gujarat and Goa; Basra was the chief foreign market for the cotton cloth which formed the bulk of the exports. The port of Lahari Bandar, which has now disappeared, could not at this period accommodate large ships owing to lack of depth in the channel : local ship-owners were few, and most of the trade was carried in Portuguese coasting vessels, known at this time as frigates. At the beginning of our period, the Portuguese dominated the commerce of the region, and their influence with the Mogul authorities sufficed to defeat the first English attempt, made in the year 1613, to obtain a footing in the port; their arguments were not in this case based on their naval or military power, but they threatened to desert the port if the English were admitted, and the Governor, who held the farm of the customs, could not face the risk of the resulting loss. The volume of commerce at this time had apparently been exaggerated : Sir Thomas Roe reported in 1618 that “ it is not so great as pretended, nor the profit to the Portugals a tenth part,” and he added that the trade had suffered greatly owing to the exactions of the Portuguese, while in a subsequent letter he said the market would take nothing but ivory, and supply only “ good cloth and many toys.” There were thus few attractions for foreign merchants. The Dutch attempted trade in the year 1631, but did not continue the venture, and the practical monopoly of the Portuguese lasted until 1635. The arrangement negotiated by Methwold for peace between the English and the Portuguese in India resulted in the termination of this monopoly ; an English ship anchored off Lahari Bandar in November of that year, the merchants were favourably received by the authorities, a factory was established, and trade continued throughout the remainder of our period. The Dutch returned to Sind some years later, and from about 1652 were engaged regularly in the trade, but not, so far as I can discover, on a considerable scale. Sind was, in fact, more important for the English than for the Dutch, because its trade with the Gulf provided a method of laying down goods in Persia, and so helping to finance the export of silk. The Dutch could, as we have seen, obtain purchasing power in Persia by the sale of spices, but the English, having no access to the principal spice markets, were forced to develop other lines of trade, and among these the sale of Sind calico took a prominent place, whether it was marketed in Persia itself or sold for cash at Basra. At the same time, the English devoted much energy to placing Sind goods on the London market, which after 1630 could not, as has just been said, be fully supplied from Gujarat, and calico was sold there in substantial quantities ; but, taken as a whole, the trade of this region cannot be said to have assumed really important dimensions. The country was poor, and suffered severely from oppressive administration : the difficulties of navigation increased as time went on ; and the most that can be said is that Sind formed a useful subsidiary to the main establishment at Surat.
The attempts to extend trade to the southward along the Konkan coast were even less successful than this venture on the west. The possibilities of the coast were thoroughly tested, and we hear of the English Company's factors residing for various periods at the ports of Danda Rajpur, Dabhol, and Rajapur, while Bhatkal, further south, was for a time the Indian headquarters of Courteen's Association, the rival English company founded in 1636.1 A factory at Vengurla was established by the Dutch, primarily in order to obtain provisions for their fleets during the seasonal blockade of Goa, and a substantial amount of trade was at times put through ; but the truth seems to be that during most of our period the kingdom of Bijapur, which was served by all these ports, was an unsatisfactory market, demanding little but the precious metals, and having few goods to offer in exchange. This section of the coast received further attention about the year 1659, when the English Company made a vigorous attempt to develop its trade, but the results lie outside our period. The chief commercial attraction was the supply of pepper, which became important at this time owing to difficulties in procuring it at Bantam or Achin ; but when Indian pepper was wanted, merchants naturally looked for it farther south in the neighbourhood of Cochin and Calicut. The latter place was indeed one of the first objectives of the Dutch after they had decided to confront the Portuguese. In 1604 they entered into an alliance with the Zamorin for the expulsion of the Portuguese from India, and further agreements were subsequently made, but no regular trade resulted at this time ; while the experience of the English about the year 1620 led to the decision not to attempt further business. Some years later, however, the merchants of both nations obtained admission to the trade of this coast, as will be explained in Chapter III. The reorganisation of the pepper trade, which followed on the Dutch conquest of Cochin, lies beyond the limit of our period.
3. The Extension to Bengal
We must now return to the East Coast, where, as we have seen, the original settlements extended from Masulipatam to the vicinity of Tegnapatam. A few years after the arrival of the English, another nation, the Danes, appeared upon the scene, and obtained a grant of the port of Tranquebar, which remained their headquarters throughout the rest of our period. I have found no regular records of their commercial activities, but from what may be read in the reports of the Dutch and English merchants it is clear that they suffered from a chronic shortage of capital, and that their share in the trade of India was small. The activities of the Dutch and English were not confined to the factories already named, but extended along the coast to any town where goods could be had on reasonable terms: the Dutch also made purchases inland in the neighbourhood of Golconda, and the English followed the same practice, but farther south the continual disturbances made it hopeless to attempt business in the interior, and even on the coast contracts were liable to be interfered with by outbreaks of war or lawlessness. The extreme south was left alone for the greater portion of our period, but in 1645 the Dutch established a factory at Kayal, to the south of Tuticorin, and about the same time the English were buying cotton goods and pepper in that neighbourhood, while an English factory was subsequently established at Kayal, designed apparently to compete with the Dutch. A little later the Dutch captured from the Portuguese the more important town of Negapatam.
The trade of the coast was thus fairly well developed from Masulipatam southward, but the chief interest of the story lies farther north. From the outset the Dutch had hoped for remunerative intercourse with Pegu, Arakan, and Bengal. It may be said at once that Pegu was a disappointment, the commercial and administrative conditions being almost intolerable, and neither Dutch nor English succeeded in establishing an extensive trade; the English factory there sent more or less encouraging reports from time to time, but in 1655 it was described as "needless," and in the following year it was dissolved, while about the same time a Dutch report described the trade as dead.
The Dutch maintained relations with Arakan throughout most of our period, though commerce was interrupted by occasional wars. The trade was of small value, but it furnished two commodities in particular, rice and slaves, which, as we shall see later on, were urgently required in Batavia, and such interest as it possesses for us arises from the fact that these commodities were obtained to a great extent from Chittagong.
Bengal offered such obvious attractions to merchants that it is at first sight difficult to understand why it was neglected alike by Dutch and English for so many years after their arrival on the coast. The explanation is to be found in the conditions which prevailed locally: the country itself was too unsettled for peaceable trade, while the seaports were difficult of access, and were dominated by the Portuguese. Indian chroniclers tell us little of the internal condition of Bengal during the reign of Jahangir, and the English correspondence discloses only projects which were not put into execution, but the Dutch records show that, while the merchants at Pulicat and Masulipatam were alive to the possibilities, they were deterred from action by the news which reached them, and which may be summed up in the judgment passed by the Governor General at Batavia in 1627, that there was no hope of profitable trade because of the constant wars and rebellions, and the frequent changes in the administration. That the commercial life of Bengal was in fact depressed at this period seems to be proved by the attitude of the Indian traders on the Coromandel coast: from time to time we read of the Dutch relying on them to bring Bengal goods to Masulipatam, but their expectations were not fulfilled, and we may reasonably accept the inference that Indian merchants did not consider the venture worth their while.
The conditions prevailing in the principal seaports afforded ample grounds for hesitation. Bengal is served by two estuaries, the Meghna and the Hooghly.1 Of these, the Meghna was dominated by the pirates of Chittagong, some of them natives of the country, others Portuguese settlers, who lived by depredations on commerce, and were (subject to temporary disagreements) protected by their sovereign, the king of Arakan, to whom they are said to have paid a percentage on the gross produce of their industry.2 It is obvious that legitimate commerce must have suffered from their operations, the more so that persons as well as goods were treated as booty, the prisoners taken being sold into slavery; and I have found no evidence of the existence of any considerable direct trade between the Meghna and foreign countries at this period. The other estuary, the Hooghly, was also threatened by pirates, though to a less extent; in addition, the dangers attending its navigation were notorious,3 and there can have been little temptation to incur these risks in order to reach a port the business of which was almost entirely in the hands of the Portuguese. The extent of their domination was fully realised by the English. In 1618 Sir Thomas Roe, who wrote “upon searching the bottom of all the secrets of India," declared that Bengal had no ports but such as the Portuguese possessed for small shipping; and two years later the English factors who had penetrated from Agra to Patna reported that "The Portugals of late years have had a trade here in Patna, coming up with their frigates from the bottom of Bengal, where they have two ports, the one called Gollye [Hooghly]1 and the other Pipli, and therein are licensed by this king to inhabit. Gollye is their chiefest port, where they are in great multitudes."
The obstacles to trade on the Meghna continued throughout our period; Chittagong was visited occasionally by Dutch merchants from Arakan, and their incidental remarks show that piracy rather than commerce was the chief occupation of the inhabitants, while the lists of the cargoes which they obtained indicate no signs of commercial progress. On the Hooghly an abrupt change in the situation followed on the destruction of the Portuguese settlement in 1632, and Indian merchants on the Coromandel coast set out to reopen trade as soon as they were relieved of the fear of the Portuguese, while both Dutch and English vessels started northwards.
The extension was gradual. The first ventures we read of were to roadsteads in the vicinity of Cuttack; later on, ships were taken farther north to the ports of Pipli and Balasore; while in the year 1634 instructions were sent from Batavia to attempt trade with Hooghly itself. The early experiences of the Dutch at this port were, however, not encouraging. A monopoly of all trade had been granted to two local merchants; the authorities were not friendly; a fairly favourable agreement was settled with the Viceroy of Bengal at Dacca, but it did not prevail against the local obstacles; and in 1636 the factors decided to move down to Pipli, where Bengal goods could be obtained without the oppression and extortion met with at Hooghly. For some years both Dutch and English followed this policy, remaining off the mouth of the river at Pipli and Balasore, and sending buyers up the country from these bases; information regarding the English activities is scanty, but it suffices to show that the merchants preferred their own interests to those of the Company, and the real pioneering in this region was done mainly by the Dutch, whose factors were at Patna and Kasimbazar early in the next decade. I have not ascertained the precise date when the Dutch returned to Hooghly, but it lies between 1645 and 1650;1 in the former year their business was still being transacted at Pipli, while in December, 1650, the English factors who were sent to settle at Hooghly were instructed to follow the Dutch example, and to obtain land adjoining their settlement. This English factory was established early in 1651, and the two Companies traded side by side, but for the remainder of our period the Dutch predominated in the markets; the staples purchased by them were raw silk from Kasimbazar and saltpetre from Patna, and the development of the former trade was their most conspicuous achievement. Cotton goods of relatively fine texture were also exported in small quantities, but the fame of the Bengal muslins was not yet established in the Western markets. The difficulties of navigation on the Hooghly have already been mentioned, and up to the close of our period goods were usually brought down in small vessels and transhipped at Pipli or Balasore. This course, however, involved heavy expense, and in the year 1660 the English Company authorised experimental trips up the river by sea-going ships; the story of this development lies outside our period.
It was said in the previous chapter that the Danes were active chiefly in the Bay of Bengal. I have not found any contemporary account of their activities, but according to Thomas Bowrey, who was in these waters from 1669 onwards, they were at war with Bengal for over thirty years, and they must consequently be regarded as obstacles to the progress of its commerce. Bowrey's story is to the effect that the Danes had obtained a settlement at Balasore, but that about the year 1642, when ships failed to arrive from Denmark, the local Governor had the residents poisoned, seized on their goods, and demolished their factory. The next Danish fleet found the settlement desolate, and the commander was forced to declare war in a just cause; but the operations, which could have ruined the sea-borne commerce of the country, were not effectively prosecuted. Negotiations for peace were in progress in the year 1674, and shortly afterwards the Danes were admitted to a settlement at Serampur on the Hooghly. I have found no other account of the origin of the trouble, and the story of poisoning is in itself improbable; but whatever the facts may have been, the existence of a state of war is borne out by various incidental records of Danish attacks on Bengal shipping, and the conclusion appears to be justified that local ship-owners were in this way prevented from enjoying their full share of the revival of commerce which followed on the destruction of Portuguese domination.
The facts which have been summarised in this chapter show that by the close of our period the influence of the European merchants had extended over the greater part of India. On the coast, from Sind to Bengal, Dutchmen and Englishmen were to be found wherever there was trade worth having, while in the north they were active over large portions of the areas now known as Bihar and the United Provinces, and their presence was familiar on the roads leading from Agra to the seaports. In the south they had not penetrated inland to any great extent, but in this region the internal markets were not too distant to experience the influence of transactions on the sea-board; and it may fairly be said that, with the exception of the Punjab, every important part of India was affected by the new conditions which had come into existence. The next step in our inquiry is to attempt to determine the nature and magnitude of the commercial changes which resulted.
AUTHORITIES FOR CHAPTER II
Section 1.—The working of the various spice markets, and their dependence on Indian-made cotton goods must be studied chiefly in the narratives of the earliest Dutch and English visits; after the first voyage or two, such matters were usually taken for granted by the narrators. The following passages may be cited: Houtman, i. 72-122; Renneville, i. 3, 369 ff. (Bantam), ii. 1 (Java), ii. 220 ff. (Moluccas), ii. 158 ff. (Achin), ii. 371 ff. (Amboina); de Jonge, II. 448, III. 149; Terpstra's Koromandel, 1 ff.; Terpstra's Surat, 3, 35; Purchas, I. iii. 153 ff. (Achin), 161 ff. (Bantam), 194 ff. (Priaman); First Letter Book, 73, 74, 77, 84, 131, 148, 427; Letters Received, i. 18, 68 ff. 77 ff.; ii. 275, 314, 336; iii. 139. The danger to ships in Eastern harbours is a common topic; see, e.g., Purchas, I. iii. 179, 180; iv. 522; Letters Received, iii. 22; Jourdain, 234, 236, 303, 311 n.; and for losses by disease or disorder, see Renneville, i. 101; Scott's Discourse, in Purchas, I. iii., and idem, I. iii. 186; Middleton, 19 ff.
The first Dutch visits to Surat are recounted in Terpstra's Surat, 17 ff.; some of the relevant documents are also in de Jonge, II. 491 ff. The concentration of the Dutch on essentials, and the consequent temporary neglect of Gujarat trade, are obvious in many passages in the Hague Transcripts, e.g., II. 1, 5; see also van Dijk, 29. The early settlements on the East Coast are described in Terpstra's Koromandel, 34 ff. For the capture of Pulicat by the Portuguese, see Hague Transcripts, I. 69; Lisbon Transcripts, I. 424; and van Dijk, 20 ff. The arrival of the English on the East Coast is in Purchas, I. iii. 315, 320 ff.; for the English at Pulicat, see English Factories, i. p. xliii; at Armagon, idem, iii. p. xlii ff., and passim; at Madras, idem, vi. pp. xxxvii, 153 ff.
Section 2.—The motives of the first English voyage to Surat can be traced in First Letter Book, 38, 114 ff., 291; that the Dutch also experienced a glut of pepper appears from de Jonge, III. 120. The determination of the Portuguese to exclude other European nations from Surat is well brought out in Lisbon Transcripts, I. 58, 444. Hawkins' narrative is in Purchas, I. iii. 206 ff., and also Early Travels, 70 ff. For the wreck of the Ascension, see Purchas, I. iii. 230, and Jourdain, 124 ff.; for Middleton's visit, Purchas, I. iii. 267 ff.; and for Best, idem, I. iv. 458 ff. The Mogul-Portuguese war is frequently referred to in the English records, e.g., Letters Received, iii. p. xxxvii; the Portuguese view will be found in Faria y Sousa, iii. 195 ff. For the reappearance of the Dutch in Gujarat, see Terpstra's Surat, especially Appendices V. and VI. Roe is the chief authority for the English position at this time. Van den Broecke's narrative is in Begin ende Voortgangh (Renneville, vii. 380 ff.).
The conditions prevailing in the Red Sea trade are explained in Jourdain, 77, 103, and in the narratives of Middleton and Downton in Purchas, I. iii. The English activities can be followed in English Factories, beginning with i. p. xi ff.; those of the Dutch in Terpstra's Surat, 106 ff., and from 1624 onwards in the Dagh Register. For the unsatisfactory nature of the trade, see, e.g., English Factories, vi. 59. The Persian attempts to divert the silk-trade are mentioned from time to time in the Calendar S.P., e.g., No. 486 of 1513–1616, and 16, 210 of 1617–21. For the beginnings of the English enterprise in Persia, see Roe, passim, English Factories, i. p. xxv, and ii. pp. vii ff.; for the Dutch, Terpstra's Surat, 137 ff. The cessation of English trade in silk is recorded in English Factories, x. 24, 46, 119.
For extensions in Northern India, see Letters Received, English Factories, and Dagh Register, passim, and also Terpstra's Surat, 74, 75, etc. The first English attempt in Sind is in Purchas, I. iv. 497 ff.; the volume of the trade is discussed in English Factories, i. 12, 14; the Dutch voyage of 1631 is mentioned in idem, iv. 207, and Hague Transcripts, I. 318; and the English establishment of 1635 in English Factories, v. 117 ff. The drawbacks of the country appear frequently in subsequent volumes of English Factories; the settlement of the Dutch is in idem, ix. 116, and is mentioned in Tavernier, i. 313, and Manucci, i. 57. For sales of Sind goods in London, see Court Minutes, passim, e.g., May 19, 1643, and June 8, 1658. As regards the West Coast, the English Company's enterprises can be followed in English Factories from vol. i. onwards, while those of Courteen's Association commence in vol. v.; for the Dutch at Vengurla, see Dagh Register from 1637 onwards. The renewed English efforts are noticed in English Factories, x. 233 ff., 352 ff. The early Dutch negotiations with Calicut are related in Begin ende Voortgangh (Renneville, v. 20; vii. 57 ff.): the treaties are in de Jonge, III. 204, 278; for later intercourse from the East Coast, see Terpstra's Koromandel, 146. For the English at Calicut, see Letters Received, vols. iv.-vi., and English Factories, i. 76.
Section 3.—The Danish activities at this period are noticed occasionally in English Factories and the Dagh Register; see especially English Factories, i. pp. xliv ff. For Kayal and Tuticorin, see Dagh Register (Coromandel), September 17, 1645, and English Factories, vii. 252, viii. 15, and x. 218, etc. Pegu is referred to frequently in both Dutch and English records; see especially English Factories, ix. 19, x. 40, and Dagh Register, May 16, 1661. The first Dutch account of Arakan is given in de Jonge, III. 287; there are frequent later reports in the Dagh Register.
For the early Dutch investigations of Bengal, see Hague Transcripts, I. 63, 139, 246, 270, and III. L3, P4; for the English projects, Letters Received, iv.-vi., and English Factories, i. 116. The Chittagong pirates are common topics; an interesting account of them is given in Sarkar's Studies, 118-152, while the Dagh Register has some incidental notices. For the Portuguese domination of Hooghly, see English Factories, i. 14, 213. Indian enterprise after the fall of Hooghly is recorded in Hague Transcripts, I. 318; the first English ventures, in English Factories, iv. p. xxx, and passim, v. p. xxxvi, vi. p. xliv; and those of the Dutch in the Dagh Register from 1634 (see especially February 8 and July 12, 1634, June 10, 1636, and March 14, 1637). The English establishment at Hooghly is in English Factories, viii. 334, and ix. p. xxvi. For seagoing vessels on the river, see idem, x. 408.
For the war between the Danes and Bengal, see Bowrey, 181 ff., also Master, i. 318. Traces of it will be found in English Factories, vii. 156 and viii. 174, and in Dagh Register (Coromandel), May 6 and December 29, 1645.
Notes
- 1. The Kistna delta was well supplied with the principal dyes, for indigo was grown in the neighbourhood, and Petapoli itself was noted for the high quality of its Indian madder, or chay-root; see for these the Account of Golconda inserted in van den Broecke’s journal in Begin ende Voortgangh. Renneville (vii. 512 ff.) evidently did not understand the word saye, or zaaie, Dutch forms of chay, and rendered “serge,” thus obscuring the significance of these passages. The Portuguese word pintado (painted) is a reasonably accurate name for the goods to which it was primarily applied, for the production of which see First Letter Book, 59 n.; the English adopted the word, while the Dutch translated it as geschilderd. Its meaning was soon extended to printed goods, on which the pattern is produced not by a brush but by means of blocks; many of the pintados mentioned in English [p. 33] letters from Surat were probably printed goods, or chintz, and the two words are used as synonyms in an early letter from Agra (English Factories, i. 46).
- 1. The fortification of Pulicat is discussed in Chapter VIII.
- 1. The defects of the farmān are clearly brought out in Letters Received, II. xxix. 103, 180; IV. xxix. 311. The credit of establishing the factory at Surat was generally given to Best, but contemporary documents show, as Mr. Foster has pointed out, that the result was due largely to the firm stand taken by a merchant named Thomas Aldworth (Letters Received, ii. 137, 157).
- 1. This view of the real intention of the Mogul officials is borne out by a letter written by Nicholas Downton from Surat in November, 1614, in the course of which he says that the Governor "hath sent to Masulipatam for the Hollanders to come hither, promising them Damān when it is taken from the Portuguese" (Letters Received, ii. 171).
- 1. The activities of Courteen's Association from about 1636 to 1646 bulk largely in the English correspondence, but they made no particular difference to the trade of India, except in so far as their competition discouraged the members of the older Company from providing the capital required to develop its business on profitable lines. The story of the Association can be read in English Factories (v. xxx ff. ; vi. xxi ; vii. xx ff. : viii. x ff.) ; and in occasional references in the Court Minutes.
- 1. In Appendix C of India at the Death of Akbar I stated some reasons for rendering the Portuguese word porto as estuary, not seaport, in references to Bengal during the sixteenth century. A good instance of this use of the word is contained in a Dutch report made in the year 1608 by a factor who had visited Arakan, and who speaks of Chittagong as the hoofdstadt, or chief town, of Portogrande, an expression which indicates that by Portogrande he meant the Meghna estuary (de Jonge, III. 287). It may be added that the Dutch sometimes speak of Chittagong itself as “Little Bengala,” so that they at least did not regard it as the “great city of Bengala” (Dagh Register (Coromandel), March 19, 1644, and January 6, 1645).
- 2. In his interesting account of the Portuguese in Bengal, Mr. Campos takes the year 1607 as marking the beginning of Portuguese piracy. I think there were individual pirates earlier than this, but there is no doubt that the menace to trade increased greatly in the first years of the seventeenth century, and lasted until the capture of Chittagong by the Mogul forces (Campos, 81-87, and 155-167.) The statement that the pirates paid a share of their plunder to the king of Arakan is taken from Shihabuddin's account, translated in Sarkar's Studies, 128.
- 3. Methwold, writing of the years about 1620, says that in Bengal “we are mere strangers; the coast is too dangerous, and our shipping too great, to adventure them among so many shelves and sands” (Methwold, 1004).
- 1. The name Hooghly takes a variety of forms in contemporary literature. An account of discussions on its derivation is given by Campos (63-65).
- 1. The series of the Dagh Register is unfortunately incomplete. Between 1645 and 1653 the only volume extant is a very brief summary for 1648, which does not include abstracts of the news received from India. The gap is not covered by any documents which have come to my notice.