From Akbar to Aurangzeb

Appendix A

The Dutch and English Companies

From Akbar to Aurangzeb, W. H. Moreland, 1923 · from page 307 · about 21 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

The constitution and management of European trading companies are topics which lie outside the scope of a book dealing with the economic history of India, but some knowledge of these subjects is required in order to understand the principal authorities for the commerce of our period, which consist of the records of such companies, and assume a familiarity with details which cannot be expected of ordinary readers at the present day. Some explanation, therefore, is called for, and the need for it is increased by the changes in the meaning of various terms which have occurred in the course of three centuries. The very word "Company" calls up a false picture : to speak of shareholders is in some respects misleading ; and it is equally dangerous to talk of capital and dividends.

The development of the joint-stock company with limited liability has been a lengthy process, and it had made comparatively little way in England when "certain adventurers" were incorporated "for the discovery of the trade for the East Indies" on the last day of the year 1600. At that date there were no Company Acts in existence, no settled forms of procedure, no recognised rules of accountancy ; and, while it was not altogether a novelty, the enterprise may fairly be described as an adventure even in the modern sense of the term. What happened was this. Certain merchants agreed together to risk, or adventure, some money in a trade of which they had no experience. They applied for, and obtained, Letters Patent, or as we should now say a Charter, from the Crown, incorporating them as a Company, and thus giving them a legal status, laying down rules for their procedure, and granting certain privileges, notably a monopoly of the trade for a term of years. The first adventurers became by this charter the original members of the Company, but the identity did not continue. The Company was, as the charter says, a Fellowship, and what we should call its members were known as brothers or freemen. Admission, or the freedom of the Company, could be obtained in the recognised ways, by patrimony, or by service, or on payment of what was called a fine; there was no inherent obligation on the freeman to adventure any capital, and thus the Company consisted of members who were privileged, but not bound, to take part in its enterprises.1 The adventurers at any moment were those members who had invested capital; the Company had no permanent capital of its own, and the funds with which trade was carried on belonged to a fluctuating body of its members. The word "fluctuating" is justified by the fact that the adventures were at first made for short periods and specific purposes. The original adventure was for a single voyage; the whole capital subscribed was spent on ships and goods, and when the ships returned, they were disposed of, and the adventure was wound up. In this way twelve voyages were undertaken in succession, each with its separate capital subscribed by bodies of adventurers, and returned to them, with any profits that had been earned, on its conclusion.

This system of separate voyages proved to be exceedingly inconvenient, mainly owing to the conditions prevailing in Asiatic markets, which, as has been explained in Chapter II., made it necessary to keep factors on the spot, to dispose of imports as opportunity offered, and to get together goods for export in advance of the arrival of shipping. In 1613, therefore, a joint stock was subscribed, which undertook all the business up to 1616, and two other joint stocks cover the period from 1616 to 1640. By the latter year, the trade had lost its initial attractions for Englishmen. Dutch competition was vigorous and successful; profits had fallen off; King Charles I. had encouraged the rival enterprise known as Courteen's Association; and the political situation in England made it undesirable to lock up funds in prolonged speculative undertakings. The subscription for a new joint stock failed to fill, and in 1642 a reversion was made to the system of Single (now called General) Voyages. Later in this year a fourth joint stock was launched, but with wholly inadequate capital: a Second general voyage was undertaken in 1646 ; and in 1650 the “ United Joint Stock ” resulted from the inclusion of certain merchants who had hitherto stood outside the Company. This in turn was exhausted in a few years ; in 1655 a subscription failed, and for a time the trade was practically open, that is to say it was carried on by individuals ; but in 1657, on the grant of a fresh charter, capital was again attracted, and the New General Stock was started with subscriptions of nearly three-quarters of a million sterling, only half of which was eventually employed. Unlike its predecessors, this adventure was made for an indefinite duration, and, since a regular market for the shares developed in London, it became permanent ; adventurers sold their shares instead of looking for repayment, and thus the share-capital of the Company came into existence.

The procedure followed by the Company makes it impossible to calculate the exact dividends paid during our period. When one or more ships had arrived in the Thames, a “ division ” (as it was called) was usually made to the adventurers concerned, sometimes in cash, sometimes in pepper, indigo, calico, or whatever goods might be on hand ; other divisions might follow at uncertain intervals ; and in some cases we do not know the precise period for which the capital was actually employed. It is certain, however, that while the first ten or twelve years’ trading, covered by the single voyages, was comfortably, though not extravagantly, remunerative,1 the first joint stock was marked by a serious fall in profits, the second and third paid very little, and the fourth resulted in a loss of half the capital. The details as set out in the records of the Company are as follows.

The First and Second voyages were eventually united, and gave an “ advance ” over the original capital of 95 per cent, which has to be distributed over the period of its employment ; the annual rate of dividend depends not only on the total period, but on whether we take the return of capital first, or proportionately from each division, and on various other factors. The Third and Fifth voyages, which were also combined, yielded 234 per cent, but the Fourth was practically a total loss, the ships being cast away, and this fact must be taken into account in any attempt to strike an average of profits. The “ advance ” given by the next seven voyages (Sixth to Twelfth) varied between 120 and 220 per cent ; and that these returns were considered to be satisfactory is shown by the large subscription (£400,000) secured for the first joint stock. At this point the tide of profit began to ebb as the difficulties with the Dutch increased. This joint stock gave 87½ per cent advance in the course of about four years, but the second gave only 12½ per cent, and the third 35 per cent, so that, taking the latter two together, the dividend calculated on modern lines would have been somewhere about 2 per cent annually. The effect was seen in the difficulties experienced in raising capital for fresh ventures, difficulties increased by the failure of the fourth joint stock, which eventually lost half its capital; and, while the United Joint Stock did somewhat better (gaining 105 per cent in all), it seems to be certain that from about 1615 to 1655 the Company was not really a commercial success.

The Dutch Company was in some respects more in keeping with the modern sense of the word, for it had from the outset what may fairly be termed a permanent capital of about £550,000, and consequently its payments to shareholders are comparable with modern dividends, though the fact that they were paid sometimes in cash, sometimes in bonds, and sometimes in spices, would have to be allowed for in a precise calculation of the rate of profit.1 Its constitution was, however, peculiar. The shareholders had no control whatever over the managing body, which was complex. The different organisations which had united to form the Company retained their individuality, in so far that there were several distinct “Chambers,” one located at each of the principal seaports. Each chamber consisted of a number of directors (bewinthebber), who were in the first instance nominated; subsequent vacancies were filled by the provincial government on the nomination of the existing directors. The central management consisted of a “College” of seventeen, representing the chambers in fixed proportions; its members were often spoken of as “the Seventeen.” The college framed the policy of the Company, which was executed by the chambers, each acting for its own seaport. Thus the size and equipment of the annual fleet was determined by the college, which allotted ships to each chamber: the chamber sent out the ships allotted to it, and marketed the goods brought back in its ships. In practice, then, the business of the Company was entirely in the hands of an oligarchical body, maintaining its continuity by nominating to vacancies. The charter provided that serious disputes in the college should be referred to the Central Government (the States General), but the historian of the Company is justified in the statement that the directors were practically autocrats, in no way responsible to the shareholders, and only nominally responsible to the State. The accounts of the Company were not published, there were no meetings of members or shareholders corresponding to the General Courts of the English Company, and it is said that no minutes were kept of the proceedings of the college. Our knowledge of the policy and motives of the Company is therefore incomplete; in later years its financial methods were dubious, and apparently some of the dividends were paid out of capital; but there seems no reason to doubt that during our period the sums distributed were really earned.

The early profits of the Dutch Company were high. The figures given by different writers are discordant, but the average dividend from 1605 to 1609 was certainly 35 per cent annually, and perhaps much more. From 1610 to 1619 the resources of the Company were devoted largely to the struggle for monopoly in the Spice Islands, and in these years the distribution averaged about 21, or, according to another account, 28 per cent. The dividends for the five decades from 1620 to 1669 averaged 12, 20¾, 29, 18, and 14¾ per cent annually, payments being made in most years, but the amounts varying within wide limits; and if we consider that the rate for loans in the London market ranged during part of this period from seven to nine per cent,1 we are justified in regarding the Dutch returns as satisfactory, but not very much more. An important point to realise regarding this Company is what may be described as its national aspect.2 It was formed at the instance of the State by the amalgamation of existing ventures: the interests of each important seaport were represented on the governing body; authority was given to it to enter into agreements with foreign Powers in the name of the Dutch Government; and when the first Governor General was appointed in 1609, the position assigned to him was very nearly that of an officer of State, with practically a free hand in matters of Asiatic policy. The protracted negotiations between the English and Dutch Governments indicate a great difference in the position held by the two Companies. The impression left on my mind by a perusal of the Calendars of State Papers is that, while James I. regarded the protection of the Eastern trade as important but not vital, the States General and the Dutch Company acted practically as a single body, ready to stake everything for the attainment of the objects of the latter. It is true that the States condemned the action of the Company's officials in the affair of Amboina, but their diplomatic efforts were directed to keeping what had been gained rather than to satisfying the English demands, and their success in doing this is a matter of history. The English Company could usually count on fair promises from the two Stuart kings, but it could count on nothing more: the Dutch acted with the certainty that its Government stood behind it; it had been given wide powers by the State, but at the same time it constituted a power within the State, and one with which the State could hardly have ventured to break.

The national position enjoyed by the Dutch Company was a material factor in its commercial success, but does not by itself explain its marked superiority over its English rival. Apart from national support, that superiority may be attributed to the advantages resulting from priority, financial strength, sound administration, and possibly a higher level of capacity in the staff employed. The fact of priority is obvious: the Dutch had six years' experience of the markets when the first ships of the English Company reached Java, and were known as customers in every promising seaport which the English visited as strangers. Their financial strength arose mainly from their large permanent capital, which was in marked contrast to the sums adventured in England for successive voyages; and thus they started in the struggle for the Spice Islands with a definite handicap in their favour. Moreover, they were quick to realise, what seems obvious now, that a strong centralised administration was essential in the East: during the critical years from 1610 onwards the direction of their whole resources was concentrated under the Governor General in Java, while the English factors and commanders, not infrequently at variance, could look for guidance only to London. Add to these considerations the emergence of a really great man, the masterful and ruthless Jan Pieterszoon Coen, who, first as director of the factories in Java, and then as Governor General, may fairly be said to have dominated the Eastern seas as Alboquerque had dominated them a century before, and the initial success of the Dutch in securing the monopoly of the Spice Islands and the Farther East is seen to have been the only possible result of the conditions which prevailed.

Their commercial success during the rest of our period depended very largely on that monopoly, but continued sound administration was also an important factor. The Council at Batavia stands out in the records as highly efficient: the chain of subordination was strict, each of the chiefs at such centres as Taiwan, Amboina, Pulicat, or Surat being held directly responsible to the Council for the various factories under his control; and the occasional inspections made by high officials from Batavia were so conducted as to maintain discipline and curtail abuses, as well as to develop and extend trade on profitable lines. During this period, the English factories, spread over a much smaller area, were usually grouped under two co-ordinate authorities, the councils at Surat and Bantam, whose views not infrequently differed, and whose conflicts of opinion had ample time to bring serious losses before they could be removed by orders from the Company in London. The discipline exercised by these councils must, I think, be described as lax, and it is hardly going too far to say that, while the Dutch carried on their business as a trained and disciplined team, the English achievement was largely the work of individuals. It is difficult to compare personnel after the lapse of nearly three centuries, but the impression left on my mind by the records of the two Companies is that the Dutch had on the average an advantage, though it is of course impossible to say whether, given equal discipline, the English might not have done equally well.

The lack of discipline in the English organisation is most apparent in the matter of Private Trade, a topic which recurs so frequently in the records that some explanation of it is due to modern readers. The factors were employed by the Company, which was entitled to claim the results of their work and knowledge, and suffered more or less serious injury when, as so commonly happened, they devoted time and brains to making money for themselves. The private trade which they carried on may be classified, from the Company's point of view, as imports, exports, and local trade. Imports to Europe by returning factors and ship's companies were the least open to objection, and individuals were formally allowed to bring home a certain amount of goods subject to certain specified exceptions. They did not, however, confine themselves within these limits, but brought cargo by the tun, filling up space on the ships which belonged to the Company, and sometimes interfering with its markets.1 The Company treated such infractions of its orders with extraordinary leniency, entering into negotiations with each individual, sometimes taking over the goods at a fair price, sometimes merely charging freight, and sometimes imposing a fine, the amount of which depended on the quality of the individual's past service; and no one who has glanced through the Court Minutes for our period can wonder that the practice was almost universal. Private imports were, in fact, speculative business, the profits on which had usually to be shared with the Company, but a factor whose record was good could hope to keep a large portion for himself.

Private exports, of course, tended to affect the Company's markets abroad, but they were discouraged mainly, I think, because they represented capital which later on could be used in local trade.2 Outgoing factors were often allowed to invest capital in the "adventure" by which they were employed, and this course was obviously advantageous; but the profits of successful private speculation might be so great that a man who went out with even a small sum in his own possession might come home with what in those days was a comfortable fortune, gained by trading in the East. The mere buying and selling, though it was sometimes on a scale sufficient to affect the local markets, was the least objectionable part of the business. Some factors employed the Company's capital in their private ventures; with the same object, others borrowed money ostensibly on the Company's account; vessels belonging to the Company were diverted to carry the goods of individual merchants; transactions were so handled that the profits accrued to the individual, while the Company bore the losses; and secret partnerships were arranged with local merchants, who thus obtained the benefit of knowledge which belonged by right to the Company. The whole thing must have been utterly demoralising, and a sound administration would have endeavoured to stamp it out; yet in 1634, when a merchant chosen as President of Bantam asked for powers to do so, his request was refused, and he was advised to use his authority "not with too much rigour and severity." The truth appears to be that the scales of salaries and expenses allowed by the Company were in themselves inadequate to attract competent merchants ; the directors recognised that the hope of gain by private trading was in fact part of the contract, and they endeavoured to keep such trade within reasonable limits while tolerating its existence, an attempt which was obviously hopeless.

The stronger Dutch administration attempted no such compromise, and, so far as can be judged from the published records, it suffered much less from the practice, at least until the closing years of our period. Raynal, writing in the eighteenth century, laid stress on the frugality and probity of the Dutch merchants, and asserted that before the year 1650 not even one remarkable fortune had been made; but he alleged that after that date luxury and corruption made rapid strides. Contemporary records suggest a continuous struggle over this question, though an absolute prohibition of private trade had been issued in 1603. As early as 1610, we hear of private goods being detected and confiscated, a stern measure which, I think, was never at this period taken by the English authorities in the East. Twenty years later, orders sent out from Amsterdam suggest that the evil was increasing, and we hear of Dutch factors transacting business through English intermediaries. Tavernier tells of much private trade after the year 1640, but he had a quarrel with the Dutch, and possibly exaggerates the extent of the evil ; at the same time he allows that heavy penalties were enforced in some instances. An order issued at Batavia in 1653 suggests that the practice was then extending, for informers were promised a share of confiscated goods ; while three years later we hear of two high officers being sent for trial on charges of gross private trading ; and from 1664 onwards the Batavia Journals indicate increased attention to the subject at headquarters. These incidents suggest that the Dutch were gradually yielding to temptation, and the same inference may be drawn from an order of the year 1676 in which the directors at Amsterdam reiterated their prohibition of the practice, “ which is nothing else than a plague and canker in the Company's body, and yet flourishes everywhere in spite of all the orders decreed and the notices issued.” On the strength of this order it may perhaps be said that by this time private trade had definitely been established among the Dutch merchants, but we may accept Raynal's statement and the other evidence quoted above as showing that in the earlier years of its existence the Dutch Company secured, to a greater extent than its English rival, the best services of its employees in the East.

This “ private trade ” must be distinguished from the business carried on by Europeans not in the service of one of the Companies, who are sometimes described as " private traders." The operations of these individuals were, however, unimportant during our period. There were free Dutchmen living at Batavia and some other places in Asia, but their business was closely controlled by the Company in whose settlements they lived, and they were probably a help rather than a hindrance to the official merchants. The English Company had little trouble with individual Englishmen until the last few years of our period. One result of the years of open trade (about 1655) was the settlement on the East Coast of individuals not under direct obligation to the Company, and from 1658 onwards they begin to take a prominent place in the commercial correspondence.

AUTHORITIES FOR APPENDIX A

The early history of joint-stock companies can be studied in Scott. The first Letters Patent of the English Company are given in Purchas, I. iii. 139 ; its subsequent history must be traced mainly in the Court Minutes. The evils resulting from separate voyages are indicated in Jourdain, 304, among other writers. The eventual establishment of share-capital is recorded in English Factories, x. 113 ; the introductions to the earlier volumes of this series give the salient facts regarding the position of the Company, while the financial results are reviewed in Court Minutes for November 1654. For the constitution of the Dutch Company I have relied mainly on Van der Chijs, who in chapter XII. gives the charter in full ; its working is discussed in van Loon, 61 ff. The dividends paid are set out in Renneville, i. Introduction, and, with some discrepancies in the early years, in Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, iv. 488, while Edmundson, p. 124, mentions one very large payment not shown in either table. The orders defining the powers of the Governor General are in de Jonge, III. 130 ; the general course of the prolonged Anglo-Dutch negotiations can be followed in the Calendar S.P.

The evils of private trade among the English appear all through the Court Minutes and English Factories; some remarks of Roe (442) show that it was rampant within a few years of the Company's foundation. The case in which the Company explicitly discouraged zeal is in Court Minutes, January 3, 1634. Raynal's view of private trade among the Dutch is i. 191. The original prohibition is given in de Jonge, III. 206 : the early instance of confiscation, in Terpstra's Koromandel, 144 : the orders of 1632, in Hague Transcripts, II. 95, 97 : the assistance rendered by the English, in English Factories, iv. 166, and passim : Tavernier's account in i. 311, ii. 43-50, 327 ff. : the later orders quoted, in Dagh Register, December 31, 1653, November 6, 1656 ; and de Jonge, VI. 163. For private traders not in the English Company's employment, see English Factories, x. 149, and later entries.

Notes

  1. 1. An adventure was not necessarily confined to the existing members or freemen. Thus the Court decided in 1607 that if the Fourth voyage were not fully financed by the "old adventurers," any of the King's subjects might be permitted to subscribe (Court Minutes, May 13, 1607); such subscribers would presumably have been admitted as freemen in due course.
  2. 1. Macpherson, in his History of European Commerce with India (p. 92), calculated the annual return of the separate voyages as something under 20 per cent, which he regarded as “ scarcely an adequate premium for the risk.”
  3. 1. Under the terms of the original charter shareholders were free to withdraw their capital after each triennial settlement of accounts, but the development of a market for the shares, usually at a premium, rendered this provision unimportant in practice.
  4. 1. In 1609 the English Company was inquiring for a loan at nine per cent or under, and in 1614 it was offered money at ten, and borrowed at nine, per cent (Court Minutes, February 13, 1609, January 24, 1614). Ten years later, the Company was paying seven and eight per cent (idem, August 25, 1624), while in 1635 the rate was 6½ to 7 per cent (idem, February 1, 1635).
  5. 2. The power of the Dutch Company appears very clearly in the records of the negotiations carried on from time to time in London and in Holland. In 1627, for instance, when the English Company was considering the abandonment of its undertaking, a “mixed court” recorded the opinion that there was very little hope of redress for the losses caused by the Dutch, since “the Government of the Low Countries is so intermixed with Bewinthebbers that in a trial they will be both parties and judges” (Court Minutes, July 20, 1627).
  6. 1. Captain Weddell, for instance, brought home 40 tuns of goods, a quantity which would occupy an appreciable proportion of the whole cargo-space available for the year (Court Minutes, December 18, 1626).
  7. 2. As has been indicated in the text, quicksilver was a favourite form of private export. In 1630 the London price of the metal was raised owing to the quantity bought by mariners and others going on the voyage (Court Minutes, October 22, 1630).