1. The Position of Foreign Merchants in Indian States
We must now turn to the last branch of our study, and examine the economic significance of the administrative and financial institutions which existed in India during our period. Our knowledge of the practical working of the various administrations is derived so largely from the observations of Dutch and English merchants that it is important for us to realise at the outset the position occupied by the observers, the more so that nothing like it can be found in India at the present day. If a company of foreign merchants, Americans let us say, or Japanese, were to decide on establishing an agency in modern Calcutta or Bombay, their resulting rights and liabilities would be clearly known beforehand. They would not require official permission to occupy offices and warehouses, nor would they have to enter into preliminary negotiations regarding the customs tariff, the harbour-dues, or the transit charges applicable to their particular business. The ports and cities would be open to them, but the fact of their settlement would involve automatically their submission to large sections of the law of India; they would not be exempt from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil or criminal courts, and they would be under legal obligation to comply with the regulations in force regarding customs tariffs and many other matters. This arrangement, which nowadays seems as natural as it is convenient, is, in Asia at least, quite modern. At the time of which I am writing, ports and cities were not open to settlements of foreign merchants as a matter of course; such settlements were based on special conventions or agreements, and the position of the merchants with regard to the authorities was determined by these conventions rather than the ordinary law. It has sometimes been asserted that the privileges of foreign merchants were forcibly acquired by the first arrivals from Europe, but the truth appears to be that similar privileges were enjoyed by Asiatic merchants before European vessels had entered Indian waters, and that the new arrivals accommodated themselves to arrangements which they found already in existence.
The nature of these purely Asiatic arrangements may be illustrated by two instances in which the facts are clearly on record—Malacca, the greatest seaport in the Farther East, and Calicut, which, before the changes resulting from the advent of the Portuguese, was probably the greatest port in India. When Alboquerque reached Malacca in the year 1511, the city already contained several foreign mercantile settlements; the men of each nation lived under their own laws and customs; and each nation had a chief or head-man of its own, who exercised the functions of a governor in regard to his nationals. Alboquerque's arrival resulted in a divergence of interest among these foreign communities: the Chinese and the Javans welcomed him, but the Moslems from the west coast of India, supported by their Malay co-religionists, were bitterly opposed to the establishment of a Portuguese settlement, and it was their predominant influence over the King which led to the outbreak of hostilities. The motives actuating the two parties are not formally on record, but it is obvious that the question at issue was essentially commercial; Malacca being the port of transhipment between East and West, the Chinese and Javans, who brought Eastern goods there for sale, would naturally welcome competing Western buyers, while the Indian Moslems, apart from their existing quarrel with the Portuguese, would naturally make every effort to maintain their monopoly of the westward trade. The Portuguese could not establish a trading settlement at Malacca as a matter of course, but required permission from the King ; their settlement was opposed by the other foreign merchants with whom they would compete ; and their attempts to negotiate a convention were unsuccessful. In the result Alboquerque effected a settlement by force of arms, and the city passed into the possession of the Portuguese, under whom the old privileges of foreign merchants gradually disappeared.
The position at Calicut some years earlier was essentially similar. When the Portuguese attempted to secure a settlement there, they were supported by the subjects of the Zamorin or King, who were engaged in the import trade from the East, while they were opposed by the Arab and Egyptian merchants, who controlled the export trade to the Red Sea ; here, as in Malacca, importers were eager to welcome new customers, while exporters exerted all their influence to keep out new competitors. In this case also the exporters prevailed with the authorities, and the Portuguese found that no convention could be arranged. Now these Arabs and Egyptians were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Zamorin of Calicut, but had a resident governor of their own ; there was thus a foreign commercial settlement in Calicut, governing itself and outside the control of the local law, just as there were several foreign and self-governing commercial settlements in Malacca.
Nor was Calicut the only Indian seaport where the institution of mercantile extra-territoriality was recognised in the early years of the sixteenth century, for the description left to us by Barbosa shows that it prevailed on extensive sections of the coast. In Malabar, we read that the Chettis from the East Coast “ manage their own affairs, the King may not enquire into their crimes ; they do justice to one another, with which the King is satisfied.” In the same region the foreign Moslems “ have in the town itself a Moorish [Moslem] Governor of their own, who rules and punishes them without interference from the King, save that the Governor gives an account of certain matters to the King.” In Kayal again the Moslem farmer of the pearl-fishery “ executes judgment and justice on the Moors [Moslems] without interference from the King"; and speaking generally, Barbosa's account shows that mercantile extra-territoriality existed on the coasts of India before Portuguese influence had an opportunity of altering the institutions of the country. The arrangement was of course familiar to the first arrivals from Europe, and we find the Dutch and English merchants accepting it without comment both in India and in the islands farther east; but the suggestion that they imported it must be set aside as unhistorical.
The first settlements made in India by the Portuguese must not be regarded as conforming to this Asiatic custom, because they were much more than commercial: the commanders of their early expeditions usually insisted on territorial concessions, or in the alternative seized territory by force, but in doing this they were acting as representatives of the king of Portugal, and not as merchants. Some of their later commercial settlements, such as Hooghly, conformed more nearly to the Asiatic type, but even in these they were assisted by, and presumed on, the prestige of their existing dominion. The chronicler Khāfi Khān wrote that the Portuguese started at Hooghly with a grant of land for stores and residences, but in course of time they overstepped the sufferance they had obtained, and I take it that in a general way this statement is correct, and that Portuguese merchants assumed rights of sovereignty in their settlements, relying on the naval power which had been established in Asia by their nation.
The earliest Dutch settlements, on the other hand, were purely commercial, and were made in accordance with existing Asiatic practice. In regard to them it is important to bear in mind the distinction drawn in an earlier chapter between the Voyage and the Factory. The original idea of a trading voyage, where a ship merely stayed at a port long enough to sell and buy, did not involve any necessity for a durable convention, but at the most a temporary agreement regarding customs and port dues; and accordingly the narrative of the first Dutch expedition under Houtman, which is the type of a trading voyage, does not throw direct light on the position of foreign settlements in Java, though there is a hint in it that the Chinese merchants may have had privileges such as foreigners enjoyed in other Asiatic seaports.1 The question of similar privileges for the Dutch can have arisen only when the mere trading voyage had been found unsuitable, and the step was taken from Voyage to Factory : when once it was decided to settle Dutch merchants at any seaport, their position towards the authorities would have to be laid down with precision, because, in the absence of the ships, the few Dutchmen on land would be dependent on them for protection. The published narratives of the expeditions which succeeded Houtman's are incomplete, and I have been unable to find an account of the first actual settlement of a Dutch factory, but factors were certainly resident in Achin before September 1602, and others were appointed at Bantam in December of that year. There is good reason to suppose that extra-terri-torial privileges were enjoyed from the outset, because the earliest extant regulations for the factories, which were issued in 1603, provide for the exercise of independent jurisdiction, not as a novelty but as an existing institution, by the authorities in charge of the factory, and definitely authorise the infliction of punishments. In 1603, therefore, and probably for some time before, the Dutch enjoyed privileges similar to those of the Arabs in India a century earlier; their settlement, or factory, was already a foreign self-governing community. In the case of the earliest English settlement there is no room for doubt, for the Commander of the first fleet commenced his operations at Achin by negotiating a convention, which provided definitely for internal self-government, and this Achin convention was quoted as a suitable precedent in the instructions issued in England to subsequent fleets.
The same procedure was followed on both sides of India. In the year 1606 the Dutch attempted to obtain a settlement at Pulicat, but on this occasion opposition was offered by the Portuguese, and no convention could be negotiated. The vessel sailed therefore for Masulipatam, where negotiations were carried on, first with the local authorities, and then with the king of Golconda, until an agreement was reached, and factories were established under it. A few years later we have similar negotiations with the Hindu authorities farther south, leading to settlements in Tegnapatam and Pulicat, as well as a convention with Calicut, which, however, was not followed up; while the experience gained on the East Coast was utilised in drafting a set of terms for a Dutch settlement at Surat, which again include reservation of criminal jurisdiction, the distinctive mark of self-government. In the Mogul Empire, however, the lead was taken by the English, and the position proved to be unlike that which existed in the maritime Asiatic states. The authorities at Calicut, Masulipatam, and Pulicat, like the kings of Bantam and Achin, were familiar with the institution of mercantile extra-territoriality, but the Great Mogul had the outlook of Central Asia, where such ideas are not likely to have been known, and in his Empire the grant of a concession was not a matter of course. Hawkins, the commander of the first English ship to reach Surat, was informed that the local authorities could allow him to trade, but that the settlement of a factory required the Emperor's orders, and he travelled to Agra to endeavour to secure "capitulations" for that purpose. His diplomacy was unsuccessful, as we have seen, and the effective settlement dates from 1612, when Best and Aldworth negotiated a convention with the local authorities, and received what they understood to be the Emperor's formal ratification. The discovery of their mistake was followed by further negotiations, which are recounted at length in the journal of Sir Thomas Roe; for a long time he pressed for a definite treaty, but eventually he was satisfied by a concession, which was in essence a convention, but in point of form fell short of his original aim. For our present purpose, the most important article was that which provided that the Englishmen in the settlement should live according to their own religion and laws without interference, thus securing to them an extra-territorial position.
In the same way it could be shown that other settlements established in India by both Companies were based on conventions securing to the merchants certain terms in matters of commerce and also exclusive jurisdiction over men of their own nation, but enough has been said to justify the statement that the position of both Dutch and English in India was essentially similar to that of Asiatic foreigners in places like Malacca or Calicut; the merchants had not submitted to Indian jurisdiction, as modern merchants would necessarily do, but lived and traded in the country on terms which had been settled with the authorities, and which both sides were bound to observe. The point is of practical importance, because it explains the nature of certain transactions which bulk largely in the records of our period, and which are almost unintelligible without a knowledge of the actual conditions. Conventions were infringed on several occasions by the authorities in various Indian States, and when a State breaks a convention the normal result is the risk of an outbreak of hostilities. The few Dutchmen or Englishmen in one or other of the factories could not, of course, enter on a war on land with the Mogul Emperor or the king of Golconda, but they could on occasion make war successfully on the sea, because, as we have seen, the Indian States maintained no naval forces; and thus we find the usual course of trade broken from time to time by events which are described as Reprisals, and which consisted of coercive measures taken against Indian-owned ships. These measures must be regarded as acts of war; the State had infringed a convention, and the sufferers considered themselves justified by the principles of international morality as then understood in exacting redress by force. Like other acts of war, they must be judged mainly by their efficacy, and in this respect the superiority lay definitely with the Dutch.
As an example of reprisals conducted by the English, we may take the events of 1623–24, a clear account of which will be found in the Introductions to the volumes of The English Factories in India for 1622–23 and 1624–29. Omitting unnecessary details, the position was that the English factors at Surat held that they had been oppressed in contravention of the terms of their settlement. They decided, therefore, to seize some Gujarat ships which were returning richly laden from the Red Sea, and to hold them as security until redress should be granted; they carried out this project successfully, and there can be no doubt that their action constituted an act of open hostility against the Mogul Empire. The immediate result was that the Mogul authorities capitulated; a new convention was framed and ratified, granting compensation for past injuries, and favourable terms for the future; the Indian vessels were restored to their owners; and the English force, consisting of four ships in all, dispersed to England, Persia, and Sumatra. This was, however, only the first act of the drama. Almost as soon as the English were left without means of offence through the departure of their ships, the Moguls reopened hostilities, and early in 1624 seized the various factories; negotiations were then renewed, and eventually a fresh convention was ratified, under which the English lost much of what had been gained, but retained permission to trade as well as the right of self-government. The idea of further action was considered by the English and rejected; the convention of 1624 therefore remained in force, and no similar trouble occurred for some years. The English at Surat have been blamed for committing an outrage in seizing the Indian ships, but, regarded as an act of war, their conduct was undoubtedly legitimate; their fault lay in their misjudgment of the position, for it should have been obvious to them that their strength lay only in their ships, and, since the needs of commerce prevented them from keeping the ships in harbour, it was injudicious to enter on hostilities with an enemy who, in the absence of the ships, was infinitely superior in force. This was the view taken at the time by the Italian traveller, della Valle, who was then living at Goa. His information came from Portuguese sources, and consequently presented the details of the English activities in an unfavourable light, but his verdict on the general question was as follows: For my part, I think the English have not managed their business discreetly in this case ; for it is not possible for a few strangers and immigrants to contest with and get the better of a great king in his own country. And upon the rising of the like differences I should account it the best course to settle them with good words, and amicably with the said king, . . . otherwise if redress cannot be obtained, then before a manifest feud, 'twere best to get out of his power and war upon him securely, not in his own country, where there are so many people, and the king undoubtedly hath more power than any other.
The contemporary neutral view was, then, that such reprisals were permissible, but that the English acted foolishly in attempting them in unfavourable circumstances. With the English action on this occasion we may contrast the conduct of the Dutch a few years later, when they were driven by oppression to break with the king of Golconda : they first withdrew their factory from Masulipatam, and then, acting from their base at Pulicat, opened hostilities by a blockade of the enemy's port. This measure proved successful. The authorities entered into negotiations with the commander of the blockading squadron, the governor of Masulipatam was dismissed, and a royal decree invited the Dutch to return and re-establish their trade. The success achieved in this case was clearly due to the existence of a convenient base of action outside Golconda territory. The State had no naval forces, and consequently Masulipatam lay at the mercy of Pulicat, where a few gunboats sufficed to dominate the coast ; the Dutch factors possessed, what the English at Surat lacked, sufficient power to threaten their enemy at a vulnerable point without exposing themselves to greater danger, and thus they were in a position to insist on adherence to the terms of their convention.
The fortress at Pulicat, which proved so serviceable on this occasion, marks the second stage in the gradual progress towards European territorial dominion in India : as the Voyage had led to the Factory, so the Factory led to the Fort, because an unprotected factory offered no guarantee for the safety of its inmates or the maintenance of the terms under which it had been established. The foundation of Pulicat thus possesses peculiar interest for students of commercial history, because it was the first fort in India to be held by the merchants of a European Company, and it led directly to Armagon and to Madras. I know of no connected account of its establishment, but contemporary documents show that it must be described as an accident rather than as the outcome of deliberate policy. As we have seen in Chapter II., the Dutch soon learned that their first Indian factories, which were located in the Kistna delta, would not serve all the markets in which they were interested, and they were thus led to look farther south. In the first instance they applied to a nayak, or chief, for a settlement near Tegnapatam, and the nayak offered to grant them a fort, but they refused the offer, and preferred to settle under his protection; in other words, they were then contented with a factory.1 A year or two later they desired to extend their business to Pulicat, and obtained from the king of Chandragiri terms for a settlement there, which were modelled on those in force at Tegnapatam : at the outset, therefore, Pulicat was merely a factory. Its transformation was due primarily to the hostility of the Portuguese at S. Thomé, itself a settlement of a somewhat anomalous nature.2 In 1612 the Portuguese attacked Pulicat and expelled the Dutch. The King was anxious to fulfil his obligation to protect the sufferers, but he was not in a position to take decisive action against the aggressors, and the outcome was a further convention concluded by him with the Dutch agent. Under this convention a fort was to be built at the cost of the local authorities, and was to be occupied partly by them and partly by the Dutch, but the local authorities neglected to perform their part of the agreement, and left the fort half-built; the Dutch agent completed it at the cost of the Company; friction inevitably arose over the joint occupation; the Indian troops were withdrawn; and by a convention made in the year 1616 the Dutch were left in sole possession of Fort Geldria, as they named it. For some time it was a fort and nothing more, for Methwold, who had lived in it, tells us that the Dutch claimed no sovereignty over the native inhabitants, exacted no duties, and prescribed no laws, contenting themselves with confronting the Portuguese and transacting their mercantile affairs. It is true that, as time went on, they assumed more extensive dominion, but the possession of the fort, which enabled them to do so, was the result of circumstances, not of policy: at the outset they sought from the king of Chandragiri protection against the Portuguese, and they came by stages into possession of a fortress which was to set a new fashion throughout India.
We have seen already the advantages conferred by the possession of Pulicat in the dispute at Masulipatam. In 1626 the Dutch Company desired to secure a similar fortified harbour to command Surat; and about the same time the English were considering a plan for taking Bombay from the Portuguese.1 These designs were abandoned, but the first English fort, built at Armagon on the East Coast, was an imitation of Pulicat, and was intended to overawe the rulers of Golconda as well as to facilitate trade, while Madras, the successor of Armagon, was designed to serve the same purposes. Andrew Cogan, one of its founders, wrote thus:
The Company must give order for the making good a place for the security of their estate2 in India; which how much prejudice the want hath been is very visible, for are we not continually subject, and have not your estates made good all demands from time to time, be it right or wrong? And lastly, are we certain of continual peace with the Portugals and Dutch? No; for the peace we enjoy by them is but for their own ends. All which being duly considered, 'twere very requisite that the making good a place were first put in practice; from which will arise these benefits : you shall be ever secured of the most part of your estate, and if any affront [be] offered be enabled to do yourselves right.
In this way the Dutch and the English Companies obtained possession of the fortresses on the East Coast.1 Ten or fifteen years after the founding of Madras, the English at Surat were anxious to imitate the precedent, and here also two motives were prominent : on the one hand, they desired to be independent of Indian officials, on the other they were anxious for protection against the Dutch, just as the Dutch at Pulicat had been anxious for protection against the Portuguese. In the year 1653 we hear of a project for obtaining possession of Bombay : in 1658 the Company authorised the President at Surat to negotiate for Bombay, Bassein, or some other suitable place; and though no definite result followed within our period, a few years after its close the English were established in Bombay, while the Dutch had secured the fortress of Cochin. From this time forward, the Fort may be regarded as an essential part of the equipment of a European trading venture on the coast of India : the later steps in the acquisition of territorial dominion lie beyond the scope of this book.
In the foregoing paragraphs I have attempted to describe the gradual development of commercial policy, from the Voyage to the Factory, and from the Factory to the Fort. The ideas of European merchants in the sixteenth century did not extend beyond the familiar trading voyage, but the conditions prevailing in Eastern markets required the establishment of factories, and, when the factories were in existence, the political and administrative environment led almost inevitably to fortresses upon the coasts. But whether Dutch and English merchants were living in factories or in forts, they had not submitted, nor had they been required to submit, to Indian jurisdiction : under conventions with the authorities they formed self-governing communities, and they could view the conduct of those authorities from the outside. They were not bound to the subjects of Indian States by ties of common political interests, and their observations of the relations between States and subjects are entitled to the respect us uallyaccorded to the views of independent witnesses. They thus fill an important gap in our knowledge, for the Indian literature of our period is written almost wholly from the official standpoint, and presents only one side of the case, frequently in terms coloured by conventional flattery of the rulers: we are dependent on this literature for accounts of existing institutions as seen through the atmosphere of the Court or the Capital, but we must turn to Dutch and English records to know how those institutions actually worked, and how they were regarded in the towns and villages of the country.
One other preliminary observation seems to be required. In the discussions which follow I estimate the various Indian administrations strictly from the economist's standpoint, and the conclusions I have reached are sufficiently unfavourable to suggest that the India of the seventeenth century must have been an Inferno for the ordinary man. It is perhaps arguable that that view is applicable to Asia as a whole, but among Asiatic States a relatively high position must be assigned to the administration of Jahangir and Shahjahan. It was indeed inferior to that of China, but, on the evidence left by travellers and merchants of many nations, the Mogul Empire may fairly be placed on about the same level as Persia or Japan, and far above the rule of the Turks to the West, Achin to the South, and Arakan, Pegu or Siam to the East. Had my object been to discuss the comparative value of the institutions of different countries, I should have gone into this subject at length; but in a book which deals solely with India this general statement must suffice, and readers who may think that the description of Indian administrations is too unfavourable to represent the truth may be advised to examine for themselves the position in some of the other States which I have named.
2. Indian Administrative Systems
A study of the materials whose nature has been briefly indicated in the preceding section leads us to the conclusion that in the India of our period the working of the administration was, next to the rainfall, the most important factor in the economic life of the country. It acted directly on the distribution of the national income to an extent which is now difficult to realise, for in practice the various governments disposed of somewhere about one half of the entire gross produce of the land, and they disposed of it in such a way that the producers were left with a bare subsistence or very little more, while the energies of the unproductive classes were spent in the struggle to secure the largest possible share. The reaction on production was inevitably unfavourable: producers were deprived of the natural incentive to energy, because they could not hope to retain any material proportion of an increase in their income; men of ability or talent were discouraged from producing, and attracted by the very great prizes to be won in the struggle for distribution; it was better to be a peon than a peasant; and critics who express surprise at the tendency of Indian brains and energy to seek employment in the service of the State will find ample explanation in the history of the centuries during which no other career was possible. We must, therefore, examine the nature and working of the administration in greater detail than would be necessary if we were concerned with the present day, and I shall first attempt to sketch the outline of the systems which prevailed, and then pass to a fuller consideration of their actual working.
The Indian governments with which we are concerned were in all cases despotic, and there are no traces of any popular institutions exercising political authority or even influence. The seat of power was at the capital of the State, and everything that was done was in theory done by order of the Ruler, though it might in fact be the work of a subordinate acting in his master's name. There was no code of written law as the term is now understood, and no public machinery existed for promulgating or harmonising the orders or regulations of the State : apart from religious obligations, the Ruler was untrammelled, and an order given one day might be reversed the next.1 But while there were no legislative or deliberative institutions, there was in every State an organised administrative machine designed to carry the Ruler's orders into effect. The Ministers at Court directed and controlled the activities of a regular hierarchy of localised officials, whose primary duty was to collect the revenue, but who had to carry out whatever orders might be given, and who owed obedience to the Ruler and not to his subjects. The actual government of the country can best be described, therefore, as a union of despotism with bureaucracy, and the emphasis on either element depended at any given time mainly on the personal character of the Ruler. Under Jahangir, for instance, the local officials had in practice very wide powers, because the Emperor was disinclined to enter into details : in Golconda, there were times when the King scarcely counted, and the group of Persian Ministers at his Court were practically uncontrolled ; while conditions in the Hindu territories appear to have varied with the individuality of the nāyaks or local chiefs, some of whom might be obedient to their king, at a time when others were practically independent. Wherever orders might originate, the duty of the subjects was obedience to the officials with whom they came directly in contact ; a particular order might come from king, or minister, or subordinate, but its source was a matter of little moment to merchants, peasants or artisans, who had to reckon with the men on the spot. There are cases on record in which individuals or communities appealed successfully against oppression by local officers, but there are, perhaps, an equal number where an official whose acts had been questioned returned to his duties exonerated through bribery or influence, and the facts appear to justify the inference that oppression was always possible, and that the prospects of an appeal were dubious.2 Thus the welfare of the people depended partly on the character of the local officials, partly on the efficiency of the system of control, and partly on the ideals of the Ruler.
In the matter of control two distinct systems prevailed. In some cases public office was farmed, that is to say, an official agreed to pay a fixed sum for his post, and retained whatever surplus revenue he could collect; this system, which in Indian official terminology is described as holding office pakka, or pukhta, appears to have been practically universal throughout our period in the south of India,1 and it was making headway, I think rapidly, in the Mogul Empire, in which Akbar had aimed at establishing the alternative system of "direct" administration. In direct administration, which Indians describe as holding office kachcha, or khām, the official receives a fixed salary, and accounts to his superior for all the revenue which he collects. In the India of our period it took two different forms, according to the method in which the salary was paid. Akbar's ideal was the modern practice of paying salaries in cash from the treasury, but the older Indian method of paying by jāgīr was generally adopted by his successors. A jāgīr was the assignment, by way of salary and allowances, of the revenue yielded by a tract of land, which the assignee took under management almost as if it had been his own estate, and from which he attempted to collect at least the amount stipulated, and in some cases was able to realise a substantial additional sum. Assignments of revenue were also granted for other purposes, which may be described rather loosely as charitable; a tract of land might be held in this way by the custodians of a mosque or temple, or by a family or individual to whom it had been granted for maintenance or as a reward for past services, and in some of the Mogul provinces the aggregate of these charitable assignments was relatively large. Lastly, the administration of large areas was left in the hands of chiefs or persons of local influence known as zamīndārs, who in practice exercised very considerable power so long as they paid the stipulated revenue. The actual status of a zamīndār approximated to that of a farmer, but the normal duration of the tenure was greater, and the position was, I think usually, hereditary, though it could, of course, be terminated in a moment by the decision of the Ruler. An Indian peasant might thus find himself under a master of one of five different classes, a farmer of the revenue, a salaried official, a jāgīrdār in temporary possession, a private person or corporation with a longer and possibly a permanent tenure, or, finally, a zamīndār; and the powers of his master were so great, and the chances of superior interference so small, that his welfare depended principally on the master under whom he happened to come.
Administrative progress has rendered the farming system so nearly obsolete that it may be well to say a little regarding its nature. The system was not, of course, peculiar to India, but at one time might almost have been described as general, and it may be recalled that the English Company had regular transactions with the farmers of the customs in London, while its factors were dealing with the farmers of the customs at Surat or Masulipatam. Its existence may be taken as connoting two things, obstacles in the way of detailed control, and emphasis on the financial as opposed to the ameliorative side of administration. The obstacles to control were mainly the result of imperfect means of communication, and no small part of the history of the art of administration is made up of the gradual development of methods of supervision which depend on the modern posts, telegraphs, and means of locomotion. So long as a subordinate remained isolated at a distance, little detailed supervision was possible, and in practice there was something to be said for a system which did not attempt impossibilities, but concentrated on what was regarded as the essential point, the punctual payment of a fixed revenue. At the same time allowance must be made for the fact that the ameliorative side of administration is itself largely modern; a foreign observer may be pardoned for questioning the appropriateness of the designation of an Indian Collector at the present day, but during our period there was no question that a collector's first duty was to keep the treasury supplied with funds, and it is easy to realise that in some circumstances the most effective way of securing this was to bind him to pay a fixed sum whatever happened, and leave him a large measure of freedom so long as the essential stipulation was fulfilled.
The farming system could not in any ordinary case commend itself to a modern administrator, but its actual effects might vary within wide limits. The first English officials in India gained much practical experience of it while bringing into order the financial system inherited by them, and their conclusions may be summarised in a sentence which now reads like a commonplace. The evils of farming will, it may be said, be minimised if the farmer is carefully chosen, if his payments are fixed at a moderate figure, and if his tenure is sufficiently long to enable him to pursue a constructive policy; on the other hand, the oppression of the people will be greatest when the farm is given for a short period on purely financial considerations, for then the farmer will have no interest other than the immediate exaction of the largest possible sum. The practice of annual auctions of the farms of the revenue, which prevailed, as we shall see, in the kingdom of Golconda, may be described as on the whole the most oppressive method of administration which has hitherto been devised; we are not entitled to infer that peasants in other parts of the country were exposed to the same degree of oppression, but we are bound to recognise that oppression was a real danger wherever the farming system prevailed.
The peasant holding land in an assigned tract might be either fortunate or unfortunate according to the nature of the assignment. When the grant was intended to be durable, and the grantee could pursue a constructive policy, the peasants might be comparatively well off, as appears to have been the case in Farid Khan's jāgīr near Benares in the sixteenth century, or under Shaista Khan in Bengal at the close of our period; but when assignments were changed frequently, as in the reign of Jahangir, the temporary possessor thought only of extracting as much as the peasants could pay, or in the words of Hawkins, "he racketh the poor to get from them what he can, who still thinketh every hour to be put out of his place."1 The peasant whose land was included neither in a farm nor in an assignment was in theory fortunate, since his master had less direct incentive to oppress him, but in practice the lack of effective supervision made oppression possible; and though our information on the subject is necessarily defective, it appears to be probable that those peasants were best off who held land from a zamīndār of an old-established family. It must not be inferred that the life of such peasants was idyllic, but such evidence as that of Bernier, which will be quoted in a later section, indicates that the average of oppression was lower under zamīndārs than under either officials or assignees.
While the peasant was concerned primarily with the collector of the land revenue, the interests of merchants and artisans centred in the arrangements for realising an indefinite number of taxes on production and transport. The farming system appears to have been adopted generally for the customs revenue, for we find it in existence in Sind and Gujarat as well as on the East Coast, and, as we shall see, the position of the farmers was such as to render oppression almost inevitable. The situation in regard to duties on production and inland transit cannot be summed up in a phrase; the subject will be examined in the next chapter, and for the present it must suffice to say that while such duties were nearly universal, their assessment was left in the hands of local officers, who thus exercised an important influence on the prosperity of merchants and artisans.
The foregoing summary will show that production was dominated by the administration to an extent which has no parallel in British India at the present day. The sections which follow will be devoted to a more detailed examination of the subject, and we may begin with the practical working of the farming system, which prevailed throughout the southern regions.
3. The Farming System in the South
The fullest account of the system of administration which prevailed during our period in Golconda is contained in “A Description of the Domains of the King Kotebipa lying on the Coromandel Coast,” which appears as an insertion in the later editions of the narrative of Pieter van den Broecke’s Voyages.1 The arrangement of the text suggests that the description is by a different author, and this is made certain by internal evidence, for the writer had spent six years on the coast, while van den Broecke was there for a few weeks only; presumably the editor thought a fuller account of Coromandel was desirable to complete van den Broecke’s story, and inserted the description with this object. The author’s name is not given, but the date of composition is fixed by a reference to the war “during the last two years” between Ahmadnagar and the Portuguese at Chaul; the only war to which this can refer is the fighting which took place in that region between 1612 and 1614, and we are justified in accepting the description as the work of a Dutch factor who was stationed at Petapoli (Nizampatam) from about 1608 to 1614, and whose duties, as his narrative shows, required him to travel through the villages; we have, therefore, the experience of one who was in a position to appreciate the every-day working of the administration.
According to this description, the chief authority at the Court of Golconda was at this time in the hands of Persians, "the proudest nation in India," who would not usually take a local appointment, but were employed as farmers-in-chief or as inspectors over the subordinate officers. The kingdom was divided into districts under "Governors,"1 whose chief duty was to collect the revenue, and these posts were farmed by the year to the highest bidders. Most of the local governors were brahmans or banians, "the craftiest and most knavish people in all India," who gave lavish presents to their superiors at Court, so that the complaints of the poor could never reach the king. The amount of revenue collected from the peasants was so great as to surprise the narrator; often, he says, "when I was travelling in the kingdom I wondered whence such large sums could be obtained, for the people are very poor and live miserably"; and in other places he writes of the severity of the governors, the difficulty they experienced in fulfilling their contracts, and the resulting impoverishment of the country. We may take the district of Petapoli as an example of the financial arrangements in force. The farm was for 55,000 pagodas, but it had been sublet to the actual governor for 1000 p. more; out of this, 8000 p. were allowed to the governor for salaries of subordinates, while a cess levied by him brought 5000 p. for the same purpose. Most of the salaries, though calculated in cash, were paid in grain and salt of inferior quality, valued at least one-third above their cost, and in this way a profit was made. The narrative does not say how the revenue was assessed, and other accounts are also silent on this point, so we are left to infer the probable standard of payments from the necessities of the governors, who were kept under strict discipline. The stipulated annual sum had to be paid in three instalments within the year, and default was visited with severe floggings; the narrator says he had personal knowledge of some cases in which defaulting governors had been permanently injured by the punishments inflicted on them. Flogging could, however, be avoided by borrowing from the Persian officials at Court, who made a business of usury, and “ were not ashamed ” to charge a governor five per cent monthly if he was known to be in difficulties, thus “ draining him to the dregs.”
This description is confirmed in substance by the concise report which another Dutch merchant, Antony Schorer, sent home from Masulipatam in 1615, and it agrees in all important points with the slightly later account written by William Methwold on his return to England after several years’ service on the East Coast. In Methwold’s view, the king of Golconda’s subjects were
all his tenants, and at a rack rent. . . . The government is farmed immediately from the King by some eminent man, who to other inferiors farmeth out the lesser ones, and they again to the country-people, at such excessive rates that it is most lamentable to consider what toil and misery the wretched souls endure. For if they fall short of any part of their rent, what their estates cannot satisfy, their bodies must, so it sometimes happens they are beaten to death, or, absenting themselves, their wives, children, fathers, brothers, and all their kindred are engaged in the debt, and must satisfy or suffer. And sometimes it so happens that the Principal, failing with the King, receives from him the like punishment, as it befell to one Basbell Raw (Governor at Masulipatam since the English traded thither), who, for defect of full payment, was beaten with canes upon the back, feet, and belly, until he died. Yet hold they not these their governments by lease, for yearly in July all are exposed in sale unto him that bids most; from whence it happeneth that every Governor, during his time, exacts by tolls taken in the way and other oppressions whatsoever they can possibly extort from the poorer inhabitants, using what violence within their governments they shall think fit; for in them, during their time, they reign as petty kings.
This system of administration appears, as I have said in the last section, to be perhaps the most oppressive which has yet been devised. The annual term, the auction of posts, and the severity shown to defaulters combined with the extortion and usury at headquarters to make up a method of stripping producers practically bare, and we need not wonder at the statement of the Dutch narrator that no rich man dare let the fact of his wealth be known, or openly raise his standard of living, since the governor would at once find some pretext for his ruin. The general accuracy of the narratives is confirmed by various incidental remarks of other observers. As regards the position at Court, we read in one place that the "chancellor" of the kingdom and other great men were working against an English petition in order to secure bribes, "which in these parts will open any passage. . . . Such is the miserable condition of this country, whence justice and truth are fled long since, the poor exceedingly suffering the riches' tyranny without redress." Somewhat later we are told that the King was kept in the dark by the officers at Court, and believed that claims had been satisfied which were in fact being actively pressed; while a Dutch record describes how, when complaints regarding a local official actually reached the King, the offender secured an acquittal by gifts and influence, and returned to his post threatening vengeance on the complainants. We find also confirmation of the statement that the local officials exercised great severity in their administration. In 1632 the governor of Petapoli with his own hand cut a village headman in two pieces for not sowing his land, and by this and other outrages drove the country into rebellion; and a little later the scanty supply of merchandise in Masulipatam was attributed to the governor's intolerable exactions. The truth appears to be that in Golconda a governor could not afford to think of anything except extracting the entire surplus income of the country, and ordinarily he would farm any possible source of revenue to the highest bidder. Thus the English factors at Masulipatam explained the sudden institution of a monopoly of dealings in gold and silver by saying that " this government is farmed at a rack rent, and he best welcome to the principal undertaker [farmer, or contractor] that can devise a new course of raising new revenues." This is the obvious explanation of the incident noted in a former section, when the Dutch were made the subject of a farm, and admission to their place of business was prohibited to any one except the licensees of the syndicate which had paid for the privilege; the Dutch were making a profit, and in Golconda profits were made primarily for the benefit of the authorities. It is noteworthy that individual towns and villages were frequently taken in farm by Dutchmen and Englishmen, sometimes for their Company and sometimes for their private benefit, a fact which confirms Methwold's statement that the farming system permeated the whole country: the governor had undertaken to pay a rack rent, and the obligation was passed on to the multitude of subordinate farmers throughout his jurisdiction. A final instance of the severity of the system may be drawn from some correspondence regarding the farm of Masulipatam itself. In the year 1626 the authorities in Holland were so exasperated by the continual difficulties at this seaport that they were tempted to take the contract for its government, but the proposal was set aside by the Governor General at Batavia on the definite ground that the Dutch merchants could not hope to extort by tyranny the amount required by the Golconda administration; and the decision is significant to students familiar with the administrative efficiency of the Dutch in Eastern countries.
The incidents which I have quoted are spread over the greater part of our period, and indicate that the administrative system in force at its opening remained substantially unchanged so far as the kingdom of Golconda was concerned. The commercial records give very little information regarding the system in the neighbouring kingdom of Bijapur, but where we get a glimpse of it we see similar processes at work. The local governors would not pay any attention to an order from the King until their immediate masters had instructed them to comply with it; and a Dutch report tells how a “high governor” came to Vengurla under a contract to pay a lakh of pagodas in three years, and how, after a short period of active extortion, he was suddenly ejected in favour of a competitor who had offered an increase of 25 per cent. Such incidents do not, at the least, enable us to infer that the people were substantially better off in the west of the Deccan than in the east; and we have the authority of Professor Jadu Nath Sarkar for the statement that the Hindu subjects of Bijapur were depressed as a deliberate policy in the time of Muhammad Adil Shah.
As to the Hindu territories in the south, we know from a large number of references in the Dutch records that farming was the regular practice from Pulicat at least as far as Negapatam. The farms were, sometimes at least, of short duration, for we read that the nayak of Tanjore put in new governors almost every month (doubtless an exaggeration); and the post commonly went to the highest bidder in Tanjore, and also in Pulicat. From time to time we hear of severity and extortion. The trade of Kayal had been ruined by official oppression; the districts round Pulicat were described as held by mean and cunning extortioners, so that people found little security; in the same locality the governor’s demands for money had driven many artisans to abscond; and in Tanjore exceptional taxation and extortion sent some hundreds of weavers fleeing to other places in the hope of securing better treatment. On such data as these, it is not easy to distinguish the Hindu system from the Moslem, but the weakness of the central authority resulted in additional risks for the people. Thus we read of towns having two or more governors at once, each appointed by one of the contending parties, and from time to time villages held in farm by the Dutch were attacked and pillaged by the forces of a nayak, who presumably had some sort of claim to their possession. No redress could be expected in such cases. On one occasion when a village had been burnt, the crops carried off, and the inhabitants driven away, the Dutch complained to the king of Chandragiri, but the result was merely a polite letter in which the King said in effect that he could not allow his merchants to suffer such injuries, and that he had told the nayak not to do it again. I have no doubt that individuals differed : some nayaks, and some governors, were probably worse than others ; but throughout the whole region the system in force appears to have been such as to render extortion and oppression practically inevitable. The Courts insisted that money should be provided ; the local authorities had somehow to find it ; and the merchants and producers had to pay. Such a system, once introduced, tends to intensify itself, for no remunerative measure will be dropped, and new expedients will be invented from time to time ; its logical result is the reduction of the people to the bare minimum of subsistence, with the possible alternative of a revolutionary change, and, short of the appearance of a strong and beneficent despot, there is no prospect of peaceful amelioration.
As has been said above, our authorities do not indicate the proportion of the gross produce which was claimed by the State, and their silence is probably significant. The governor, who had to pay a rack rent for his district, was bound to claim a rack rent from the farmers of individual villages, while governor and farmer alike hoped to make a profit out of the transaction, and risked their persons in the event of failure to fulfil their undertaking. In these circumstances it does not seem possible that any traditional standards of revenue should have remained effective in practice ; the need and the greed of the farmer were the dominant factors, and the only limit to collections was the risk of checking cultivation or driving the peasants to rebellion or flight. The short term of the farms rendered a constructive policy impossible, and I think it is justifiable to conclude that for the south of India, taken as a whole, the first half of the seventeenth century was a period when the masses of the people were forced by the administrative system to live on the border-line of starvation or rebellion.
4. Administrative Changes in the Mogul Empire
When we turn to the north of India, we are met at the outset by a measure of uncertainty as to the practical working of the Mogul administration at the opening of the seventeenth century. Akbar had instituted in a large part of his Empire a revenue system which, though undoubtedly severe by modern standards, was in theory substantially just; it required, however, close supervision, and there are indications that, even in the lifetime of its founder, practice lagged some way behind theory. At the same time we must not underrate Akbar's efficiency as an administrator: the traditional estimate of his great capacity is borne out substantially by independent evidence, and it appears to me to be impossible to accept the view that his regulations existed only on paper. The more reasonable inference is that they were put into practice largely, but not completely; that while many old abuses were checked, some may have survived; and that unscrupulous subordinates may have been finding new methods of oppression to replace the old. On this view the official record of his institutions, known as the Ain-i-Akbari, is to be regarded neither as an infallible guide to practice nor as a work of merely theoretical interest, but rather as an authoritative indication of the standard of administration which Akbar endeavoured to secure; we cannot infer that the revenue was everywhere assessed and collected in precise accordance with his regulations, but we can safely compare them with those which were issued by subsequent rulers. Such a comparison will disclose changes in the standard, while incidental observations may assist us to estimate within wide limits the extent of the gulf between standard and practice at different stages in history. It is beyond dispute that Akbar was far superior as an administrator to Jahangir or Shahjahan in their later years, or to Aurangzeb in the greater part of his reign;1 we should be justified therefore in inferring that the same standard would have been worked more oppressively in 1660 than in 1600, and when we find that a new standard had come into existence in the interval, itself much more oppressive than the old, the conclusion becomes irresistible that for the masses of the people our period was one of growing impoverishment.
Akbar's administrative system was not entirely uniform throughout his dominions.1 The framework was given by the division of the Empire into provinces (suba), of the provinces into districts (sarkār), and of the districts into subdivisions (mahal), which last usually, but not invariably, coincided with the traditional local areas known as pargana. The methods of assessment were adapted to local conditions and might vary within the province, or even within the district. The outlying provinces, Bengal,2 Berar, Khandesh, and Sind, were left under the systems prevailing at the time of their conquest; in Sind the crops were actually divided by the traditional method, while in the other three provinces some easier and more summary alternatives were in vogue, the precise nature of which is not on record. In the northern plains from Multan to Bihar, as well as in large parts of Rajputana, Malwa, and Gujarat, the revenue was assessed on the special system identified with the names of Akbar and Todar Mal, and known technically as Zabt, but in nearly every province we find areas where a different system is known, or may be suspected, to have prevailed. In most of these areas the determining factor was the presence of tribal chiefs or other men of local influence, who were described collectively as landholders (zamīndār), and were allowed to engage for the revenue in a lump sum, in some instances at lower rates than would have resulted from assessment on the regulation system. The essence of this system was the determination of fixed cash rates, payable, in place of a fluctuating share of the produce, on each unit of area sown with each crop ; the peasant thus knew beforehand the precise amount of his liability to the State, and could adapt his course of cropping to all the circumstances, including the differential revenue rates. These rates once fixed, the procedure required for assessment was limited to the measurement and record of the areas cultivated in each season ; given the rates and the areas, a simple calculation sufficed to show the revenue to be demanded from each peasant. The rates were the average value of one-third of the average gross yield as determined once for all by local investigation ; the pitch of the revenue demand was thus much higher than is considered wise at the present day, but in other respects the theory of the zabt may be regarded as sound. The practical difficulties in its working arose mainly from the quality of the staff available. The seasonal record of crops field by field was a laborious and expensive affair ; most of the cost appears to have fallen on the peasants, in addition to the revenue due from them, but the real objection was the scope for extortion by the measuring staff, while in addition to this there was no security in practice against the levy of additional payments by officials of intermediate rank.
A study of Akbar's orders on the subject indicates that he attached great importance to two general principles : whatever the system of assessment might be, he desired that the officials should be paid cash salaries instead of receiving assignments of land, and he insisted that, wherever possible, they should deal directly with the individual peasant cultivators. Our knowledge of the activities of his successors is incomplete on many points, but it is possible to show that these two principles disappeared in the course of the next half century ; assignments multiplied, the farming system spread, and the growth of what may be called summary settlements of the revenue gave increased scope for tyranny within the village. These three changes all point to deterioration in the position of the ordinary peasant ; in addition we have evidence of increasing pressure to extend the area under crops beyond the economic possibilities of the time ; and lastly, we have the standard of assessment raised from one-third of the gross produce to one-half. The cumulative effect of these measures cannot be stated in precise figures, but the facts appear to justify the conclusion that the small margin left by Akbar was swept into the Imperial treasury or the pockets of officials, and that a very large proportion of the peasants were brought dangerously near to the bare level of subsistence. The evidence of these changes must now be set out.
In regard to assignments, it must be remembered that this method of remunerating officials was of old standing : Akbar endeavoured to abolish it, but there are indications that he was not entirely successful, and, when his personal influence was removed, the system quickly regained its previous vogue. The frequent references to assignments in Jahangir's Memoirs show that they were normal incidents of his administration, and the same inference can be drawn from the experience of William Hawkins at his Court. If the practice of payments in cash had been at all common, it would almost certainly have been followed in the case of a foreign visitor, but as a matter of fact Hawkins found that, as soon as he had been appointed to an official position under the Emperor, he had to join in the scramble for assignments which he describes so vividly. His narrative shows further that at this time changes of assignment were frequent ; a man could not " continue half a year in his living, but it is taken from him, and given unto another " ; and consequently it was the assignee's interest to extract the utmost possible sum from each successive grant. Terry also noted the frequency of transfers, saying that officials were usually removed annually, and, while Hawkins' language is probably exaggerated, there is no reason to doubt the substantial truth of his account.
The practice of granting assignments was continued by Shahjahan, as can be seen from Peter Mundy's account of his journey through the Gangetic plain, in the course of which he notes the numerous assignments through which he travelled. According to him, transfers were at this time less frequent, being made at intervals of three or four years, but about the same period van Twist noted their frequency in Gujarat, and some incidental remarks in the commercial correspondence suggest that, with the weakening of the Emperor's will, this source of danger to the peasants increased. It is clear that under Shahjahan a very large proportion of the revenue was assigned. In the careful account of the Empire about 1650 given in Abdul Hamid's Badshahnama, the total revenue is shown as 880 karors of dams, while the khālisa, or portion available for the Imperial treasury, was 120 karors; on this basis, nearly seven-eighths of the revenue at this period was received by assignees or other intermediaries, and a still larger proportion appears in statistics of the reign of Aurangzeb. The ordinary peasant was therefore subject to an assignee rather than an official collector.
I have not traced any instance of a farm of the land revenue being granted during Akbar's later years, and, while the absence of evidence is not by itself conclusive, it is rendered significant by the fact that the system is utterly opposed to the Emperor's ideal of direct relations with individual peasants. The earliest indication I have found that farms were given in the Mogul Empire is in van Ravesteyn's account of Gujarat in the year 1615, in which the farms of various "governments" (or districts) are formally set out. Writing about the same time, Roe referred to "the new Farmer, rather than Governor, of Surat"; and his record of an interview with the Viceroy of Patna seems to show that by 1616 the provinces were ordinarily administered on this system. In this interview he was told that " the government of every province did yearly pay a rent, as for his government of Patan only he gave the King 11 lakhs of rupees : all other profits were his, wherein he had regal authority to take what he list." Whether the practice continued to be general is a point on which I have found no direct evidence, but in Gujarat, the only part of the Empire regarding which we have detailed knowledge, it certainly persisted under Shahjahan. The Batavia Journals show that both Cambay and Surat were held in farm in the year 1636, and the farmer of the latter place was reported to be five lakhs to the bad, which he was expected to recover " in one way or another "; the peasants were complaining of his intolerable extortions and the area under tillage was falling off. Two years later the English at Surat reported that the local governor " is just now outed of his government by Mezer Mulcke [Muizz-ul-mulk, alias Mīr Mūsa], whom he also wrought out and succeeded by farming Surat at a greater rent "; and a subsequent letter makes it clear that the farm applied to " this adjacent country, mint, and custom house," in the affairs of which none of the King's ministers intermeddled. Mir Musa, however, was unable to fulfil his contract, and vacated it in debt for 31 lakhs, " which he yet owes the King, and is therefore called to Court to clear accounts, which it is known he cannot do. And therefore this his failing induced the King to think on some more provident course," and so he appointed certain officers to the government, " and a certain exhibition [stipend] allowed all of them yearly from the King, unto whose account whatever this country, mint, and custom house produceth is brought." The factors added that, though the change to direct management involved some delay and increase in work, they and all other merchants rejoiced exceedingly. The Dutch factors made a similar report to Batavia, and the fact that both Dutch and English explained the system of direct administration in detail shows that in their experience it was a novelty. There is no reason to think that during this period the farming system was peculiar to Gujarat: the government of Lahari Bandar in Sind was certainly farmed in the year 1640; and, if similar evidence is not on record regarding other provinces, the imperfection of the sources makes it impossible to draw any inference. We hear of farming from the provinces where we happen to possess a certain amount of information, but we have practically no detailed knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the remainder of the Empire. It is noteworthy also that, at the end of Jahangir’s reign, assignees frequently farmed their land, handing it over “ to farmers or karoris, who have to take the risk of good or bad harvests.”
So far we have seen that the changes in the terms of appointment of officers were such as to curtail the power of the central authority, and place a very large proportion of the peasants at the mercy of men whose main object was to realise as much money as possible. Coincidently with these changes, there was an administrative revolution in the method of assessing the revenue, which made it easier for assignees and farmers to raise the level of their demands. I have not found a record of this revolution in the chronicles of the period, but its occurrence is established by a comparison of Akbar’s regulations with orders issued in the early years of Aurangzeb. Akbar, as we have seen, required the revenue to be assessed on individual holdings at rates previously sanctioned by himself, and he explicitly forbade the practice of making summary settlements, under which the village headmen contracted to pay a lump sum for the village as a whole, a practice which he condemned as conferring undue authority on high-handed oppressors.1 Orders which were issued by Aurangzeb to take effect from the eighth year of his reign (a.d. 1665–66) show that by this time the normal procedure was that which Akbar had prohibited : the assessors proposed each year a lump sum based on general considerations, and applied Akbar’s methods in detail only when a village or a larger area refused to accept their proposals. It has been explained above that the main objection to Akbar’s methods was the risk of extortion, and knowledge of ordinary human nature is sufficient to show that, when those methods were used as a threat, the risk became a practical certainty, so that we are justified in concluding that annual summary assessments had become the working rule, and that the less influential peasants were thus exposed to the risk, apprehended by Akbar, of having to pay more than their fair share of the demand on the village. The village as a whole had become more directly subject to the assessors, and the individual peasants to the stronger men among them.
Meanwhile it appears that the pressure on the assessors had also increased. Their immediate masters, whether farmers or assignees, were in a position to demand more for themselves, while at the same time the needs of the State were increasing, and it was the assessors' business to see that both claims were satisfied. There is no doubt that Shahjahan's tastes and methods resulted in a large rise in public expenditure, and it is sufficient to quote on this point the eulogy passed on him by the chronicler, that " the expenditure of former reigns, in comparison with the one in question, was not even in the proportion of one in four ; 1 and yet this King, in a short space of time, amassed a treasure which it would have taken several years for his predecessors to accumulate." If then expenditure rose largely, while surplus receipts were accumulated, we should expect to find either that fresh taxation was imposed or that the yield of existing sources was increased. We do not hear of new taxes, and, as will be explained farther on, the miscellaneous duties were devoted to provincial or local expenditure, so that it was mainly the land revenue which had to meet these increased demands.
The first obvious method of increasing the land revenue was to extend the area under cultivation. That this development was actively pressed forward is indicated by the eulogy just quoted, which refers to the favourable consideration given to those officials who were successful in extending cultivation ; but the nature of the pressure exercised by them is more fully explained by the orders issued by Aurangzeb in the year 1668, which described the existing practice of revenue officers in the following terms:
At the beginning of the year inform yourself as far as possible about the condition of every peasant, and whether they are engaged in cultivation or are abstaining from it. If they have the means to cultivate, ply them with inducements and assurances of kindness, and show them any favour they may desire. But if it be found that, in spite of having means to cultivate, and of a favourable season, they are abstaining from cultivation, then you should urge and threaten them, and make use of force and the whip.
In other words, the standard of cultivation was to be determined not by the peasant, but by the assessor, whose momentary interest was that it should be as large as possible, and who was authorised to enforce his views if necessary by flogging. If this regulation be compared with the directions on the same subject given by Akbar, the change in emphasis will be apparent; Akbar laid stress on friendly arrangements, Aurangzeb laid stress on the whip.
Apart from this insistence on the largest possible area of cultivation, the required increase in revenue was obtained by raising the standard of the State's demand from one-third of the gross produce to one-half, an enhancement of 50 per cent. Apparently the rise was not immediately universal, for Aurangzeb's orders of 1668, in which the new standard is recognised as already well established, indicate that the lower rate might still be accepted in some localities, or from peasants of particular classes, but their general tenor justifies the statement that a collector or assignee would demand one-half of the produce in all ordinary cases. I have not found a notice of the introduction of this standard in any of the chronicles, but I suspect that the change was made early in the reign of Shahjahan,1 since van Twist, writing before 1638, records that half the produce, or more, was claimed by the authorities in Gujarat; and probably the measure is covered by the phrase “generous attention towards the improvement of agriculture and the collection of the revenue,” on which the chronicler already quoted lays such stress. The general standard of 50 per cent was perfectly familiar to Manucci and other writers in the reign of Aurangzeb, and it reappears in regulations of the next century, so that it cannot be regarded as a temporary measure; and since it was defined in terms of produce, it must be thought of as independent of alterations in the level of prices.
We may then state the change in the ordinary peasant’s position in the following terms:
- (1) His liability to the State had risen from one-third to one-half of his gross produce.
- (2) He might be required to pay at this rate for more land than he could cultivate effectively, so that he would actually pay more than half his produce.
- (3) He might have to contribute to the revenue of the more influential men, who distributed the burden on the village among the individual peasants.
- (4) The probability of additional levies was substantially increased by the administrative changes which have been indicated.
In order to realise the deterioration in the position of the ordinary peasant, it is necessary to bear in mind that the revenue, though it was assessed on the gross produce, had in fact to be paid out of the net income, that is to say, out of the produce which remained after defraying the expenses of cultivation and the cost of maintaining the peasant and his family. In a previous work1 I suggested that something like half the gross produce must have been required to maintain the “representative” peasant as an efficient cultivating unit with a small margin to meet losses in unfavourable seasons; on this view the effect of enhancing the revenue to one-half the produce was to bring the peasant dangerously near to the level of subsistence in ordinary times, and to leave him practically nothing to make his life worth living, while even moderate losses might be ruinous. Under Akbar's regulations, the distribution of the gross produce of the soil was nearly one-half for necessary expenses, one-third for the State, and a margin of one-sixth or a little more for the peasants' comforts and luxuries, or for unfavourable seasons: under Shahjahan, nearly one-half was for necessaries, one-half, or more, for the State and intermediate claimants, and practically nothing was left at the disposal of the peasant. Judging by modern experience, Akbar allowed the peasant just about the minimum required to keep agriculture going, but Shahjahan did not; and, arguing merely from the official regulations, we should expect to find that the industry was becoming unpopular, and that men who found the life not to be worth living were deserting it for other forms of employment.
There is direct evidence that this change had in fact set in before the end of our period. Many of the detailed provisions contained in Aurangzeb's orders indicate that peasants were absconding to an extent which seriously embarrassed the administration, but the fact is brought out most clearly in Bernier's Letter to Colbert, which was based on his experiences about the year 1656. In this letter, after commenting on the severity of the Mogul officials, he goes on :
Thus it happens that many of the peasantry, driven to despair by so execrable a tyranny, abandon the country, and seek a more tolerable mode of existence, either in the towns, or camps; as bearers of burdens, carriers of water, or servants to horsemen. Sometimes they fly to the territories of a Raja, because there they find less oppression, and are allowed a greater degree of comfort.
Farther on he writes of the tyranny
that drives the cultivator of the soil from his wretched home to some neighbouring State, in hopes of finding milder treatment, or to the army, where he becomes the servant of some trooper. As the ground is seldom tilled otherwise than by compulsion, and as no person is found willing and able to repair the ditches and canals for the conveyance of water, it happens that the whole country is badly cultivated, and a great part rendered unproductive from the want of irrigation. The houses, too, are left in a dilapidated condition, there being few people who will either build new ones, or repair those that are tumbling down. The peasant cannot avoid asking himself the question, “ Why should I toil for the tyrant who may come to-morrow and lay his rapacious hands upon all I possess and value, without leaving me, if such should be his humour, the means to drag on my miserable existence ? ” The Timariots,1 governors, and revenue contractors on their part reason in this manner : “ Why should the neglected state of this land create uneasiness in our minds ? And why should we expend our money and time to render it fruitful ? We may be deprived of it in a single moment, and our exertions would benefit neither ourselves nor our children. Let us draw from the soil all the money we can, though the peasant should starve or abscond, and we should leave it, when commanded to quit, a dreary wilderness.”
These somewhat lengthy quotations are justified by their importance, for they state as observed facts the inferences which have been drawn from official regulations and other indirect evidence. The concentration of the authorities on immediate gain, their severity to the peasants, the compulsory cultivation, the neglect of agriculture, the desertion of the land for other employments, the gradual impoverishment of the country, all these features were sufficiently obvious to attract the attention of a foreign observer. It has occasionally been suggested that Bernier was inclined to exaggerate, but each fact alleged by him, though not the magnitude of each fact, follows almost necessarily from the changes known to have been introduced in the administration ; and the concurrence of the two lines of evidence justifies the conclusion that by the end of Shahjahan’s reign the economic system of the Mogul Empire had been strained almost to breaking-point, because the burdens on the principal industry were becoming unbearable, and that production was ceasing to be worth while, because the life of the producer was ceasing to be worth living.
The foregoing observations relate to the area of the Mogul Empire as it stood at the beginning of our period, and they require to be supplemented by a brief account of the changes in the southern territory acquired by Shahjahan. In the course of the struggle to maintain the independence of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, Malik Ambar introduced a revenue system obviously modelled on that of Akbar, but it did not survive the downfall of the kingdom. This region suffered terribly from the famine of 1630, and for twenty years or so it remained in a deplorable condition, with a falling revenue demand, which was still far in excess of the collections. When Prince Aurangzeb became Viceroy of the Deccan in 1653, he found that the area which had formerly belonged to Ahmadnagar could not pay even for the local administration. The Emperor sent repeated orders to extend cultivation so as to increase the revenue, and the administration was reorganised under Aurangzeb's revenue officer, Murshid Kuli Khan, who re-introduced the methods of assessment approved by Akbar. The results lie outside our period, but the fact is significant that the two outstanding administrators in this region should have taken Akbar's regulations as their model. The same inspiration is apparent in the system applied by Sivaji to the dominion which he secured, and it is noteworthy that at first he followed Akbar in claiming only one-third of the gross produce, though the proportion was subsequently raised to two-fifths.
It is important, however, to distinguish Sivaji's dominions (or swarāj) from the area which he drained of its resources but did not administer. He treated his own subjects comparatively well, but he was able to do so only because he was in a position to draw a large income from the subjects of neighbouring rulers. The exactions of chauth and sardeshmukhi in Mogul territory lie outside our period,1 and it must suffice to say that they came as the proverbial last straw on peasants who were already assessed to the uttermost. There can be no doubt that the system inaugurated by Sivaji contributed materially to hasten the economic collapse of the Mogul Empire, but the evidence which has been adduced shows that the evil was already at work when the Marathas first appeared upon the scene, and to my mind there is no doubt that the national bankruptcy which ensued must be attributed primarily to the enhancement of the land revenue, coupled with the administrative methods by which it was assessed and collected.
Before we leave the subject of land administration under the Moguls, a few words may be said on the rise of the modern rental system. Akbar's regulations disclose no trace of rent in the sense of a sum payable merely for the right to occupy land; his revenue was charged not on occupation, but on cultivation, no payment was claimed on land which lay fallow, and his system was in essence the traditional one of taking a share of the produce of whatever land was cultivated. This system was still predominant in the time of Aurangzeb, but by its side an alternative had come into existence, under which a peasant could compound for his revenue by annual cash payments agreed on with the authorities for the land in his occupation, altogether independent of the income which he might actually draw from it. This system was known as kharāj-i-muwazzaf, and the detailed provisions regarding it which are contained in Aurangzeb's orders show that it had already become practically important. I have traced no account of its origin, but I conjecture that its extension at least was due largely to the oppressive methods of assessment which have been indicated above; pressure to get the land cultivated would be unnecessary when payments were independent of cultivation, and contracts covering a term of years would seem convenient both to assessors and to peasants at the moment, however disappointing their eventual results might prove. Whatever were the causes, the system was in existence at the outset of Aurangzeb's reign, and it furnishes a link between Akbar's methods and those which were found to prevail on the establishment of British rule; when the Mogul assignee or official was transformed into a landholder, the contract payments of revenue made to him would naturally become rents in the modern sense of the term.
5. The Statistics of Mogul Land Revenue
In the last section we followed two distinct but converging lines of evidence to the conclusion that during our period administrative pressure on the peasants increased so seriously as to affect the productive resources of the Mogul Empire. The increase is apparent also in some statistics of the revenue demand which happen to have survived, and an examination of these is required in order to present a complete view of the subject; but the interpretation of the figures presents numerous difficulties of detail, the discussion of which is necessarily technical, and is of interest only to those readers who may wish to carry the subject further. I have therefore thought it best to relegate the detailed figures and their explanation to Appendix C, and to offer here only the broad results which appear to me to be established, subject to the warning that the manuscripts I have used have not yet been critically edited, and consequently the conclusions based on them cannot be regarded as absolutely final.
Before, however, we compare statistical data extending over more than half a century, we must inquire whether the monetary unit in which they are expressed can be regarded as reasonably stable, since a general rise or fall in prices would make an important difference in the financial position of the peasantry. In a previous chapter the tentative conclusion has been drawn that the relation of value between silver and agricultural produce did not vary materially within our period, and the restatement of this conclusion would have sufficed, if the land revenue had been assessed and collected only in silver. In fact, however, the assessments which we have to use were almost certainly made in terms of copper, and since we have seen that the silver price of copper rose during our period by something like 30 per cent, it might at first sight be inferred that, apart from any formal enhancement, the real burden of the revenue had increased in a corresponding proportion. An examination of the official regulations seems to show that this inference would be erroneous, because peasants could pay the revenue in either metal, and the official ratio between them was not apparently altered to follow the market. Akbar's directions to the official treasurers make it clear that peasants could pay in gold, silver, or copper, whichever they might choose, and Aurangzeb's orders of 1665 show that silver could still be paid, since they permit the receipt of Shahjahan's rupees in cases where coins of the current reign were not available. The official ratio in Akbar's time was 40 dam to a rupee : I have found no record of its alteration, while it is used repeatedly in chronicles of Shahjahan's reign, and Manucci, writing many years after the close of our period, states definitely that the old rate was still in force in his time for the conversion of salaries. So long as the official rate remained unaltered it is obvious that when a rupee cost less than 40 dam in the market, the cultivator would never pay 40 dam in copper to the treasury, but would buy a rupee at the market rate ; and consequently, though he might have given more produce than before for his copper, he would give less copper for his rupee, and his real burden would depend on the relation between silver and commodities, which as we have seen was probably unchanged. We may assume that while the rise in the price of copper was in progress, the peasant's burden was increased, because he would naturally, as is still the case, get the worst of the market, but this loss would not be cumulative, and when the metal settled down at the higher level, his payment, measured in produce, would be about the same as before. We can therefore compare the statistics of different years without the necessity of allowing for a large change in the value of the unit in which they are expressed ; but if evidence should come to light showing that the peasants bore the burden of the enhancement in the value of copper, it would strengthen the considerations I have put forward to show that their position deteriorated greatly during the period we are examining.
One other preliminary remark seems to be required. The value of these statistics has been occasionally questioned on the ground of the discrepancies between the various tables which have survived, but this objection overlooks the fact that the revenue was assessed annually and not, as now, for a term of years. If, then, two tables of revenue were in exact agreement, we should have to conclude that they referred to the same year, and even large proportionate differences in the entry for a district or subdivision need excite no surprise if we remember that war, famine, or rebellion might suddenly transform the economic position of an extensive region. In my opinion the true way of using these tables is to ascertain the date to which each refers—unfortunately a matter of some occasional difficulty—and then, having arranged them in chronological order, to see whether they tell an intelligible story. For the present purpose, I make use of six tables. The first shows the revenue demand under Akbar about the year 1594; the second gives the demand at the accession of Shahjahan; the third relates to 1647, or perhaps a year or two earlier; the fourth and fifth are not precisely dated, but refer to years very near the end of Shahjahan's reign; while the sixth is taken from a chronicle which closes with the year 1668, and may be presumed to relate to one of the early years of Aurangzeb. In the table on the following page I have excluded the southern provinces, the boundaries of which are known to have varied; the province of Bengal, because the initial record of its revenue is obviously not in accord with the administrative facts; and the small province of Sind, the figures for which are doubtful and incomplete.
Looking first at the changes between the year 1594 and the accession of Shahjahan, we see that the revenue of nine provinces rose by 29 per cent, but that the increase was by no means uniform. In four, the increase was less than 20 per cent, a rise which cannot be taken as evidence of unduly increased pressure, since it may be accounted for by a reasonable extension of cultivation. Of the provinces where the increase was greater, we know that Allahabad and Bihar were very much under-cultivated about the year 1594, and the increase in them may well represent mainly a recovery from the low state of cultivation which then prevailed. In Ajmer also the increase of 48 per cent probably represents a process of levelling up : the administration of this province was not very effective in Akbar's time, when the standard of revenue was only one-seventh or one-eighth of the produce, and the extension of Mogul authority which was effected by Jahangir must have meant a larger revenue, which was the primary
| Province. | Akbar about 1594. | Shahjahan | Aurangzeb before 1668. | Aurangzeb before 1668 ; figures in column 3 equated to 100. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accession. | About 1647. | Late. | Late. | ||||
| 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. |
| Bihar . . | 100 | 138 | 176 | 173 | 175 | ? | ? |
| Allahabad . | 100 | 146 | 194 | 202 | 214 | 208 | 142 |
| Oudh . . | 100 | 114 | 147 | 136 | 155 | 157 | 138 |
| Agra . . | 100 | 151 | 165 | 158 | 196 | 193 | 128 |
| Malwa . | 100 | 119 | 170 | 174 | 166 | 181 | 152 |
| Gujarat . | 100 | 117 | 122 | 117 | 105 | 102 | 87 |
| Ajmer . | 100 | 148 | 212 | 213 | 229 | 224 | 151 |
| Delhi . . | 100 | 110 | 168 | 205 | 200 | 196 | 178 |
| Lahore . | 100 | 147 | 161 | 160 | 153 | 162 | 110 |
| Multan . | 100 | ? | 187 | 147 | 144 | 164 | ? |
| Total . | 100 | 129 | 166 | 170 | 175 | 175 | 136 (eight provinces) |
object of all such developments. There remains the anomaly that Agra and Lahore show large increases, while Delhi, intermediate in situation and probably in economic condition, shows the lowest increase of all. Various conjectural explanations of these figures could be suggested, but I have found no positive basis for any of them, and the anomaly must stand until further facts come to light ; but, taking all the provinces together, the figures justify the statement that during Jahangir's reign there was no large general increase in the revenue, though the demand on some provinces was levelled up, and Lahore and Agra show large unexplained enhancements.
Turning to the reign of Shahjahan, it will be seen that the index for nine provinces rose from 129 at his accession to 175 in the early years of his successor, while the figures given for his reign prove that the increase occurred within it, since the index in his time had already risen to that level. In order then to measure the increase in this reign, we may take the figures for Shahjahan's accession as the base, and re-calculate those of Aurangzeb as percentages, as is done in the last column of the table for eight provinces, the figures for Multan being doubtful in one year and those for Bihar in the other. The first obvious anomaly in this column is the actual fall in the revenue of Gujarat, but it is adequately accounted for by the persistent effects of the famine of 1630, which has been described at length in an earlier chapter: the lapse of a generation had sufficed to restore the economic life of the country, but even at this time its revenue had not increased materially above the amount claimed by Akbar. Shahjahan's enhancement over the eight provinces works out at 36 per cent, but if Gujarat be excluded, the figure for the remainder rises to nearly 44. The other anomalies are the relatively low increases in Lahore and Agra, with a relatively large increase in Delhi, and it will be noticed at once that their effect is largely to obliterate the unexplained anomalies observed in the reign of Jahangir. In general terms, then, it may be said that under Shahjahan the revenue rose by 40 to 50 per cent —more in Delhi, where the revenue at his accession was low, and less in Agra and Lahore, where it was exceptionally high.
There are no statistics later than 1594 of the area brought under assessment; apparently these figures were recorded only under Akbar's regulation system, and they disappeared with its abandonment, so that it is impossible to compare the incidence of revenue on cultivation, but, notwithstanding this drawback, I think the claim may fairly be made that the figures I have given tell an intelligible and probable story. Under Jahangir the pressure of the revenue did not greatly increase except in two provinces: under Shahjahan, it increased by nearly one-half, apart from those two provinces, and from Gujarat, which was desolated by famine during his reign. No part of the large increase can be accounted for by a rise in the value of produce, and it must be attributed partly to extended cultivation, and partly to the rise in the standard of assessment. But at this time extension of cultivation was not, as it would be now, a measure of the increase of population or resources; it was forced by the administration, and, according to Bernier, cultivation was in fact tending to decline in Shahjahan's later years, so that most if not all of the increase must be attributed to administrative action. We have seen that the standard of assessment was raised by one-half, and we have seen that the revenue demand rose by nearly the same proportion. The coincidence is of course not exact, for a new standard can rarely yield a precise arithmetical result in practice, but speaking in general terms it may be said that the increased pressure on the peasants, which is indicated in official orders and in contemporary observations, is clearly reflected in the revenue statistics which have survived.
Before passing from this branch of our study, a few words may be said regarding the suggestion which is occasionally made, that these statistics give an exaggerated idea of the administrative pressure, because the sum actually collected as revenue might fall far short of the demand. The suggestion that the revenue could not be realised in full will be recognised as, at the least, probable by any one familiar with the conditions of the period; but the point is that the demand was made. I do not myself suppose that Shahjahan's revenue could possibly have been collected in full over a series of years, but that fact serves only to show how great the pressure on the peasants must have been. An energetic subordinate might not hope to realise everything, but he could sweep the country clear in the attempt to minimise the total of arrears; while the severity of the methods of recovery in force, including the sale of a defaulter's family into slavery, makes it practically certain that not much could be saved by bribery, for the amount of the bribe would approximate to that of the demand. It would probably be a mistake to take the figures I have given as representing money actually brought to credit as received: they may be accepted with safety as a measure of the threat which, from season to season, impended over the agricultural population.
AUTHORITIES FOR CHAPTER VIII
Section 1.—The description of the position of foreign merchants in Malacca is based on Alboquerque, III. 96, Barros, II. ii. 33 ff., Correa, ii. 253 ff., Castanheda, iii. 179 ff.; see also Journal R.A.S., 1920, p. 517 ff. For Calicut, see Correa, i. 189, Castanheda, i. 111, and Barbosa, ii. 76; for the rest of the coast, idem, ii. 73-122; and for Hooghly, Elliot, vii. 211, Smith's Akbar, 137, and Campos, 50 ff. The earliest references I have found to Dutch factories are in Begin ende Voortgangh; the factory at Achin is p. 44 of Spilberg's voyage; Bantam is p. 23 of Harmansz.' voyage; the first regulations for a factory are printed in the voyage of Warwyck and de Weert. The English convention at Achin is in Purchas, I. iii. 156, and First Letter Book, 69. The early history of the Dutch on the East Coast is in Terpstra's Koromandel, 35-123: the draft Dutch-Mogul convention is in Terpstra's Surat, Appendix VI.
The references to the English negotiations with the Mogul are Purchas, I. iii. 206, 210, and I. iv. 458, 461; Letters Received (Introduction to ii. and iv.); Roe, passim; and English Factories, i. 39, 40. For English reprisals, see idem, i. ii (the facts are summarised in the Introductions); iii. 24, 27; della Valle, 418. The facts of the Dutch reprisals are taken from Hague Transcripts, I. 284, 291, 298, and Dagh Register, June 16, 1628.
The history of Pulicat fort is compiled from Methwold, 994; Terpstra's Koromandel, 85 ff.; Hague Transcripts, I. 69, 86; van Dijk, 20-35; Elias, ii. 53. Early plans for forts on the West Coast are referred to in Hague Transcripts, II. 73, 95; English Factories, iii. 198. The founding of Armagon is in the same volume (passim, especially 128, 134): Madras, in v. 90, 161, and vi. Introduction, and 156: later projects for the West Coast, ix. 170, and x. 151, 208, etc.
Section 2.—This section is mainly a summary of the conclusions reached in India at the Death of Akbar, and a forecast of the results to be reached in the sections which follow. Detailed references will be given in these, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here.
Section 3.—The war at Chaul is referred to in Faria y Sousa, iii. 168, 185, etc., and Letters Received, ii. 150, 239. Schorer's description of the administration is ff. 3, 4. Methwold's account of Golconda is p. 996. The instances of oppression, etc., in Golconda are taken from English Factories, ii. 46, iv. 228, 232, vii. 41, and Dagh Register, March 12, 1625, March 31 and October 23, 1633, November 23, 1636, and March 14, 1637. For European farmers, see idem, October 31, 1636, and English Factories, v. 45, vi. 188, ix. 6: the Masulipatam farm is discussed in Hague Transcripts, I. 261, II. 73, and III. J4. The references to conditions in Bijapur are Dagh Register, April 30, July 11, 1661, and Sarkar's Shivaji, 34. I have found no systematic account of administration in the Hindu territories ; the occurrences mentioned are taken from English Factories, vii. 49 ; and Dagh Register, February 19, 1641 ; April 23 and 24, and July 16, 1642 ; November 20, 1643 ; June 21 and July 29, 1644 ; January 18, August 19, and September 17, 1645.
Section 4.—Much of this section is based on two papers in Journal R.A.S.: (1) Akbar's Land Revenue System, January 1918 ; (2) The Development of the Land Revenue System, January 1922. The original authority for Akbar's system is Ain ; the changes during the period are deduced from two of Aurangzeb's farmāns, of which the text was printed with translations in Journal A.S.B., June 1906. Translations are also available in Sarkar's Studies, 168 ff. For Akbar's capacities, see Dr. Vincent Smith's Akbar, the Great Mogul, passim.
References to assignments are idem, p. 121, Akbar-nama (translation) ii. 95, Tuzuk, passim. Hawkins' account is in Purchas, I. iii. 221, and Early Travels, 114 ; Terry's statement is in Purchas, II. ix. 1480. For the prevalence of the system under Shahjahan, see Mundy, ii. passim ; for frequency of changes, idem, ii. 85, and van Twist, XVIII. ; and for statistics, Badshahnama, ii. 710 ff.
Ravesteyn's account of farms in Gujarat is in Terpstra's Surat, Appendix VI. Roe's observations on the subject are pp. 124, 239 : see also Dagh Register, October 31, 1636, January 28, 1642 (Surat) ; English Factories, vi. 100, 276, and vii. 23, 24 ; and Pelsart, MS. f. 20. The account of Shahjahan's expenditure is in Elliot, vii. 171, 172. The demand of one-half the produce is mentioned in van Twist, XLI., Manucci, ii. 451, Ovington, 197, and other writers. The peasant's position in regard to revenue is discussed at greater length in India at the Death of Akbar, 295 ff. Flight of peasants can be inferred from Aurangzeb's orders in Sarkar's Studies, 172, 189, 191 ; Bernier's discussion of the subject is p. 205 ff.
For the Deccan administration, see Sarkar's Aurangzeb, especially i. 179 ff., and Shivaji, 470 ; also an article by S. Sen in Calcutta University Journal (Department of Letters), 1921, p. 237. The paragraph regarding the rental system is based on Aurangzeb's farmāns, quoted above.
Section 5.—The sources of the statistics discussed in this section are given in Appendix C. The option of paying revenue in either metal is stated in Ain (translation), ii. 49, and Sarkar's Studies, 193 : the persistence of the official ratio is indicated in Badshahnama, ii. 712, 715 ; Majalis-us-Salatin, f. 115-118 ; and Manucci, ii. 363 ff. The deficiency of cultivation in Bihar and Allahabad is discussed in Journal, United Provinces Historical Society, 1919 : the condition of Ajmer is indicated in Ain (translation), ii. 267.
Notes
- 1. In the description of Bantam given in the Journal of Houtman's voyage, mention is made of the separate settlement occupied by Chinese merchants, but no details are given of their status (Houtman, i. 108). The fact that the Dutch recognised a "captain" of the Chinese in Batavia suggests that the earlier Chinese settlements in Java had been self-governing.
- 1. The documents I have seen do not explain why the nayak should have offered a fort, but presumably he supposed that the Dutch would follow the precedents set by the Portuguese in the vicinity ; the point is that the offer was made, and was refused.
- 2. I make out S. Thomé to be one of the places where the Portuguese assumed greater power than they had been granted. Couto (X. i. 49) distinguishes it from the Portuguese territories on the West Coast as not being the King's "patrimony," but says it was "peopled by his vassals" and "governed by the laws of his kingdom." Methwold (994) says it was governed by Portuguese, "who notwithstanding must acknowledge some dependency from the nayak." The Portuguese in the town certainly governed themselves, but they were not in sovereign possession of its area.
- 1. Some years earlier Roe had been attracted by the idea of a fortress on the coast of Gujarat, but he gave it up on the ground of expense (Roe, 344).
- 2. The word estate had not yet been restricted to its modern signification of landed property, but was used in the wider sense of property in general. The older sense survives in such legal phrases as personal estate.
- 1. The Danes also had obtained a fort at Tranquebar, but I do not know of any account showing in detail the circumstances of its acquisition.
- 1. In the greater part of India the canon law of Islam was recognised in theory, but not in such a way as to hinder the practical freedom of the executive (Pelsart, MS., f. 21).
- 2. The experience of Vīrji Vora, recounted in Chapter V., may be taken [p. 235] as an example of a successful appeal against local oppression. Against it may be set the fact, recorded in the next section, that a Governor, who had been called to the Court for punishment, had been liberated by bribes and influence, and returned to his duties, threatening vengeance on his accusers. Manucci tells us in his account of Shahjahan's captivity that the old King justified his past administration by the fact that months would pass without any one presenting a petition to him; the inference that nobody had any grievance against his officers will, however, scarcely commend itself to students of the period (Manucci, ii. 19).
- 1. In India at the Death of Akbar I stated the prevalence of farming in the south as an inference drawn from indirect evidence. I had not then come across the materials utilised in the next section, which show that the system was in fact prevalent early in the seventeenth century.
- 1. Hawkins' pointed description of the system of assignments will be found in Purchas, I. iii. 221, and Early Travels, 114. The prosperity of the peasants under Farid Khan is described in Elliot, iv. 313, and Shaista Khan's beneficence in Bengal is recounted in a chronicle translated in Sarkar's Studies (155 ff.), but both these documents are eulogies, and their language is subject to a rather high rate of discount. In both it is easy to see the extent of the general oppression with which these favoured areas are contrasted.
- 1. The description did not appear in the edition of the Voyages published in 1634, soon after the author’s return to Holland. Its first appearance seems to be on p. 77 of the reprint in vol. ii. of Begin ende Voortgangh, and it is also given in the independent reissue of 1648; no MS. appears to have survived. “Kotebipa” is an obvious mistake for Kutbshah, more correctly Kutb-ul-Mulk, the title of the Golconda dynasty.
- 1. I retain the word "Governor" because of its regular use in the contemporary authorities, but its meaning is more nearly that of District Officer. The head of a Mogul province is usually described as Viceroy, or by an Indian title such as Sahibsuba: the Portuguese appear to have applied their word governador to the chief local authority with whom they came in contact, and it was doubtless through Portuguese interpreters that this use passed to the Dutch and the English. In the Mogul Empire it usually signifies the Amil, who was subordinate to the provincial Viceroy.
- 1. Jahangir's rank as administrator can be judged from his own statements in the Tuzuk, as well as from the accounts given by Roe and other contemporary writers; Pelsart (p. 2) traces the commercial decline of Agra to the time when this Emperor abandoned the drudgery of administration for his pleasures, and justice was replaced by violence. I think there are [p. 247] good grounds for the view that Shahjahan's capacity deteriorated with age, though it would carry us too far to set out the evidence at length; in 1636 we are told that "every man honours the king, but no man obeys him"; in 1645 we read of daily appointments and removals of high officials; and a year later of "the king's wavering mind, which like a weathercock turns with the wind" (English Factories, v. 204, vii. 302, viii. 51). Manucci's favourable account of this Emperor (i. 188) is obviously coloured by time; his caustic descriptions of Aurangzeb's methods (e.g. ii. 382) are perhaps better evidence of fact.
- 1. The text omits reference to the systems in force in Kashmir and the country which is now Afghanistan; they were very intricate, and the population affected by them was too small to justify their discussion in this connection.
- 2. The position in regard to Bengal is somewhat obscure. The long discussions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (summarised in Ascoli) started with the revenue settlement made by Todar (Tooril) Mal in 1582, but the nature of the action taken by him has not yet been made clear; the passage describing it in the Ain (translation, ii. 122) is obscure, the MSS. are discordant, and I have not found one of them which makes tolerable sense. The inference that Akbar continued existing arrangements seems, however, to be permissible, and the form of the statistics shows that, whatever Todar Mal may have done in Bengal, he did not introduce the system usually associated with his name. It is possible that some of the extant MSS. were deliberately falsified in the eighteenth century, when the secrets of the revenue system were jealously guarded by Indian officials.
- 1. The published translation of this regulation (Ain, ii. 45) does not give the exact sense. There is nothing in the original about “ entrusting the appraisement ” to the headmen ; the text says simply, “ He shall not make a summary settlement (nasaq) with the headmen.”
- 1. The proportion is probably exaggerated, but the large increase in expenditure is indisputable.
- 1. Some figures given in the next section indicate a possibility that Jahangir in his last years had introduced the higher rate in two provinces, but they are open to more than one interpretation.
- 1. India at the Death of Akbar, c. iv.
- 1. “ Timariot ” denotes the holder of a military tenure in the Turkish Empire (Dictionnaire de l’Académie, s.v.). The brief descriptions of it which I have seen indicate that the tenure was practically the same as that of an assignee in the Mogul Empire, and the expression in the text may be read as “ assignees, governors, and farmers.”
- 1. Chauth was an old-standing tenure in the Deccan; some sixteenth century references to it will be found in Dalgado (s.v. Chouto), which suggest that it originally denoted liability to pay one-fourth of the gross produce, but the proportion varied in practice, and under the Marathas the word seems usually to have meant one-fourth of the revenue. Sardeshmukhi was a cess, or extra demand, of ten per cent on the revenue. Manucci (ii. 25) asserts that Sivaji had obtained a grant of chauth in the Mogul Deccan as early as 1658, but the statement seems to be inconsistent with the careful account of the transaction in question given in Sarkar's Shivaji (p. 65).
- Note. Note.—As indicated in the appendix, there are uncertainties regarding the figures for Multan in column 3 and Bihar in column 7, and these provinces have been ignored in calculating the ratios of the totals of these two columns.