1. General Features of the Markets
From the transactions of the Dutch and English merchants in India we pass to an examination of the conditions prevailing in the markets into which they had secured an entry. A slight experience of the commercial records of the period will suffice to disillusion any one who may have been tempted to regard the India of the seventeenth century as a country of Arcadian simplicity; buyers and sellers resembled in all essentials the buyers and sellers of the present day, and the commercial aptitudes of Indian merchants were certainly not inferior to those of the foreigners who dealt with them. William Finch, the first English merchant at Surat, insisted that a regular factory was required there, on the ground that, when once the foreign ships had arrived, the local merchants would not sell their goods for less than double the value; he emphasised his opinion by a familiar quotation, saying, “They are ‘as subtle as the devil,’ whose limbs I certainly persuade myself they are”; and compliments of the same kind could be quoted from various other parts of the country. The ideas, and occasionally even the language, appearing in the records are in this matter altogether modern, and, subject to two important reservations, we need not hesitate to apply the results of recent economic analysis to the transactions which they describe. Throughout the country we find recognised market prices, constantly fluctuating with variations in supply and demand; the conception of a normal price governed by cost of production was perfectly familiar; and if we find few traces of the more remote process of alterations in the normal cost of production, the reason probably is that the conditions of agriculture and industry afforded very little scope for its operation within the short period to which the attention of the merchants was confined. We meet, too, the keenest competition among buyers and sellers, eager search for exclusive information, the organisation of rings and commercial monopolies, the specialised activities of a large class of brokers, a remarkable development of financial machinery for credit, exchange, and insurance; a crisis was at least as familiar an event in Surat in the seventeenth century as in modern Bombay; and, though a bankruptcy law did not exist, the institution itself was generally recognised.1
The two reservations which have to be made arise from the risk of official interference, and from the time and cost of transport. As regards the former, merchants dealing in any Indian market had to be prepared for the appearance of the local governor, or his nominee, as buyer or seller of practically any commodity; and when this occurred, it meant that competition was for the time being displaced by force. In some cases this intervention could be justified by the necessities of the State, though the justification might be merely an excuse, but foreign merchants did not complain very seriously of the Governor's monopoly of lead at Surat, of the restrictions throughout the country on the sale of saltpetre, or of the prohibition of the re-export of copper at a time when the supply for currency was deficient; their complaints were directed rather against the practice of engrossing or monopolising such staple commodities as indigo, cotton goods, spices, and even food-grains, solely for the profit of the State or its officers, or against other monopolistic developments of a more general nature.
The instances of engrossing or monopoly given in contemporary records are sufficiently numerous to establish the proposition that a local governor was in practice free to enter the market on his own initiative, while at the same time he was bound to carry out the orders of his official superiors. We may take as a type of local action the indigo-monopoly set up in 1647 by the Governor of Ahmadabad, regarding which the English merchants wrote as follows :
Our Governor having most unjustly and unconscionably forced some banjāras [itinerant merchants] to sell him a parcel of sugar, and thereby made an unlawful gain of 1000 rupees, is so well encouraged thereby that he is now intended to become the sole merchant of this place, being in hand to engross all the indigo that the city and country will afford. . . . We do not find it probable that he should make any gain hereby this year, the indigo-men being likewise resolved to oppose his proceedings herein to the utmost; but should he thrive in his project, we may then expect shortly to fetch our butter and rice from him.
As a matter of fact, the profit does not appear to have been great, for shortly afterwards we read that the “indigo-men” bought liberty to sell their stock by the payment of a sum of 250 rupees, “which they must give our Governor as the profit issued from what he bought from them, or (more truly) what he pretended to buy”; but the very smallness of the payment accepted indicates that a staple industry might be subject to interference on trivial grounds. In the same way spices were monopolised at one time on the East Coast, and a little later, unbleached cloth; in 1641 the piece-goods of Gujarat were monopolised temporarily for a State consignment to Mocha, and weavers working for any private purchaser were threatened with death; and in 1632, when Surat was still famine-stricken, the local prices of food were doubled because the governor and one or two merchants had combined to engross the available supplies. Such operations were facilitated by the fact that in some commercial centres local governors were frequently appointed from the mercantile community, and there was nothing corresponding to the modern prohibition of official trading; being free to enter the markets, it was practically inevitable that they should employ their official powers in their commercial transactions, and the risk of their doing so was always a factor to be taken into account by private dealers.
Of monopolies on a larger scale, the most prominent instance is that which was established in the indigo-market in 1633. By this arrangement, which was apparently modelled on the Persian royal monopoly of raw silk, a merchant undertook to make large payments to the treasury for the privilege of buying all the indigo manufactured in the Mogul Empire, including the produce of Gujarat as well as Biana; he proceeded to buy in Sarkhej at Rs. 18 and sell at Rs. 27 the local maund (33 lb.), but the arrangement broke down because the principal buyers held aloof, and freedom of trade was restored at the close of the year 1635. The failure of this general monopoly must be attributed to the agreement to defeat it, entered into between the Dutch and English merchants, whose joint demand was the most important single factor in the market; where individual customers were numerous and carried less weight, similar arrangements might last longer, as in the case of the monopoly of freight on the East Coast, which has been mentioned in a former chapter, but, whether the duration might be long or short, the possibility of such interference had to be taken into account in almost every mercantile transaction.
So far we have spoken of monopolies affecting particular commodities or services, but that there was nothing to prevent a governor from monopolising the entire trade of a seaport is shown by the case of Hooghly, where in the year 1635–36 the Dutch found that an exclusive concession had been given to three individuals, who fixed prices of all goods as they chose. Again, a monopoly might be granted of the business of a group of foreign merchants; in 1625 the Dutch at Masulipatam were farmed out like any other source of revenue, and thus found themselves debarred from dealing with any merchants except those who had paid for the privilege; while the existence of a similar arrangement was one of the reasons which led to the English determination to abandon that port in 1628. The system of monopoly was probably most highly developed under Mīr Jumla, the famous Minister of Golconda, who subsequently transferred his allegiance to the Moguls. Manucci tells us that Mīr Jumla was a self-made merchant before he attained to office, and his official proceedings lend credit to the story. We are told that, when he was at the height of his career as Minister, he maintained a large force of land transport for his goods, while he owned ten ships, and was building more, for his trade to various foreign countries. Being offended with the Dutch, he proposed a sort of partnership with the English Company to monopolise the East Coast trade as a whole, and meanwhile he was active on his own account, reserving for himself the services of all the weavers of a large tract of country; and we read that “this course he is resolved to continue, until he can bring a monopoly of all imported goods.” The factors at Madras doubted the wisdom of the proposed partnership, fearing that the example might result in the establishment of similar monopolies elsewhere to the detriment of the Company’s business, and no student of the records of the period can deny that their apprehensions were reasonable, though the danger of this particular project disappeared when Mīr Jumla abandoned Golconda for the service of the Mogul Empire.
The second consideration we have mentioned, the time and cost of transport, was of not less practical importance than the danger of the disturbance of markets by official interference: the result was to confine markets within limits which nowadays seem extraordinarily narrow, and to make prices depend on the stock of a commodity actually on the spot, rather than on the supply available throughout the world. In the case of imported goods, the dominant factor was time. At the present day an apprehended shortage of a commodity in any part of India would at once set the cables to work, and additional supplies might usually be expected in the course of a few weeks; during our period, the provision of a supply of such a commodity as lead, or coral, or woollen cloth of some particular fashion, required nearly two years, the indent being sent home from Surat in January, and the goods arriving, if all went well, in the next September but one, by which time the conditions of the market might have entirely changed. There was thus a large measure of uncertainty in making up cargoes for remote destinations; goods which had been asked for might prove to be unprocurable, or, if they were available, they might prove to be unsaleable on arrival, and merchants had to be guided partly by local prices and partly by the most recent information, which was already more or less out of date. Some saving of time between India and Europe could be effected by despatching letters overland by way of Basra and Aleppo, a route which came into more or less regular use as experience proved its advantages ; 1 transit by it was, however, by no means certain, and while a letter sent overland might effect a saving for practical purposes of about a year, it might in other circumstances take almost as long as one sent by sea. No similar saving of time could be effected in communicating with the Far East, and, speaking generally, the connection between distant markets was so uncertain as to introduce into business a factor which is nowadays practically unknown.
In purely Indian transactions, the factor of time, though it was not negligible, was subordinate to the factor of cost, at least so far as goods had to be collected or distributed by land. It is possible to form a rough idea of the cost of land transport from some details mentioned in contemporary records. Thus in 1619 the rate for conveyance from Agra to Surat by way of Burhanpur was Rs. 14¾ for a camel-load of approximately 500 lb. ; in 1638 a cartage contract on this route was settled at Rs. 2¾ per 74 lb. ; in 1651, Rs. 15 3/16 was the charge per camel from Agra to Ahmadabad by the Rajputana route ; while in 1639 goods could be carried from Agra to Lahore for Rs. 2 per maund of 74 lb. Reducing these and other rates to a common standard, we find that the cost of carrying 100 lb. a distance of 100 miles in Northern and Western India ranged between half and three-quarters of a rupee, exclusive of anything required for payment of armed guards and inland customs duties. These latter charges varied greatly according to local conditions; that they might add materially to the cost is shown by Peter Mundy's reference to a contract by which the carriers from Agra to Ahmadabad undertook to discharge all customs demands in return for payments of Rs. 45 per cart and Rs. 9½ per camel-load, but it must be remembered that the number of independent chiefs on this route was exceptional, and these figures cannot be taken as representative of the country as a whole. Confining our attention to the actual cost of carriage, we may say that, while it could be borne by goods of high value per unit of weight, it was absolutely prohibitive in the case of ordinary agricultural produce. At the end of the sixteenth century, the normal price of wheat in Northern India was about 185 lb. per rupee: transport of 100 miles would have sufficed to double this price, and transport to the consuming markets of Gujarat would have multiplied the price from five-fold to eight-fold according to the rate charged. Again we shall find that the normal price of wheat at Surat during our period was somewhere about 85 lb. per rupee; wheat carried to Surat from a distance of 250 miles or less would have required to be sold at that price to cover cost of transport alone, so that the normal radius of import must have been well under 200 miles, and a very large rise in price would have been required to attract food from any considerable distance. Thus we may say that for commodities like indigo, Agra and Ahmadabad were comprised in one market, because inter-transport was a commercial possibility, and the chief buyers could make their purchases in one city or the other; for food grains, on the other hand, India must be regarded as split up into a large number of nearly independent markets, because the cost of carriage by land was so great as to eliminate effective competition. In cases where a route by water was available, the segregation of markets was much less noticeable, and the sea in particular exercised a powerful unifying effect. So far as imports and exports were concerned, Surat and Lahari Bandar were one market, provided that the quantity of goods to be dealt in was sufficient to load a single coasting-boat; Gujarat and Malabar again were one market, except when the sea-route was closed by pirates or blockade; and the same may almost be said of Surat and Masulipatam. In this last case, the existence of the Dutch headquarters at Batavia was an important factor in equalising the price of imports, because the council could, with very little difference in cost, direct goods such as spices, porcelain, or the precious metals, to whatever point on the coast of India might offer the best market; and the same influence affected the price of many exports, though the specialisation of such commodities as cotton goods in some cases made prompt substitution impossible.1 So much, however, may be said that, subject to interruption through war or piracy, the coastal markets were closely interdependent when not altogether unified, but even a short stage of transit by land might suffice to sever all connection in the case of goods of low value.
2. Personnel and Organisation
It is easy for a student of the contemporary records to form an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Dutch and English merchants in the Indian markets where they possessed a footing. It is true that, taken together, they had a practical monopoly of the supply of goods from Western Europe, and that they controlled purchases for the same region, but Indian markets were not dominated by the European trade, and the competition between the Dutch and English companies made each of them much less influential than if they had been able to work in harmony. From time to time we find attempts made to eliminate this competition, which was certainly injurious to European interests, though it was beneficial to Indian producers and consumers; but these attempts were short-lived, and even the operation of the agreement to break the official monopoly of indigo in 1634 was seriously hampered by the independent transactions of the buyers at Agra. From time to time the European merchants dominated the markets for particular commodities, but it cannot be asserted that they ever dominated the commercial outlook; that position was held rather by individual Indians—Moslems, banians, or chettis, as the case might be— men who through their wealth and abilities might almost be said to control the entire wholesale trade within the area covered by their operations.
The most prominent of these Indians during our period was Vīrji Vora, the merchant-prince of Surat, who, rightly or wrongly, was reputed to be the richest merchant in the world.1 The first reference to him which I have noticed relates to the year 1619, when one of his employees in charge of a Surat vessel obtained a recommendation to courteous usage on the part of English ships. From this time onwards he is mentioned frequently in the commercial records, usually as buying or selling various commodities, gold and silver, lead, coral, and ivory, spices, opium, cotton, and practically everything which changed hands in the Surat wholesale market. His dealings were on a large scale, and syndicates dominated by him were ready to buy entire cargoes valued at from five to ten lakhs of rupees. Such purchases naturally secured a temporary monopoly of particular commodities, such as the spices imported by the Dutch, and we find his syndicate selling for Rs. 62 and 65 the cloves which had been bought for Rs. 45 the maund. Apart from foreign goods, he controlled the pepper market in Surat, and the coasting trade to those Malabar ports which were not dominated by the Portuguese. His business had wide ramifications: he had branch offices or agencies at such places as Ahmadabad, Agra, Burhanpur, and Golconda, as well as in Malabar and on the East Coast; and he maintained relations with Java, Basra, and Gombroon, occasionally sending his goods to these destinations on English vessels. As time went on, his power in the market increased to a point where it became irksome to the English factors. From being the “usual merchant,” he became “the sole monopolist of all European commodities,” and in 1634 he was “observed to bear such sway amongst the inferior merchants of this town [Surat], that when they would oftentimes buy, and give greater prices, they are still restrained, not daring to betray their intents to his knowledge and their own sufferance, insomuch that the time and price is still in his will and at his own disposure.” The Council which recorded these observations declared itself “weary of his unprofitable correspondence, which they intend to shake off by degrees, and incline to others that promise more fairly”; but the intention was not realised, for in 1642 Vīrji Vora was “awing all other banian merchants to his observance,” and four years later the factors were still practically in his hands. In the last decade of our period, we read of a dispute over a particular transaction, which was referred to London for decision; the Company decided against Vīrji Vora, but sent him a valuable present as a mark of esteem, which, however, did not suffice to mollify him, and for a time he was so angered “that he will not hear of lending any moneys upon account of any interest.”
Powerful as he was, Vīrji Vora was not always able to disregard the local authorities. In 1630 we find him apprehensive of the Governor’s intention to join him in a partnership, which might “ensnare him to his abuse,” and a later Governor, Masīh-uz-Zamān, appears to have judged that he was ripe for extortion, for at the end of the year 1638 he was experiencing “most barbarous tyranny” in the Surat prison. The particular charge made against him is not stated, and we do not know whether it was true or false; but the proceedings appear to have been irregular, for the Dīwān (the provincial representative of the Imperial revenue authorities) reported the matter to the Emperor, Vīrji Vora was summoned to Court to answer in person, and eventually Masīh-uz-Zamān was removed from his post. From that time to the close of our period Vīrji Vora's career was not seriously checked. He lost heavily by Sivaji's raid on Surat in the year 1664, but a little later we are told that he and another merchant " hold up their heads still and are for great bargains." In 1665 anonymous petitions reached Batavia accusing him of corrupt dealings with the Dutch factory at Surat, and about the same time the traveller Thévenot wrote of him as a friend supposed to be worth at least eight millions. The unit in terms of which Thévenot was writing is not specified, but another contemporary account gives 80 lakhs of rupees,1 and we may take it that Vīrji Vora was popularly credited with a capital of this amount, an estimate which may of course have been very wide of the truth. I have not come across a notice of his death, but it probably took place before the year 1677.2
The question naturally arises whether a man in Vīrji Vora's position welcomed the presence of European merchants in the market. The facts appear to justify an answer in the affirmative, so far at least as the English are concerned, for he willingly financed their transactions during a long period, in the course of which he could probably have driven them out of the country. We have seen in a former chapter that the English were frequently compelled to borrow capital in Surat; it was Vīrji Vora who met most of their needs, and his position in the market was so strong that it is reasonable to conclude that he could have prevented others from making loans if he had wished to do so. On the contrary, he once volunteered a loan of two lakhs at a time when the difficulties of the English were unusually great, and on another occasion he saved their credit by an unexpected offer of half that sum. It would be absurd to suggest that he acted out of philanthropy or charity in these transactions; he took the regular interest, and raised the rate when market conditions justified this course; he stood out stubbornly for his full terms; and the most reasonable inference is that he valued the presence of the merchants whose business he did so much to facilitate, and judged that more money could be made in Surat when the English were there than if they were away. Another inference which may be drawn from his conduct relates to the importance of personal credit at this period. The records do not show that he asked for security for his loans, and it is tolerably clear that such a request would have been futile, because the English had nothing tangible to offer, their local assets consisting at most of a stock of goods which were temporarily unsaleable. We must conclude therefore that, in the conditions which prevailed in Gujarat, money might be lent by the lakh as a business transaction, if the borrower’s personal credit appeared to justify the venture.
Vīrji Vora had a counterpart on the East Coast in the family or firm known by the name Malaya, with headquarters at Pulicat, and connections as far south as Negapatam. Malaya himself died in the year 1634, but the business was carried on by his relatives, and the English records continue to speak of “Malaya” for ten or fifteen years after the date of his death. The business of this firm is more difficult to follow than that of Vīrji Vora, because it was closely intertwined with the complex politics of the south: Chinana Chetti, who was Malaya’s younger brother, and succeeded him as head of the firm, appears also as holding various public offices in farm, and on occasion as commanding troops in the field; his career was necessarily marked by vicissitudes, and at one time his debts were regarded as doubtful, but I have not found any record of an actual collapse. In business proper, the firm was largely interested in shipping, and the various manœuvres referred to in Dutch and English records suggest to me that its guiding policy was to play one Company off against the other.
Of ordinary merchants we naturally hear less than of such firms as these, and all that need be said is that their business was on a smaller scale, and that as a rule they worked on the lines set by the men who dominated their market. One instance is on record where a merchant at Surat seems to have thought of defying Vīrji Vora, and bought a consignment of coral, but for two years he did not dare to avow the transaction, and the goods remained in the English store-house "unrequested and unregarded"; but the correspondence of the period shows that even so much individuality was not to be expected in the ordinary course. Brokers are more prominent in the records than ordinary merchants, and their employment was a universal custom. They were numerous and ubiquitous, and at times they were a nuisance; in 1635 the English factors at Surat
enacted that no brokers should be permitted to come into the English house, except such as are of the Company's brokers . . . and certain known servants of theirs, unless that they have business that doth concern the Company, and shall first require leave to be admitted; the contrary whereof hath occasioned many inconveniences, not only by furthering all men's private trade of all conditions and qualities, but also by discovering our business, which by that means hath been made as public as the bazar before the affair might be so permitted.
From time to time we read of brokers proving fraudulent or unfaithful, but I take it that, within limits imposed by current mercantile conventions, good service was the rule, and there are some grounds for thinking that the English merchants were for a long time in the hands of a not too respectable clique.1 Whatever their commercial morality may have been, there can be no doubt that their activities were of the kind which ensures close prices, and, as we shall see in the sections which follow, prices did in fact move rapidly in accordance with the conditions of the market.
The line dividing merchants from brokers was, I take it, the possession of capital, and, apart from this particular case, there are few traces of specialisation in the markets of our period. Vīrji Vora was eminently a merchant, that is to say, a buyer and seller of commodities, and his business extended to any class of goods in which there might be hopes of profit ; but at the same time he freighted ships, he acted as a banker, he received deposits, and he arranged remittances by means of bills or letters of credit on his branch houses. The activities of the firm of Malaya were equally multifarious, and I have not noticed any record of a banker as distinct from a merchant, or of a prominent merchant confining his transactions to a particular line of goods. The nearest approach to specialisation is perhaps to be found among the dealers in currency, or money-changers ; the variety of coins in circulation made this business one for experts, and the " shroffs," as they were called, impressed such visitors as Tavernier with their highly specialised abilities. They did not, however, confine themselves absolutely to dealing in currency, for we read on one occasion that a shroff employed by the English hired one of their small vessels for a trading venture to the Persian Gulf ; and in the same way we hear of the English brokers engaging from time to time in business on their own account. It is possible that the business of marine insurance was specialised, but I have found no definite information on this subject. The practice of insurance was quite common, and we read of war risks being dealt in, and also of an " overdue market," but the names or positions of the insurers are not stated, and it is perhaps more probable that the risks were underwritten by ordinary merchants.
We may thus regard an Indian commercial centre of our period as comprising an indefinite number of men of business, not subdivided into numerous branches, but graded in accordance with their ability and command over capital, and all of them eager to take part in any hopeful venture, provided only that it was not of a nature to bring them into conflict with leaders whom they were not prepared to oppose. The inevitable result was that hopeful ventures were often overdone. Thus on the Arab reoccupation of Aden, ships hurried there from various Indian seaports, and the market was so glutted that sales were possible only at a great loss. Conditions were even worse at Mocha owing to official oppression, while no ships had returned from Achin; and the consequence was the bankruptcy of many Hindu and Moslem merchants in Surat, and a fall in the price of cotton goods throughout the country. In 1644 again the Dutch records note that several dealers in currency and some Mocha merchants had become bankrupt in Surat, so that the bullion market was disorganised; and I take it that this trouble is referred to in a letter from the English factors in which it is said that in Gombroon "a commodity can no sooner be in any request but such vast quantities are suddenly sent that it becomes of no esteem. The like it is with Mocha. So that Basra is yet the place that produceth you most profit." This last opinion was, however, soon falsified, for in 1647 the glut at Basra was as bad as at Mocha owing to "the infinite quantity of goods transported there, and the small vend." There was similar trouble in connection with the market at Achin: the tyrant-king of that place died in 1641, and the reputation of his successor for just dealing attracted numerous Indian ventures, so that there was a glut of cotton goods, and not long after the stocks were estimated to be sufficient for two years to come. The general result of these and other incidents of the period is to suggest that the eagerness and lack of restraint which now characterise the markets of Western India are qualities which go far back into history; certainly during our period there was no lack of energy or initiative, and in the conditions which prevailed we cannot wonder that it should have been devoted so largely to business of a highly speculative nature.
3. The Indigo Market in Gujarat
The working of the markets during our period can be illustrated most effectively by tracing the changes in price recorded for a few important commodities. It is scarcely necessary to say that no systematic price-records are available among Indian sources, but the information given in the English correspondence is extensive, and many additional figures have been preserved in the Batavia Journals, so that in favourable circumstances an almost continuous account of fluctuations can be constructed. Unfortunately some of the figures are difficult to interpret; the quality of woollen cloth, for instance, varied so greatly that it would be rash to discuss the prices quoted for it without specialised knowledge of the subject; a somewhat similar danger exists in regard to some other imports such as coral and ivory; while on the export side changes in the sources of supply affect the value of the figures which are available for saltpetre and cotton goods. The illustrations which follow have been chosen so as to avoid these difficulties as far as possible; in some cases, such as lead, or quicksilver, or cloves, there is no question of marked differences in quality, while in others, such as indigo, the figures give the average price paid, or quoted, for large export consignments, and in this way eliminate fluctuations due to variations in the quality of particular parcels. The units in terms of which prices are quoted are discussed in Appendix D. The question of trade allowances, of one or two sers in the maund, presents some difficulty, as it is often uncertain whether their occasional mention indicates a regular custom or a special concession, but the error they introduce cannot be greater than five per cent, and the significant fluctuations are usually much larger, so that we can draw inferences from them which are substantially, though perhaps not arithmetically, correct.
The first illustration relates to the price of the export grade of Sarkhej indigo in the Ahmadabad market, the figures for which are given in the table on following page.
In order to interpret these figures it is desirable in the first place to arrive at the standard of price which was recognised in the market at the opening of the period. There is no doubt that the early English buyers took Rs. 18 as the standard. Writing from Ahmadabad in November 1613, Thomas Aldworth reported that the price had fallen greatly owing to the absence of Portuguese buyers, “insomuch that their
Prices of Sarkhej Indigo at Ahmadabad, 1609-63
Note.—The price is given in rupees (and decimals) for a Gujarat maund of 33 lb. In 1635-36 this maund was raised, and from 1636 the quotations given in the authorities have been reduced by 10 per cent (the new maund standing to the old as 20 to 18), so as to facilitate comparison for the period. In the references, L.R. stands for Letters Received, E.F. for English Factories, D.R. for Dagh Register, F.R. for Factory Records, O.C. for Original Correspondence.
| Year. | Price, Rs. and Decimals. | Description. | Reference. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard . . | 18·00 | Quoted | L.R. i. 306, and passim. |
| 1609 . . . | 10·00-12·00 | ” | L.R. i. 28. |
| 1612 . . . | 14·00 | ” | Jourdain, 217. |
| 1613 . . . | 14·00 | ” | L.R. i. 306. |
| 1614 . . . | 10·00-12·00 | L.R. ii. 214, 238. | |
| ” . . . | 12·00-13·00 | Paid | ” ” 248. |
| 1617 . . . | 12·00-15·00 | Quoted | Terpstra's Surat, App. IV. |
| 1618 . . . | 15·00-18·00 | ” App. VII. | |
| 1619 . . . | 15·00 | Paid | E.F. i. 62. |
| 1621 . . . | 10·00 | Estimate | F.R. Surat, i. 16. |
| ” . . . | 9·25-9·50 | Paid by Dutch | E.F. i. 348. |
| 9·25 | Paid by English | ” 353. | |
| 1622 (Jan.) . | 7·00 | Estimate | E.F. ii. 19. |
| ” (Aug.-Dec.) | 8·00-9·00 | Asked | ” ” 109, 158, 162. |
| 1623 (Apr.) . | 7·50-8·00 | Quoted | ” ” 219. |
| ” (Nov.) . | 8·50-8·75 | ” ” 328. | |
| ” ” . | 12·00 | Asked | ” ” 328. |
| ” (Dec.) . | 10·25 | Paid | ” ” 331. |
| 1625 . . . | 12·00 | Quoted | E.F. iii. 63. |
| ” . . . | 11·00 | Estimate | F.R. Surat, i. 100. |
| 1628 (Jan.) . | 14·00-15·00 | Asked | E.F. iii. 230. |
| ” (Mar.) . | 12·75-14·25 | Asked | ” ” 275. |
| 1630 . . . | 16·00 | Quoted | F.R. Surat, 84 (ii.), 52. |
| 1632 . . . | 19·00-22·00 | ” | E.F. iv. 215. |
| 1633 (Jan.) . | 23·00-25·00 | ” ” 255. | |
| ” (Nov.) . | 16·00-18·00 | Agreed with Dutch | ” ” 328. |
| 1634 . . . | 27·00 | Monopoly price | E.F. v. 70. |
| 1635 . . . | 27·00 (?) | Paid | ” ” 142. |
| 1636 . . . | 25·20 | Estimate | ” ” 292. |
| 1638 . . . | Under 18·00 (?) | Quoted | E.F. vi. 92. |
| 1639 (Jan.) . | 26·90 | Paid, average | O.C. 1656. |
| ” (Dec.) . | 17·30 | ” ” | O.C. 1725. |
| 1640 (Jan.) . | 20·00 | Quoted | E.F. vi. 232. |
| ” (Dec.) . | 16·70 | Paid, average | O.C. 1764. |
| ” ” . | 12·60-14·40 | Anticipated | E.F. vi. 273. |
| 1641 . . . | 13·50-14·40 | Asked | D.R. 3. 11. 42. |
| 1642 (late) | 14·62-14·85 | Paid | D.R. 27. 4. 43. |
| 1644 . . . | 17·00 | Paid | E.F. vii. 164. |
| 1645 . . . | 20·70–22·50 (?) | Asked | ” ” 254. |
| 1646 . . . | 20·25–21·60 | Asked | E.F. viii. 31. |
| 1647 . . . | 17·10–20·25 | Paid | ” ” 77. |
| 1648 (Jan.) . | 17·10–17·55 | Estimate } Experi- | { ” ” 189. |
| ” (Apr.) . | 19·35–19·80 | Actual } ment | { ” ” 203. |
| 1650 . . . | 12·60–13·50 | Quoted | ” ” 305. |
| 1653 . . . | 14·22 | Paid | O.C. 2309. |
| 1655 . . . | 11·81 (?) | ” | E.F. x. 18. |
| 1656 . . . | 15·75–16·20 | Quoted | ” ” 76. |
| 1663 . . . | 13·25–13·50 | Paid | D.R. 21. 6. 63. |
best flat indigo, that was wont to be sold for 18 rupees, is now offered for 14 rupees, and like to fall every day "; and the same rate is used for reference by two or three other merchants in the course of the next year or so. The chief business of these merchants in India was to buy indigo, and it is reasonable to suppose that they had taken all possible pains to ascertain the facts of the market; but even if we make the rather violent conjecture that they had been deceived by a conspiracy among their brokers, we can safely say that the standard at the time when English purchasers began was certainly above Rs. 15. It is true that the first actual quotation, which was given by Finch in 1609, falls much below this standard, being equivalent to Rs. 10 to 12 per maund, but we are justified in regarding his figures as abnormally low. In the first place, Finch was not buying but only inquiring, and when, as was obviously the case in Gujarat, the market was anxious to attract new customers, pro forma quotations were likely to fall below the facts. In the second place, Gujarat was during this season suffering from a severe financial crisis, and it is reasonable to infer that holders of stocks were unusually anxious to sell. In a letter written a few weeks before the date of his report, Finch tells of the sudden bankruptcy of one of the leading merchants, and the flight of another who was involved in the collapse, and in these circumstances the quotation given cannot be regarded as typical of normal conditions, even though it represented the panic price of the moment.
The next figure in the table is for the spring of 1612; it is given by Jourdain as having been agreed on as the basis for adjusting certain transactions in the Red Sea, and may safely be taken as representative of the season in Gujarat. In the next two years prices were depressed by the absence of Portuguese buyers owing to the war with the Moguls, but this disturbing cause was quickly eliminated, and, when the Dutch came to Gujarat and appeared as possible buyers, the price was " talked up " to Rs. 18, the figure which I have taken as the standard. The bulk of the cargo despatched by the English in 1619 works out at 40 mahmudis, or say Rs. 16, free on board; charges from Ahmadabad to the ship's side were about one rupee a maund, so that Rs. 15 is a fair figure for this year.1 From 1621 to 1625 prices were very low, Rs. 7 being talked of at one time. I have found no record of a reason for this drop, a fact which is not in itself surprising, since buyers are usually more ready to defend high prices than to explain prices when they are low; the Portuguese were now buying very little, but the demand of the Dutch and English taken together should have supported the market, and I conjecture that the fall was due to temporary overproduction, growers having no means of judging the real requirements of the new customers, and being misled by the vigour of their methods. However that may be, the price had returned to Rs. 14-15 by the year 1628, while early in 1630 there is a quotation of Rs. 16; the fall was therefore a temporary phenomenon. The famine followed, and for a time the market was dead; at the end of 1630 the price was Rs. 18 for what was left of the old stock, "a poor remains of refuse stuff," and there was no new crop in prospect. When cultivation was resumed, food-stuffs at first took precedence; quotations for indigo ranged up to Rs. 25, and late in 1633 the situation was further complicated by the monopoly which has been described in a previous section. The Dutch and English came to an agreement to limit offers to Rs. 16-18, but the monopolists stood out for Rs. 27, and they were supported by the curtailment of production resulting from their operations; in the north the peasants, "being in general a resolute, hare-brained folk," rooted up their standing crops, and, though we are not told of similar action in Gujarat, we may safely infer that sowings were reduced. The price remained about Rs. 25 or over for two years after the monopoly closed, but agriculture was now recovering, and in 1639 and 1640 the English purchases were made at about Rs. 17. The fall continued for some time, because adulteration had become very prevalent, and European buyers were insisting on a high standard of quality, but by 1644 there was a recovery, attributed to improved manufacture and a short crop. In the two following years the price was over Rs. 20, the rise being attributed to the official measures taken to check adulteration : in 1648 adulteration was again troublesome, and the English factors experimented in manufacture, but were unable to reduce the cost appreciably. A reaction came in 1650, as the result of a very good crop both in the north and in Gujarat, while three years later the average price paid was little over Rs. 14. The very low price of 1655 is explained by gross adulteration, and the last available quotations up to 1660 range round Rs. 16 ; while a Dutch report of 1663 records that purchases below Rs. 14 represented a rise in the price at that time.
It may be added that Tavernier, whose experience covered the last twenty years of our period, puts the ruling price at from Rs. 15 to Rs. 20, a quotation which agrees substantially with the standard suggested for its beginning. Taking then the whole period into review, I cannot point to any evidence of a rise in the normal price ; fluctuations can be accounted for usually by recorded alterations in the demand or supply, and the adjustments are at least as rapid as could fairly be expected. Even if we take the view that the first English buyers were deceived, it is not possible to argue that prices in the last decade of our period were materially higher than in 1613, when they began to buy.
4. The Markets for Imported Goods
The next commodity to be considered is quicksilver. There was a limited but insistent demand for the metal, chiefly, I presume, for conversion into vermilion, and, as it was not produced in India,1 it is a simple case to illustrate the market for imported goods. The offtake of the Gujarat market was estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000 lb. annually, and appears to have been fairly constant; any shortage of supply sent up prices rapidly, while even a small excess sufficed to break the market. Supplies came from China as well as from Europe; they might arrive by way of the Red Sea as well as the Cape; and the small bulk of the commodity rendered it suitable for surreptitious private trade. All these factors combined to make the market highly speculative, and the price fluctuated within wide limits. The unit of sale was the Gujarat maund, and in order to facilitate comparison, I have again reduced the quotations by ten per cent from the year 1636 onwards, so that the figures given apply throughout to a maund of 33 lb.; both rupees and mahmudis are quoted in the various Gujarat markets, and I take these in one series, neglecting the cost of transit (somewhere about a rupee per maund) between Surat and Ahmadabad.
In 1609, Finch found the price to vary from Rs. 64 to 80, but this was as we have seen a time of crisis, when buyers were likely to hold off. In 1612–13 sales were made at Rs. 120, and up to Rs. 160, but the arrival of fresh supplies in 1614 brought the price down to Rs. 100, while in 1615–16 it was Rs. 80, “no buyers,” on an unfounded report of the discovery of a mine near Agra. From 1619 onwards the level of prices fell, and Rs. 60-90 represents the general trend of the market for the next few years; the fall was probably due to the establishment of the Dutch at Surat, as their supplies competed with those brought by the English. In 1625–26 there was a sharp rise; the Dutch had brought nothing, the Portuguese little, and supplies by the Red Sea route were also scanty, with the result that the price rose to Rs. 100, with small lots at Rs. 120. The next noticeable change was in 1630, when excessive supplies brought by the Dutch and by English private traders, coming just at the beginning of the famine, broke the market, and prices fell below Rs. 50. Private trade continued to keep prices down: in 1633 the rate was Rs. 36, in 1634 it was Rs. 42, and in 1636 the Dutch sold some at Rs. 35¼. I have found no quotations for the next nine years, but the commodity reappears in 1645 at about Rs. 65-70, and in 1649 it was over Rs. 110. The rise appears to have been due in part to the failure of Chinese supplies, for in 1652 the English factors wrote that if that trade revived, the price might go down again to Rs. 60 ; Dutch, English, and Portuguese were at this time all importing, and there was evidently a sharp fall, for a transaction at Rs. 75½ in 1654 was described as a good advance on the previous price. A recovery had occurred by 1659, when the price was Rs. 100, and in 1661 the Dutch obtained Rs. 84. Generalisation is obviously dangerous in regard to such a market, but I think it may fairly be said that there is no trace of any rise in the normal price, which I should place at Rs. 80-100 over the whole period, while occasional outbursts of excessive competition were of at least temporary benefit to the Indian consumer.
The Surat market for lead offers a great contrast to that for quicksilver. Imports were again the main source of supply, and they came, I think, entirely from Europe,1 with competition between Dutch and English consignments; but the market was not free, for the local Governor usually asserted a claim to buy all that was offered in the town, and, if it had not been for the existence of alternative outlets, the price would have depended chiefly on his views. In point of fact alternatives existed: there was usually a free market in Ahmadabad, while the masters of coasting vessels were glad to carry the metal as ballast, and we read of sales from Surat to Goa, Lahari Bandar, and Rajapur, as well as to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The position then was that imported lead would ordinarily be sold to the local Governor, but he could not, except by violence, obtain it for much below the market price ruling along the coast, though probably a small concession might be made in order to avoid friction.
At the opening of our period the price of the Gujarat maund ranged between 7 and 8 mahmudis,2 and up to the year 1630 there are no indications of a change though the quotations are fairly numerous. In 1634 we hear that the English Company’s lead had been detained in the custom house for nearly two years, because the Governor wanted it at 5½ ma. ; but in 1638 the price was up to 7½ ma., and in 1642 to 8 ma. These two quotations, as well as those which follow, should be reduced by ten per cent to allow for the increase in the maund, but fractional deductions from such small figures would give a misleading idea of minute accuracy, and in this case I leave the deductions to be allowed for. In 1646 the merchants hoped to realise 10 ma., and this rate was reached in 1650, but in 1652 the Governor was offering 8 ma., and in 1659 the price paid was 9¼ ma. If we exclude the occasional forced sales, and remember that from the year 1636 onwards the figures are subject to a ten per cent deduction, we see that the range of price in the course of 50 years was from 7 to 9 ma., with no definite tendency in either direction. In this case then we can conclude that the normal price along the Indian coast had not risen materially, for if it had risen, the Governor of Surat would have been forced eventually to increase his offers, or the lead would have gone elsewhere.
A third illustration of the course of the import market may be found in the sales of cloves, a commodity of which the English records have comparatively little to say, but which is mentioned frequently by the Dutch. The trade passed through various phases. In the sixteenth century the commodity was in theory a monopoly of the king of Portugal, but private trade was active, and I suspect that there was in fact a certain amount of competition among sellers even when Portuguese authority in the Moluccas was firmly established. Towards the end of the century, when the political situation in the Spice Islands was increasingly involved, the market at Macassar came into prominence, and the history of the next fifty years covers the Dutch acquisition of the sources of supply, and their prolonged efforts to stop the leakage by way of Macassar; it is only in the ’fifties that we find their monopoly in thorough working order.
The usual price of cloves at the Mogul Court about the year 1595 is given by Abul Fazl at a figure which, allowing for the cost of inland carriage, works out to about Rs. 35 for a Gujarat maund of 33 lbs. landed at Surat.1 The first quarter of the seventeenth century shows a marked rise, for which I have found no explanation, but which may be attributed partly to the disturbed state of the Spice Islands and partly to increased shipments to Europe; the price at Surat was Rs. 64 in 1617, Rs. 72 in 1621, and Rs. 84 in 1622. The record is broken at this point for eleven years, but prices were still high when information again becomes available, being Rs. 77 in 1633, Rs. 55 in 1634, and Rs. 67 early in 1636 ; the last figure, and all which follow, have been reduced by 10 per cent to allow for the increase in the maund. Later in 1636 there was a sudden fall to about Rs. 40, and between 1641 and 1645 the rate varied between Rs. 27 and 35. In 1648 the price to consumers was raised, for the syndicate which had bought the entire supply at Rs. 41½ resold it at Rs. 55 to 60, and the rate of Rs. 50 ruled in 1649. Another gap in the record occurs at this point, but apparently the authorities in Amsterdam found themselves at last in a position to regulate the spice trade of the world on a uniform basis, for we find that in 1657 India was assigned fixed quantities, to be sold at or above specified prices, and the minimum rate for cloves works out at Rs. 77 for a maund of 33 lb.; the correlation of supply and price was clearly not exact, for sales in 1661 were made at the high price of nearly Rs. 95.2 It appears then that on this side of India consumers had to pay prices higher than the competitive level from about 1615 to 1636, and again from 1648 onwards. It should be added that in the Surat market allowances were occasionally made to buyers of as much as 4 sers in the maund; I have taken these into account in the figures given in the Dutch records, where they are clearly indicated, but it is possible that some of the quotations from English sources should be reduced by about 10 per cent. The error, if it exists, is small in size compared with the actual fluctuations.
The clove market on the East Coast has features of greater interest, because here the Dutch had for a time to meet the active competition of the Danes, who obtained supplies at Macassar. The prices at Masulipatam are given in pagodas per local maund (about 26 lb.), and I have not attempted to convert them into rupees, because the gradual rise in the silver-value of the pagoda cannot be traced with sufficient accuracy to determine the precise ratio in a particular year. It may be said, however, that the rate at Akbar's Court, which I have taken as a starting-point, would represent at the beginning of the seventeenth century very nearly 7 pagodas for the local maund delivered at Masulipatam. We find that here, as in Surat, a marked rise occurred early in the century. A year or two before 1616, the usual price was stated 1 to be 8½ to 10 p., but in 1618 the rate was 14½ p., "an unheard of price"; in 1622 it was 13 p., and by 1631 it had risen further to 20 p. At this point the competition of the Danes became acute, and there was a sudden fall to 8 p. in 1632; in 1638 the price dropped further to 6 p. and in 1639 to 4 or 4½ p., a figure which the English factors conjectured was intended "to break the Danes altogether." Prices remained about 5 p. for the next five years, after which the record breaks off; but when we next hear of the trade, the monopoly is complete, and the minimum prices prescribed from Amsterdam work out between 13 and 14 p. In this case, therefore, consumers benefited for a time owing to the war of prices, but in the end they had to pay, and pay heavily, for the monopoly which the Dutch had established by efforts prolonged over nearly half a century.
The market for mace and nutmegs followed a somewhat similar course, and here also consumers had in the end to pay higher prices; but apart from these monopoly-goods, I can find no trace of any increase in the normal cost of imports, and the figures available for tin, ivory, and coral suggest that the tendency was if anything towards a small reduction.
5. Food-grains and Silver
It may be urged that the prices of such commodities as lead, or quicksilver, or spices, were of little interest to the population of India taken as a whole. The contention is true, and it applies to all imported goods, because none of them entered largely into the consumption of the masses. The indigo market is of more general significance, for while the crop was grown for export by comparatively few peasants, it came into competition with food-grains, and consequently its price affords an indication of the conditions affecting agriculture; but, at the same time, it cannot be denied that we want most of all to know the course of prices in raw produce—food-grains, oilseeds, and cotton—because, taken together, these commodities represent the bulk of the country's income at this period. Unfortunately the data available under these heads are scanty. I have found no quotations for oilseeds, while those available for cotton are too few to form anything like a connected series, and even in the case of food-grains the materials are very disappointing in point of quantity. The English factors were not ordinarily concerned in the grain trade: the Dutch were, but the available records do not show the prices paid, or the values of the consignments; and regular accounts of housekeeping expenses or of the cost of victualling ships have not, so far as I can learn, been preserved.1 The information available is therefore fragmentary, but the facts which are on record fit together in a way which makes it possible to draw tentative inferences.
The normal prices of grain in Northern India at the end of the sixteenth century have been preserved for us by Abul Fazl, and we are on fairly safe ground in concluding, first, that the relative values of the various food-grains were much the same as in 1910–12, and, second, that actual prices rose sevenfold between the two periods indicated. I have not found data for the north between 1600 and 1660, but the following facts are on record for the markets of Gujarat. In the year 1609, Finch says that rice "of the best" could be got in Surat at a rial-of-eight per quintal, which is equivalent to about 65 lb. per rupee, and we can safely infer that ordinary qualities were substantially cheaper. In 1611 rice for an English ship was bought at 65¾ lb., wheat at 53¾, and a pulse (mung) at 72¾ lb. : probably these figures were substantially above the current market-rates, for the buyers were in a hurry to get the ship provisioned, and they had little experience of the country. The purchase was made in October, when wheat would be near the maximum of the year. In 1619, a consignment of wheat sent to Bantam was invoiced at a price which works out to 78¼ lb. free on board, representing something over 80 lb. in the market. In 1623 we have a record of wheat-meal bought for baking bread for the ships, and, taking the usual contemporary ratio of meal to wheat, we get a rate of 85 lb. of wheat per rupee. The Dutch factor van Twist says that before the famine of 1630, the usual price of wheat was 33¾ Dutch pounds for 10⅔ stivers, which makes nearly 82½ lb. avoirdupois per rupee.1 In none of the specific cases quoted is there any complaint that the price was exceptional, nor have I found any indications that scarcity prevailed in the years to which they relate; they appear to me to support the definite statement of van Twist, who, as his record and his writings prove, possessed a minute knowledge of Gujarat, and I think the inference is justified that, in the first quarter of the century, the usual, or normal, rate of wheat was somewhere about 80 or 85 lb. the rupee. I have found no indication of the usual price of rice, beyond a statement that in Broach it was about 65 lb. for a rupee. In the transaction of 1611 referred to above, it was somewhat cheaper than wheat, and this relation might be inferred from a consideration of the sources of supply; but the difference in value of the varieties of rice was, and is, so great that it would in any case be dangerous to base any conclusions on such figures.
The rise of prices during the famine was enormous. In November 1630, the English factors bought wheat at the rate of 13¾ lb., and a month later they found that grain was unprocurable "though at sevenfold the price of former times accustomed"; if the normal was, as suggested, 80 or 85 lbs., this means that the rate had now risen to 12 lb. or less. The year 1631 was marked by further calamities, and in September we hear of 2½ ser for a mahmudi, giving a rate of very little over 6 lb. per rupee; supplies arrived during the winter, and in January 1632 the rate was about 12½ lb., until the supplies were engrossed, when prices rose again. The next quotation I have found relates to the year 1635, when a consignment of wheat was bought for Goa at 33 lb., and this seems to mark the end of the period of pressure; prices were falling, seasonable rain had produced abundance of all sorts of grain, and in 1636 prices were lower than before the famine. We have seen in a previous section that the price of indigo remained high until 1638, but was down to the normal in 1639 and 1640; this fact appears to confirm the statement that the old normal was restored in the case of food-grains also, and the two years' delay in the case of indigo is what might be expected in view of the precedence naturally given to the former.
There are thus definite grounds for the inferences that the normal price of wheat in Gujarat was about 80 to 85 lb. per rupee in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, that it was not permanently altered by the effects of the famine of 1630, and that the old rate persisted at least to the year 1640. At this point the supply of direct data fails, and, except in seasons of scarcity, I have not found a single positive indication of the price of any food-grain in Gujarat during the next twenty years. This absence of data is not without significance. For the English factors the time was one of drastic retrenchment, and I think we should have heard of it if their bills for wages and household expenses had been materially increased by a rise in prices; the absence of complaints on this score suggests that causes of complaint were wanting, and that prices kept within the limits regarded by the factors as customary.1
In the absence of direct data, some light may be thrown on the question by the rate of wages paid in Surat. A letter written in 1636 says that the wages paid to peons had formerly been from five to seven mahmudis monthly; the rates were raised in 1634 by three mahmudis, and an attempt to revert to the old rates was successfully resisted by the peons on the ground that, although food-prices had dropped, clothing still remained expensive. In 1636, therefore, when food-prices had returned to the normal, the peons received from 8 to 10 mahmudis. I have found no subsequent reference to their wages for the rest of our period, a fact which by itself suggests that there was no important change, but Ovington, who reached Surat in the year 1690, found that the rate was then 4 rupees, or 9 mahmudis at the exchange current late in our period: thus the rate showed no change after half a century, and the fact supports the inference that prices of food had not risen to such an extent as to necessitate a rise in wages. We are justified then in saying that, while normal prices of food did not change between 1610 and 1640, there is no evidence to show that they changed during the next twenty years, and such indications as are available suggest that they remained fairly constant.
No surprise need be felt that wheat should stand at about 85 lb. in Gujarat a very few years after the rate of 185 lb. had been recorded as prevalent in Northern India: the figures which have been given for the cost of land-transport show that it would have required nearly three rupees to bring 85 lb. of wheat from Agra to Gujarat, and obviously no one would have thought of doing this so long as the total return would be only a rupee. The markets were in fact quite distinct, and it required the enormous rise in prices which has been indicated to attract distant supplies to the scene of a famine. The great advantage of water-carriage in such conditions is shown by the fact that during the famine the English at Surat were buying wheat from Persia, while fifteen years later they were able to forward supplies to famine-stricken Madras ; the coasts could help each other, but in the interior nothing could be done without such a rise in prices as occurred in Gujarat.
In the India of our period, even more than at the present day, to talk of the price of food-grains was also to talk of the purchasing-power of the money in circulation. Measured in terms of food, the value of the rupee fell as from 7 to 1 in Northern India between 1595 and the period 1910–12, which I have taken as the basis of the calculations I have published on this subject. The wholesale price of wheat in Gujarat during those years was about 20 lb. per rupee, so that in this case the value of the rupee fell as from 4 or 4¼ to 1 in the course of three centuries. Whether any portion of this fall took place during our period is a question of real importance, because, until it has been answered, we cannot reach definite conclusions regarding the incidence of the land-revenue, which in the seventeenth century may justly be described as, next to the rainfall, the weightiest factor in the economic life of the country. It is clear that practically all wholesale transactions in Gujarat were settled in silver coin, while there are no grounds for inferring any large change in the velocity of the circulation. Now, with the exception of the clove-market on the East Coast, all the prices hitherto discussed are silver-prices : we have seen that spices eventually became dear owing to the perfection of the Dutch monopoly, but, apart from spices, we have found no trace of a rise in the normal price of imports, of a typical export, or of the staple food-grains ; and to say so much is merely to say that we have found no trace of a fall in the value of silver money. It is true that our examination has not extended to all commodities, but, with the exception of cotton goods, raw cotton, and oilseeds, it has covered most of the ground : data for raw cotton and oilseeds are wanting, as I have said above, while, as regards cotton goods, the interpretation of the figures which are available is so dependent on obscure questions of quality that I have thought it best to ignore them. It can be shown, for example, that broad and narrow baftas, the staple calicoes of Gujarat, were bought for England rather more cheaply about 1640 than about 1620,1 but complaints of the deterioration of weaving after the famine make it dangerous to base any argument on the decline in price ; while for tracts which escaped the famine, prices are not on record over a sufficiently long period to justify any inference. The evidence then is incomplete, but it appears to me to permit of the provisional conclusion that the probabilities are entirely against the occurrence of a fall in the value of silver during the half century which we are considering. To establish such an occurrence, it would be necessary to demonstrate two propositions : first, that a rise in price, not otherwise accounted for, took place in a number of commodities, equal in importance to the aggregate of those which have been discussed ; and second, that the prices of imports, indigo, and food-grains were depressed by causes of which I have found no trace, so that they failed to respond to the assumed fall in silver. Until some evidence to support these propositions comes to light, it would be unprofitable to discuss the question further, and I shall proceed on the provisional conclusion that in the Gujarat markets silver was a fairly stable standard of value between 1610 and 1660.
If this conclusion be accepted for Gujarat, it can safely be extended to Northern India, taken as a whole. The north may be regarded as one market for silver : there was practically no local production or large influx over the land frontier, and the supply was maintained by the imports on the coast, that is to say in Bengal, Sind, and Gujarat. The account which has been given of the maritime trade of Bengal shows that the influx of silver cannot have been great until the last decade of our period, when the Dutch restored and extended the traditional export business; Sind was even less important from this point of view, and I think that students of the contemporary records will agree that the trade of the various ports of Gujarat constituted the principal source of supply. We may then regard the silver-using north as a reservoir replenished chiefly from Gujarat, though subsidiary streams entered it from Bengal and Sind; but we must not regard the silver as absolutely mobile, because the cost and risk of transport were by no means negligible. In these circumstances, if the total supply had exceeded the absorptive capacity of the country, so that the quantity of silver in circulation tended to rise, the resulting fall in its value would have been most apparent in Gujarat, where the principal supplies were received and minted: and since we have found that no noticeable fall in value occurred in Gujarat, we may infer that the stability of silver as a standard extended throughout the country, or in other words that the stream of silver poured in by the Dutch and other merchants was not in excess of the absorptive capacity of Northern and Western India taken as a whole.
In this connection it may be well to notice the history of the Mogul mint at Surat, because at first sight the facts relating to it might suggest a large increase in the currency. Practically all the silver imported, whether foreign coin or bullion, was taken directly to a mint and reissued in the form of rupees or mahmudis.1 At the opening of our period, the chief mint of Gujarat was located at Ahmadabad, where it had been established by Akbar after his conquest of the country. Akbar had also set up a mint in Surat; it was closed for a time, but was reopened in 1620, presumably in consequence of the growing importance of the seaport. By the year 1634 the amount of silver imported at Surat had outrun the capacity of the local mint, and two years later the difficulty of obtaining currency was one of the reasons urged in favour of a proposal to move the English headquarters to Ahmadabad; but the difficulty was met by increasing the capacity of the Surat mint, which thenceforward appears to have been equal to all ordinary demands. It is certain then that imports of silver into Surat increased largely, but it does not follow that there was an increase in Gujarat taken as a whole, and in point of fact the change must be regarded as an indication of the transfer of business to Surat from Cambay. The chief trade of the Portuguese was conducted at the latter port, and the silver imported by them was naturally taken to the mint at Ahmadabad; when trade passed from the Portuguese to the Dutch and English, Surat prospered but Cambay declined; and the large increase in coinage at Surat was counterbalanced by a decrease at the northern mint.
This change can be traced in the collections of Mogul coins in Indian museums, which in the aggregate are sufficiently extensive to afford a rough indication of the relative importance of the different mints. The following figures have been extracted from the catalogues of the three principal collections.1
| Reign. | Ahmadabad Mint. | Surat Mint. | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reign. | Lucknow. | Lahore. | Calcutta. | Total. | Lucknow. | Lahore. | Calcutta. | Total. |
| Akbar . . | 153 | 51 | 53 | 257 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Jahangir | 79 | 27 | 32 | 138 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 23 |
| Shahjahan . | 34 | 9 | 12 | 55 | 88 | 22 | 31 | 141 |
| Aurangzeb . | 21 | 5 | 11 | 37 | 131 | 55 | 91 | 277 |
| Total . | 287 | 92 | 108 | 487 | 233 | 82 | 127 | 442 |
Taking the whole period from Akbar to Aurangzeb, it will be seen that the two mints are about equally represented in the collections, but that Ahmadabad declined as Surat rose. The extension at Surat was carried out early in Shahjahan's reign, and thenceforward it became the chief mint of Gujarat, supplying nine-tenths of the specimens available for the reign of Aurangzeb. These figures then support the inference that during our period there was not a large proportionate increase in the influx of silver into Gujarat; the direct trade to Europe was undoubtedly a new feature, but its volume was small relatively to the existing commerce, which we have seen no reason to think was largely extended; and, taking the business of this part of the country as a whole, we are justified in the view that the course of trade was not such as to produce a general rise in prices of produce.1
Turning now to the other side of India, it may be said at once that I have found practically no data for the course of prices of food-grains on the Coromandel coast. We know that famines were frequent in this region, and that in bad seasons prices rose enormously, but we do not know their tendency in ordinary years, and can say only that the absence of complaints regarding increase in the cost of living is a fact consistent with the theory that normal prices did not greatly change. The stability of wage-rates stated in silver points in the same direction. Methwold, who left Masulipatam in 1622, put the rate for the factory servants at a rial-of-eight monthly, or approximately two rupees. In 1658, William Smyth gave the wages of factory servants in the same neighbourhood as from 4s. to 5s. a month; the rupee was at this time taken as equivalent to 2s. 3d., so that the rate is identical with that known to Methwold thirty-six years before, and it becomes highly improbable that any large change in the cost of living can have occurred in the interval.
In Bengal, on the other hand, there is definite evidence of a large and sudden rise in food prices between the years 1650 and 1660, which is of interest as throwing light on the economic position of that part of the country. It will be remembered that the active development of the trade of Bengal began when the Dutch and English settled at Hooghly about the former year. In December of 1658 the English factors applied for an increase in the allowance for housekeeping charges on account of the great rise in the cost of living; their letter is not extant, but from the reply sent by the Company it appears that the allegation was made that provisions had trebled in value, and that the Company did not entirely accept this statement, but called for a detailed account. We may conjecture that the factors exaggerated the extent of the rise, or at least made their case look as strong as possible, and it would be unsafe to conclude that prices had actually trebled, but we are justified in holding that a rise had taken place so great as to render inadequate an allowance which had been fixed less than ten years before.
This rise does not represent the beginning of a divergence between Bengal and the rest of the Indian sea-board, but rather the removal of an anomaly which appears to have been of some standing. By December of 1658, local prices had risen very sharply, but, just eight years before, such commodities as rice, butter, oil, and wheat could be procured "all at half the price or little more that they are in other parts"; in other words, up to the end of 1650, prices in Bengal were abnormally low compared with those which were familiar to the English merchants, that is to say, those which prevailed elsewhere on the coast of India; but a few years of rapidly expanding trade, financed almost entirely by silver, had brought prices up to, or possibly somewhat above, the familiar standard. The natural inference is that the supply of silver in Bengal had previously been inadequate in comparison with what was available on other portions of the sea-board, so that silver prices would be normally depressed, and that the sudden increase in imported supplies occurring from 1650 onwards sufficed to remove this special cause, and bring Bengal into line with the rest of the coast. This inference is in accordance with the fact that for a long time previously Bengal had exported rice to countries which would more naturally have obtained their supplies from Coromandel. To take one instance, Fitch records that Sunargaon (near the present Dacca) served all "India" and Ceylon; by India we may assume that he meant the Western Coast, to which the trade in provisions is mentioned by many other authorities, and we have to ask why rice should be carried thither from Bengal when it could be obtained from Coromandel by a shorter, and much less dangerous, voyage. The only reasonable answer seems to be that the prime cost of provisions in Bengal must have been so much lower as to cover the increased charge for transit, and that prices were, in fact, low is shown by the narratives of various observers from Caesar Frederick to William Methwold. Writing of the years about 1620, the latter spoke of the traffic in provisions and other goods from Bengal to Masulipatam, "which, considering the plenty of the place whereunto they bring them, should come hither as we say of coals carried to Newcastle, yet here they sell them to contented profit "—a striking testimony to the difference in the purchasing power of silver in two coastal regions linked only by imperfect means of communication.
It appears, then, to be a fact that Bengal was inadequately provided with silver until about the year 1650. A probable explanation of this shortage may be found in the working of the revenue system. The land revenue was paid mainly in silver; much of it was usually remitted to the Mogul Court in the same form; and the amount of imported silver retained in the province was apparently insufficient to satisfy the local demand, so that silver would normally be expensive, or, what is the same thing, commodities would normally be cheap. The entire revenue of Bengal is given in the Ain-i-Akbari as close on 150 lakhs of rupees, but there is some reason to think that this record is exaggerated, if not fictitious; taking various statements which relate to the reign of Shahjahan, we find that the demand stood at about 130 lakhs of rupees.1 Some part of this was doubtless spent locally, but if we allow for the fact that grantees, like the State, commonly remitted part of their receipts to the capital in the form of cash, we must recognise that the regular drain up-country must have amounted to a very large figure, probably something like 50 lakhs a year. We have seen in a former chapter that the sea-borne trade of Bengal had been at a low ebb for many years before 1650, and, while we cannot calculate its actual value, we need not wonder if it were insufficient at once to meet this drain and provide the province with the silver it required. Now the Dutch records show that their trade with Bengal was of the order of a lakh of rupees in magnitude in the years before 1650, but in 1661 it was close on 20 lakhs, the increase representing, as we have seen, new business, and being financed mainly by imports of silver; simultaneously the English were developing new business on a smaller but substantial scale; and it appears to me to be reasonable to infer that this sudden increase in the influx of silver, approaching, if not exceeding, 20 lakhs annually in the closing years of our period, was sufficiently large to effect a material alteration in the monetary position in Bengal. I have not found any figures to suggest that the revenue demand was raised during these years,1 and, if the drain to the north remained approximately constant, the increased supply of silver would go a long way to satisfy the local demand, and the main cause of depressed prices would be removed.
The final result of this disquisition is that, while the evidence available is incomplete, what evidence there is can be summarised in the tentative conclusion that, during our period, silver was stable in value throughout the north and west of India; but that in Bengal it depreciated rapidly during the closing decade, thereby removing a long-standing anomaly, and bringing prices on the Hooghly into line with those which prevailed elsewhere on the Indian sea-board.
6. Gold and Copper
Having reached the tentative conclusion that, except in Bengal, silver was a stable standard of value throughout our period, it remains to consider the markets for gold and copper, both of which circulated as currency on the basis of their value as commodities. In Appendix D, I have indicated that the silver price of the gold coins known as new pagodas rose during our period on the East Coast, and we should expect to find that the gold market in Gujarat showed a corresponding rise, but the data on record are too few to establish, or to controvert, this proposition. As regards the middle of our period, all that can be said is that this market, like every other, was disorganised for a time by the famine, because the income of the rich had failed so that they could not buy, while poorer people were forced to sell their jewellery in order to purchase food. After the famine, in the year 1635, the English 20-shilling piece sold for 20 mahmudis, while in 1646 its price was 21½ mahmudis, and this rise may be significant, but more data are required for a conclusion, especially as the gold market was subject to professional manipulation; the English factors complained on one occasion that they lay at the mercy of the shroffs or exchangers of money, “who at their pleasures raise and fall the price of either specie as themselves please,” and the difference noted may be merely a fluctuation of the market. In 1652 the Surat factors reported that gold was more likely to rise than to fall, but I have not found any actual quotations for the closing years of our period. The circulation of gold in the Mogul Empire was in any case so limited that the question of its value did not affect currency-users in general: in the south we should expect to find indications of a fall in gold prices, but here again data are wanting, and the only commodities for which I have been able to construct a regular series of quotations are the spices, which, as has been shown, were dealt in at rates determined by the Dutch monopolists.
Our information regarding copper is more extensive, and also of more general interest. The position at the opening of our period was that Northern India depended entirely, or almost entirely, on the produce of the local mines, while the south was furnished mainly by the supplies imported by the Portuguese from Japan. The metal was very expensive in the north, as is shown by the fact that the mint price works out at about 84 lb. of wheat for a pound of copper, the corresponding figure in 1910–12 being 16 lb. of wheat ; and it cannot have been materially cheaper in the south, for in that case imported supplies would have been diverted from Malabar and Goa to the ports of Gujarat. At this price the metal was a luxury, and utensils made of it were much rarer than is now the case ; the industrial demand was small, and, apart from occasional requisitions for founding cannon, the various mints were probably in the aggregate among the principal consumers. Up to about 1620 I have found no signs of a material change in the value of copper in Northern India. The official rate of exchange in Akbar's time was 40 dam, that is 80 Gujarat pice, for a rupee, equivalent to 32 pice for a mahmudi ; in 1609 Finch put the current rate for the mahmudi at 31 or 32 pice, "varying as copper riseth and falleth" ; and early in 1615 Elkington quoted 34 pice, mentioning the tendency of the rate to fluctuate, so that up to this year, at any rate, there is no sign of a rise in value. Nor had the import into Gujarat begun, for in 1619, when the English factors at Surat wanted a consignment of copper for Persia, they first inquired for it at Burhanpur, that is to say, in the direction of some of the mines, and eventually they sent it in the form of coin, though the amount was only 330 lb., a quantity which would assuredly have been procurable locally if a regular import trade had been in existence. At some time in the next decade a marked rise in price occurred. The earliest reference I have found to an alteration in the rate is Pelsart's statement, made in 1626, that at Agra 58 pice went to the rupee, a remarkable divergence from the former rate of 80. In 1636 the English factors at Surat wrote that for two or three years before the famine the mahmudi was not worth above 20, 21, or 22 pice; on these terms the rupee would be equivalent to from 50 to 55 pice. The rate in 1636 was 25 to a mahmudi, in 1640 it was 24, and twenty years later it was still between 24 and 25, so that, neglecting minor fluctuations, the rupee, which, at any rate up to 1616, was worth 80 pice (or 40 dam), from 1627 onwards was worth 60 pice (30 dam) or a little more or less.1
The rise in price was followed by the development of a steady import of Japanese copper into Gujarat. On their establishment in Japan, the Dutch had lost little time in undertaking the supply of the East Coast from that source, but the first recorded appearance of their copper in Surat is in the year 1635,2 and for the next few years their sales were satisfactory, so that it is clear that a real demand was being met. In 1640 the export of copper from Japan was prohibited, and during the seven or eight years covered by this restriction, we find the Dutch selling copper from Sweden and other European sources both at Surat and at Masulipatam; export from Japan was resumed in 1648, and the trade appears to have continued without further interruption, while supplies were also carried to Bengal, when the Dutch had secured a footing in that province.
Some light is thrown on the conditions of the market at the end of our period by entries in the Batavia Journal for the year 1661. A letter from Surat explained a sudden rise in the price of the metal by two causes: first, that imported supplies were inadequate; and second, that owing to the civil war the northern mines were short of workmen. The authorities in Gujarat met this emergency by prohibiting exports of copper (coined or uncoined), and the rate for a rupee rose in consequence from 30 to 33 dams. At the close of our period, then, we find that the silver price of copper had permanently risen by something like 20 per cent, so that the approximate number of pice to a rupee had fallen from the old standard of 80 to nearly the now accepted standard of 64; and further, that the supplies of Northern India were no longer exclusively local, but depended in part on what could be brought from the mines of Japan.
So much for the facts on record. I have found nothing to account for the sudden rise in price, but the results of our examination of silver prices justify the inference that the cause was connected with copper, and not with silver, so that we must look for either a permanent increase in demand, or a permanent decrease in supply. The former is in itself improbable, I can find nothing in the history of the period to suggest it, and I have been unable to conjecture anything which would account for the facts; it appears to me much more likely that the supply from some of the Indian mines failed in the years before 1630, and the permanence of the rise in price indicates that the failure was not a temporary matter. We know that the mines of Rajputana and Central India have failed since Akbar's reign, when they were the only source of supply for the bulk of the Mogul Empire, and I suggest that the failure of some of them occurred at this particular time, and that the resulting rise in the price of copper made it profitable for the Dutch to establish an import trade into Gujarat.
AUTHORITIES FOR CHAPTER V
Taken as a whole this chapter is based on the English commercial correspondence calendared in Letters Received and English Factories, together with the reports from India contained in the Dagh Register. The detailed references given below are illustrative rather than exhaustive; a full appreciation of the course of markets requires the study of these authorities in detail.
Section 1.—Finch's view of Indian merchants is in Letters Received, i. 30. For monopoly of lead, see English Factories, i. 134; of saltpetre, idem, viii. 53, and Dagh Register, March 31, 1641; for prohibition of export of copper, idem, October 18, 1661. For the Ahmadabad indigo monopoly, see English Factories, viii. 130, 143; for spices, Dagh Register, December 26, 1641; for cloth, English Factories, ix. 22, and Dagh Register, May 20, 1641; for food in famine time, English Factories, iv. 209; for merchants as governors, idem, i. 147. The Imperial monopoly of indigo is described in idem, iv. 324-28, and v. 1, 70-73. The account of the general monopoly at Hooghly is taken from Dagh Register, June 10, 1636; for monopoly of Dutch trade, see idem, March 12, 1625; and English Factories, iii. 282. Manucci's sketch of Mir Jumla is i. 231: his commercial activities are referred to frequently in English Factories, ix. and x. The data quoted for cost of land transport are in English Factories, i. 74, vi. 135, ix. 52; Agra Accounts, MS. 120; and Mundy, ii. 278, 291. Prices in Northern India were discussed by the writer in Journal R.A.S., October 1917 and July 1918.
Section 2.—Competition between Dutch and English is a regular feature of the commercial records; e.g. English Factories, iii. 208, v. 205, 206; for the difficulty experienced in working together, see idem, v. 1, 69, 142. Virji Vora's name appears so frequently in the English and Dutch reports from Surat that a full list of references would be tedious; the following will perhaps suffice to guide readers to the principal topics. His syndicates are referred to in Dagh Register, October 3, 1641, and June 9, 1645 (Surat); also English Factories, viii. 206, 257. His foreign relations, idem, iii. 212, vii. 253, viii. 105. His domination of the market, idem, v. 24, 218; vii. 18, 108; viii. 5; x. 16, 160. His difficulties with the authorities, idem, iv. 31; vi. 94, 108-110. His loans to the English, idem, iii. 271, 300; iv. 193, 216; v. 97, 216; vii. 5, 152; ix. 119, 141; x. 360. His wealth, Thévenot, 46.
“Malaya” is mentioned occasionally in English Factories, but more frequently in the Dagh Register; see August 14, 1634, for his death; November 27, 1640, February 19, 1641, February 15, 1643, for his successor's political activities; June 1, 1644, for his financial position; March 14, 1637, November 27, 1640, May 6 and August 19, 1645, for commercial policy.
For the activities of brokers, see in particular English Factories, v. 102; for their misconduct, idem, iii. 239; iv. 101; v. 171; vi. 225; viii. 209. For shroffs, idem, iii. 296; vii. 21; and Tavernier, i. 29. For marine insurance, English Factories, ii. 101; vii. 92, 161; viii. 259. For gluts and consequent failures, see—at Aden, Dagh Register, March 22, 1636; at Mocha and Basra, idem, July 18, 1644 (Surat); and English Factories, vii. 208; viii. 184; at Achin, Dagh Register, May 20 and December 15, 1641; March 10, 1642.
Section 3.—The references to quotations for indigo are given in the opening table. For the initial standard and Finch's estimates, see Letters Received, i. 23, 28, 306; ii. 152, 214, 248. For the famine price in 1630, English Factories, iv. 125; for curtailment of cultivation, idem, iv. 325; for adulteration, idem, vi. 273; vii. 163; viii. 31, 203. Tavernier's statement of price is ii. 9.
Section 4.—Quicksilver. For demand, see English Factories, iii. 325, 334; ix. 121; for private trade, idem, iv. 32, and Court Minutes, February 13, 1629, and October 22, 1630. Prices up to 1626 are taken from Letters Received, i. 32, 235, 305; ii. 191; iii. 9; iv. 296; English Factories, i. 55, 327; ii. 158; Factory Records (Surat), vol. 102, No. 478; and Original Correspondence, 1241. For the glut of 1630 and subsequent low prices, see English Factories, iv. 32, 89, 102, 180, 275; v. 82, 205; and for the revival, idem, viii. 188, 282; ix. 121, 252; x. 199; and Dagh Register, May 1, 1661.
Lead. For the official monopoly, see English Factories, i. 323; iii. 157, 196; vii. 210; for alternative markets, idem, v. 69, 218; vi. 204, 275; ix. 71, 104. Quotations are from Letters Received, i. 33, 235, 238, 300; ii. 193; iii. 8, 9; iv. 296, 336; v. 107; vi. 159; English Factories, i. 323; iii. 334; iv. 32, 129; v. 7; vi. 98, 204; viii. 7, 216, 282; ix. 140; and x. 199; also Original Correspondence, 1794, 1808.
Cloves. The price at the Mogul Court is given in Ain (translation), i. 64. The early quotations at Surat are from Original Correspondence, 609; Terpstra's Surat, Appendix VII; and English Factories, ii. 25. Prices from 1633 to 1649 are from idem, viii. 206, 257; Original Correspondence, 1543A, 1558; and Dagh Register, May 14, 1633, December 26, 1641, July 3, 1643, and June 9, 1645. The final monopoly prices are in idem, August 17, 1657; May 1, 1661; and English Factories, x. 157. For East Coast prices, see idem, i. 41; ii. 136; vi. 47, 186; and Dagh Register, March 27, 1631; November 25, 1632; November 29, 1640; December 23, 1641; December 29, 1644; May 14, 1645; June 3, 1661.
Section 5.—The prices of food grains in Northern India are discussed in Journal R.A.S., October 1917 and July 1918. The Surat prices are taken from Letters Received, i. 31, 141; English Factories, i. 63; ii. 254; and van Twist, III. For famine prices and the recovery, see English Factories, iv. 95, 122, 165, 196, 209; v. 146, 149, 151, 177. Retrenchment is dealt with in idem, vii. 121, 171; viii. 245; ix. 14, 198, 216; peons' wages in idem, v. 151, and Ovington, 392; for the scarcity of 1658–59, see English Factories, x. 196, 306; and for movement of grain by sea, idem, iv. 196; viii. 74, 106.
The Surat mint is referred to in idem, i. 36, 218; v. 68, 216; vi. 84; also Ain (translation), i. 31. For wages on the East Coast, see Methwold, 1001, and English Factories, x. 261. For the rise in prices in Bengal, see idem, x. 407; and for the antecedent cheapness, idem, viii. 338; Original Correspondence, 2188; Purchas, II. x. 1720, 1737; and Methwold, 1005. The value of Dutch trade in Bengal has been abstracted from successive entries in the Dagh Register for the years in question.
Section 6.—The remarks on the price of gold at Surat are based on English Factories, iii. 296; iv. 123; v. 121; viii. 7; ix. 141. The position in regard to copper is discussed at greater length in India at the Death of Akbar, 148 ff. The early exchange quotations are from Pelsart, 11; Letters Received, i. 34; iii. 11; and English Factories, i. 100, 114, 142-44; those from 1636 onwards, in idem, v. 206; vi. 249; and Dagh Register, June 26, 1661. For the import of copper, see idem, March 22, 1636, March 14, 1637, February 20 and October 30, 1648, April 12, 1661, and many other incidental entries; also English Factories, ii. 260; v. 81 n., 101, 120. The crisis of 1661 is mentioned in idem, x. 306, and at greater length in several passages in the Dagh Register for that year.
Notes
- 1. Manucci (ii. 84) gives a vivid description of a bankruptcy at Patna.
- 1. The Portuguese occasionally sent information overland by way of Aleppo, and also Suez (see, e.g., Couto, X. i. 72), but in the instances I have noticed the news sent was political rather than commercial. In 1616 the Dutch were considering the possibility of overland communication between Amsterdam and Masulipatam, but the route was at this time obstructed by wars (Hague Transcripts, I. 83). English use of the overland route becomes noticeable in the 'thirties (English Factories, vi. 245, vii. 27, etc.).
- 1. In 1627 Pelsart (p. 8) pointed out that the Dutch were injuring their trade in Northern India by excessive imports of spices on the East Coast, and recommended a reduction there coupled with increased supplies to Surat. A few years later general orders were issued from Amsterdam to regulate supplies to Persia, Surat, and Masulipatam in such a way as to keep prices level throughout the whole region (Hague Transcripts, II. 95).
- 1. I follow the transliteration of the name adopted in English Factories; Professor Sarkar writes Baharji Borah (Shivaji, 110), and also Pirji Borah (Aurangzeb, i. 325), in passages which clearly refer to the same individual. His reputation as the richest merchant in the world is affirmed in a letter written at Surat in 1664 by the Rev. John l’Escaliot. This letter was printed in Wilkin’s edition of the works of Sir Thomas Browne (i. 424); the portion here referred to appeared in the Indian Antiquary for 1921, pp. 312 ff.
- 1. This figure is taken from l'Escaliot's letter quoted in a previous note.
- 2. Some curious letters from Surat are printed in the Dagh Register of June 1, 1678; their tenor is such that Vīrji Vora's name would almost certainly have appeared if he had been still in business, but no allusion is made to him.
- 1. The irregularities of the first English broker, Jādu Dās, are familiar topics in the early correspondence, e.g. Letters Received, i. 284, 304; v. 115; vi. 232; English Factories, i. 21, 42. Roe (216), says, "he did more to hinder us than all other lets together"; but also (277), that he was "sufficient in all but his honesty, wherein there is little choice." I take him to have been an aggravating but indispensable subordinate, such as may still be found occasionally in India; and he was certainly successful in placing his relatives in the Company's employment, for in 1632 Mundy noted (ii. 79) that his assistant at Patna was "cousin to Gur Das (the broker in Surat), to Dhanji, our broker in Agra, and Panju in Broach, these being the sons of two brothers, whereof Jadu, broker in Burhanpur, is the third."
- Note. Notes.—1635. Perhaps the figure 27·00 should be reduced to 24·30; it is not clear whether the size of the maund had been increased before or after this transaction took place. 1638. Suspicious; quoted by a factor on his defence. 1645. Price is quoted per bale, but this is impossible, and I assume maund to be meant. 1655. Greatly adulterated; described as “half dirt.”
- 1. In the detailed invoice attached to Original Correspondence, No. 1725, the charges on 2007 maunds from Ahmadabad to the ships at Swally, the roadstead of Surat, are given as Rs. 2038.
- 1. A quicksilver mine near Agra is referred to in Letters Received, iii. 63, but we hear nothing more about it, and I take it to have been an invention put about by buyers in order to lower the price.
- 1. The Batavia Journals occasionally mention an export of lead from Siam, and some of this may have reached Surat, though I have found no record of the fact.
- 2. I give the figures as recorded in mahmudis, because they are so small that to reduce them to rupees would involve the use of minute fractions. The mahmudi was worth about ⅖ of a rupee, rising to ⁴⁄₉ as time went on.
- 1. Abul Fazl's figure is 60 dams per ser, or Rs. 60 for an Akbari maund. Writing in 1626 Pelsart (f. 8) mentioned that old merchants had told him that the rate in Agra used to be Rs. 60 or 80, so that Abul Fazl was probably correct.
- 2. An entry in Realia, vol. iii. under "Spices," suggests that prices had been fixed at any rate by the year 1653, but I have not found a record of the actual date.
- 1. This quotation is taken from Schorer, f. 7. His report is not dated, but it reached Holland in 1616, and must therefore refer to the market of 1614 or 1615.
- 1. The Agra Accounts, which are quoted elsewhere, extend over only two years, one at least of which was altogether abnormal.
- 1. The Gujarat Report, written in 1629, gives the usual price in Broach at a figure which works out to 75½ lb. It is practically certain that van Twist had this report before him when he wrote; perhaps he chose a rather higher figure out of regard for the position of Gujarat as a whole, but the difference is not very material.
- 1. In 1650, and again in 1659, we find statements that prices had risen in consequence of failure of the rains, but there is no suggestion of a change in normal rates.
- 1. The average prices, free on board, shown for the large consignments of 1619 in the table given in the last chapter were, broad baftas, 6·3 and 6·8 mahmudis per piece, and narrow baftas, 3·8 and 5·0 ma. In the invoice for December 1640 (Original Correspondence, 1764), the corresponding prices (including charges to the ship's side) are, broad baftas 5·2 and 5·5 ; narrow, 3·8 and 4·1 ma.
- 1. As explained in Appendix D, mahmudis were coined up to about 1637 in the mint at Mulher in Baglan. I gather that this coinage at Surat was not undertaken when that mint was reopened in 1620, but in any case it was concerned mainly with rupees.
- 1. The figures of Aurangzeb's coinage include the few specimens minted by Murad Bakhsh in 1658.
- 1. It is probable that remittances of silver from Persia to Gujarat fell off during our period to an extent which would counteract part of the increased import from Europe, though I have not found sufficiently precise data to justify a definite assertion; the balance of trade must have been affected by the new export of silk from the Gulf.
- 1. The statistics of Bengal given in the Ain cover tracts which were outside the Mogul Empire at the time of compilation, and the figures for these, at [p. 181] least, cannot be accepted as representing facts. Ascoli (p. 25) gives the revenue of the year 1658 as 131 lakhs of rupees. In the British Museum I find the revenue given as 52,46, lakhs of dams in three MSS. (Or. 1842, and Addl. 6588, and 6598); taking 40 dams to the rupee, this gives the figure quoted by Mr. Ascoli.
- 1. Ascoli (l.c.), following the Fifth Report of the Select Committee appointed in 1808, says: "It is probable that Shah Shuja's revenue roll [131 lakhs of rupees] was not a new settlement or assessment, but merely a clerical revision." The next assessment on record was not made until 1722.
- 1. The market rate of exchange between silver and copper fluctuated considerably. In the Agra Accounts for 1637–39 the rupee was taken as only 50 pice in January 1637, 52 pice in April, 54 pice in September, 55 pice in January 1638, and 58 pice in the following October.
- 2. The apparent delay in meeting the needs of Western India is explained by the fact that from 1629 to 1634 the trade of the Dutch in Japan was practically suspended owing to political difficulties; imports of copper began as soon as these had been finally adjusted.