Chapter III

Calamities From the Abolition of the East India Company Until the Present Day

The History & Economics of Indian Famines, Alexander Loveday, 1914 · from page 44 · about 42 minutes

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It would be too great a task for the narrow limits of this book to give a full or comprehensive account of all the famines in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In every case the natural phenomena differed widely, and, more important still, the method of alleviation grew from a rough system of temporarily and hurriedly organised employment to an infinitely elaborate and detailed permanent scheme. Many of the details must unavoidably be ignored. In the succeeding chapter will be discussed some of those general principles which underlie the treatment of all famines, and also the more important efforts which have been made to prevent their occurrence, or lessen their intensity. All that can be attempted here is to sketch in bold outline the development of the main features of that system of immediate relief which finds its ultimate expression in the revised famine codes of the present day.

In 1868 was published a supplement to the Gazette of India, containing a summary of the measures authorised by the Government for the relief of the starving in time of drought. It would have been convenient to adopt this memorandum as the structural basis upon which the subsequent organisation of famine relief was laid, and to trace the growth of method from this point. But it was itself little more than the codification of the systems adopted and recommended in the two great preceding famines of 1860 and 1866, and, though clearness may be thus sacrificed to historical accuracy, though the foundations may be laid in less firm soil, still the balance of the whole structure will be more perfect if the former of these famines is taken as the basic rock.

In local extent and intensity this famine bore close resemblance to that of 1837. The actual population affected in the former year was, it is true, but nine as compared with the nineteen millions of 1860. But in both cases only five millions were seriously stricken. In the latter event the North-West Provinces had been exhausted by the Mutiny, and given little chance to recuperate owing to the deficiency of the crops in 1858 and 1859. But, on the other hand, irrigation had progressed rapidly in the last twenty years, and the East and West Jumna canals alone protected some nine hundred thousand more acres than in 1837.1 Summarising the general nature of the two calamities, Baird Smith reports that the general conclusion regarding the two famine periods was, "that as in all the material conditions by which intensity of suffering is decided, 1860–61 was fully equal to 1837–38." Yet only a few lines later he is able to continue, "Neither will revenue have to be abandoned now to an extent at all comparable with what was needful then; nor has society become disorganised; nor have the people died in any such terrible proportions; nor will the influences of the suffering . . . continue so long.” (a)

An inquiry into the system of relief on this occasion will afford an explanation of these differences in the resulting effects, though it is noticeable that the same writer alleges the primary cause of diminished fatality to have been “ the vast mass of readily convertible and easily transferable agricultural property,” resulting from “ the limitation for long terms of the Government demand on land.” (b) However this may be, and the question is too large a one to be discussed here, a cause of undoubtedly no less importance was the greatly improved system of relief organisation. Theoretically the same principle as in 1837 was enunciated, that the Government would supply work and leave to the public the purely eleemosynary duties. (c) But in practice almost the whole work fell upon their hands.

To a large extent modern conditions prevailed in the North-West Provinces at this time—a fact to which the difference in the system of relief from that of preceding history on the one hand, or of the famine six years later in Orissa on the other, must primarily be attributed. As Baird Smith expresses it, “ our famines are rather famines of work than of food.” (a) That is the keynote of almost all subsequent history. The means of communication were good, the East India Railway alone importing one-third of the necessary grain. (b) Free trade principles were announced and strictly adhered to, and, if the consequent speculation in Calcutta was sometimes erratic, at least the corn merchants were competent to supply the needs of the stricken district. The problem was now one of distribution, not of supply. To the Government it meant how to obtain the greatest possible return for their money, with the least possible loss of life, and involved two considerations, the remunerativeness of the work undertaken, and the enforcement of work from all those physically capable. In 1860 the problem and the responsibility were fully realised.

The population was roughly divided into three classes—those capable of work in the large public undertakings; those who were proper objects of charity, but from whom, for moral rather than economic reasons, some work was demanded in the poorhouses in which they were fed; and lastly, those who, on account of their caste or decrepitude, were unable to leave their homes. The first of these classes was organised in gangs of some 500 each, housed in temporary sheds, and employed upon canals or roads. The second, into the genuineness of whose claims to charity rigorous inquiry was made, was divided into groups according to their ability to perform the light tasks of the poorhouse system. To the third direct assistance in their homes was given by agents under the supervisions of the Deputy Collectors and Inspectors. (a) Such was the main foundation of that organisation of famine relief which, adopted in 1860, has been modified in a hundred ways in accordance with the demands of later experience, but which, nevertheless, has never totally disappeared beneath the weight of subsequent structure.

The various minor questions, such as the relief of the Parda-nishin women, the provision for orphan children, the extent of emigration, will be discussed later. One point alone remains to be noted, namely, the fact that owing to irrigation the districts of greater and less complete failure of crops were intermingled, so that the people were able to migrate from the one to the other, and the burden of relief was thus lightened by the removal of some 160,000 of the population. (b)

The famine of 1860 is historically of considerably greater importance than that in Orissa six years later. The latter has attracted more attention because of the greater suffering of the people and the comparative failure of the Government’s measures. But for that very reason its story is of less value. It belongs rather to the famines of the first than to those of the second half of the century. Orissa was isolated, without means of communication, and without irrigation. The same system of relief as that adopted in the North-West Provinces was impossible ; and what there is to be learnt from that actually adopted is to be learnt from its failure.

The failure of relief, however, is of real importance, for it led to an inquiry presided over by Sir George Campbell, and a report on the result of his work, a model for all subsequent Commissions, and the basis of all subsequent codes.

The isolation of Orissa, however, was relative and not absolute. Cramped as it was between the Eastern Ghats and the sea, with short rapid streams liable to dry up at certain periods of the year, trade was difficult, but not impossible. It was limited in time, but not in extent. In fact, Orissa presented the peculiar anomaly of a district subject to the dangers of modern enterprise, but with none of its accompanying benefits. The export of grain in 1864 and 1865 had been excessive, but import, owing partly to the dilatoriness of the Government, partly to the lack of enterprise among traders, and not a little also to the increased demand for grain by the new cotton growers in Bombay and the North-West Provinces, proved completely inadequate in the early months of 1866. With the decay of the village system the irrigation works had fallen into disrepair, and the almost uninterrupted succession of floods during the fifteen years which preceded the failure of the September rains in 1865 (a) had diminished the resisting power of the people. But, for all that, the real cause of the extent of the suffering was the series of mistakes committed by the Government. Importation was almost immediately proposed, but, despite repeated appeals from starving districts, the Governor-General refused his assent until the middle of May. Subsequently it was asserted that “every maund of rice landed from June to October saved a life, whether it was sold, given away, or stolen.” (a) The rivers, however, were in the main unnavigable.2 In Pooree, where the lack of grain had already created unalleviable distress, and in Cuttack floods in August prevented all communication, (b) and in Behar supply was left almost entirely to private enterprise (c). The Government, in fact, was blindly endeavouring to apply certain economic principles to conditions to which they were wholly inapplicable. But, if economy was the ultimate object, it was not achieved. The cost has been estimated at fourteen and a half million rupees, and on the result of this expenditure the Commission finally reported that it was “evident that in practice the means taken in the shape of public works to anticipate and obviate famine in Bengal and Orissa were truly insignificant.” (d) The real fault indeed lay in a complete failure to anticipate the distress. In Behar, no work was organised until six months after death from starvation was reported; while in Orissa “it was not until September that the relief operations attained anything like efficient proportions, and to some extent reached the mass of the people.” (e)

The famine, however, was not confined merely to Orissa and Behar, but stretched down the whole eastern coast of India. Its importance in these two particular districts lay in its effect upon the Government's subsequent policy. The death of about quarter of the population in Orissa (a) on this occasion was the cause of the excessive expenditure of eight years later, and the waste incurred on that occasion was in its turn the origin of the more stringent policy in the North-West Provinces and of the famous "Temple ration" in Madras in 1877. In the last-mentioned Presidency in 1866 the relief afforded was scarcely less tardy than in the more northerly districts. But the ultimate mortality was not so high and the dramatic effect was comparatively slight. (b)

As has been mentioned above, it was in September 1868 that the Government published a memorandum on the measures to be adopted for relief in times of famine. In the same year a drought, which centred in the Native States of Rajputana and spread to a limited degree over the British territory lying to the north-west, afforded some opportunity of putting the measures recommended to a practical test. An Executive Committee was established at Calcutta, with the special objects of controlling the import and sale of grain and organising the direct relief afforded to the destitute. The main structure of the relief organisation was similar to that in 1860, though there was, it is true, an extension of the use of district as contrasted with central works, (c) and village relief was distributed with questionable success through the agency of the headman. (a) But more important was the adoption of a principle, the real value of which was never fully grasped until the present century, of making large grants of tuccavee to the cultivators in order to give them immediate employment on their own farms, and to capitalise sufficiently the harvest preparations for the succeeding year. It was in Rajputana and Ajmer, however, that the distress was really intense.3 Surrounded as they were on three sides by deserts and suffering from a complete failure of grass crops and a consequent loss of nine-tenths of their cattle, the sole means of transport, the inhabitants of Rajputana had no choice but emigration or starvation. (b) Two-thirds of the inhabitants of Marwar departed with their herds for the more prosperous districts lying to the south. But masses of the population flocked to the poorhouses and relief works erected by the English in districts more easily accessible. In Ajmer, a tiny British island in the midst of the native territory, the relief mechanism broke down almost immediately under the strain; and in no single district was it possible for the Government to accomplish the ideals with which they had been primarily inspired. On the one hand, the Governor-General had issued an order laying on the district officers the responsibility for all deaths which occurred, on the other, the Government had been anxious to uphold the principle that it was the public's duty to support the sick and aged. To enforce family responsibility, however, among the masses of starving immigrants who flocked to the relief houses was as impossible as the total prevention of death from want. The moral obligation of endeavouring to offer direct support to all who should demand it, which indeed had always been acted upon in practice, was then finally acknowledged in principle ; but the hope of preventing all mortality had inevitably to be surrendered. (a)

When Sir Bartle Frere delivered a lecture before the Society of Arts in December 1873, he traced in general outlines the policy which past experience had shown to be the most effectual for mitigating distress. Trade, he thought, should be organised and assisted with the utmost care, works should be systematised, and every step be taken to acquire accurate information as to the crop issue. (b) But the report of the Orissa Famine Commission had sunk deep into the mind of the Government, and bore fruit in an absolute determination, and almost hysterical anxiety, to avoid mortality. Money was poured into the stricken districts of Bengal and Behar, corn was imported to the extent of 460,000 tons by the Government alone, and altogether some £6,500,000 (c) were expended upon a famine the very existence of which has been denied, (d) and which the Report in 1876 described as only urgent in the districts of Sarun and Tirhoot. (e) The Government, in fact, on this occasion was panic-stricken, and threw aside all thoughts of economy so long as the principle first enunciated in 1868, that no loss of life from starvation was to take place, was successfully carried out. But it is, perhaps, open to doubt whether they have not been too severely criticised. Their fault lay rather in excess than in principle. In no province of India was less known of the social and economic condition of the people. The original crop estimates were hopelessly at fault. If the 100,000 tons of rice (a) with which they found themselves burdened on the return of prosperity is more than sufficient to condemn their administration, it affords no real evidence against their policy as such. The desirability of import is solely dependent on the efficiency of the means of communication, and the comparative activity of trade and intensity of distress. The system they introduced was revolutionary, and like all revolutions it was no model of executive excellence. But the ideas which underlay their actions are the very ones to which subsequent success has owed the most. The principle of self-acting tests, for example, was largely abandoned in favour of individual inspection. But the idea was reduced to an absurdity. In a province where the existing information was so small that it was not even known what sorts of crops predominated,4 the effect was disastrous, and over seven thousand officers were employed only to be deceived. (b) It was in fact too elevated an ambition to attempt to supply relieving officers at a moment's notice for a population of seventeen millions. But with the general progress of administrative efficiency it is exactly this principle which has become more and more widely adopted. The enormous system of administrative control, entailing the division of the whole Presidency into a complex system of relief districts and circles and village groups, which this principle of personal touch with the people entailed, was too overwhelming a task to be successfully and economically carried out at the time. But it is a system now incorporated in every famine code. Moreover, the large poorhouses, which in the Orissa famine led to the ‘‘utmost demoralisation,’’(a) were abandoned in favour of more hygienic institutions with not more than fifty inmates. (b) The one fundamental error of policy was the attempt to promote emigration to Burma. Fifty thousand pounds were granted with this object in view; (c) 5526 emigrants were finally dispatched at a cost of Rs. 19 per head, and the Government of Bengal ultimately declared that ‘‘the experiment was most unsatisfactory as far as Burma was concerned.’’ (d)

Probably the permanent effects of no other famine, so comparatively limited in area, in any way approach those of 1873–74. The ignorance of social conditions, so disastrously demonstrated on this occasion, added a new incentive towards greater administrative efficiency, and a new argument against the Permanent Land Revenue assessment. The experience, so dearly bought, was ultimately invaluable, and, as a direct result of the financial strain, a famine insurance scheme was initiated. To quote the words of Sir John Strachey, its originator —" It was not until 1874 . . . that it was recognised that, since famines could not be looked on as abnormal and exceptional calamities, it was essential that provision against the grave financial obligation which they involve should be made as one of the ordinary charges of the State." (a) The proposal was not immediately put into practice; but when in 1877 there occurred the most extensive famine which India had experienced since the predominance of British power,5 an amount of accumulated experience in the methods of alleviating distress had already been acquired sufficient to render the ultimate goal of economy and efficiency at any rate within the bounds of possibility.

In this year drought was sufficiently severe to create famine conditions in Madras, the whole of south-east Bombay as far north as Koregaon, Mysore, and part of the Nizam's dominions, and to a less extent in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, affecting in all an area of some 200,000 square miles and a population of some thirty-six million souls. (b) Moreover, the summer rains in other parts of North India had been deficient, so that the possible sources of supply were restricted, and whatever the actual ability of India to feed herself on this occasion may have been, large supplies of grain were actually imported from the Persian Gulf. (c) Thus the calamity which the Government had to face was no mean one. There were, moreover, peculiar difficulties in the way. In so far as it is ever possible to select arbitrarily a single year in this way, it is true to say that this famine marked the actual point of transition to modern economic conditions. In Bombay and Madras alike the means of communication was adequate, but the railway companies were not sufficiently capitalised to supply rolling stock to meet the suddenly increased demand. Moreover, while the preceding years of peace and progress had improved the economic position of the cultivators in South India, the population had increased in direct ratio with prosperity, (a) and it is doubtful whether the Government assessment in the Deccan made possible any personal insurance against drought. (b)

With a better comprehension of the nature of the difficulties to be overcome, and the recollection of the disastrous extravagance of 1873–74 still fresh in their minds, the Government determined to restrict their ambitions, and defined the limits of their policy in precise terms. “The task of saving life,” wrote the Secretary to the Government of India to Sir Richard Temple, “irrespective of cost, is one which it is beyond our power to undertake. The embarrassment of debt and weight of taxation consequent on the expense thereby involved would soon become more fatal than the famine itself.” (c)6 In other words it was finally realised that the famine problem was a purely economic one, and involved a simple question of insurance against risks which might be foreseen. The debt incurred in any one year must not exceed the capacity of the country to bear it. Apart from purely humane motives, it might, under given circumstances, be more profitable to incur direct loss of property and life, when the means of subsistence were deficient, than to protect the one and the other at the cost of property and life in succeeding years. The importance of a firm grasp of this principle lay not only in its effect upon immediate relief methods, but also upon the whole policy of preventive expenditure.

In practice, however, the methods adopted by the various provincial governments in the execution of this policy differed widely. In Madras, where the actual population affected was greatest, (a) an attempt was made at importing grain, but on the advice of the Government of India the policy was abandoned and the trade left wholly to private enterprise. The wisdom of this policy is open to doubt; for although the railways managed to carry some 4000 tons daily, and not less than 700,000 tons were imported by sea, (b) the retailers were either unwilling, or unable, to supply the outlying districts, and the price proving prohibitive to large portions of the agricultural population, riots ensued. (c)

So much controversy has centred round the other methods of alleviation adopted by Sir Richard Temple in this Presidency that the task of unbiassed judgment is no light one. The attempt to provide employment for nearly four hundred thousand people by means of small decentralised works, which was made in the first months of the famine, proved as impracticable as in 1873, and even when in August it was definitely abandoned the larger works undertaken were in many cases of questionable utility. a Such mistakes as these may be well deemed naturally incidental to a time when spontaneous improvisation had to supply the lack of well-considered pre-existing plans. But that the system was in fact seriously defective in some way seems incontrovertibly proved by the facts—that despite a wage scarcely sufficient to maintain existence, the expenditure up to August 1877 amounted to 900 lakhs of rupees; b the ultimate mortality apart from the decrease in birth-rate approached four millions, and in "large districts half the population temporarily disappeared." c The numbers in receipt of relief, it is true, were enormous, varying from 1,185,488 in March and 1,102,248 in May to a maximum of 2,218,000 in September. d But, for all that, the ratio between cost and expenditure demands explanation. The two most remarkable flaws in the system were probably the so-called "Temple ration" of one pound of food a day with condiments, for those on relief works, the lack of control over local civil officers and the want of combination between them and the public works department, to whose care the larger undertakings were allotted.

In Bombay relief was more efficiently executed and more promptly started, hampered though it was by a protracted dispute between the local and supreme government on the subject of the advisability of large relief works. The Government of India finally gave way and permitted these undertakings, which acted subsequently as a model for Madras and Mysore. The whole population was divided into four classes, in a manner very similar to that initiated in 1860. The able-bodied were employed by the Public Works Department; the less capable were left to the control of the collectors on smaller undertakings; those who were unable to travel were supplied with such employment as could be found in the immediate vicinity of their villages; and the emaciated and the sick were nursed in the public infirmaries. There was nothing essentially original in the system; but its comparative success is a tribute to the methods already approved. Indeed, surprising as it may seem at first sight, in view of the fatality of former calamities, it is nevertheless true that every departure made in 1878 from the officially recommended system proved disastrous in its effects. In the North-West Provinces all employment was left to the control of the Public Works Department and no village relief was given, with the result that in spite of the abundant winter crops and the restricted area affected, (a) 7 in nine months the mortality amounted to over a million; in Mysore no change of any sort was made in the Public Works labour organisation, and, largely in consequence of this, the smaller relief works completely broke down; (a) in Madras Sir R. Temple attempted, and failed to economise by a rate of wages inadequate to maintain proficiency. In fact the events of the year afforded a general confirmation of the wisdom of that policy which first found written expression in the memorandum in 1868, to which the relief authorities had added certain principles of material importance, but which no administration had, up to then, successfully carried out in practice.

If the historical importance of the famine of 1873 lies in the new proposals for immediate relief then promulgated, that of 1878 depends rather upon the impulse which it gave towards more extensive protective measures, and a greater elaboration of preparatory organisation.

The insurance scheme, of which mention has already been made, was then first incorporated in the financial system, and a Commission presided over by Sir Richard Strachey, after a careful investigation of the whole economic problem, submitted a series of recommendations, (b) which in 1883 were embodied in a provisional famine code. The spirit of these recommendations constitutes a general confirmation of the measures attempted with so little success in 1873. Special emphasis was laid upon the desirability of village relief in preference to poorhouses, which were always repellent to the people, and which in the North-West Provinces it had been shown the people would sooner starve than enter. (a) Both in Madras and Bombay this decentralisation of relief had met with marked success. Care had been taken to avoid what the Commission defined as the fundamental danger of weakening the village system; and the actual responsibility of investigating the distress in the villages, feeding those who were unable, and dispatching those who were able, to travel to the revenue officers' station, was laid upon the village headman. (b) The success of such a plan depended naturally upon the amount of trust which could be placed in the honesty of these native officials, and in some districts circle inspectors were appointed to superintend their work.

Though village relief was to constitute in future the basis of the system, it was not proposed by the Commission that the poorhouses should be wholly abolished, but rather that they should constitute a second line of defence for the assistance of those whom no inducements could prevent from wandering from their homes. For the management of relief works it was laid down as pre-essential that work should be offered immediately before lack of food had weakened the efficiency of the people, and that the wage offered should be sufficient, and only just sufficient, to maintain that efficiency.

The principle of freedom of trade from Government interference was confirmed, but with the qualification that the actual supply should be carefully watched, and the means of communication improved. In addition to this the desirability of some definite system for the remission of the Land Revenue and grants of tuccavee on a ratio with the general crop failure was realised. For the control of the whole organisation and the acquisition of information and statistics a special Government department was to be created. (a)

It was not until 1896 that the proposals made by the Commission were put to a serious test. Amplified in the provisional code of 1883, they had been further modified by the various provincial codes of which it formed the basis, and finally revised in 1893 in light of the evidence which the droughts between 1884 and 1892 supplied. The nature of this amplification and modification will to a certain extent become evident in the narration of the events of 1896–97 and 1900. But a more particularised description must be postponed until the evolution of the various methods of famine relief and prevention is traced in greater detail.

Twenty years intervened before India again suffered from a deficiency of crops in any way parallel to that of 1877. Droughts, however, of varying intensity occurred in several districts, the historical importance of which is by no means negligible in view of the accumulated experience which the Government derived from them.

The lesson of primary importance taught by the events of these years was the ultimate economy of free grants of tuccavee and prompt offer of employment. In Ganjam in 1889 tardiness in relief, and ignorance of the conditions under which the native population lived, rendered the work of the Government of small value. Ragi was supposed to be the common food of the people, and little was done until that millet had reached 16 seers the rupee. Only too late was it discovered that not even the poorest would eat it unmixed with rice, and that, owing to the high percentage of waste in grinding, only 13 seers of food could be obtained from every 16 seers of grain purchased. (a) 8

When in Bombay, on the other hand, in the following year a similar deficiency in the harvest returns occurred, by a policy of free advances to cultivators, not only was mortality in any way comparably avoided, but the relief works proved almost unnecessary on account of the richer cultivators, thus guaranteed, seizing the opportunity of a ready supply of labour to enter upon extensive improvement of their properties. (b) Not less marked was the effect of the promptitude shown in opening relief works in Bengal (1891–92), where, as was subsequently reported, almost the whole cost was covered by the value of the work done. (c)

As has been already noted, so early as 1877 means of communication had so far been improved that the difficulty of importation was comparatively slight.

By 1877 the historic conditions controlling production and distribution had been perceptibly modified; by 1897 they had been revolutionised. Every class in the community had begun to feel the effect of a new balance in the economic order. But the balance had not yet been perfected, and the tendency towards equalisation and rise in food prices throughout India had not been followed in all districts by an equivalent increase in income. When, therefore, in that year there occurred one of the most extensive failures of crops of which history makes mention, although the weight of the calamity was spread more equally over the whole land, the resisting power of the people in certain localities was found to be unexpectedly debilitated. In the case of the Central Provinces, it is true, the circumstances were abnormal as the harvests of the three preceding years had been partially ruined by excessive wet; (a) and although the Commission considered that the condition of the landless labourers had not improved, (b) the success with which the drought of 1887 in the Chattisgarth division was met (c) proves at least that any increase in poverty must have been of essentially recent origin. In many districts, indeed, the resisting power of the people appears to have considerably increased; but the real wages of the labouring classes in Behar had sunk, (d) and the population in the Deccan were described as living “a hand to mouth existence.” (e). As the report on the famine in the Madras Presidency said, the tendency was “to exchange grain for money, and money soon flies, usually for unproductive purposes.” (a) The effect of this change in conditions was twofold. On the one hand, there was never any real deficiency in the supply of food, on the other, the number demanding relief was unprecedented. A drought which affected an area of 225,000 sq. miles and a population of 62,000,000 would, it is true, in any case have necessitated relief on an enormous scale. (b) But the aggregate of 2,220,000 individuals, who came under the Government’s protection during the year, is a measure not so much of the failure of the crops as of the increased generosity of relief and increased level of prices. As was of course inevitable, the nature of the relief afforded in the twelve affected provinces differed widely in detail. But, summarising the events of the whole period, the Commission of 1898 concluded, that “the success actually attained in the relief of distress and the saving of human life was, if not complete, far greater than any that has been recorded in famines that are at all comparable with it in extent, severity, and duration,” and that the cost was remarkable for its moderation. (c) It is to the existence of the permanent existing codes and to the consequent readiness to meet disaster that the success must be mainly attributed. Such failure as there was, was due in almost every case either to ignorance of social conditions resulting in miscalculation of the effects of crop failure, or to the absence of a definite scheme of works. In the Central Provinces, where the failure was greatest, no change was at first made in the rate of wages, the public works subsequently undertaken were of small value, and in Saugor, where the death-rate was nearly doubled, it was not deemed necessary in the first months of the famine to establish any form of poorhouse for the relief of those unable to work. (a) A comparison of the measures adopted in this district and in the United Provinces will help to illustrate the character of the relief system of the present day. In the United Provinces the principle was generally accepted that centralisation of employment in the public works department should vary with the intensity of the famine. But in addition to this, and to the extent and freedom of gratuitous relief, a system of smaller works paid by contract with natives on the basis of the actual work performed was initiated. (b) Such a plan was only rendered possible by the fact that relief in the first place was offered before debilitation from starvation set in. In the Central Provinces, though indeed peculiar difficulties existed owing to the excessive wet of preceding years and the high percentage of aboriginal tribesmen, the primary cause of failure lay just in that fact that the relief in the early months was not adequate. The wage on the relief works was not sufficient to attract labour; the nature of the work was such that “ the mere prospect of escape from starvation was an insufficient attraction to the labouring classes,” (c) the village dole did not fluctuate with prices, and the poorhouses when they were opened proved in consequence inadequate for the numbers who flocked to them. (a)

Apart from the peculiarities of different districts, however, there are certain outstanding features of the famine as a whole, on which its historical importance mainly rests. Of these indubitably the most prominent was the extension of gratuitous relief as compared with public employment. During the whole period no less than 42 per cent. were relieved in this manner, and, except in Burma and Bombay and the Punjab, the assistance was brought straight to the houses of the people. (b)

As the general opening up of the country progresses, the difficulty of finding remunerative forms of employment on public works becomes increasingly severe. It was estimated that the total value of the work executed was at the most not more than 40 per cent. of the expenditure, and that in many cases the work might be neglected “as of little or no utility.” (c) A mistake, it is true, was made in the extent to which employment on road-making was offered: the people viewed it with disgust,9 and in many cases the stones broken were never utilised and the highways begun never extended. But for all that, the real difficulty lay in the fact that the amount of work available on railway and tank construction had appreciably diminished.

Another fact, the importance of which was striking, was the inverse ratio between the mortality and relief statistics. In four districts of the Madras Presidency 20·8 per cent. of the population were in receipt of relief. Yet, in spite of the poverty of the cultivators in many localities, the mortality was only 4·1 per mille in excess of the normal. In Bombay, on the other hand, where a more rigorous policy was adopted, the percentage of population relieved did not exceed 17, while the mortality statistics rose to 15 per mille above the decennial average. In the Central Provinces where, as has been seen, the relief was least adequate, it was 22 per mille above that of 1893.10 It is not without pertinence to add that the average wage as measured in food was 24 lb., 17 lb., 16 lb., in these three districts respectively. (a)

The variations from the systems suggested in the codes were too numerous to mention in detail. But in one respect there was a remarkable unanimity throughout India in the adoption of a new policy. An attempt had been made to graduate labour and wages according to the ability of the workers, and the whole population had been divided into four classes, ranging from the able-bodied and skilled to those on the margin of competence. In every district the system broke down, and in so far as speculative classification was possible at all, it was in future to be based on the nature of the work, only indirectly on the skill and physique of the labourer. (b)

In view of the vast extent of the whole famine relief organisation the departures from the codes were comparatively slight, and if mortality statistics and expenditure be the final measure of success, the three quarters of a million who succumbed constitute but a small percentage of the whole population affected. Indeed, the administrative efficiency necessary for the relief of some 76,601,544 units (a) at a cost of Rs. 32·7 per head per annum is difficult to calculate. (b)

The famine is of peculiar importance on account of the relatively normal conditions. Unusually extensive in area, it is true, it was. But for a generation India had been comparatively immune, and the Government and the people alike had been given time for preparation. Exactly the reverse was the case when two years later a deficiency of rain occurred which was not only unique, but actually more than double any known record. The two intervening years between these calamities were wholly insufficient to allow the people to recuperate, and as subsequent events proved, did not allow the Government time to organise new permanent schemes for relief works. Though some 45,000 square miles less than in 1897 were affected in British territory, the whole area of the drought was estimated at 475,000 square miles bearing a population of fifty-nine and a half millions. It is thus difficult, almost impossible, to compare the Government's success in their attempt to mitigate distress on the two occasions. On the former the difficulties to be met might be foreseen, on the latter the mere occurrence of the calamity was a unique meteorological phenomenon. On the former the greatest difficulty was the unwillingness of the hillsmen to come to the works, on the latter it was the unparalleled and unexpected numbers who flocked to them. There was no reserve of grain, or wealth, or strength, and the famine affected not the grain crops only, but the whole supply of fodder. The railways carried over two and a half million tons of grain to the afflicted districts; (a) but the problem of importing fodder at a purchasable price in many cases proved insoluble. (b)

The most important recommendation of policy, as distinguished from legislative regulations, made by the Commission of 1898, was that ultimate economy would be better assured by greater generosity. The most noticeable fact in the administration of the famine of 1899–1900 was the extent to which this recommendation was followed. In the Central Provinces the increase in the units relieved from 158 millions in 1896–97 to 556 millions in 1899–1900 was the greatest; (c) but the final total of 1,140,000,000 units was far in excess of any previous occasion.

Following the advice of the recent Commission also on another point, labour was concentrated in the main in large relief camps. The success of the system was doubtful. Insufficient as the time had been for the drawing up of new plans, the work, much of which consisted in road construction, was of little permanent value, while in some districts immediate difficulty was met, in the lack of tools and necessary provisions for the labourers.11 "In no province," it was said, "were well-considered programmes of public or village works ready at the beginning of the famine." (a) When opportunity arose for investigating the actual value of the whole result, the opinion was expressed that "on the whole it was impossible to say that the utility of the works executed during the recent famine was great." (b)

In consequence of the expense and waste on these works, a certain change of opinion is noticeable on the question of the desirability of large undertakings in the final report of the Commission of 1901. But though the success of the new system of decentralisation and private enterprise during the drought of 1907 corroborates the opinion of Sir Antony MacDonnell and his collaborators, the lack of preparation in 1899 never really afforded an opportunity of putting the recommendations of the 1898 Commission to a fair trial. It was indeed this fact which was the primary cause of such inefficiency as there was. In Madras, for example, in spite of the demand for irrigation, roads were constructed, the maintenance of which in the future proved a financial impossibility, (c) and little attention was paid to the suggestion of the Commission that advances should be made for the repair of wells and the permanent security of the Kharif crop. (a) Viewed as a whole, however, these defects in administration are but incidental, and the real lesson of the famine is its justification of the existing system.

Summarising the events of the two years, the Commission laid emphasis upon the refusal of relief in the early stages of the famine in some districts, and the fact that “taking the period as a whole the relief distributed was excessive.” (b) The total cost of the famine, amounting to nearly ten crores of rupees, (c) was indeed unparalleled. But the sweeping condemnation of the whole British administration made by certain writers, based on the financial burden of this expenditure, the excess in mortality of a million during these two years, and an estimated check to the natural increase of the population of nineteen millions,12 can scarcely bear criticism.

There was a certain lack of generosity in the Bombay Presidency ; there was a heavy mortality among the aboriginal tribes in Gujarat and Khandesh, whom it was scarcely possible to assist ; immigrants from native states added largely to the mortality statistics ; and disease, the inevitable consequence of drought and heat, eliminated those whose power of resistance was relatively inferior. But the scenes of the tragedies of past centuries can never be reacted.

The problem of relief organisation was indeed solved before the Commission of 1901 drew up their report. The real value of that report lies in its clear summary of principles already enunciated, and still more in its exhaustive inquiry into the whole economic condition of India, and the suggestions it threw out for general economic reform.

In less than six years a proof of the value of that work was given. Into the nature of the change that has passed over India in the last decade it is impossible to enter here; but from the story of the drought of 1906–7 some conception of it can be gathered. Although the rains in June had been locally deficient, and those of September and December had completely failed in the provinces affected, (a) although the harvests had suffered in 1903 and 1904 from excessive wet and been generally deficient in 1905–6, still the increase of mortality was almost negligible, (b) and the calamity never bore the name of famine. The consequent rise in prices during this period had been met in some districts by an equivalent rise in the wages of labour.13 But the real causes of the success, with which the effects of the drought were resisted, lay rather in the improved condition of the cultivators, the existing irrigation systems, and the ready and extensive grants of tuccavee.

All mechanism must change with the changing needs of the times, and on this occasion it was found that that great structure of administrative organisation which had been necessary in the past was to be superseded by a less complex system. The food supply for nine months completely failed, and a population of nearly fifty million was affected. (a) But although higher wages than was customary were paid, the numbers on relief works over the whole period were abnormally small. More remunerative work was to be found in the less stricken districts and the agricultural labourer was employed elsewhere. For, owing to the moral and economic development of the "cultivator" classes and the insight of the Government, a new system, at once more economical and more congenial to the people, was found possible. Loans were made at varying rates of interest to the landowners, who were ready to seize the opportunity for the extension of the irrigation and drainage of their properties; the unusual expense of sowing the spring crops was guaranteed by the Government; (b) and thus the duration of the distress was curtailed, and the disorganisation of the normal conditions reduced to a minimum. Moreover, that tendency towards decentralisation, the almost unbroken history of which can be traced from 1873, found its final expression, and the numbers relieved in villages exceeded those of 1896–97 by over eleven million units. (c)

The history of famine relief during this period is one of action and reaction, but all the minor oscillations of opinion have scarcely checked the general movement, which has been towards the ultimate ideal of co-operation in work and generosity in charity.

The relief afforded in native states during this period was almost throughout in imitation of the English systems. Its history is, in fact, a mere reflection of that which has been related, blurred and bedimmed on occasions by the lack of energy of native potentates, but obtaining an ever increasing precision as the century advanced.

In one respect alone has there been a marked difference. Although special mention was made in reports of the extent to which the Zamindars and richer ryots offered personal assistance in Madras in 1865–66, (a) and such generosity was even more marked in later years, still a subject people can never be expected to show an eager readiness to assist a foreign Government in the execution of the most onerous of its duties; nor can such assistance be enforced as an obligation. Thus it is that in Native States the co-operation of the richer members of the community, sometimes obligatory, sometimes voluntary, has played a considerably more important rôle. But even in these states, such private enterprise is accessory to the central organisation.

In 1865–66 relief centres were established, and cooked food distributed in a manner closely similar to that in the North-West Provinces a few years previously. (b) In 1868–70, as has been seen, the death of the cattle and dearth of corn in Rajputana rendered all hopes of mitigating distress impossible. But the success of village relief in Rampur, carried out through the agency of the headmen, (c) gave a hint to the British Government, upon which it was not slow to act; and the striking energy of the younger native princes throughout the whole period was the subject of special note. (a) Such energy, however, was not always shown, and in spite of the existence of some twelve thousand breached tanks in Mysore which gave the native government of that province an opportunity probably unique in history for the establishment of relief works, (b) the famine of 1877 was mismanaged, no public works were undertaken till too late, and subsequently the reporting Commission felt obliged to draw up a special code for that province. Although there have been local exceptions, viewed as a whole the history of relief in Native States from that date to the present day has been little more than the story of the success or failure of the application of such codes. In Mysore in 1896–97 the success was such that not only was perfect competence to support its own population shown, but assistance was also rendered to the adjoining British territories; (c) and so efficient was the administration in Bundelkhand and Gwalior in 1900 “that it might well form a model for us.”(d) But this was not always the case. There is an inevitable element of doubt and danger in the amount of reliance that can be placed on particular individuals. The British Agent was often compelled to bring pressure to bear; (a) and in some cases, such as those of Banganapalle and Hyderabad in 1896, nothing worthy of the name of relief was undertaken, and the kitchens in the neighbouring British districts were flooded with immigrants. (b)

Notes

  1. (a). B. Smith, Report, pt. ii. para. 59.
  2. (b). Ibid., pt. i. para. 60.
  3. (c). 1880 Comm., pt. i. para. 49.
  4. a. B. Smith, Report, pt. i. para. 25.
  5. b. Ibid., pt. ii. para. 172.
  6. a. Girdlestone, Report, pp. 71–9 ; B. Smith, Report, pt. i. para. 22.
  7. b. B. Smith, Report, pt. ii. para. 10.
  8. (a). H.O., vol. i. p. 64.
  9. a. Orissa Report, para. 291.
  10. b. (b) Ibid., para. 291.
  11. c. Cockerell, Report, para. 149.
  12. d. Orissa Report, para. 407.
  13. e. (e) Ibid., para. 291.
  14. a. Orissa Report, para. 69.
  15. b. Dalyell, Mem., pp. 80–132 passim.
  16. c. G., p. 48.
  17. a. 1880 Comm., pt. iii. p. 96.
  18. b. 1880 Comm., pt. iii. p. 80 seq.
  19. a. 1880 Comm., pt. iii. p. 93.
  20. b. Sir Bartle Frere, p. 13 seq.
  21. c. (c) Suppl. to Gazette of India, Feb. 25, 1875, p. 4.
  22. d. (d) Vide A Black Pamphlet, 1876.
  23. e. MacDonnell's Report on Food Supply, para. 44.
  24. (a). Acc. and Papers, 1875, liv. p. 4, para. 3.
  25. (b). 1880 Comm., pt. ii. p. 116.
  26. (a). (a) G., p. 147.
  27. (b). (b) Acc. and Papers, 1875, liv. p. 48.
  28. (c). (c) Ibid., liv. p. 9.
  29. (d). (d) 1880 Comm., pt. iii. p. 143.
  30. a. Sir John Strachey, India, p. 140.
  31. b. 1880 Comm., pt. i. para. 60.
  32. c. Corresp. re Famine in S. and W. India, 1877, pt. ii. p. 72.
  33. a. Papers re Partial Census in Famine Districts, p. 14.
  34. b. Vide infra, cp. V.; Dutt, Economic Hist. of India, p. 490.
  35. c. Sir R. Temple’s Report, pt. ii. p. 19.
  36. a. Namely, nearly 18 millions. Corresp. re Famine, op. cit., pt. ii. p. 15.
  37. b. Madras Manual of Administration, vol. i. note pp. 298–300.
  38. c. Digby, A Famine Campaign in S. India, p. 7.
  39. (a). Corresp. re Famine, op. cit., pt. i. p. 119.
  40. (b). Ibid., pt. i. p. 275.
  41. (c). Madras Manual of Administration, vol. i. note pp. 298–300.
  42. (d). Sir R. Temple’s Report, pt. iii. p. 448.
  43. (a). (a) Namely, mainly in the Shahjahanpur, Meerut, and Delhi districts.
  44. a. 1880 Comm., pt. i. para. 63.
  45. b. Ibid., pt. i. para. 112.
  46. a. 1880 Comm., para. 140.
  47. b. Digby, Famine Campaign in S. India, pp. 336 seq.
  48. (a). 1880 Comm., pt. i. para. 112.
  49. a. 1898 Comm., p. 17.
  50. b. Bombay Famine Report, 1892, pp. 4–5.
  51. c. 1898 Comm., pt. i. pp. 28–9.
  52. a. Report on the Famine in C.P., 1896–97, pp. 17–9.
  53. b. Ibid., p. 155.
  54. c. 1898 Comm., p. 12.
  55. d. Ibid., p. 361.
  56. e. Report on Famine in Madras Pres., 1896–97, p. 49.
  57. (a). Report on Famine in Madras Pres., 1896–97, p. 48.
  58. (b). 1898 Comm., p. 196.
  59. (c). Ibid., p. 234.
  60. (a). 1898 Comm., pp. 162 and 173.
  61. (b). (b) Ibid., pp. 54 seq. and 119.
  62. (c) · [Unlinked note, p. 67] Report on Famine in C.P., vol. i. p. 159.
  63. a. Report on Famine in C.P., App. iv. p. 11.
  64. b. 1898 Comm., pp. 207–8.
  65. c. (c) Ibid., p. 232.
  66. (a). (a) 1898 Comm., pt. i. pp. 179, 182, 202–3, 212 ; pt. ii. pp. 21, 174. Report on Famine in C.P., 1896–97, App. iii. p. 7.
  67. (b). (b) Report on Management of Famine Relief Works, T. Higham, 1897, pt. viii. pp. 1–2.
  68. (a). 1907–8 Comm., p. 84.
  69. (b). 1898 Comm., p. 196.
  70. a. Mem. on Railway Admin., p. 29.
  71. b. Nash, The Great Famine, pp. 12, 69; Papers regarding Famine, 1899, 1900, xxvii. p. 266.
  72. c. 1901 Comm., pp. 4–5.
  73. a. 1901 Comm., p. 10.
  74. b. Report of Irrigation Comm., 1904, pt. i. p. 329.
  75. c. Ibid., 1904, pt. ii. paras. 300, 305.
  76. a. 1901 Comm., p. 15.
  77. b. Ibid., p. 7.
  78. c. Ibid.
  79. (a). Namely, the United Provinces, especially Agra and Oudh.
  80. (b). 3·41 per mille above the 1892–1901 average. Report on Admin. of Famine Relief, 1907–8, p. 131.
  81. a. Report on Admin. of Famine Relief, 1907–8, p. 4.
  82. b. Ibid., pp. 21, 72.
  83. c. Ibid., 1907–8, p. 84.
  84. (a). (a) Report on Madras Famine, Dalyell, p. 112; Eth., Report, p. 109.
  85. (b). Madras Man. of Admin., vol. ii. p. 299.
  86. (c). G., p. 165; 1881 Comm., pt. i. p. 196.
  87. a. Col. Brookes, Dec. 9, 1870; 1881 Comm., pt. i. p. 84.
  88. b. Digby, Famine Campaign in S. India, p. 403, quoting Col. Sankey.
  89. c. Report on Famine Admin. in Madras Pres., 1896–97, p. 55.
  90. d. Report of Irrigation Comm., 1904, pt. ii. para. 732.
  91. (a). Papers on Famine, 1899–1900, vol. ii., “Native States,” pp. 166–9.
  92. (b). Report on Famine Admin. in Madras Pres., op. cit.