Among the critics (a) of, and indeed to some extent among the sympathisers with, English rule in India, there are two widespread fallacies in reference to the causes and effects of famines in that land. The one is that the extent and severity of these disasters at the present day are the direct consequence of English government, and that in the times of the predominance of Hindus and Muhammadans they were not only less extended in area, but also less tragic in their effects; the other is the fatalistic doctrine that to struggle against famines is to struggle against the unalterable laws of nature, as they constitute a natural check on a population which shows a constant inclination to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence. The detailed criticism of this latter contention must be postponed until the whole problem of the poverty of India is considered. (b) But a review of the early famines of which history makes mention will, it is hoped, prove the lack of truth in the half-expressed complementary contention that the famines of modern serve the same useful and necessary purpose as the wars of more ancient history. Wars and famines have reduced the cultivator to the verge of subsistence, and the productivity of land has been checked by his lack of capital. They have not in the long run increased the net capital per head by reducing the divisor of the national income.
In view of the story of the great drought in the first book of the Ramayana, (a) and the hymns of Rig Veda, filled as they are with prayers for rain, and the endless praises of Indra, the god of the elements, it is difficult to believe in the statement of Megasthenes, that at the time at which he wrote famine had never visited India. (b) Indeed, the frequency of the mention of famine in the later history of that land increases in exact proportion with the precision and accuracy in detail of her historians. That there is not more frequent mention and more detailed description can only be attributed to the fact that the Hindus seldom wrote accounts of their lives, and that the Muhammadan historians occupied themselves more with the glories and the wars and the sins of their rulers than with those phenomena of nature which they deemed to be the scourges of an enraged God.
It is impossible to portray here, even in such scant detail as is available, all the famines between 297 (c) and 1770.1 It is a tale of infinite destruction of human life sometimes resultant from, often aided by, wars and oppressive government, and occasionally, spasmodically, restrained by the energy of a particular monarch or the generosity of the rich. But, through all the turmoil of wars and the rise and fall of dynasties, despite the absence of any organised system of protection or alleviation, it is possible to trace a development, however slow and indeterminate, in the methods adopted and the success attained in famine relief.
The fatalism of the Hindus and their fortitude and endurance in suffering afforded them little incentive to energetic action. There are, indeed, few pictures of famine which portray such abject lack of power to resist, or willingness to assist, as that given in Kalhana's Rajatarangini of the drought in Kashmir in 917–8. “One could scarcely see the water in the Vitasta (Jehlam), entirely covered as the river was with corpses soaked and swollen by the water in which they had long been lying. The land became densely covered with bones in all directions, until it was like one great burial-ground, causing terror to all beings. The king's ministers and the Tantrins (guards) became wealthy, as they amassed riches by selling stores of rice at high prices. The king would take that person as minister who raised the sums due on the Tantrin's bills, by selling the subjects in such a condition.” (a)
History is, indeed, not lacking in such instances of maladministration and misgovernment adding to the horrors of natural calamities. Whether it was, as on this occasion, the deliberate tyranny of the Government, or, as was not seldom the case, its want of foresight, which intensified the evil, the result was the same to the masses of the people, and escape from starvation was impossible. One of the most striking examples of the disastrous effects of a mistaken economic policy is to be found in Alla ud Din's attempt to fix the prices of grain at Delhi at a permanent level. Export of all commodities was prohibited, and grain was stored in granaries in the capital, while half the land revenue, which was enhanced, was to be paid in kind. The country had been already partially exhausted by the famine of 1291; the attempt to maintain an arbitrary level of prices completely broke down; and the financial and commercial chaos which ensued from the interference with the natural course of trade rendered the State totally incapable of bearing the strain of a deficient harvest. (a) Similarly it was owing to the excessive land cesses of the unfortunate Muhammad Tughlak, and the consequent ruin of the cultivators, that the series of droughts which followed in uninterrupted succession in the years from 1343 to 1345 so exhausted the last sparks of vitality in his Empire that Zia Barni could write without exaggeration, "The glory of the State and the power of the Sultan Muhammad from this time withered and decayed." (b)2
The impoverishment of the people on these occasions, moreover, was neither exceptional nor caused merely by the brutality of a single despot or the folly of particular Emperors. It was rather under the heel of the minor officials of State that the people groaned, and their condition was but little better in times of political prosperity than in those of dynastic decay.3
War was so continual under the various Muhammadan dynasties that it is scarcely possible to select any one instance as worthy of especial emphasis. There are, indeed, two examples toward the beginning of the sixteenth century of famines, almost purely artificial in their origin, possessing a peculiar interest as being the result, not of the ordinary ravages of war and plunder, but of a deliberate defensive policy. In 1527 Jam Ninda, ruler of Sind, with the same object in view as the Dutch when they opened their sluice gates, ordered all standing corn in that country to be destroyed. The scheme was unsuccessful; but at least the effects were not so fatal as when thirteen years later Mirza Shah Humayun forbade the sowing of corn on either bank of the river and prohibited import. For with a favourable harvest six months later the distress passed rapidly away, whereas in the later reign two years of natural deficiency followed the year of artificial famine, and the people were only delivered from the conqueror to be decimated by want. (a)
Still more worthy of note, perhaps, are those occasions when famine forced contending armies to lay down their arms, as, for instance, in 1424, when the Sultan, Ahmed Shah, was compelled to come to terms with Dewal Roy. The famine is reported to have "raged throughout the Dekkan," and although the Sultan enlarged the pay of his troops and opened his stores of grain to the poor, the starving people rose in sedition against him on the ground that his "reign was unlucky and displeasing to God." (a)
Among the other forces which have contributed their share to the fatality of drought must be included plague and those other contagious diseases the danger of which starvation and deprivation naturally intensify.
On those rare occasions when plague is mentioned by Indian historians it is almost always as the accompanying evil of drought and starvation. But the problem of the exact relationship and interdependence of the two calamities is by no means clear. There is, indeed, but a single instance recorded of an outbreak of plague between 1033 and 1683 in which there is not direct evidence also of famine conditions, (b) and a study of more recent plagues tends to show that the virulence of that disease is itself partially dependent on climatic conditions. Moreover, mortality is naturally greatest when the resisting power of the people has already been weakened by lack of sustenance. It does not, however, necessarily follow that these epidemics were unknown in years of plenty. The relation of natural disasters was not the primary object of the native historians. Their references to famines themselves are relatively scarce, and their references to plague are in the main merely incidental to their descriptions of the greater tragedies. But whatever the frequency of plague may have been, there can be no question as to its destructiveness, or the terror it inspired. During the famine of 1033 a pestilence is related to have swept across the country, claimed in less than four weeks forty thousand victims in the single city of Ispahan, “depopulated whole countries” in Hindustan, and left not a single house untouched in Moosul and Bagdad. (a) There is, unfortunately, insufficient evidence to prove the general effects of the plagues which broke out in the two famine years, 1345 (b) and 1399. (c) In both instances, as was so often the case, the disease was spread by the armies. But to what degree the troops of Tughlak or of Timur affected the civil population remains unknown, beyond the fact that for two months after the retreat of the latter “ Delhi was desolate.” More detailed information is, however, obtainable of the famines and plagues of 1574 and 1594. In the first instance, the inhabitants of Gujarat, both rich and poor, were forced to abandon their homes and fly from the country, (d) and in the second, as Nuru-l Hakk relates, men were driven to eat their own kind, and the streets and roads were blocked with dead bodies, for the removal of which no assistance could be rendered. (e)
Plague was indeed a source of terror to the people sufficient alone to paralyse all action. Dr. Whyte has related how in the nineteenth century it was deemed to be “ no disease, but an order from the Almighty to remove whomsoever it attacked.” (a) Indeed, the sentiment expressed by the Emperor Jehangir when he said, “ God knows we must patiently submit to His will,” (b) has been through all history typical of the attitude of the people. In order to estimate accurately its effects in time of famine account must be taken not only of the victims of the plague itself, but of those also who abandoned themselves without an effort to death by starvation, terror-struck by the horror of the double calamity.4
There is, however, no small difficulty in attempting to compare the intensity of these earlier famines with those of more modern times. When means of communication were few, and exact information difficult to acquire, it was naturally impossible for writers of memoirs to have precise knowledge of the events which were taking place in neighbouring countries. It is not surprising, then, that only the roughest and most inadequate estimate can be made of the area over which early famines extended. Historians seldom gave details of such disasters as took place outside the dominions of the particular rulers whose history they were writing.
The famines of 1423 (c) and 1685 (d) are said to have affected the whole of the Deccan (a somewhat indefinite term); that of 1471, the whole of the Bahmini dominions.5 Of apparently greater extent were those of 1630 and 1660. According to Kafi Khan the former not only "prevailed throughout all India, but . . . also extended over the whole of Asia." (a) Of the latter, it can only be definitely asserted that of all the territories of the Empire of Aurangzib, Bengal and the Punjab (b) alone appear to have produced normal crops.
There is a curious legend among Hindus that the famine of 1396 in the Deccan lasted twelve years, and that a very scanty revenue was obtained from the territory of the Godavery and Kistna for upwards of thirty. (c)6 Actual failure of rains is comparatively seldom suffered for more than two, or at the most three, years in succession, though it is often the case that a year of complete failure is preceded by several of relative deficiency. There is little evidence to show that meteorological conditions have materially changed. The unusually long period of inadequate water supply experienced at the close of the nineteenth century has its exact parallel in a similar phenomenon at the close of the sixteenth. (d) Only the 1396 legend and an excessive period of drought in Tartary are in any way peculiar. (e)
It is possible to estimate the intensity of modern famines from the published reports of the officials, and (though it is only for the most recent famines that both sets of figures are available) by a comparison of the size of the population in the affected areas and the mortality statistics. In the curious mixture of picturesque, almost rococo, exaggeration and matter-of-fact simplicity, which characterises the writings of Indian historians, the reality of the calamity is displayed in a more telling, if more gruesome, manner. But it is impossible to compare. Too much is dependent on the histrionic power of the writer. But two or three examples will suffice to test the truth of the theory that in past times the suffering and mortality were less than at the present day. In the famine of 1291, for instance, so intense was the misery that, despite the fact that "the Sultan and nobles did all they could to help," whole families would go together to seek a less cruel death by drowning themselves in the river. (a) In 1540 no less than two-thirds of the population of Vijayanagara perished from want. (b) It is related how in 1555 the people endeavoured to support life on the seeds of acacia, and, more striking still, on the hides of their dead beasts, (c) while on some occasions even greater extremes were reached, and death was avoided by the stronger by the destruction of the weaker, fathers even devouring their own children. (d) Nor did the people alone suffer, for in 1345, as so often subsequently, the whole stock of horses and cattle in the country round Delhi is said to have perished from lack of fodder. (a) But the most vivid description of any famine that has come down to us is of that of 1630. It is a story of want and plague and war, against which all the energy of Shah Jehan was in vain. "The war in the Deccan produced nothing but desolation in that country. An extraordinary drought burnt up all vegetables and dried up the rivers," (b) and, as Peter Lundy relates, "the men and women were driven to that extremitie for want of food that they sold their children for 12d., 6d., and [3?] pence apiece. Yea, and to give them away to any that would take them." (c) "Life was offered for a loaf, but none would buy; rank was to be sold for a cake, but none cared for it; the ever-bounteous hand was stretched out to beg for food; and the feet which had always trodden the way of contentment walked about in search of sustenance." (d)
Thirty thousand persons are said to have perished in the single city of Surat, and when the rains did finally break, the country round was inundated by floods, which prolonged the scarcity into the following year. (e) In Tartary, populous and flourishing provinces were converted into solitudes and deserts; and a few, who escaped the general calamity, wandered through depopulated cities alone. (f)
Special emphasis has been laid upon this famine, not only on account of the vividness of the descriptions, but because it is one of comparatively few instances in which direct evidence is discoverable of a genuine attempt on the part of the Government to alleviate distress. Another example of the effect of these calamities in the past, in some ways scarcely less illuminating, is afforded by the revolution in customary exchange values in 1628, when camels are said to have been sold for a single rupee each. (a)
Not in the fact of the disaster itself, however, but in its gradual and final recognition lies the real tragedy. That final recognition in this case is to be found in the law books both of the Muhammadans and the Hindus. According to the former, “the practice among free men and women of selling their offspring in time of famine is extremely improper and unjustifiable.”(b) According to the latter, one maintained in famine is permitted to release himself from servitude for a pair of oxen.7
The economic condition of India before Western civilisation was superimposed was so profoundly different in character from that of the present day, that little similarity can be expected between the ancient and modern systems of relief. Roads and railways there were none, canals and rivers were rarely navigable, and the vital organisation of society lay rather in the village units than in the central government. It was therefore impossible for the rulers to import corn on a sufficiently large scale to provide for the destitute. It was equally impossible to create at a moment’s notice an administration capable of dealing adequately with the distribution of supplies or the organisation of labour. Within the bounds of practicability, however, both these methods of relief were attempted. But they did not, as at the present day, constitute the main basis of the general system. If wars and lack of means of communication hampered importation, they limited exportation correspondingly. It was to the supplies of stored grain that the rulers and the people chiefly looked for protection against drought. The Muhammadan Emperors maintained these stores in their capitals as war chests, and the cultivators kept what surplus they could from their years of bounty as an insurance against those of dearth. How often such provision proved successful cannot be estimated; for only of the droughts which proved disastrous does record exist. According to the benevolence of the rulers and the severity of the famine the corn was either sold or given away.8 In some cases, indeed, there was no corn to sell, (a) and in others the people had no means wherewith to buy. To Muhammad Tughlak is due the honour of being one of the first to take really vigorous measures to alleviate the effects of drought. The disaster which befell his dominions in 1343 was, as has been shown, caused partially by his own folly, and fear of the anger of his people and the ruin of his kingdom lent impulse to his efforts. In addition to a distribution of six months’ supply of corn to the inhabitants of Delhi, (a) advances were made from the treasury not only for the ordinary cultivation of the land, but in addition for the digging of wells. Indeed, a general system of compulsory labour, the failure of which Zia Barni relates, seems to have been attempted. (b) But the people, crushed down by the excessive load of taxation, refused the work which was offered them, abandoned themselves in some cases to cannibalism, and finally compelled the Emperor to allow them to migrate to Bengal, which only three years before had revolted from his rule. (c)
The energy of the Government of Delhi on this occasion was only exceeded by that of Shah Jehan in 1630, three years after his accession. Under his direction, five thousand rupees were distributed every Monday to the deserving poor, and in Ahmedabad, where the famine was at its height, fifty thousand. The same principle of doles of food was also adopted, and taxes were subsequently remitted to the extent of seventy lacs. (d) But a departure was made from the generally established precedent, in that relief was not confined to the capital; for especial mention is made of the fact that the officers of Burhampur and Ahmedabad and the country round Surat were ordered to establish soup kitchens and alms-houses. In 1596, it is true, public tables were spread, some sort of relief works were established, and the army was increased to give maintenance to the poor; (a) and during the famine of 1577 in Kutch, and that of 1746 in the district round Bombay, relief was afforded by the direct distribution of cooked food to the starving. (b) But there is in these, as in so many other cases, no evidence to show that anything was done outside the limits of the capital. The poor vacated the country for the towns on such occasions, and pestilences followed.
The actual progress that was made in remedial measures is difficult to estimate. The great Moghul Emperors, Shah Jehan and Aurangzib, demonstrated perhaps the greatest powers of organisation. But Ferishta relates, that so early as 1396 Sultan Mahmud kept a train of ten thousand bullocks on his own account, constantly going to and from Malwa and Gujarat for grain, to supply his stricken kingdom of Bahmini. (c) By 1630 the actual transportation was left to private enterprise, which was promoted by the removal of taxation. (d) In 1660 grain was purchased by the Government directly from the producing provinces, and subsequently sold at such prices as the people could afford to pay. (e) According to Kafi Khan, the organisation on this occasion so far excelled all past efforts that relief was carried into every corner of the great Moghul dominions, and, despite the expense to the Government of this distribution of food, the rents and taxes of husbandmen were remitted when they fell due. (a)
Subsequent history shows that the first impulse of the people when food is scarce is to migrate into neighbouring districts. That so little mention of the fact is made in early history probably merely proves the generality of the custom. Indeed, only two references to this habit have been found in the writings of historians previous to the eighteenth century, and in the one instance it was the attempt of the Emperor to check it which drew the attention of the chronicler, (b) while in the other it was the almost total depopulation of the towns. (c) The migratory habits of the people on these occasions, the stores of grain which wise Emperors of the past had maintained, and, above all, the principle of mutual assistance and family support of the aged and weak, were the real bulwarks in the past against the perils of destitution and the ravages of starvation.
And I will maintain my relations,
The rest I will protect;
Such is a wise man’s vocation.” (d)
Of all the preventive methods adopted by various governments, undoubtedly the most important has been irrigation. Irrigation in India is as old as history. It is mentioned by Strabo (e) and Dion Chrysostom (a) with wonder, and in later times it was the special pride of the Muhammadan Emperors. But though, as has been noticed, Muhammad Tughlak had wells dug during the famine of 1345, and although the waters of the canals built by Akbar were for “rich and poor alike,” still in the main the vast works of the Moghul chiefs were executed rather with a view to increasing the magnificence of their capital, than with the direct object of promoting the fertility of the soil. It is roughly true to say, and it was the natural consequence of topographical situation, that the work of the Muhammadans lay rather in the construction of canals, that of the Hindus in the construction of tanks and digging of wells. This protection of land against drought, and the storage of grain by the people and the Government, constituted the two main protective measures, and were indeed the only two possible, when importation was dependent upon cattle, which themselves often perished from lack of grass.
In Appendix A is given a list of the more important famines between 297 and 1907. A fact which the evidence already given should to some extent have made clear will there be still more strikingly noticeable, namely, that famines tend to recur in cycles of five years, and the greater ones in cycles of fifty years. Roughly speaking, it is towards the middle and the end of each century that the most disastrous calamities have fallen upon India. The famines of 1343–45, 1540, 1630, 1747, and 1837 were all intense in certain districts, but comparatively limited in area, and short in duration. That of 1396, which is said to have lasted twelve years, and those of 1596, 1660–1, 1803–04, 1896–1900 are the most fatal and the most extensive of which history makes mention. It is but natural that no reference is made by early writers to the famines of less import. A study of those at the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, is sufficient to prove the general truth of the rule that, after an exceptional period of drought, a time of comparative prosperity may be expected, varying in length from forty to fifty years.
It seems difficult to attribute the regularity of these cycles to chance, and whether its cause be discoverable or no, it is at least sufficiently certain to be of more than mere academic interest. The mere fatality of droughts in the past, it should be noted, is not in itself a fair test of the actual meteorological conditions. The facts must be studied more closely. Excessive death-rates are recorded, for example, on four occasions between 1660 and 1747. (a) But in every instance the ultimate cause can be traced to the disorganisation of society produced by war. There is, indeed, no necessary correlation between the severity of the drought and the intensity of the famine. A contemporary writer states that in 1677 “all persons were destroyed by famine excepting two or three in each village.” (b)9 But from the detailed list of food prices which he adds, grain appears never to have risen above three times the normal level, whereas in 1709,10 when the mortality was comparatively negligible, it is reported to have been no less than two-and-thirty times higher than in normal years. If the account given by Nicolas Manucci in his Storia do Mogor (a) is to be believed, no less than two millions of the population of the Deccan perished from the effects of drought and plague in the opening years of the eighteenth century. The absence of more detailed information renders it, no doubt, impossible to estimate the extent to which the mortality was due to disease. But it is at least justifiable to conclude from this very lack of information that the drought was inconsiderable in comparison with that of 1660, and though allowance should be made for the epidemic, still the more probable cause of the extent of the mortality is the impossibility of affording relief. Aurangzib was, indeed, owing to the wars with the Mahrattas, no more in a position to organise relief on this occasion than he had been in 1685 at the time of his campaign against Abul Hasan. But though the degree of mortality affords inadequate evidence for gauging the deficiency of rainfall, though the descriptions of the extent and nature of the drought are, as a rule, scanty and unconvincing, still it is not impossible to form a rough estimate of the real conditions. Account must be taken of the strength of the Government and prosperity of the people at the time, of the absence or presence of contributory causes of distress, of the dramatic effect which the drought had upon the minds of contemporaries. The accounts of native historians, to whom such calamities were not unusual, are, as a rule, of more value than those of temporary sojourners in the land. Descriptions of the worst famines of the past have passed down by word of mouth from generation to generation. Statistics may be lacking; but those greater disasters which have recurred in India with almost mathematical accuracy, stand out vividly and unmistakably enough in the pages of history.
Notes
- (a). Vide e.g. R. C. Dutt, Famines in India, etc.; W. Digby, “Prosperous” India.
- (b). Vide infra, cp. V.
- a. V. Dutt's Ramayana, bk i.
- b. Megasthenes, Anc. Ind., trans. J. W. McCrindle, 1877, p. 32.
- c. Dutt, Anc. Hist. of India, vol. ii. p. 317.
- a. Stein's Trans. of Rajat., bk. v. vv. 272–5.
- a. Briggs, vol. i. p. 356; Elliot, vol. iii. p. 146. Zia Barni.
- b. Elliot, vol. i. p. 328. Zia Barni.
- (a). Eth., Report, pp. 16–7.
- a. Briggs, vol. ii. p. 405. Ferishta. Scott, vol. i. p. 102.
- b. Namely, in 1443, in Malwa, Briggs, vol. iv. p. 34. Ferishta.
- a. Dow, vol. i. p. 85; Briggs, vol. i. p. 103.
- b. Elliot, vol. iii. p. 619; Travels of Ihn Batuta.
- c. Ibid., vol. iv. p. 36. Yahya Bin Ahmad.
- d. Ibid., vol. v. p. 384. Nizam-D Bin Ahmad.
- e. Ibid., vol. vi. p. 193. Shaikh Nuru-l Hakk.
- a. Vide Dr. Whyte's letter. Nathan, vol. ii. App. ii. p. 69.
- b. Elliot, vol. vi. p. 346; Autobiography of Jehangir.
- c. Scott, vol. i. p. 102. Ferishta.
- d. Elliot, vol. vii. p. 328. Kafi Khan.
- (a). Quoted Blair, p. 22.
- (b). Elliot, vol. vii. p. 263. Kafi Khan.
- (c). Dutt, vol. i. p. 59; Eth., Report, p. 99; Bomb. Gaz., vol. i. pt. ii., 1896, p. 637.
- (d). Elliot, vol. vi. p. 193. Shaikh Nuru-l Hakk.
- (e). Circa 1630. Said to have continued for seven years. Dow, vol. iii. pp. 128-9.
- a. Elliot, vol. iii. p. 146; vol. vi. p. 47. Zia Barni.
- b. (b) Investigador Portuguez, vol. xvi. p. 279.
- c. Elliot, vol. v. p. 490. Mulla.
- d. (d) E.g. in 1556 in Hindustan, Elliot, vol. vi. p. 21. Abdu-l Fazl.
- a. Elliot, vol. iii. p. 244. Zia Barni.
- b. Dow, vol. iii. pp. 128-9.
- c. Hak. Soc. Pub. (Second Series), vol. xviii.
- d. Elliot, vol. vii. pp. 24-5. Abdu-l Hamid Lahori.
- e. Foster, Eng. Factories in Ind., 1630-33, pp. 180-1. A Dutch factor at Surat to a member of the Dutch Council at Batavia.
- f. Dow, vol. iii. pp. 128-9.
- a. Eth., Report, p. 63.
- b. W. H. Macnaughton, p. 314.
- a. E.g. 1556, Elliot, vol. vi. p. 21. Shaikh Abdu-l Fazl.
- a. Elliot, vol. iii. p. 620. Ihn Batuta.
- b. (b) Ibid., p. 245. Zia Barni.
- c. Briggs, vol. i. pp. 425 and 428. Ferishta.
- d. Elliot, vol. vii. p. 25. Aminar Kazwini. Dow, vol. iii. p. 129.
- a. Elliot, vol. vi. p. 193. Shaikh Nuru-l Hakk.
- b. Eth., Report, pp. 25–6.
- c. Scott, vol. i. p. 56. Ferishta.
- d. Elliot, vol. vii. p. 25. Aminar Kazwini.
- e. Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 263 and 246–7. Kafi Khan,
- a. Elliot, vol. vii. pp. 263 and 246–7. Kafi Khan Dow, vol. iii. p. 310.
- b. Namely, in 1343, Briggs, vol. i. pp. 425, 428.
- c. Namely, in 1471, in Tuhirgana and Marhutt in the Bahmini Dominions, Briggs, vol. ii. pp. 493–4.
- d. The Dasaratha Jataka.
- e. Strabo, Geography, bk. xv.
- a. Dion Chrysostom, Oratio xxxv.
- a. 1677, 1685, 1702–4, 1739. The famine of 1739 was due largely to the plundering of the Persian army.
- b. Mackenzie MSS., vol. iv. p. 34.
- a. Storia do Mogor, Nicolas Manucci. Trans. W. Irvine, vol. iv. p. 97.