Chapter II

Calamities and the East India Company

The History & Economics of Indian Famines, Alexander Loveday, 1914 · from page 29 · about 18 minutes

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THE year 1770 forms a useful date at which to begin a sketch of the history of those famines which occurred during the time of the growing predominance of the East India Company. Its importance does not lie in the discovery of any new principles of relief, but rather in the fact that that Corporation, which had assumed the revenue administration of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa in 1765, became for the first time responsible for the steps which were taken to ameliorate distress. Moreover, the disaster of this year stands out naturally as a landmark in the literature on the subject, because it has been immortalised by the brilliant pen of perhaps the most brilliant of all writers of Indian history. Possibly, indeed, too much attention has been concentrated on this single event. No one can question the justice of Sir William Hunter's attack upon the policy of the East India Company on this occasion. But it would be wrong to conclude, from the predominance that has been given to this particular famine, that the Company ever learnt its lesson thoroughly, or showed great ability in subsequent years. If the mortality in 1783 was less, it was mainly due to the lesser intensity of the famine; and though the expenditure was greater in 1832 and 1837, its benefits were counterbalanced by an almost equal incompetency. The difficulties which the British had to face during this period were, it is true, immense. They had no choice but to abandon the heritage they had received or to march forward. War was inevitable were they to protect their possessions, and neither the check which they gave to the predatory expeditions of Haidar Ali, nor the death-blow which they dealt to the ascendancy of his son, nor the downfall of the Mahratta house, can be subjects of regret. But when every allowance is made for the difficulties which beset its path, and for the lower standards of humanity at the time, it is still little exaggeration to say that the Company was more concerned with the dividends of its shareholders than with the lives of those from whom those dividends were drawn.

As the Orissa Report said, there is “extraordinarily little information about this famine.” (a) From the death of Aurangzib in 1707, and the subsequent disruption of the Moghul Empire, India passed through some half a century of violent transmutation, during which the French and the English struggled for predominance. There was little time to write reports on, or pay attention to, mere natural calamities, and fortunately, with the exception of that of 1747, (b) they were comparatively slight. Nor, indeed, was the position of the Company in Bengal in 1770 so long assured that they could boast any sort of efficient administration. The double government initiated by Clive was proving unworkable, and merely gave greater opportunities for fraud and peculation. It was not till 1769 that the supervisors were appointed; and in reality the famine relief was mainly administered by the native government.

The primary cause of this calamity was a failure of the autumn and the summer rains in northern and eastern Bengal, and more especially in Behar. But, as is almost always the case in times of serious want, the crops in the two preceding years had been deficient. The author of Seir Mutagherin asserts, moreover, that smallpox broke out in certain districts contemporaneously with the beginning of the real famine distress, and that "villages and whole towns were swept away by these two scourges."1 The rains in Behar in 1768 were excessive, and floods had lent their aid to the work of destruction, while in Gaur "plague" broke out from the corpses which had been abandoned to putrify in the river. (a)

One of the most striking features of the policy of the East India Company is the gulf of distance which severs their promises and their good wishes from the work they actually performed. Thus in February 1770 the Government wrote to the resident of Moorshedabad that he might be assured of their concurrence in every measure for the relief of the poor, and earnestly recommended him to take every step towards this purpose. (a) Yet in June, the resident himself writes that six in every sixteen had died. (b) Similarly in November 1769 the Court of Directors asserted, “We have taken and shall pursue every means in our power to relieve the miserable situation the poor inhabitants must be involved in from this dreadful calamity.” (c)

The methods actually adopted were unwise, unorganised, and ungenerous. Reliance was especially laid on the policy of embargoes on export and the removal of duties on import. A proclamation against hoarding was made in Calcutta, (d) which was, however, unnecessary, as rice had become scarce in that town so early as the beginning of August 1769, while in the following year it was unable to supply itself, so that in April fifty rupees worth of corn was daily distributed free of cost. A similar policy was adopted in Patna, Burdwan, and Behar, (e) and Sir William Hunter estimates that some £4000 were contributed in six months for a starving population of some four hundred thousand souls. (f) It is true peculiar difficulties stood in the way of the Government. The means of communication were deficient, the English rule was confined to a comparatively restricted area, the troops which battened on Behar could not be removed for political reasons, and, as Hamilton said, “no adjacent country was capable of supplying corn.” (g) But be this as it may, the fact remains that the real work of relief was left to the generosity of private individuals. Some £15,000 was contributed by the natives for the importation of corn, as well as a supplementary £3000 for general charity, (a) and it was such men as Shittabory who kept a fleet of boats employed between Benares and Patna, who made real endeavour to do what lay in their power.2

Despite the thirty-three per cent. of the population who are said to have perished,3 the extent of the calamity would in the end undoubtedly have been less had the Company realised the truth of that fact, which bitter experience alone has succeeded in teaching, that on such occasions immediate generosity is ultimate economy. The subsequent depopulation of the country was due, not merely to the high mortality, but also to the refusal of the Government to make any adequate reduction of the land tax. In Moorshedabad Rs.25,77,428 more were collected in 1771 than in 1769; and though the Company was “induced to grant a remission to the farmers of Burdwann province of about 2½ or 3 lakhs,” in reality less than one was finally remitted, and that duly demanded in the following spring. (b)

In estimating the general value of the work performed certain difficulties present themselves. According to Sir George Campbell, the interference with freedom of trade, contrary to modern economic laws, was not adopted to a very great or a very injurious extent. (c) The embargo on rice was in point of fact removed in November. (a) Whether the application of the so-called modern economic laws would have been wise on this particular occasion seems open to doubt. The amount of exportable corn was negligible, the prices in Bengal itself were higher than in the open market, and in all probability the interference was non-injurious because without effect. Moreover, importation by the central authorities, and it was meagre enough on this occasion, is the primary essential of relief when the means of communication are defective and the capital of the corn dealers limited. It is, in fact, on account of the paucity of the relief afforded, and for the lack of general organisation, that the Government is open to criticism.

The comparatively detailed review which has been given of the events of this year will afford a basis of comparison with those of more recent times.

There can be but little doubt that the Company had been seriously frightened by the final effects of the 1770 disaster, and when, thirteen years later, a similar failure of crops threatened, they faced the danger energetically and courageously, if not wisely. A committee of grain was established for the Bengal districts, with full powers to control trade and prices and establish granaries when it seemed advantageous. Unfortunately the calamity of 1783 differed widely from that of 1770, and those methods which might conceivably have been wise in the former were merely aggravating in the latter case. The failure of crops was greatest in the North-West Provinces, Oudh, the Punjab, and Madras. (a) In Bengal it was less extensive, and only Behar and Purneah were really seriously affected. (b) Moreover, in the preceding year the harvest had been unusually abundant. The Company was, however, nervous, and possessed by the idea that it had no other resort but to its former stores. Collectors were ordered to investigate the existing stores and forbid, by threats of "exemplary" punishment and seizure, any attempt to restrict sales, (c) and an embargo was placed on the export of grain. (d) If the distress had been intense in Bengal, it is conceivable that this attempt to treat the district like a town in state of siege might have been justified. As it was, trade was undermined, and Madras, which had always imported largely from Bengal, and now was almost wholly dependent on her, was unnecessarily starved.4 In Bengal, until the floods in 1784, the distress was avoidable, and the Company was half proud of its success, half apologetic to those less fortunate parts which it had refused to assist. But even in Bengal its success was not striking. The cause has been stated trenchantly by Warren Hastings: "Yet I have reason to fear that the cause existed principally in a defective, if not corrupt and oppressive, administration. I am sorry to add that from Buxar to the opposite boundary I have seen nothing but traces of complete devastation in every village." (e)

In Madras the actual failure of crops was aggravated by war,5 and, as has been shown, the sudden cessation of importation. Distress had begun in the preceding year, and, "notwithstanding the liberal contributions of charity, thousands are reported to have expired daily through want." (a) With this check on their one source of supply the starvation for a time became more intense; but with the re-establishment of peace and the unexpectedly heavy crops of 1784 the price of corn fell to an almost unprecedented level, (b) and the Government found themselves with an unsaleable surplus stock in their hands. (c) In the other districts, as Hari Charan narrates, it was the lack of employment almost as much as the lack of food that constituted the overwhelming difficulty. (d)

A more genuine attempt was made on this occasion to administer the historic policy of their predecessors by means of the corrupt agents at their disposal. Only in one point did the Company endeavour to strike out a new line of their own. In September and October of 1783 some 9000 of the starving population were deported in parties of 1000 to the northern districts of Madras. (e)

Though no widespread distress was felt in India again until 1803, the century did not close without local disasters. In Jessore, Nuddea, and parts of Central Bengal the rice crops were destroyed and the people isolated by a series of floods which terminated, November 1787, in a cyclone, which swept across almost the whole of that province. (f)

Again, as in the famine four years later in Bombay and Madras, (a) 6 export of corn was restricted. In the latter instance, however, though the transportation of corn from Bengal was left to private enterprise, sale prices were fixed and doles were made to the poverty stricken.7 The native government, not content with this alone, made extensive remissions of land revenue, while the Sarvant Wari plundered the passing ships in order to increase the general supply. (b)

No change took place in the general principles of native relief during the latter half of this century. During the famine of 1791–92 in Gujerat, the Peshwa bought corn from the Nizam's country and distributed it free, (c) and in certain districts remission of the land tax was made, (d) and if indeed the lists of the population drawn up by the Ameers for the distribution of money were a new departure, they contributed really little more than a peculiar elaboration of an historic system.8 As was always the case, the effectiveness of relief was dependent upon external politics, and apparently during the drought in Sholapur (1794) the war between the Peshwa and the Nizam prevented any steps towards mitigating the distress from being taken. (e)

The nineteenth century opened with a series of local calamities which war and the divided state of India helped not a little to intensify. (f) Their real historical importance lies in the new methods of alleviation adopted. Thus in 1803, in addition to the execution of the generally accepted principles of checking export and promoting import, relief works were opened and temporary hospitals erected in Bombay and such other cities as were in the hands of the British. (a) The works actually undertaken were mainly the construction of tanks and wells, and a road to Tanna ; (b) and Forbes reckons that altogether the Government succeeded in saving some 100,000 lives.9 But the British territory in West India was at that date limited, and in the native districts only importation and remission of land revenue seem to have been thought necessary, although it is reported that the Hindus not only ate their children, but even their sacred oxen. (c) The Peshwa of Poona was joined on this occasion by the East India Company in the remission of revenue, and indeed that Corporation seems to have grasped more fully about this time the real principles of the native policy of land taxation. For in the following year, in addition to this renunciation, large grants of tuccavee were made to the cultivators. (d)

In the ceded districts of Oudh an exorbitant land revenue demand10 deprived the people, already financially exhausted by the tyranny of the Nawabvizier’s rule, of all power of resistance. There is no evidence to show that relief works were undertaken ; but liberal grants of tuccavee were made for the promotion of irrigation, and a bounty was placed on importation. (e) In Madras, in the following year, more enterprise was shown, both in respect to public works, upon which some 2000 persons were employed, and to the actual feeding of the people, which the Government undertook by means of offering grain at a fixed purchase price and reselling at a loss. (a)

But for all that, no general principles of relief had been formulated. Each famine was an isolated, unexpected phenomenon with which the Government dealt hesitatingly and uncertainly, groping in the dark for some principle which they sought in vain. Thus in 1807 they disputed as to the wisdom of importing grain until the cattle were dead and their means of transport gone ; (b) and when finally they guaranteed price, and teams were organised and trade began, they found that by the time the grain arrived the famine was over, and some 23,000 garce of rice were left on their hands.11 They failed to check the mortality,12 and, as Munro pointed out, they managed "to distress the ryots as much in the second year by want of demand for their produce, as in the first by its failure." (c)

Perhaps it was owing to this disaster that free trade principles were adopted in North India in 1812, and in Bombay twelve years later. But there was no general consensus of opinion. A bounty was imposed again in Madras in 1823 and 1832. In this latter year that bounty, which was granted too late,13 and doles of food which were wholly inadequate, constituted the sum total of the Government's endeavours. (a) The severity of the calamity was not recognised until too late. (b) The Government was unprepared, and the cultivators, who were rack-rented and harassed by an uncertain assessment of the land revenue, died in thousands. (c)

As the British arms and diplomacy met with growing success, their responsibilities correspondingly increased. Whereas in 1783 the upper reaches of the Ganges and Jumna Rivers flowed through the dominions of the Nawabviziers of Oudh and the Mahratta Confederacy, by 1837, owing to the policy of the Marquis of Wellesley, the whole of that territory was directly, or indirectly, under British control. When famine broke out in that year, therefore, the difficulty of divided administration, which had paralysed relief on former occasions, was no longer extant; but the weight of the burden upon the Company's finances was more than doubled. It acknowledged its responsibilities, however, more openly. Some form of relief was promised for the able-bodied. But they, in their turn, must aid the sick and helpless according to the custom of the land. (d) Already an attempt had been made to open up the country on European lines. The existing works were continued and a few minor ones instituted. But the control of this work was left, not to expert engineers, (e) but to the local civil officers ; the Company’s general administration was incompetent, and, as a later commission comments, its value probably nil. (a) In addition to this, although under the protest that it was given as charity and could not be demanded as a right, direct relief, to a limited extent, was given to those unable to work.14 According to the general reports of the time its success was scarcely greater than that of the works. “The relief society,” says a contemporary journal, “feeds about 1500 daily ; but then, owing to the villainy of those who have to serve out the food, the flour is so adulterated with lime and sand that heaps upon heaps have died from eating it.” (b) Indeed, the whole social structure became a chaotic ruin. Internal trade was cumbered with burdensome duties, the cultivators fled because the landlords endeavoured to collect rents for the payments of taxes, the intended remission of which the Government neglected to announce ; the applications for work at Bilhour exceeded the work to be done ; 15 and finally riots broke out and the military had to be called in to assist. (c) The Commission of 1880 estimated the mortality conservatively at 800,000 ; but such estimates are of questionable value. It is more enlightening to read that “the river, owing to the sluggishness of the stream, became studded with dead bodies.” (d) As Girdlestone’s report says, “The famine had got the upper hand, and with all its energy and its expenditure, what Government did was small in comparison with what it left undone. (a)

The last improvement which the Company made in the administration of relief before its final abolition in 1858 was during the famine in Bellary seventeen years later, when it handed over the general management of the road building undertaken as relief works to an expert engineer. (b)

It cannot be said that in the course of its curious career the Company showed marked aptitude to deal with these calamities. But through its own failure it taught the Government, which succeeded it, some lessons of value, and at least in the later years of its existence confessed some obligations to the subjects over which it ruled as well as to the shareholders by whom it was controlled.

As has been seen, its policy was uncertain and tentative. After the famine of 1770 Lord Cornwallis had grain stored from the surplus of abundant years. (c) But there is no evidence to show that his successors maintained his granaries. Public works were often, but not always, undertaken, and little or no attempt was made towards preparatory organisation. The nearest approach towards efficient management was probably in 1824 in Bombay, when a committee of tanks and wells was appointed. (d) But there were no permanent famine officials, there were no codes, there were no regular reports on crops.

But the competency of the other Powers in India was in no way superior to that of the East India Company, though a change in their methods of relief is indeed perceptible. In 1803 the Peshwa, after long refusing to take any steps, finally made arrangements for the importation of grain. (a) But in the subsequent famines the system of relief works appears to have been increasingly adopted. The year 1812 marks the point of transition. For though in some districts nothing was done, and in Mandavee food was distributed gratis and indiscriminately in the old way, Jemadar Futteh Mahomed with better judgment employed the starving population, whom he paid for their labour in kind, on the construction of a tank at Desulpur; (b) the Dewan of Pahlunpoor instituted works of a similar nature, and opened a state shop at which grain might be obtained at a low price; and a like policy was adopted in that year in Kathiawar, and in Khandesh in 1838. (c) It is, however, impossible to generalise. With the exceptions of those of 1803–4 and 1812, the famines of the first half of the nineteenth century were comparatively restricted in area. It was a time of political unrest and transition, and all attempts at mitigation were necessarily dependent upon the characters of the various rulers, and upon the exigencies of the moment.

Notes

  1. a. Orissa Report, para. 13.
  2. b. Eth., Report, p. 40. “Not a drop of rain nor a blade of grass.”
  3. a. It is highly improbable that this was the real plague.
  4. a. G., p. 414.
  5. b. (b) Ibid., p. 418.
  6. c. (c) Ibid., p. 413.
  7. d. Hunter, Rural Bengal, p. 35.
  8. e. Blue Book, 1878, vol. xii. paras. 19. 6.
  9. f. Hunter, Rural Bengal, p. 402.
  10. g. Orissa Report, para. 18.
  11. a. Hunter, Rural Bengal, p. 400.
  12. b. Ibid., p. 402.
  13. c. G., p. 421.
  14. a. Hunter, Rural Bengal, p. 409.
  15. a. G., p. 422.
  16. b. G., p. 423.
  17. c. G., p. 424.
  18. d. Campbell, Report, para. 42.
  19. e. Girdlestone, Report, p. 9.
  20. a. G., p. 422.
  21. b. G., p. 24.
  22. c. Girdlestone, Report, p. 15.
  23. d. Elliot, vol. viii. Hari Charan Das, p. 230.
  24. e. Dalyell, Mem., p. 14.
  25. f. G., p. 427.
  26. a. Dalyell, Mem., p. 17.
  27. c. Ibid., p. 87.
  28. e. Ibid., p. 87.
  29. b. Eth., Report, p. 122.
  30. d. Ibid., p. 60.
  31. f. Vide Appendix A.
  32. a. Campbell’s Report, para. 43.
  33. b. Eth., Report, p. 116.
  34. c. Ibid., p. 99.
  35. d. Dutt, Famine in India, p. 4.
  36. e. Girdlestone, Report, pp. 11–24.
  37. a. Dalyell, Mem., pp. 12–7.
  38. b. Dutt, Famine in India, p. 4.
  39. c. Vide Munro's Minute, Jan. 23, 1824. Quoted Sir Bartle Frere, note, p. 47.
  40. a. Dalyell, Mem., p. 37.
  41. b. 1880 Comm., pt. i. p. 12, para. 46.
  42. c. Sir Bartle Frere, pp. 62–3.
  43. d. 1880 Comm., pt. i. para. 47.
  44. e. Ibid., pt. iii. p. 23; B. Smith's Report, para. 58.
  45. a. 1880 Comm., pt. iii. p. 23.
  46. b. The Englishman, March 24, 1857.
  47. c. B. Smith, Report, pt. ii. para. 57.
  48. d. The Englishman, op. cit.
  49. a. Girdlestone, Report, p. 58.
  50. c. Dalyell, Mem., p. 4.
  51. b. G., p. 63.
  52. d. Eth., Report, p. 96.
  53. (a). Eth., Report, p. 90.
  54. (b). Ibid., pp. 27, 43.
  55. (c). Ibid., pp. 33, 36, 80.