Chapter IV

Relief Organisation

The History & Economics of Indian Famines, Alexander Loveday, 1914 · from page 79 · about 20 minutes

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Viewed from the standpoint of the economist, drought constitutes a reduction in the gross revenue ultimately derivable from the natural agents of production. That reduction no system of relief can hope to affect. Protective works may restrict the area, or partially mitigate the effects of deficient rainfall, but the actual work of relief is confined in its objects to preventing a concomitant decrease in the supply of labour and cattle, and, to a less extent, to spreading the economic burden over a greater length of time and width of space. Only to a limited degree, however, does this latter object of insurance come within the ideals of relief. It constitutes a modifying factor, restricting the amount of immediately expendable wealth, and influencing the nature of the work undertaken. In so far as the policy of the British Government has changed, or fluctuated since 1858, that change has been largely dependent upon the amount of importance laid upon it.

From the sketch which has been given of the history of the famines of the past it will have been observed that certain methods of relief have failed in their object and that others are no longer applicable to the changed conditions of the present day.

A study of these failures, and these anachronisms, and an examination of some of the difficulties which efficient relief must face, may perhaps throw light upon the principles underlying the present system.

The time of wholesale mortality from lack of food has passed. The problem is now economic and moral, not geographical. It is concerned fundamentally with the means of establishing at any given moment some system of provisional employment, which shall be capable of providing work for an uncertain and fluctuating, but always considerable, percentage of the population, and, with wages sufficiently high for efficiency, shall at the same time possess a permanent value as great as possible. In Western countries public works as a method of poor relief have been almost universally discredited on the plea not only of their demoralising effects, but also of the impossibility of supplying remunerative employment at those times of year when destitution is greatest. But in India, where no alternative exists, the climatic variations are infinitely greater, the available capital is infinitely less, and the abruptness with which the normal demand for labour ceases, and then revives, renders the difficulty of assuring results of permanent utility almost inestimable. A famine may be caused by a rainfall not actually deficient in depth, but a fortnight too early or too late, or a harvest which promised sufficiency may be ruined by minor calamities such as plagues of locusts or rats,1 or disease. Moreover, as is still more frequently the case, such plagues as these, or summer floods, may prolong an existing period of distress and upset the whole basis of calculation upon which relief was established.

It is not the object of this chapter to estimate the measure of success or criticise the failure of the relief organisation of the past, but rather to trace in outline the growth of that system as it at present exists. Little is to be learnt from the methods adopted previously to 1858, not merely because of the relative inadequacy of the more ancient systems, but still more because the economic conditions were then such that little common ground for comparison exists. Previous to the arrival of Europeans in India the policy of the native rulers was rather prevention than cure; subsequent to 1858 it has been mainly in imitation of the English. It is only during the last half-century that India has undergone her economic transformation, and the evolution of relief organisation could not exceed in rapidity that change upon which it was dependent, nor the growth of those ideals by which relief was inspired. Mention has already been made of how in 1868 the object, subsequently modified, of total prevention of death from starvation was asserted. The system of liberal but unmethodical charity, which had been characteristic of the famines of the first half of the century, had indeed been scarcely more unsuccessful than that of laying the obligation of assisting the sick and infirm upon the able-bodied, and organising charity under the local agencies which had been adopted in 1860 and 1866. But the acme of governmental benevolence was reached when in 1897 the whole of the private donations, which so early as 1877 had amounted to over £678,512, were devoted to extra comforts for the poor, and special assistance after the drought had passed.2

Perhaps the most important effects which the economic changes in India have had upon the general policy of relief, as distinguished from details of administration, were the surrender of importation to private enterprise and the prevention of "wandering" or emigration.

Emigration in ancient times was the natural impulse of the people, and until subsequently to 1880 had been looked upon favourably by the Government. In 1868 it was deemed advisable to offer such assistance as was possible, and, as has been mentioned, in 1873 a considerable grant was made for that purpose. Its effectiveness as a means of relieving the pressure of the population on a diminished supply of the means of subsistence depends ultimately upon the extent of the distress and the rapidity and certainty with which the people move. In some cases, as in that of the drought in Rajputana in 1868, no alternative is available; in others, as eight years earlier, the proximity of irrigated districts may ensure success; but, as the Commission of 1880 pointed out, in no case has artificial stimulation met with anything but tragic failure, (a) and often the natural inclination to migrate has led to nothing but objectless wandering from one stricken district to another. The whole spirit of the modern system has been towards maintaining so far as possible the existing homes of the people.3 But the policy is necessarily negative rather than positive. The desirability of migration at the present day must depend on the existence of a real demand for labour elsewhere.

Importation of grain was an obviously necessary complement of all systems of relief at that time when facilities for private enterprise were deficient. The undesirability of weakening the security of trade by interference, when such facilities did exist, was no less obvious. But, unhappily for that country, the Government of India during the middle of the nineteenth century suffered from an excessive faith in the principles of the classical economists, which, influencing their policy in reference to internal free trade, had for its result that the importation of corn to famine-stricken districts depended, not so much on the necessities of the particular case as upon the respect paid to those principles at the moment. The example, which the East India Company had set, was indeed not a happy one. The prohibitions on export made on numerous occasions, (a) had either proved unnecessary on account of the rise in prices, or had prevented the export of one grain paying for the import of another. Their attempts to restrict sale prices, (b) a confession of the inadequacy of supply, had acted as a check to enterprise, and their bounties and guarantee of purchase prices (c) had in some instances left them with superfluous stocks on their hands, in others proved an insufficient stimulus to trade. It was, in fact, exactly that difficulty of gauging the total demand which was the inspiring force of the Government's faith in free trade principles in later years. But the necessity of importation on certain occasions was shown clearly in 1866, and definitely accepted in 1873. The excess on the latter occasion no more proved the undesirability of the system than did the difficulties met in 1868. (a) Non-interference in 1812 had raised prices to six times their normal level, and had prevented the rapid distribution of food to the outlying districts in Madras in 1877. Indeed, until the railways in India had extended to such a degree as to make private enterprise really adequate, it can scarcely be said that the Government formed a definite policy. A tendency is, however, perceptible in favour of direct control rather than bounties or guarantee prices, and the necessity of that control under particular circumstances, as the events of 1890 and 1907 proved, will never be absolutely lost.4 But it is not too much to say that emigration and importation on a large scale belong to the mitigative methods of the past.

The real lesson taught by the history of famine trade is the extreme difficulty of foretelling the occurrence or duration of droughts. The rise in corn prices is no definite criterion, for in some cases the people have no money with which to buy, and in others there is no corn which money can measure. To these facts, to no small extent, have been due the modifications which have taken place in relief organisation. The history of this organisation presents a remarkable paradoxical development towards simultaneous centralisation and decentralisation.

The evolution of these two principles is somewhat obscured by the variety of methods of employment; and the impossibility of any classification of works, or wage systems, applicable to the whole period, prohibits perfect clarity of expression. Moreover, this evolution, superficially paradoxical in its nature, has not been uninterrupted in its progress.

The desirability of the concentration of labour upon large undertakings was first upheld by Baird Smith during the famine of 1860. But from that date until some weeks after the outbreak of distress in Madras in 1877 a general drift of opinion in the opposite direction is noticeable. But distinction must be made between the relief offered to the able-bodied and to the sick and infirm. It is the classification of the population which forms the foundation of the existing system. Thus, while opinion may lean towards centralisation of employment, it may at the same moment maintain the desirability of decentralising gratuitous relief. This is indeed, within certain limits, exactly what has taken place. In 1860 there were two centres—the poorhouse and the works. Since 1873 the former has gradually disappeared.

Under native rule, as has been already related, such employment as was given consisted either in the increase of the numbers of the army, (a) or in vast works on tanks or canals. But it was not until after the termination of the East India Company in 1858 that anything at all comparable in extent was undertaken by the English. The reason for the concentration of labour in large gangs in 1860 was the increased facility of supervision. But in both the succeeding famines other considerations, such as the fear of epidemic and the desirability of increased differentiation, proved of greater weight. There is, it is true, theoretically no necessary interdependence between the size of the gang and the size of the undertaking. The problem must indeed be considered relatively. But the systems adopted on these two occasions of light labour gangs and subsidised contracts, (b) both resulted in greater decentralisation. Similarly in 1873 a certain number were drawn from the public works by the Government's policy of giving privileges to private individuals undertaking works of utility. But in this year the Government first gave utterance to a policy to which it adhered in principle until the close of the century. The institution of small works in Madras during the first weeks of 1877 was rather the expression of a personal opinion on the part of Sir Richard Temple than the execution of an authorised policy, and although the Government proved its own indecision by opposing the opening of larger works in Bombay on the same occasion, the ultimate success of centralisation brought conviction; and for the immediate future the policy of promptly concentrating labour under the supervision of the Public Works Department, and then gradually drifting gangs off to works nearer their homes, remained unchanged. There were, it is true, local deviations from this principle, as in Bengal in 1896–97; but the Commission of 1898 viewed their action with dubious approval, (a) strongly advocated the extension of centralisation and the reservation of smaller works until the summer, or to meet the danger of epidemic diseases.5 Without directly dissenting from the opinion of their predecessors, the Commission of three years later, while reserving final judgment until the utility of the work performed during the late famine was tested, laid stress on the advisability of a further extension of village operations. The evidence submitted in 1904 (b) was more than sufficient to justify them in their attitude.

The drought of 1907–8 was perhaps scarcely intense enough to test fully this change in policy. But it did at least demonstrate the extent to which that alternative to public works could be beneficially adopted under favourable circumstances. It is round the practicability of village relief and village industry that the problem really centres.

There exists a certain obvious a priori advantage in affecting the ordinary social and economic routine in as small a degree as possible. Until 1873, however, the importance of this desideratum was deemed slight in comparison with the danger of the people battening upon governmental paternalism. The success of village decentralisation is the reflection of moral and administrative progress.

Previously to the eighteenth century, when works were not instituted, relief was direct and, with some noticeable exceptions, (a) confined to one centre. Apart from the limited extent of such relief, its obvious defect was the overcrowding of the capital and the consequent outbreak of epidemics. But the poorhouses and relief centres, which formed the backbone of the system for mitigating distress among the weak in the middle of the nineteenth century, were little more than a modification of this system. They were a modification inasmuch as work was demanded in the poorhouses, and those institutions were considerable in number. But, as far as the agricultural population was concerned, it was identical in its effect of breaking up the home life.

In tracing the history of gratuitous relief it will become apparent how the drift towards decentralisation has been almost uninterrupted, until at the close of the past century its organisation was so nearly perfect, and its beneficial effects so convincingly demonstrated, that it was made possible to advocate a decentralisation of employment on similar lines.

The poorhouse system was first doomed when in 1868 the Government extended its promise of assistance to all classes of society. The attempt in the famine of that year to adhere to this plan was an anachronism. The hatred of the poorhouse has in many instances proved more strong than the fear of death, the test of cooked food for admission was to many a religious prohibition, and in 1866 an example had been set, however limited in extent, of the possibility of outside assistance. But though an anachronism in respect to the Government's ideals, it is more doubtfully so in view of administrative efficiency. When in 1873 an attempt was made to substitute personal knowledge for self-acting tests, that knowledge was found wanting. But though the history of the presentday system may be conveniently dated from that year, its ultimate origin is to be found in the sympathy extended to the Parda-nishin women so early as 1860. The measure of success met by the efforts to assist in their own homes those who were too proud to enter the poorhouse, led on the next occurrence of drought to the extension of the principle to the weavers, and it was from these small beginnings that the village relief grew. In 1877 the undesirability of giving heavy labour to skilled industrial workmen was finally recognised, and the village inspection and relief were extended in the manner already described. But with extension of this system in the two last famines of the century, other methods of relief did not totally disappear. Kitchens were still maintained and advocated for children by the Commission of 1898. (a) But the old tests had broken down, and their utility was strongly criticised three years later. Ultimately the problem was a psychological one, and it was found that greater demoralisation ensued from the temporary destruction of family life than from the possible pampering of the people maintained in their own homes. But, granted the desirability of this method in respect to the weak or aged, the question of its extension to other classes was merely one of practicability.

The economic advantages of maintaining the ordinary agricultural occupations were no less obvious than those of shortening the duration of the famine by ensuring early harvests, and in 1896 it was definitely proved that the public works were the most expensive of all forms of assistance. But the practicability of this plan depended not only on the reliance which could be placed in the village headman, but also upon the system of wage payments.

The difficulty of fixing wages at such a rate as to maintain efficiency and obviate over-indulgence has proved the greatest of all those in connection with famine relief. In respect to nothing has policy varied so much. It is almost impossible to unravel the thread from the tangle. There was a tendency up to 1877 to limit the amount paid after the responsibility for maintaining dependants was taken over by the Government. With the improvement of administration and supervision there has been a parallel tendency, the necessary complement, towards differentiation and classification. Classification, however, has proved the fundamental difficulty.

The attempt made in 1860 so to group labour as to allot the lighter tasks to the physically weaker was developed in the following famine by the formation of “light labour gangs” employed nearer their own homes. From that date up to 1900 the task was essayed of classifying on the basis of hypothetical efficiency, and graduating wages according to the value accruing from the task corresponding to any particular group, the assumption being partly that the food should bear a ratio to the energy expended, and partly that while obviating the danger of laziness the more competent would be able personally to support their dependants. This principle, however, was necessarily modified and restricted by the obligation to offer to all a wage adequate to their essential needs. But, as has been seen in the foregoing chapter, it proved unsuccessful. In the first place, sufficient stimulus to work was not given within the various groups, and while fining was proved to be unjust, the minimum wage was looked upon as a form of gratuity.6 In the second, the system of classification proved in practice to be meaningless.7 It was realised in 1898 that a modified system of payments by results would hold out a greater incentive to work, and that a classification on the basis of the nature of the task would render this more possible than one on the basis of presumable efficiency.

Two facts have made the existing system possible— the perfection of supervision and the immediate offer of employment before emaciation sets in. Both indeed are essential; for the system entailing payment, partly on the amount of work done, and thus resulting in the creation of groups as small as possible, and partly on the basis of classification, is in fact a combination of task and piece wages. Indeed, with the abolition of the minimum wage, the perfection of supervision and the relatively greater efficiency of the worker, the system must in the future, and has largely in the past, resolved itself into one of payment on results.

As soon as this result was achieved or nearly achieved, as soon as the increased cost of closer supervision was remunerated by the greater efficiency of the worker, then so soon did village works become practicable.

There is, however, a natural limit to the amount of available work to be done in villages, which is more rapidly reached than in the case of the larger undertakings. So long ago as 1898 it was reported that that limit had almost been reached, (a) and although subsequent experience throws doubt upon the assertion, its justification is a mere matter of time. But as the larger village works available have decreased in number, new methods of individual employment have been found. During the famine of 1899–1900 the aged and infirm were employed in preparing the prickly pear as fodder for cattle, while many able-bodied were hired by the more wealthy cultivators for property improvements. The solution of the difficulty lies in reality in loans to cultivators and liberal grants of tuccavee. This system, which formed the backbone of the relief organisation of Muhammad Tughlak in 1345, was rather accepted as a principle than adopted as a means of relief until 1868. But it is only within the last twenty years that the grants for seed corn, or loans for improvements, have been made, not merely with a view to securing future harvests, but also with the immediate object of lightening the pressure of unemployment. Successfully carried out in 1884 in the Punjab, (a) and in the Bombay Presidency in 1890, (b) the plan achieved its ultimate perfection in 1907.

Little mention has been made in preceding chapters of that corollary of tuccavee, upon which, no less than upon direct loans, the power of recuperation in agriculture is dependent. The question, however, of the Land Revenue remissions is so inextricably intermingled with that of the whole economic position of India that it is difficult to discuss it here, without introducing those wider economic problems which may be advantageously postponed for fuller treatment elsewhere.

These remissions accepted as a principle of relief by native rulers reached the unprecedented sum of 70 lakhs in 1630 under the Emperor Shah Jehan. (c) But though there were some such remarkable exceptions as this, the general plan under native rule was to remit in so far only as it proved impossible to collect. As a rule, under the East India Company, either a similar policy was adopted or the remission was merely provisional on a promise of subsequent payment. On some occasions, it is true, as in 1858, the remissions were liberal, and the 23 lakhs surrendered on that occasion considerably exceeded the sums in 1860. The policy of greater liberality may be dated from 1873. But not until the necessity of giving immediate information as to the amount to be remitted was grasped was the effect of these remissions in any way equivalent to their cost. In 1900, in accordance with the growing policy of protecting the poorer agriculturists, they were made subject to a similar abatement of their claims on the part of private creditors.

But beyond the mere question of administrative wisdom the beneficial result of such remission of taxes, or granting of loans, is essentially limited by the extent of mortality among cattle. This was so far realised in 1900 that special advances were made in May and June, at the time of Kharif sowing, for their purchase. But the problem of prevention of mortality is one which up to the present has remained unsolved in practice. As Sir Richard Temple pointed out, when the failure of fodder is relatively small the ensuing mortality among those beasts too old for work is no economic loss. (a) But such occasions are comparatively rare. In some cases, before the existence of railway connections, districts have been isolated and starved to death by the loss of the one means of traction; still more often have lands gone temporarily out of cultivation owing to the impossibility of ploughing. In the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency the difficulty was largely overcome by driving the herds into the hill forests. In the Madras Presidency on the same occasion some relief was afforded by preparation of the prickly pear. (b) But though similar arrangements were made in the two great subsequent famines, and employment was found for the villagers in cutting grass, and cattle camps were established, the supply of fodder proved ultimately inadequate, and agriculture has suffered in consequence. How far the provisions made in the existing codes to meet the danger will be successful still remains to be proved.

These codes present the formulated expression of past administrative experience. They cover not only the relief directly afforded during the period of distress, but the whole of the standing preparations. It is impossible here to sketch adequately, even in outline, the nature of these preparations, or the peculiar features of the various provincial codes. The codes of 1883 and 1893 and the report of the Commission of 1901 constitute the three stages of their development. Of the nature of that development some description has already been given.

The permanent provisions alone vary in extent and character from the meteorological stations situate in Africa and Arabia to the purely local centres of information in reference to the prospects of the harvests and movements of the population. Reserves of establishments and tools are maintained, and in 1900 the Government accepted the recommendation that a Commissioner should be appointed for the executive control of relief measures, “ whenever a reign of famine is impending.” (a) Programmes of works are kept in preparation by the Public Works Department, and for village undertakings by the local officials.

Beyond this the whole scheme of the measures to be adopted from the first indication of distress to the final closing of the works is elaborated and detailed. The provincial codes as they now exist are not absolutely identical in their nature; but in Native states and in British states alike they are in the main the incorporation of those principles the history of which has just been traced.

Notes

  1. (a). 1880 Comm., pt. ii. p. 181.
  2. a. (a) E.g. 1770, 1792, 1803, 1807, 1824.
  3. b. (b) E.g. 1729, 1785, 1803.
  4. c. (c) E.g. 1803, 1823, 1833, 1807, Guarantee Price, vide Appendix A.
  5. (a). In the case of Rajputana owing to the mortality among cattle.
  6. (a). Cf. 1423 and 1596, vide Appendix A.
  7. (b). G., pp. 85–91, 103–5, passim.
  8. a. 1898 Comm., pt. i. p. 135.
  9. b. Report of Irrigation Comm., 1904.
  10. a. Cf. Famine, 1596, 1630, 1660, vide Appendix A.
  11. (a). (a) 1898 Comm., pp. 286–7.
  12. (a). (a) Cf. Report on Famine Relief Works, T. Higham, 1907, pt. viii, p. 13.
  13. a. 1898 Comm., p. 7.
  14. b. Report on Bombay Famine, 1902, T. E. Fleet, p. 5.
  15. c. Elliot, vol. vii. p. 25.
  16. a. India, p. 337.
  17. b. Ibid., 1877.
  18. a. Resol. No. II., Dec. 20, 1900.