From Akbar to Aurangzeb

Chapter IX

The System of Taxation

From Akbar to Aurangzeb, W. H. Moreland, 1923 · from page 268 · about 52 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

1. A General View of the Fiscal System

In this chapter we have to examine the economic aspects of the financial institutions, other than the land revenue, which existed in India during our period, and we can most conveniently begin with a description of the fiscal system which we find in the Mogul Empire. The key to this system is the distinction between what we should now call Imperial or Central, and Provincial or Local, income and expenditure. The Emperor relied on a small number of recognised heads of income, which he disposed of at his pleasure, while the provincial and local authorities enjoyed a large measure of freedom in levying revenue for their own needs within the area under their jurisdiction. It follows from the nature of the sources of information which are available, that we know much more of central than of local finance; the magnitude of the Imperial resources was a stock topic for the chroniclers of the seventeenth century, as well as for European visitors to the country, but the details of the local administration can have possessed little attractions for writers of either class, and our knowledge of them is drawn mainly from incidental remarks in the commercial correspondence.

The central heads of income were land revenue, customs, mint, inheritance, and presents, which may be classed as ordinary, together with occasional special receipts, such as monopolies, or what may be described roughly as indemnities. The land revenue has been discussed in the preceding chapter, and the other ordinary heads will be examined in the next section: as to the extraordinary items, no general statements can be made, and it must suffice to refer as examples to the indigo monopoly of 1633, which was designed to bring in several lakhs of rupees,1 or the tribute imposed on Golconda after the military operations of 1636. We have no trustworthy figures to show the central income as a whole, but it is, I think, safe to say that land revenue was much the most important single item, and we have seen in the last chapter that its incidence on the old provinces rose by 75 per cent during our period. Its gross total was increased further by annexations of new territory, and in order to get a rough idea of the development which occurred, we may contrast the figure of 880 karors of dams given in the Badshahnama with the 363 karors accounted for in the Ain.

The bulk of the land revenue was, as we have seen, assigned to meet the ordinary expenses of the army and the general administration. These two heads of expenditure cannot be separated, because the maintenance of troops was a condition of practically all assignments, while the administration in all its branches was conducted by officers holding military rank.2 Apart from these two heads, the normal central expenditure consisted chiefly of the outlay of the Court, a term which covered the maintenance of the artillery and other special troops, together with a considerable volume of charitable and miscellaneous items. The extraordinary charges met from central revenues consisted primarily of the cost of military operations, and secondly of buildings or other works of utility or ornament. The large rise in the standard of expenditure under Shahjahan is established by general testimony, and in particular by the eulogy quoted in the last chapter, which suggests a four-fold increase; the precise figure is perhaps exaggerated, but the record of wars and buildings speaks for itself regarding this Emperor's extraordinary budget, while a large part of the increase in recurring expenditure must be attributed to inflation of the salary list. Akbar remunerated his officers on a scale which may fairly be described as extravagant, but in Shahjahan's time the numbers in the higher grades, and the incomes of the leaders, both show a remarkable rise. About the year 1594, not more than 58 individuals held the "rank" of 1000 horse or upwards;1 about 1647 the corresponding number was 218, and a detailed comparison of the two lists indicates that, after allowing for certain curtailments in the scale of remuneration, the total cost of salaries must have been multiplied three-fold in the course of this half-century. It cannot, I think, be maintained that the expansion of the Empire justified anything like so great an increase at the top of the list, and a large proportion of it must be attributed to the lavishness of the Emperors and to lack of effective control on the financial side.

We may conclude, then, that, while the central gross revenue was very large, the bulk of it was pledged to recurring expenditure on an exceedingly costly bureaucracy and on an army whose actual numbers fell far below the nominal strength: the balance was at the disposal of the Emperor, and so much as could be provided was devoted mainly to wars of aggression.2 To ensure the supply of funds for these and other undertakings, branches of the Imperial treasury were maintained throughout the country, and a representative of Imperial finance, known as the Diwān, was stationed in each province. The revenue paid into a branch treasury was not held at the disposal of the Viceroy or the local Governor: any sums sanctioned by the Emperor for expenditure within the province were disbursed on the authority of the Dīwān, and the balance was remitted periodically to the Court, or to one of the reserve treasuries which were maintained in various fortresses. From some remarks scattered through the chronicles, I gather that each province was expected to produce a surplus for remittance, and that the special attention which Shahjahan paid to the Deccan finances was the result of the abnormal deficit which existed there after the famine of 1630; but, however this may be, the fact is clear that the surplus, if there was a surplus, was wholly at the disposal of the central government, and was not available for provincial or local needs except under the Emperor's express authority.

The question then arises how these needs were met. The administrative staff in the provinces was certainly remunerated by assignments of land revenue,1 and it may be assumed that the troops employed on police and revenue duties were drawn from the contingents which the officers were bound to maintain at their own cost. It may also be assumed, though I have found no authority for the statement, that expenditure on clerks and routine work generally was meant to be covered by the assignments given; but we have still to take into consideration the facts, firstly, that frequent and costly presents to superiors were in practice compulsory, and, secondly, that administrative employment was regarded as a legitimate source of private profit. Towards the close of our period, the Mogul officials, taken as a whole, were poor, for extravagance had at least kept pace with the rise in remuneration, and, as Bernier wrote of the upper ranks, "most of them are in embarrassed circumstances, and deeply in debt; not that they are ruined, like the nobility of other countries, by the extravagance of their table, but by the costly presents made to the king at certain annual festivals, and by their large establishments of wives, servants, camels, and horses.” In such an environment it is obvious that the profit to be drawn from military or administrative rank must have been a primary consideration, and that there were the strongest motives for developing local sources of revenue. I have not found any Imperial orders granting specific powers of local taxation to viceroys or governors, but there is abundant evidence that these officers in fact levied taxes distinct from those which were accounted for in the Imperial treasury, and the conclusion appears to be justified that they had in practice a free hand to raise revenue for local needs, or for their personal profit, so long as they did not drive their charges into rebellion, or cause a scandal so great as to require Imperial interference. On this view it becomes easy to understand the wide diversity of conditions disclosed by the commercial correspondence: quite apart from the Imperial sources of revenue, there were numerous duties closely adapted to local possibilities, but most of them exceedingly burdensome in their nature; and the instances on record of the scale of taxes changing with a change of governor make the conclusion, to my mind, certain.

In the following sections then, we have to examine, firstly, the Imperial sources, other than the land revenue, and secondly, the expedients employed to raise funds for local or provincial objects; but before entering into the details of these topics we may glance at the financial systems in the countries lying to the south of the Mogul Empire. Here the universality of the practice of farming the revenue at least made for simplicity. The net payments made by the farmers-in-chief constituted the central revenue at the disposal of the King and his ministers, while within the “government,” or district, the farmer-in-chief could farm out any possible source of revenue, the balance of receipts after making good his contract remaining at his own disposal. To recur to the instance given in the last chapter, the governor of Petapoli had to pay 48,000 pagodas net for his year of office, and that sum represented the total accruing to the central government from his charge, though individual ministers might obtain something additional by way of bribes or presents. Those liabilities discharged, the governor could retain all that he collected in excess of necessary expenditure, and his sole object was to make the collections as large as possible, and, as the account which I have quoted shows, to cut down administrative expenditure to a minimum during his short term of office. The financial system in southern India was thus perhaps the simplest, as it was the most oppressive, which it would be possible to devise.

2. The Mogul Imperial Resources

Apart from the land revenue, the Imperial budget, if such a document was drawn up, contained on the receipt side four ordinary heads, Customs, Mint, Inheritance, and Presents. The Customs appear to have been usually administered along with the land revenue, in so far that the governor of the district held also the farm of the seaport, but this relation was not invariable, and it may be recalled that when Hawkins arrived at Surat, he found the port under the Viceroy of the Deccan, while the land was under the Viceroy of Gujarat. The duties on imports and exports were fixed by the Emperor, and the privilege of collecting them was farmed, or occasionally assigned, to the governor or some other authority. The rates of which we read were distinctly low. At Surat in 1609 they were 2½ per cent on goods, 3 per cent on provisions, and 2 per cent on "money," a term which I take to include gold and silver, whether coined or not; they were increased somewhat during our period, but at its close they were still less than 5 per cent; and the Surat schedule may be taken as typical. Under these arrangements it was the interest of the farmer to foster foreign commerce as much as possible, since, his principal disbursements being fixed, the duties in excess of the farm were practically clear profit, while a serious fall in trade might result in his ruin; and, as a matter of fact, we find that the authorities were disposed in a general way to welcome foreign merchants. But the lack of continuity in administration made it impossible for an individual farmer to pursue a constructive policy. A port might, for instance, require protection against pirates, but such a measure would have involved immediate expenditure, while the returns would have benefited the farmer's successors rather than himself; and the records of our period disclose nothing in the way of far-seeing measures for the benefit of trade, while on the other hand, the need for realising the amount of the farm, and the natural desire for an immediate profit, resulted in the adoption of various questionable expedients, some of which were undoubtedly injurious in the long run.

Perhaps the least harmful of these expedients was the practice of tempting away traders from a competing port. An instance of this practice is recorded by Sir Thomas Roe, who, at a time of difficulty in Surat, was approached by the authorities of Cambay with the object of diverting the English trade thither, and who successfully played off the competitors against each other. Somewhat later we hear of similar competition between various ports in Gujarat; and, while the affair was largely one of promises, it appears to be probable that the fear of loss of trade may have operated to impose a limit on active extortion, and that the Indian merchants of Ahmadabad were pursuing a recognised line of action when in the year 1647 they transferred capital for investment from Surat to Lahari Bandar on account of the oppression practised at the former place. The expedients which were obviously injurious may be classed as delay, over-valuation, and compulsory sales. Delay in clearing goods is referred to so frequently that it must have been a common experience throughout India, and it must be regarded as practised with the definite object of extorting bribes, or of bringing pressure to bear on traders to fall in with the officials' schemes. The English merchants attributed such delays to the “innate accustomed villany” of the officials, who, they added, “will do nothing without bribes, which, however extorted, is made a continual custom, enforced as a duty”; and we may safely conclude that the sanctioned schedule of duties was supplemented to a substantial extent by such charges.

The practice of over-valuation was more serious. The schedules were ad valorem, but, while the rates were fixed by superior authority, the valuation of goods was left to the discretion of the officers on the spot, who could, if they chose, double their demands by doubling the values placed on the consignments passed through the customs. The practice was not universal, for fixed values were recognised at the small port of Lahari Bandar, but it was very common at Surat, from which place an English merchant wrote as follows :

Here the governor’s will is a law ; so that he sets what prices he pleaseth on commodities, that thereby it cometh to pass that, while you think you pay but 3½ per cent, your customs stand you in twice as much, for the goods are often times rated at double the prices they cost, as was that indigo I bought in Agra, which costing 61 rupees per maund was here rated by Mazel Mulk at 110 rupees, because (he said) it was worth so much in Persia. But at Bandar Laree [Lahari] it is not so, for there the prices are known and set down in a rate book, not to be innovated or altered at every covetous or unjust governor’s will.

The practice of over-valuing is recorded at Surat as early as 1615, and is mentioned frequently thereafter : that the valuation might be at least doubled is shown by some figures given by a Dutch merchant in 1641 (saltpetre costing 1½ rupees being valued at 4 rupees, and cotton goods costing 9 rupees at 18 rupees) ; and the obvious result was to make the incidence of the duties much heavier than could be inferred from the official schedule, while the lack of certainty as to the basis of the calculation must have been a serious handicap to trade.

The farmer’s ability to hasten or delay clearances, and to raise or lower the valuation, put him in a position not merely to extort bribes, but to make a profit by forced dealing in goods which came into the custom house. In the year 1615, we find the English merchants complaining that their goods were taken away by the governor and customer, and either not paid for at all, or paid for at inadequate rates ; thirty-five years later their successors reported that goods were refused clearance for two years and upwards, if they declined to accept the inadequate price offered by the customers; and various other statements show that these instances were not exceptional. Such claims could on occasion be settled by bribes, as in the year 1620, when a demand for the sale of imported coral at an inadequate price was evaded for "1000 rials-of-eight bribe to the governor, 100 ditto rials to the broker, and the sale of 2000 maunds lead into the Prince's warehouse1 at a mahmudi per maund less than we ordinarily sold at." In one way or other, however, money had to be paid, and if we take account of bribes, forced sales, and over-valuation, we shall find that the schedule of duties sinks into insignificance in comparison with the demands which might have to be met in practice. I cannot find that the burden of these demands altered materially in the course of our period; it varied from time to time with the rapacity of individual farmers; it could scarcely be worse than is depicted in the representation of 1615 already quoted; and I have found nothing to suggest that any permanent improvement took place.2

Regarded as sources of revenue, the Mints were of much less importance than the Customs. It is clear that they yielded something, for they were farmed, but, so long as the standard of coinage was maintained, the legitimate profit cannot have been large. The administration was minutely controlled by the Imperial authorities, and must be regarded as of political rather than fiscal importance; the issue of coin was the prerogative, and also the most direct evidence, of sovereignty, so that it is easy to understand that no local official, "or any man whatever" would dare to make alterations "without the King's especial order and warrant." Judging by the commercial correspondence, the administration of the mints in Gujarat compared favourably with that of the customs, for, apart from the complaints of delays at Surat, when, as has been explained in a previous chapter, the local mint was temporarily overworked, there is scarcely a grievance on record, and the claim may fairly be made that the mercantile community enjoyed during our period the advantage of honest money. I have found no contemporary account of the working of the mints in the interior of the country, but just after the end of our period the Dutch were complaining bitterly of delays and malpractices at Rajmahal in Bengal, so that it would be unsafe to conclude that the high standard of Gujarat was generally maintained.

I have not found any official statement of the precise claim made by the Mogul Emperors to inherit the estates of their subjects. The accounts of European visitors disclose certain variations, some asserting that the claim was universal, others limiting it to the estates of the official nobility, and others extending it to the wealthier merchants; but legal exactitude is not to be expected from such sources, and if we consider these statements in the light of incidents recorded in other authorities, the most probable conclusion is that the rule was not absolutely rigid. The Emperor certainly claimed the estates of his nobles, and occasionally we hear of the claim being extended to estates of merchants; probably the practical questions which arose in any case were the value of the particular estate and the amount of bribes offered to avert confiscation. This view is in accordance with a letter written by Aurangzeb to Shahjahan, a portion of which was preserved by Bernier. "We have been accustomed," wrote Aurangzeb, "as soon as an Omrah [noble] or a rich merchant has ceased to breathe, nay sometimes before the vital spark has fled, to place seals on his coffers, to imprison and beat the servants or officers of his household, until they made a full disclosure of the whole property, even of the most inconsiderable jewel. This practice is advantageous, no doubt ; but can we deny its injustice and cruelty ? ” In this passage I take the expression “ rich merchant ” to be significant, and to denote that, while no general claim was made on merchants as a body, the risk must always have been present in the minds of successful men. The severity described by Aurangzeb was not a novelty, for it is prominent in the following extract from the account given by Pelsart of the procedure under Jahangir.

Immediately on the death of one of the lords, be he great or small, without any exception—sometimes even before the breath has left his body—the King’s officers are on the spot, and make an inventory of the entire estate (provided it has not been concealed), recording everything down to the value of a single pice, even to the clothes and jewels of the ladies. The king takes the whole estate absolutely for himself, but if the deceased had done good service in his lifetime, the women and children are given enough to live on, but not more. It might be thought that wife, or children, or friends, could conceal enough to support the family while the lord was alive, but this would be very difficult, because all the acts of the lords, and their possessions, are perfectly well known. In every palace there is a dīwān [steward], through whose hands everything passes, and he has many subordinates, each of whom has some definite charge, for which he must account. [When the lord dies], all these subordinates are arrested, and compelled to show from their books and papers where all the cash or property is deposited, and how their master’s income has been disposed of ; and if there is any suspicion about their disclosures, they are tortured until they reveal the truth.

The income derived by the Imperial treasury from this source cannot be stated precisely, but it must have been substantial. A Dutch report asserts that Shahjahan realised 19 karors of rupees on the death of the famous Asaf Khan in the year 1641 : the figure is probably a gross popular exaggeration, for the items of the estate enumerated in the Badshahnama amount to only 2½ karors ; but in any case the windfall was important, and, as Father Sebastian Manrique tells us, the land routes leading out of India were closed to prevent the removal of any portion of the property. Estates of such magnitude were doubtless exceedingly rare, but the revenue derived from lesser accumulations was, as Aurangzeb said, “advantageous,” and it is noteworthy that, while he condemned the system, he did not abandon it in practice ; for Manucci tells us that in his time, though the claim had been formally renounced, the estates left by officials were still regularly appropriated on the pretext of debts due from them to the State.

Some sidelights on the working of the system are thrown by casual entries in the commercial correspondence. Thus in the year 1646, we read that woollen cloth was unsaleable at Court, partly because the King was “plentifully furnished with that specie by the death of some of his umraws” [nobles]. At one time an attempt was made to apply the rule of inheritance to the estates of foreign merchants dying in the country, and on the death of the English chief at Ahmadabad everything in the factory was sealed up without discrimination of the goods belonging to the Company ; but, so far as the English were concerned, this claim was finally abandoned in the settlement of disputes affected in the year 1624. A transaction of the year 1647 suggests an extension of the practice of seizing Indian merchants’ estates. The estate of a prominent Sind trader was seized, and incidentally his brother was subjected to ill-usage which was resented in the locality ;

. . . it is said the King have fined him 100,000 rupees, which is a-paying in Tatta ; besides which the Prince’s and other great men’s fees will carry away at least 50,000 rupees more. This all men exclaim against, being the worst (they say) of all ill customs that ever came up yet ; for now, if a merchant of fashion, or any other that hath but means dies, his wealth will be all seized on, though he hath children and brothers to leave it unto, and, having so, the King ought not to pretend any right.

The same letter mentions that, on the death of a local governor, all his goods were seized by the King’s officers, “as the manner is when any umbraw [noble] deceases,” and the phrases I have quoted indicate that, while a claim to an official’s estate was regarded as a matter of course, a claim to inherit from a merchant came as a novelty to the people of Sind, the “ fine ” of a lakh being presumably what would now be called a composition.1 Apart from this indication that the demands of the State were being extended to new areas, I have found nothing to show that any material change occurred during our period. It would be superfluous to insist at length on the economic evils resulting from the system. So far as officials were concerned, it may fairly be said that the liability was part of the contract under which they served, and that since the condition of the administration impelled them to predatory courses, there was some reason for a rule which ensured the reversion of their gains to the State; but as regards the wealthier merchants, it is obvious that trade must have suffered, and that productive enterprise must have been rendered impossible, by the risk of a sudden demand for the whole visible capital at the moment when the death of its owner had probably involved the business in temporary uncertainty. The instances which have been given show that the risk was real, and its existence must be taken into account in any estimate of the economic condition of the Mogul Empire; so long as the claim persisted, there was no possibility of either the establishment of wealthy families independent of the State, or the development of capitalistic production in any form.2

The last main head of the Imperial revenue consisted of the presents which were offered to the Emperor on every possible occasion. The custom appears to have been general throughout Asia, and we read occasionally of places where presents of equivalent value were returned, but the rule of equivalence was not observed in the Mogul Empire or the kingdoms of the Deccan, where the articles given in return were sometimes of comparatively trifling value. Writing of the Emperor Shahjahan, Manrique recorded that the presents received at his ceremonial weighing far exceeded his own gifts and expenses on the occasion, and we find in the Batavia Journals records of expenditure and receipts which show a large balance in the Emperor's favour, as when a present costing some thousands of rupees, and including an elephant, great copper candelabra, broadcloth, and various other items, was requited by a horse and a dress of honour, the whole valued at 520 rupees. On another occasion we hear that the English merchants gave presents worth about Rs. 13,000, and received the equivalent of Rs. 3500 in return. The net receipts were thus large, as can be inferred from a perusal of Jahangir's Memoirs, where the values of many presents are recorded, while the burden of the practice was a standing grievance with foreign merchants. It must not, however, be supposed that the balance received by the Emperor represented a clear financial gain. Officials who presented large offerings could usually hope for early promotion, and since there were no regular cadres or limits to the numbers in any particular rank, many transactions of the kind must have involved a contingent liability greater than the actual receipt. Foreign merchants again usually expected some sort of concession in return for expensive presents ; in the case which has just been mentioned, the Dutch obtained a series of concessions of considerable value from the commercial point of view ; and speaking generally, the system bears some resemblance to modern financial methods in which a State receives an immediate payment in lieu of an annuity, but with the important difference that the annuity was by no means certain, since concessions might at any time be cancelled, or an officer might be summarily dismissed shortly after his promotion. It is impossible to say whether on balance the Mogul Empire gained or lost by the system in the long run; it produced an immediate visible income, but at the same time it created contingent liabilities, and, having regard to the financial conditions of the period, the former fact was probably sufficient justification for its existence.

In order to complete the survey of the normal sources of Imperial revenue, reference may be made to a small number of entries in the statistics given in the Ain, which show that miscellaneous income was occasionally brought to account under the head of land revenue. Nearly all of these occur under Bengal, where there are about twenty entries of comparatively small sums under “markets,” “salt,” “transit dues,” and the like; but on the view I have put forward that the figures recorded for Bengal represent only the claims of the kingdom to which Akbar succeeded, these entries do not justify any inference as to the financial system of the Empire. Outside Bengal I have found only three cases of the kind, one of road-tolls at a village in Berar, one of ferry-tolls at Attock in the Punjab, and the maritime customs in the province of Gujarat. The last of these shows merely that in Gujarat customs were brought on to the land revenue accounts: the two former indicate that inland tolls were credited to the Imperial treasury in two cases, and, if we consider the great detail in which the statistics are presented, we may fairly infer that these two cases stand by themselves, representing exceptions to a general practice. There were thus only two instances in Akbar’s Empire, outside Bengal, where duties other than those which have been described were brought separately to account. It is possible that some items of miscellaneous income may have been included in the totals shown as land revenue, but a detailed examination of the figures leads to the conclusion that, if this was done, the amount was insignificant,1 and consequently we may accept the view already given of the Imperial resources as substantially, if not absolutely, complete. The Emperor was in a position to take from the estates of the rich practically as much as he chose : his direct revenue from commerce consisted of the receipts from customs and the mints : and he claimed first one-third, and eventually one-half, of the gross produce of the soil of his dominions. The income of artisans and ordinary merchants, together with the balance of their produce retained by the peasants, remained available for local and provincial needs.

3. Provincial and Local Resources

Our authorities indicate that revenue required by provincial or local officials might be raised either by supplementary imposts on Imperial taxes, or by duties imposed independently, while their income might be increased largely by presents, fines, and bribes. The practice of adding cesses for local purposes to the regular revenue is still familiar in India, and its prevalence during our period is sufficiently established by Aurangzeb's orders to endeavour to prevent it. An illustration of a similar practice in relation to customs may, however, be given from the kingdom of Golconda, because it is in itself of some historical importance. When the Dutch began to negotiate for trade at Masulipatam in the year 1606, no difficulty arose about the general scale of the King's duties, which were moderate, but the local authorities claimed as much as 16 per cent on exports of cotton goods, a duty which they described as belonging to themselves. The Dutch carried this question to the Court, and obtained a decree fixing export duties in their case at 4 per cent, and expressly relieving them from the impost (known as chhāpa-dalāla1) of 12 per cent on cotton goods, which was paid by subjects and foreigners alike. In this instance we find that the claim of the central administration was quadrupled by a duty levied simultaneously for local purposes; and the events of the next few years show that the exemption granted to the Dutch by the King was resented by the local authorities, who tried various expedients to recover what they had lost. The incident in fact is by itself a sufficient explanation of the constant friction of which we read at this seaport.

An idea of the number and nature of the duties, or taxes, or levies, imposed independently can be formed from the occasional orders by which some of them were formally prohibited. The edicts issued by Jahangir on his accession condemned the levy of cesses and other burdens which the assignees of "every province and district" had imposed for their own profit, an expression which brings out the wide prevalence of such imposts. About seventy years later Aurangzeb issued more detailed orders on the subject.1 The texts of his orders vary somewhat in detail, but Professor Sarkar enumerates fifty-four imposts under six main heads; there is no certainty that the list is exhaustive, but it seems to cover practically every kind of transaction in which ordinary people were likely to engage, such as sales or purchases, transport of goods or journeys of passengers, and the like, besides such incidents as the birth of a son, or the demarcation of a boundary. A contemporary view of the system is contained in the following extract from the chronicle of Shihabuddin Talish, as translated by Professor Sarkar :

From the first occupation of India and its ports by the Mohammadans to the end of Shahjahan's reign, it was a rule and practice to exact hāsil [revenue] from every trader—from the rose-vendor down to the clay-vendor, from the weaver of fine linen to that of coarse cloth—to collect house-tax from new-comers and hucksters, to take zakāt 2 from travellers, merchants, and stable-keepers. As Sadi has said, "At first oppression's basis was small, but every successive generation increased it," till at last in all provinces, especially in Bengal, it reached such a stage that tradesmen and merchants gave up their business and householders took to exile, saying,

We shall flee from the oppression of the Age,
To such a place that Time cannot track us there.

The rulers, out of greed for hāsil, gave them no relief. On the roads and ferries matters came to such a pass that no rider was allowed to go on unless he paid a dinar, and no pedestrian unless he paid a dirham.1 On the river highways, if the wind brought it to the ears of the toll-collectors that the stream was carrying away a broken boat without hāsil, they would chain the river. . . . They considered it an act of unparalleled leniency if no higher zakāt was taken from rotten clothes actually worn than from mended rags, and a deed of extreme graciousness if cooked food was charged with a duty lower than uncooked grains. None of the Delhi sovereigns, in spite of their efforts to strengthen the Faith and follow the rules of the Prophet, put down these illegal practices, but connived at them.

Allowing for the writer's picturesque style, this account may be taken as substantially correct: everything was taxed, and the system tended to intensify itself as time went on. Shihabuddin proceeds to say that Aurangzeb abolished the evil, but this statement proved to be premature, and the lists of miscellaneous duties actually levied in Bengal during the eighteenth century bear a strong resemblance to those of the remissions ordered by successive Mogul Emperors.

A comparison of Aurangzeb's prohibitions with those which had previously been made by Akbar discloses similarity amounting to practical identity, and the story is really older, going back at least to the time of the Emperor Firoz Shah. There is thus evidence of a conflict between the central administration, which attempted spasmodically to abolish these burdens, and the local authorities, who maintained and developed them to meet their need for funds. It is scarcely worth while to discuss the question whether this need was public or private in its nature, because the two spheres were not clearly distinguished in practice; but, whatever the object might be, the conclusion must be accepted that the conflict was decided in favour of the local authorities, who in fact continued to levy prohibited duties, subject only to the primary administrative consideration that there should be no scandal to provoke the Emperor's personal interference. Various incidents could be quoted to show that such interference would result from greed or oppression carried beyond the point which the people would stand, but the people were habituated to endurance, and exaction could be carried far without reaching the breaking-strain.

From the nature of the case, we hear little in detail of the duties levied on artisans, retailers, or consumers ; they did not directly affect the business of the foreign merchants, from whose reports most of our information is derived, and who noticed them only when they became important to the export trade, as in the case of the various monopolies instituted from time to time. The duties on internal transit stand in a different position, because they were collected from the English and Dutch, whose experience may be accepted as evidence of the ordinary working of the system. These duties are a very common topic in the commercial reports, where they are spoken of as rāhdārī or jagāt,1 and the constant friction which arose over their levy indicates that they must have been a very real hindrance to trade, not only for the foreigners who tried to escape them, but for the Indians who presumably submitted to them as inevitable. As early as the year 1615, we find the English complaining that three separate duties were collected on goods brought from Ahmadabad to Surat for export, and a few years later they were contesting the charges demanded at Burhanpur, and on the road thence to Surat. The agreement made at Surat in 1624 provided that no land customs should be demanded at places belonging to the Emperor, and this was confirmed by Jahangir’s farmān, but the duties were collected all the same, and in 1627 the merchants sent instructions to Lahore to obtain more effective orders from the Emperor ; “ otherwise,” they said, “ we will bribe no more to have the King’s farmāns.” The duties, however, were still demanded, and in 1644 a mission was sent to Court, not on this occasion to evade the duties, but to obtain orders regarding the valuation of goods for assessment purposes. From time to time we read of exemptions in particular localities, but these were favours granted by individual officers, and lapsed when they vacated office; and in 1650 renewed efforts were made to secure a general exemption. Again a farmān was granted, and it was occasionally effectual, though one caravan had to pay as much as formerly, and individual officers refused to take notice of the orders; but at the close of our period payments were still being made at Burhanpur and elsewhere in the Mogul Empire.

The experiences of the Dutch were similar. A farmān was obtained in 1634 exempting them from all tolls and duties on the road to Surat, but seven years later the merchants were discussing whether it was worth while to press for new orders; the old farmān was useless, the duties were still levied, and it was thought better for the moment to conciliate the local officials. In 1643, however, a new farmān was obtained, and it had some effect, for though it was ignored by the officials at Agra, where it was granted, a personal representation to the Emperor secured an order for refund. Meanwhile complaints were frequent on the other side of India: tolls on silk were already heavy, and were greatly raised on the advent of a new Viceroy in Bengal; in Orissa on the other hand some authorities were anxious to foster trade, and the duties were reduced by three-quarters, but they were raised again shortly afterwards; and we are told that Indian merchants were refusing to transport goods owing to the increase in the burdens.

It will be apparent from these experiences that transit dues might be levied even when exemption had been granted by the Emperor, and we may safely conclude that for Indians, who had obtained no similar privileges, the charges were hard facts. The Mogul administration cannot be blamed for the existence of the system, because it was by no means confined to the country under Mogul control, and indeed there are indications that the charges were higher and more frequent in independent territory. That the Imperial exemptions were not intended to apply to the Hindu Chiefs or Rajas whose territory lay within the Empire, is apparent from a comparison of the first and final settlements of the English troubles at Surat. In the first settlement, when the Moguls were temporarily helpless, exemption was granted, among other places, for the territory of the Raja of Dhaita; but in the second, when the Moguls were free agents, this territory was not included, and the exemption was limited to “places belonging to this King,” a phrase which was obviously intended to exclude the country administered by Chiefs. This distinction had been drawn a few years previously when a request for exemption at Dhaita was met by the reply that the Prince (Shahjahan) could not interfere with the Raja’s collections, seeing that they supplied the tribute which he paid; and various incidents in later years show that as time went on the English recognised that the demands made by Chiefs, especially in Rajputana, stood on a different footing from those of the Mogul officials. But the claim for transit dues was not made by Chiefs only, for on occasion it was asserted even by villagers. In 1637 such a claim was made only a few miles from Agra, and an English merchant was killed in a skirmish which ensued; while Peter Mundy mentions various cases where the country-folk, having become rebels, levied customs on their own authority. Outside the Mogul Empire the system was perhaps more oppressive than within its borders. Thévenot was struck by the change when he entered the kingdom of Golconda, and passed sixteen taxing-posts in 23 leagues’ journey; Manucci comments on the severity of the toll-collections in Bijapur; exemptions from junckans,1 as the duties were called locally, are prominent in the various farmāns obtained by the English at Masulipatam; and the demand was a frequent source of trouble in the Hindu territories in the south. We are therefore justified in regarding land-transit duties as an Indian, rather than a Mogul institution, leviable in all parts of the country by any one who possessed, or asserted, administrative authority.2 Perhaps we get a suggestion of its origin in an explanation offered by an English factor for a change of route ; “ I purposed,” wrote John Parker in 1622, “ to have come Handia way ; but here I understand that of late the Raja of the country, whereas formerly he only took custom, now robbeth merchants and passengers of what he findeth with them. Within these eight days a merchant was robbed of eight camels laden with goods, himself and three men killed.” From robbery to blackmail, and from blackmail to transit duties, is a natural development ; and occasional reversions to the initial practice were not unknown even in recent times. Whatever the origin may be, the universality of the system makes it easy to understand its persistence in the face of repeated prohibitions and exemptions : the people were accustomed to pay transit duties, and were unlikely to protest effectively, even though the levy might have been formally forbidden.

In the circumstances it is not possible to define the burden on commerce in quantitative terms, since any one might claim a tax of any amount, even if goods had paid taxes in an adjoining jurisdiction. Some of the charges of which we hear were in themselves moderate, while others were apparently excessive. In one case we read of a charge of two rupees per cart, in another of 65 rupees, and payments clearly varied within wide limits ; but the real evil consisted in the uncertainty of the demand and the violence with which it was collected. Merchants could not make a confident forecast of what they would have to pay on any particular journey, and goods would not be transported unless the anticipated profit was sufficiently large to leave a margin for unforeseen demands ; in the long run the consumer doubtless paid the duties which were actually levied, but consumers and producers alike must have suffered by the curtailment of trade resulting from the uncertainty in the operation of the system.1

It may perhaps be worth while to point out that, in some cases at least, transit duties benefited the Imperial treasury indirectly, though they were not brought to credit in the Imperial accounts. The case of the Raja of Dhaita, which has already been quoted, shows that Shahjahan would not interfere with the dues charged by a Raja because they supplied the tribute which he paid; and some remarks of the historian Khafi Khan indicate that similar considerations were applicable to the demands enforced by assignees. This writer tells us that in the famine of 1660 Aurangzeb gave orders for the remission of transit dues, as well as various other cesses, but that officers and assignees continued to collect them, partly because the Emperor was not respected, and partly

". . . because the revenue officers, through inattention, or want of consideration, or with an eye to profit, contrary to what was intended, made deductions (for these cesses) from the tanhkwāh accounts of the jāgīrdārs; so the jāgīrdārs, under the pretext that the amount of the cesses was entered in their tanhkwāh papers, continued to collect the rāhdāri and many other of the abolished imposts, and even increased them. When reports reached the government of infractions of these orders, the offenders were punished " . . . but after a while they got their rank restored, so that "the regulation for the abolition of most of the imposts had no effect."

The highly technical language of this quotation may be explained as follows. An officer got an assignment of land estimated to yield him a certain income. He did his best to make it yield more, while the officials endeavoured to see that he did not, and kept records (the tankhwāh papers) of what he collected, with a view to claiming an adjustment of any excess. If then an assignee collected transit dues, the amount was entered in these records; and the assignee could thereupon argue that his demand was recognised by the authorities, and that consequently he was entitled to enforce it on the public. There was in fact a continuous struggle between assignees and the Accounts officials, and transit dues were merely one of the items on which the ingenuity of both sides might be exercised.

Khafi Khan adds some comments which are worthy of reproduction as showing the views of a well-informed Indian on these imposts.1

“ The rāhdāri in particular is,” he says, “ condemned by righteous and just men as a most vexatious impost, and oppressive to travellers, but a large sum is raised by it. In most parts of the Imperial territories the faujdars [commandants] and jagirdars [assignees], by force and tyranny, now exact more than ever from the traders and poor and necessitous travellers. The zamindars also, seeing that no inquiries are made, extort more on roads within their boundaries than is collected on roads under royal officers. By degrees matters have come to such a pass that between the time of leaving the factory or port and reaching their destination, goods and merchandise pay double their cost price in tolls. Through the villainy and oppression of the toll-collectors and the zamindars, the property, the honour, and the lives of thousands of travellers and peaceful wayfarers are frittered away.”

Khafi Khan, like most chroniclers, writes from the point of view of the consumer and the traveller, but the references which have been given to the Dutch and English correspondence show that his condemnation of the entire system of transit dues was substantially in accordance with commercial opinion, and there is nothing to be said in its favour beyond the fact that it was endured by the people, and consequently profitable to the authorities.

As has been said above, our knowledge of the other duties levied on trade and industry is much less detailed. It is natural to assume that the payments required from artisans and petty traders had settled down on a more or less customary basis, but sufficient evidence exists to justify the statement that any marked development of business was likely to lead to an increase in the demand made either by the State or by its officers. The Imperial monopoly of indigo which, as we have seen, was established in the year 1633, involved a tax on production of practically 33 per cent, since producers had to sell at Rs. 18 when the market price was about Rs. 27. The earlier provincial levy in Gujarat was at first sight even heavier, for it works out at a charge of Rs. 10 on indigo valued at about Rs. 16, but in this case it is reasonable to suppose that the initial demand was pitched high in order to give a favourable start to negotiations, and the sum actually realised was probably less. Again we read that the Mogul Emperor had made saltpetre an Imperial monopoly in the year 1655, when the export trade had just begun to assume large dimensions; while ten years earlier a Dutch report mentions that a new toll had been imposed on the same commodity. In this connection we may notice a levy made by Mir Jumla in Bengal. A Dutch narrative tells how he called together the grain-merchants at Dacca, and demanded from them Rs. 50,000 on the ground that they had made twice as much by way of what might now be called excess profits owing to the prolonged presence of his large camp. The merchants offered Rs. 10,000; they were mercilessly beaten with whips, but refused to offer more, urging that they were only retailers; the two leaders were then seized and thrown in front of elephants, and, in fear of death, they compromised by paying Rs. 25,000; after which the bankers of the city paid three lakhs, apparently without the need arising for similar coercive processes. It is, I think, fair to conclude from such occurrences that industrial or distributive enterprise must have been seriously discouraged by the risk that novel demands might be imposed in the event of any profitable development of business.1

Before leaving the subject of local duties, a few words may be said regarding three heads of revenue, octroi, excise, and salt, which are familiar in modern India. Our authorities do not distinguish between octroi and transit duties, and probably the attitude of Indians was similar, but the levy of duty on goods brought into a city for consumption was certainly a recognised institution. In the sixteenth century these duties were familiar in Vijayanagar, where nothing could come through the gates without payment, and even head-loads were charged; while Akbar’s regulations for urban administration recognise and define the taxing power of the Kotwal, or city-governor. We may say, then, that octroi formed part of the system of local taxation during our period, and probably its incidence varied in practice with the individuality of the administrator.

There is no trace of any general system of excise, and such an institution would have been inconsistent with a strict adherence to Moslem religious law. Prohibition of the sale of alcohol was not rigorously enforced by Jahangir, but we hear of it under his successor. In his journal for 1632 Peter Mundy refers to the heavy penalties on distillation or sale of spirits; near Allahabad supplies could be obtained by stealth, but farther east none could be got for any money, there being “a strait prohibition, with death to the party, and destruction to that house where it shall be found.” The same writer, however, records that the Governor of Surat had farmed the palm trees from which intoxicating liquor was obtained; distillation was a recognised craft in that neighbourhood in the year 1630; and it is clear that while the Emperor’s orders were strict, their enforcement depended on the local administration, which might, as in the instance just given, draw revenue from consumption.

There is no doubt that under the Moguls salt was taxed, but the rates of duty do not appear to be on record except for the mines in the Punjab, where in Akbar’s time the charge was considerably more than double the prime cost. This duty is said to have been paid “to the dīwān,” an ambiguous phrase, which, however, probably denotes the Imperial authorities. The sources in Rajputana were under the local Chiefs at this period, and nothing is said about them in the Ain. Most, if not all, of the supply obtained in Gujarat and from the Ran of Cutch was taxed by the local Chiefs. In Bengal the tables of Imperial revenue include certain salt-duties, but, as has been said before, these tables appear to bear little relation to the administrative facts of the period. Speaking generally, then, we may conclude that, while salt was taxed, there was nothing like a uniform system of administration, and the duties were usually provincial or local rather than Imperial. The prominence of salt in the budget of modern India arises from the fact that—with the exception of the octroi levied in some municipalities—the tax is the sole survival of the mass of duties and imposts which during our period left scarcely any branch of industry untouched.

Apart from taxes, local authorities could hope to realise a large income from presents, fines, and bribes. The first of these heads does not call for detailed description; the practice of giving presents was universal and binding, and what has been said regarding it in the previous chapter applies generally to officials of all ranks. As regards fines, the Dutch commercial reports make it plain that fines went into the pocket of the officer by whom they were imposed. Writing primarily of Agra, Pelsart recorded that criminals were rarely executed unless they were poor, but their property was confiscated for the benefit of the Governor and the Kotwal. He added an expression of pity for those who came before “these godless and unrighteous officers; their eyes are bleared with greed, their mouths gape like wolves for their prey, their bellies hunger for the bread of the poor; every one stands with hands open to receive, for no mercy or compassion can be had except on payment.” Similarly the Gujarat Report shows that in the Empire generally fines were ordinary punishments, not only for minor offences, but even for murder, theft, and robbery, because all fines went to the Governor, whose pocket would not benefit if such criminals were executed. The line between fines and bribes was thus indistinct, and the report shows also that armed gangs of robbers infested the vicinity of some of the principal cities with the connivance of the Governors, who benefited both by the bribes they received, and by the savings in police expenditure. In the case of citizens also the authorities were in a position to extort money almost with impunity; a trumped-up charge would bring either fine or bribe, and there was no lack of informers to set the law in motion, for Pelsart wrote that in Agra they swarmed like flies. Nor could the provisions of the Moslem law be relied on: the Kāzi, whose business it was to interpret the law, might be sitting in the court, but in practice the Governor was absolute, and as the same observer says, "Who can excommunicate the Pope? and who can challenge the decision of the Governor?" The possibility of appeal existed, and we have seen in a previous chapter that a man of great wealth, like Virji Vora, might be successful before the Emperor; we do not know how much Virji Vora spent on that occasion, but it would be rash to infer from his success that men of moderate means were efficiently protected against the rapacity of local officials. To my mind the correct inference is that which has already been suggested, that in levies of all kinds, whether imposed on classes or on individuals, officials had to avoid such a scandal as might provoke interference from above, but that, short of this limit, they had very large opportunities of raising money by methods which would not be tolerated by public opinion at the present day, and which were undoubtedly injurious from the economist's point of view.

AUTHORITIES FOR CHAPTER IX

Section 1.—I know of no contemporary description of the Mogul fiscal system as a whole. The account I have given is based on statements scattered through the chronicles, and on Sarkar's Aurangzeb. The heads of revenue are stated most clearly in Manucci (ii. 415), but his list includes items which were added after the close of our period. For the gross yield of land revenue, see Ain (translation), ii. 115, and Badshahnama, ii. 710 ff. The nature of the outlay debited to the Court can be learned from Book I. of the Ain. Shahjahan's increased expenditure is emphasised in Elliot, vii. 171, 2. The comparison of salaries is based on Ain (translation), i. 308 ff., and Badshahnama, ii. 717 ff. Regarding the remittance of surplus revenue, see Sarkar's Aurangzeb, i. 171 ff. The poverty of the officials is stated by Bernier, 213. Authorities for the fiscal system in the south have been given under Chapter VIII.

Section 2.—For the Surat customs, see Hawkins in Early Travels, 171; Purchas, I. iv. 423; and Thévenot, 7: for competition between seaports, Roe, 45, 57, 82, and English Factories, iii. 192, viii. 134. Delay recurs frequently: see for instances, Letters Received, iv. 78, and English Factories, i. 137, ii. 311, iii. 29, viii. 302; also Schorer, f. 8. Over-valuation is also a common topic; the instances given are English Factories, v. 244; Letters Received, iv. 78; Roe, 152; Dagh Register, July 31, 1641. Instances of forced dealing by customs authorities are Letters Received, iv. 78, English Factories, i. 187, viii. 302.

The references to the Surat mint are English Factories, iv. 103, v. 18, vi. 84, vii. 23, viii. 185, x. 120. Abuses at Rajmahal are stated in Dagh Register, September 3, 1663, and numerous entries in the next few years. Statements of the Mogul claim to inheritance will be found in Purchas, I. iii. 218, II. ix. 1480; Roe, 110 ff.; Bernier, 164, 204, and elsewhere: Aurangzeb's letter on the subject is in Bernier, 167: the description of Jahangir's practice is translated from Pelsart, MS. f. 21. For Asaf Khan's estate, see Dagh Register, September 4, 1642; Elliot, vii. 68; and Manrique, lxxi: for Aurangzeb's attitude, Elliot, vii. 161, and Manucci, ii. 415 ff.: for notices in the commercial correspondence, English Factories, ii. 125, iii. 29, viii. 7, 102, 119.

The system of presents is mentioned by most writers: the specific passages referred to in the text are Manrique, lxiv, and Dagh Register (Surat), April 27, 1643, January 18 and June 9, 1645. The items of miscellaneous Imperial revenue must be sought in the statistical tables of Ain (translation), ii.

Section 3.—The levy of cesses on the revenue is referred to in Sarkar's Studies, 194; the local cess in Masulipatam in Terpstra's Koromandel, II., and Renneville, v. 179 ff. Jahangir's prohibition of local duties is in Tuzuk, i. 7; Aurangzeb's orders are discussed in Sarkar's Administration, 120; the persistence of such levies can be traced in numerous later works, e.g. Taylor's Dacca, 197. The passages referred to in connection with transit dues are Letters Received, iv. 79; English Factories, i. 88, 331; iii. 28, 176, 273; vii. 160; viii. 58, 71, 108, 301, 320; ix. 10, 26, 38, 84; x. 63; and Dagh Register, February 24, 1634; March 31, May 20, 1641; April 27, December 12, 1643 (Surat); April 17, 1643, January 5, 1645 (Coromandel). For the levies by authorities other than the Moguls, see English Factories, i. 331; ii. 96, 310; v. 17; vi. 13, 150, 258; vii. 306; ix. 235: Mundy, ii. 111, 119: Thévenot, 279: Manucci, ii. 171: Letters Received, v. 128. Khafi Khan's account is in Elliot, vii. 246-248.

As regards other duties, the monopolies mentioned have been discussed in Chapter IV. Dues on saltpetre are mentioned in English Factories, x. 15, and Dagh Register (Coromandel), August 19, 1645; for Mir Jumla's levies, see idem, November 29, 1661. Town duties are recorded in Sewell, 364 ff., and Ain (translation), ii. 42: excise regulations in Mundy, ii. 32, 97, 134; and salt duties in Ain (translation), ii. 242, 249, 315. The quotations regarding fines and bribes are taken from Pelsart (MS. ff. 22, 24), and Gujarat Report, ff. 20, 21.

Notes

  1. 1. The amount to be paid by the monopolist is variously stated as four and six lakhs, in addition to repayment of a loan from the treasury (English Factories, iv. 324).
  2. 2. The features of the Mogul administrative organisation here summarised are explained at greater length in India at the Death of Akbar, chaps. ii., iii.
  3. 1. Mogul officers ranked according to a scale drawn up in terms of mounted men; the position of a "commander of 1000," for instance, was nearly as definite as that of a Commissioner of a Division at the present day. All that need be said here is that the number of men denoted by the rank was far greater than the number required to be maintained.
  4. 2. The Indian tradition was to accumulate a large surplus, which was hoarded in the treasury, in the form of either cash or jewellery. The chronicler quoted in the last chapter asserts that Shahjahan followed this tradition successfully. On the other hand, Bernier (p. 223) says that his accumulations were less than six karors of rupees, a small amount considering the duration of the reign, but this writer excludes precious stones and other articles of value, which the chronicler presumably took into account, so the discrepancy is not very material.
  5. 1. These assignments were usually of the type already described, in which the assignee was expected to collect the income, but cash assignments were also recognised, which would be paid out of the treasury under the order of the Dīwān. Thus when Aurangzeb was Viceroy of the Deccan, he held large assignments of land, but received also a fixed sum in cash (Sarkar's Aurangzeb, i. 179).
  6. 1. Prince Shahjahan was at this time assignee of the revenues of the port.
  7. 2. The prevalence of such practices as I have described may be inferred from the fact that even passengers' personal luggage was not exempt. It is dangerous to rely on the available editions of Mandelslo's journal, because his editors added so much to the original, but the following passage (p. 12) appears to record his personal experience at Surat: "The Sultan or Governor, nay, the Customers themselves, oblige merchants and passengers to part with, at the price they shall think fit to put upon them, those goods and commodities which they had brought for their own private use. Accordingly the Sultan, having found among my things a bracelet of yellow amber and a diamond, would needs buy them both of me."
  8. 1. Up to 1635, there were probably no wealthy merchants in Sind, other than the Portuguese, who almost monopolised its trade. It cannot be inferred, therefore, that similar protests would have been heard if the transaction had occurred in Agra or Gujarat.
  9. 2. In his History of Jahangir, which reached me while these paragraphs were in the printer's hands, Mr. Beni Prasad writes (p. 85 n.) that in India at the Death of Akbar I have fallen “ into the mistake of supposing that the effects of merchants also escheated to the State.” I can find no such assertion in my former book, but on page 51 I wrote that the Emperor certainly claimed the goods left by the wealthier merchants. The extant evidence, some of which is set out in the text, appears to me to justify that statement; the mistake, if there be one, is primarily Aurangzeb's.
  10. 1. I examined this question in a paper on the agricultural statistics of Akbar’s Empire, in the Journal of the United Provinces Historical Society, 1919.
  11. 1. Obviously, a fee for stamping (chhāp, a stamp or seal), and brokerage (dalāl, a broker).
  12. 1. Aurangzeb's exemptions are set out and discussed in Professor Sarkar's Lectures on Mughal Administration, p. 120 ff.
  13. 2. Zakāt, which occasionally appears in the commercial correspondence in forms such as jagat, properly denotes an income-tax recognised by Moslem law, but at our period its popular meaning had come to be a duty levied, not at fixed intervals of time, but at uncertain intervals of space.
  14. 1. Dinar and dirham: traditional Moslem coins. Their precise value is immaterial for this passage, which is obviously rhetorical.
  15. 1. For jagāt, or zakāt, see the note above. Rāhdārī appears to have meant originally payments for travelling guards, but in our period it means transit dues, whether guards were supplied or not.
  16. 1. Junckan is apparently the Tamil word chungam, a toll: in the East Coast correspondence it represents duties of the same general kind as were called rāhdāri in the north and west.
  17. 2. In the Maurya Empire, “the merchant was mulcted in dues at the frontier, by road-taxes and tolls, and by octroi at the gates of the cities” (Cambridge History of India, i. 478).
  18. 1. The Gujarat Report (f. 19) shows that about the year 1628 Ahmadabad enjoyed marked advantages over other cities in that local taxation was both light and certain, and the writer attributed to this fact its extensive and flourishing trade and industry. Probably some other places enjoyed similar advantages from time to time, but they were exceptions to the general rule.
  19. 1. Khafi Khan’s personal experience was later than our period, and where he writes in the present tense he is probably referring to the beginning of the eighteenth century, when administrative disorganisation had progressed and the check on local abuses had been weakened; things were doubtless worse when he wrote than under Shahjahan, but the system was identical.
  20. 1. The reputation earned by Mir Jumla in Bengal is indicated in an entry in the Dagh Register, under date September 3, 1663. The letter which described his encounter with “death, his last enemy,” went on to say: “And this is the end of a man, who, rising out of obscurity, must be classed among the most eminent, inspiring such awe that even his master, the Great Mogul, appeared to fear him; but now he is little mourned, indeed every one seems absolutely delighted at his death.”