The political horizon of the Government of India lengthens out far beyond the external frontiers of British dominion. It maintains the peace and safety of the seas that wash the Indian coasts; it watches the movement of sea-borne trade and the commercial tariffs of its neighbours; it studies the course of events on the borders of Siam, Tongking, China, Russia, and Persia; it protects the rulers of islands and maritime districts in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea; and it maintains a fortified outpost at Aden, surrounded by a belt of protected territory. Its activities and responsibilities in these more distant fields of foreign policy will be dealt with in the next chapter, where also some account will be given of the small French and Portuguese settlements which still exist in India. Here attention will be confined to those States or territories which are not subject to British law, and yet lie within the outer line that the hand of diplomacy has drawn as the boundary of India upon the map of Asia. The countries thus mapped off, whether ruled by single chiefs or tribal organizations, fall under the general designation of the Native States of India, although some of them, such as Nepāl, differ in the measure of independence which they enjoy, and in other material respects, from the principalities of the interior.
The diplomatic line which has been mentioned as including all the States of which an account is here given, stretches from Gwetter Bay, in the Gulf of Oman, to the Mekong river, near latitude 22° N. and longitude 101° E. Its extreme point on the north is Povalo Schveikovski on the Taghdumbāsh Pāmīr, a little north of 37° N., while its southern limit is Victoria Point (below 10° N.) in the Mergui District of Burma. The principal conventions with foreign powers which have established this international cordon round India are those with Persia in 1871 and 1895; with Afghānistān in 1893 and 1895; with Russia in 1895; with China in 1890, 1894, and 1897; with France in 1896 and 1904; and several engagements with Siam extending from 1868 to 1894.
Within this frontier, which marches with Persia, Afghānistān, Russia, Tibet, China, and Siam, lies an area estimated at more than 1,800,000 square miles, inhabited by about 300,000,000 people. On the west the Persian Makrān border runs from Gwetter Bay, through Jalk, to the Koh-i-Malik Siāh, whence the Afghān line continues east along the desert sands of Nushki as far as the Sarlat range. Thence the line, usually called the Durand line, goes north through Chaman and Domandi till it reaches Mount Sikarām, in the Safed Koh range, above the Peiwar Pass. The British-Afghān border here turns east to Landi Khāna in the Khyber Pass; then, resuming its northerly direction and leaving Kāfiristān to the Amīr, it follows the Wākhān frontier to Povalo Schveikovski, in longitude 75° E., where three empires, the British, Russian, and Chinese, meet. Nature then interposes a scientific frontier along the Muztāgh (Karakoram) range and the Himālayas, until the Brahmaputra is crossed on the north of Assam. Unexplored and uncivilized tribal country guards the northern limits of Assam and Burma from the intrusion of peaceful surveyors or hostile visitors, until the upper basins of the Irrawaddy and Salween are reached, and then, at a fixed point north of Sabu Pum (25° 35′ N. ; 98° 14′ E.), scientific survey and diplomatic agreements resume their operations and trace the British-Chinese border along the side of Yünnan. Kokang falls to India; and from the point where the Chinese frontier is left, down to the mouth of the Nam Huok, the possessions and spheres of influence of France and Great Britain are divided by the Mekong river. The rest of the frontier, from the Mekong to the mouth of the Pakchan in the Malay Peninsula, has been clearly defined by various agreements with Siam.
India, lying within the limits thus defined, consists of two parts, British India and the territories of Native chiefs, or to use the more common phrase, Native States. Parliament in the Interpretation Act of 1889 (52 & 53 Vict., cap. 63, sec. 18) has adopted the following definitions: ‘The expression British India shall mean all territories and places within Her Majesty’s dominions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India, or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India. The expression India shall mean British India, together with any territories of any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of Her Majesty, exercised through the Governor-General of India, or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India.' We may say, then, that the Native States consist of territory in India, not being within His Majesty's dominions yet under his suzerainty, which in the case of 175 States, including those of the greatest importance, is exercised by the Supreme Government, and in the case of the remainder, numbering about 500, is entrusted to the Provincial Governments. The most obvious test of dominion is supplied by the constant action of courts of law. In whose name do writs run and in whom is jurisdiction over the territory vested? The courts of British India rest upon the law of Parliament and the legislative powers which that law has entrusted to British authorities in British India, whereas the courts which administer justice in any Native State exist under the authority of the ruler of that State. This authority, it must be remembered, is not impaired by the sanction, express or implied, given by such a ruler to the establishment within his territory of courts introduced by the executive authority of the Governor-General-in-Council, for such courts are in theory the courts of the Native State. In other words, the jurisdiction sometimes exercised by the Government of India in a protected State is, from the British-Indian point of view, extra-territorial, and is part of the internal sovereignty of the State, in which the British Government has a share by treaty, cession, or other lawful means. Its existence does not convert suzerainty into dominion. Sometimes a question arises whether this or that block of territory in India is or is not within British dominion, and the Privy Council has more than once been appealed to on this point. In particular, doubts have occurred as to whether the British Crown possesses territorial dominion, and not merely suzerainty, over Kāthiāwār, the Tributary Mahāls of Orissa, and those of Chotā Nāgpur. Whether or not a so-called Native State is what it professes to be is a question of fact which, in the absence of a legal decision, must be settled by the present action of the British paramount power. If the persons who reside in the territorial area, not being by birth or naturalization British subjects, are treated by the courts of India as foreign subjects, it may be concluded that the country to which they belong is a Native State.
The position of the territorial chief, or ruling authority, is of less importance. The status of the territory and not that of its ruler is the essential point. The generally accepted view is that sovereignty is divisible, and that its attributes, such as the right to make war or peace, the right of foreign negotiation, the right to legislate, the right to administer civil and criminal justice, and so forth, are capable of division. The sovereign who enjoys all these rights is alone independent, and in India the accepted suzerainty of the British Crown involves a partition of the aggregate of such powers between the suzerain and the prince. Accordingly no ruler of a Native State can be described as 'independent.'
Information in respect of the area, population, revenue, and other details regarding Native States will be found in the Appendix. The statistics there given invite some remarks. The area outside direct British dominion is enormous (more than 824,000 square miles), but the population (68,000,000) is vastly inferior to that of British India, and has moreover suffered diminution in the last decade. The arid tracts of Rājputāna and Baluchistān, the States embedded in the mountainous tracts of Northern and North-Western India, and many of the small principalities in the forests and hills of Central India and the ranges of the Ghāts account in some measure for this difference. The relegation of so many States to inhospitable and unproductive regions was the natural consequence of the pressure of invasion and conquest, as each successful invader drove back those who opposed or fled before him into tracts which were sufficient to support existence and yet not rich enough to afford plunder. At the same time also some of the fairest portions of Indian territory lie within the Native States. Mysore possesses a fertile soil and valuable mineral ores. Hyderābād is considerable in area and rich in iron and coal-fields. Baroda is the garden of Gujarāt. Kashmīr is one of the most favoured countries in the world as regards scenery, climate, and natural capabilities. The territories not under British dominion are thus often valuable, and their geographical position frequently lends them importance.
If the collective extent of the Native States strikes the eye, the multiplicity of separate sovereignties is even more noticeable. Many of them are very small, some of the chiefs exercising authority over only a few villages. Thus in Rājputāna the area of Lāwa is but 19 square miles; Central India, especially in Baghelkhand and Bundelkhand, contains several very petty territories; the Simla Hill States are little more than small holdings; and the same feature is to be seen in the Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt groups of Bombay. Equally remarkable is the irregular geographical distribution of the principalities.
Bengal, in the foremost rank of Indian Provinces, has now only twenty-six States, most of them of small account, in direct relations with its Government, against thirty-four in the Punjab. The United Provinces count only two, Rāmpur and Tehrī, while Madras has but five, against 354 attached to Bombay. Even in the large Agencies directly subordinate to the Government of India, there is a marked contrast between the partition of Rājputāna under twenty rulers and the 148 separate States or estates into which the Central India Agency is divided. The explanation of these irregularities lies partly in the policy pursued by the British at various times, and partly in the course of events over which they had no control. In some parts of India a stronger power had made a clean sweep of upstarts, and even of ancient petty dynasties, before the British advanced. Thus, in the South of India, the Nizām of Hyderābād, the Nawāb of the Carnatic, and the Muhammadan usurper of Mysore had cleared the ground, while even in Travancore the ruler had bound up a number of petty chiefships into one unit, strong enough to resist the encroachment of its neighbours. When, therefore, the Carnatic fell under British control and Tipū Sultān was finally overthrown, large united territories had to be disposed of, either by annexation or by restitution to a former dynasty. The work of consolidation had here been accomplished by others before the British introduced their system. On the other hand, Central India continued to the last a scene of disorder and contest, owing to the policy of non-intervention, until the British Government cried halt and the swords of adventurers were perforce sheathed: then the spoils were suffered to remain in the hands that held them. In Bombay, again, the Peshwā's authority had been weakened, and territories were constantly changing rulers up to the moment when the Marāthā supremacy was overthrown at Kirkee. The British had by that time changed their policy of non-intervention for one of political settlement. They accordingly proceeded at once to recognize the status quo in the disturbed areas of Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt which they did not bring under British dominion. There was no general inquiry into titles, nor was pause given for the consolidation of States by the will of the strongest. Existing acquisitions were recognized once for all, and the political situation, ruffled as it was by the storms of war and aggression, was in a moment petrified. On the other hand, in parts of India which were at that time regarded as beyond the British sphere, the process of natural consolidation went on. Thus in the Punjab, although the cis-Sutlej chiefs were protected, Ranjīt Singh was left to swallow up his other neighbours as he pleased. Accordingly, the annexation of the Lahore kingdom in 1849 brought a large and compact territory under British dominion, the principalities that formerly clustered there having already been subdued by the Sikh ruler. Political as well as physical geography bears witness to the stress of destructive forces through which a country has passed. The volcanic origin of some of the political groups shown in the Appendix is clearly revealed by the number of fragmentary States that still subsist in those parts of India where chaos reigned longest.
Speaking generally, it may be said that the majority of Native States are of modern origin. Their source or longevity is, however, no longer a question of vital interest. The important fact for them is their admission into the political system of the British protectorate, and the assurance by statute (21 & 22 Vict., cap. 106, sec. 67) that all ‘treaties made by the said [East India] Company shall be binding on Her Majesty,’ to which may be added the solemn declaration, contained in the sanads of adoption conferred after the Mutiny upon every important ruling chief, that Her Majesty is ‘desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India who now govern their own territories should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their houses should be continued.’ Moreover, in the celebrated Proclamation of 1858, Queen Victoria declared that ‘We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression on our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall allow no encroachments on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.’ Nevertheless, in view of former controversies, especially those excited by the application of the doctrine of lapse, it is desirable to take a rapid survey of the principal Native States, in order to indicate those which were in existence when the Company obtained from the Mughal emperor, in 1765, the Dīwānī of Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa. Such an examination will also serve to explain the material out of which the map of India as it exists to-day was originally formed.
Kalāt, which occupies a very important position on the western flank of British India, had then already shaken off the control of Delhi. At the beginning of the eighteenth century its Khān was virtually independent. Later on the Persian invader, Nādir Shāh, annexed the whole of the Mughal territories west of the Indus ; and after his death Ahmad Shāh, Durrāni, established his supremacy over Kalāt, but was obliged to leave a member of the ruling family in possession of its territories. The Durrāni supremacy, however, sat so lightly on the Khān that the British entered into relations with him during the Afghān War of 1838 ; and in 1854, during the Crimean War, they strengthened this alliance, thereafter substituting British protection for formal dependency on Kābul. North of the area known as Baluchistān lies a rugged country, mainly inhabited by Pathān tribes, through whose passes wave after wave of conquest has flowed without affecting the internal independence of its inhabitants.
Kashmīr was no doubt re-created by the British after Ranjīt Singh had annexed it to the Punjab ; but Gulāb Singh, upon whom he had conferred Jammu, belonged to a family of Dogrā Rājputs which had long ruled over this mountainous tract. Jammu then, to which Kashmīr was attached by the British Government in 1846, may be reckoned as an old principality. The State of Nepāl as now existing arose from the subversion of previous Newār dynasties by the present Gurkha house in 1769; the Tibetan families which now rule in Sikkim and Bhutān date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. South of the mountain barrier of the Himālayas there are Native States still held by rulers of ancient origin. Manipur, ruled by a Nāgā family which adopted Hinduism in 1714, fairly held its own against the Burmese until it was rescued from further danger by the treaty made in 1826 with the king of Ava. Cooch Behār was established four centuries ago by its Koch Rājās, and although it suffered heavy losses of territory at the hands of the Mughals and Bhutānese, it still remains a fragment of an historic principality. Conquest, and the disorders which preceded it, have wiped out numerous chiefships which once existed in the United Provinces; but Rāmpur, although re-created by the British after the cession of Rohilkhand in 1801, is held by descendants of the Rohilla Afghāns who founded a principality there in the early part of the eighteenth century. Bahāwalpur, the largest State (territorially) in the Punjab, represents an offshoot of Muhammadan conquest from Sind; Patiāla, Nābha, Jīnd, and Kapūrthala are the chief of the Sikh principalities saved or restored by British intervention; while a number of the petty Rājput States in the hills can trace their origin to a period anterior to the Mughals.
Rājputāna, the Abode of Chiefs, has, by virtue of its inhospitable deserts and the protection of the Arāvalli Hills, given secure shelter to the most ancient Hindu houses. The victory of Bābar at Sīkri in 1527, the attempts of Akbar to establish his supremacy by means of matrimonial alliances, and, later on, the intrusion of the Marāthās and Pindāris effected great changes in the territorial arrangement of the Rājput clans and dynasties; but through all these sufferings seventeen States have preserved their political existence. The chief of these are Udaipur (Mewār), Jaipur, Jodhpur (Mārwār), and Bīkaner. The two Jāt States of Bharatpur and Dholpur, and the Muhammadan principality of Tonk, which was seized by the celebrated Pindāri leader, Amīr Khān, alone represent the intrusion of aliens, drawn into Rājputāna by the shock of the explosion which shook to the ground the empire of Delhi. The case is far different with the territorial area known as the Central India Agency. Here the whole ancient political system was wrecked, and the country redistributed as the prize of violence and disorder. This large tract invited attack from north and south. The Marāthās, headed off on the east by the Muhammadan State of Hyderābād, and obliged by want of forage to avoid the desert tracts of Rājputāna, pushed up the valleys of the Tāpti and the Narbadā rivers and pursued their way across the Sātpurā and Vindhyan ranges in search of spoil. As they moved north they left behind them soldiers of fortune, favourites of the Peshwā, and adventurous spirits, who settled themselves in the country. Sindhia, who became ruler of Gwalior, Holkar of Indore, the Ponwārs of Dhār and Dewās, were the most successful commanders of such colonies, while many petty States and mediatized estates are also relics of these plundering and lawless immigrants. Into the same area descended other spoilers from the north, as, for instance, the Afghān who founded the State of Bhopāl, and the Pindāri who seized Jaorā. Almost all ruling chiefs in this part of India are of modern origin, sprung from the anarchy which the British tolerated after the battle of Buxar because they were anxious to avoid increasing their responsibilities. Nevertheless, even here may be found chiefs of a respectable antiquity. The Bundelās of Tehrī or Orchhā, in Bundelkhand, lost heavily at the hands of the Marāthās; but they preserved their independence, and their antiquity was recognized by the British when, in later years, the question of lapse was raised on the failure of male heirs. Datiā was an offshoot of Tehrī, and among the smaller estates are a few held by aboriginal chieftains whose ancestors kept their ancient foothold in forest and hill tracts until the British peace was proclaimed. Further east, in Baghelkhand, the State of Rewah has a less chequered history, and is ruled by a Rājput of ancient lineage.
If the survey of the Native States is continued to the west, it will be seen that Bombay resembles Central India in the traces of disintegration and disorder left by the eighteenth century. In no part of India is there a greater variety of principalities, the bulk of them being of modern origin. There are, however, several Rājput houses that have long held rule here. The Jādejas of Cutch were established in that secure peninsula, behind an arm of the sea and the deserts of Sind, at the close of the fifteenth century. From Cutch and from Rājputāna there was, in the distant past, an overflow into Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt. Yet even in Kāthiāwār, lying off the usual path of invasion, the premier state, Junāgarh, represents the comparatively modern intrusion of Muhammadans. Afghāns and Bābis rule farther east at Pālanpur and Rādhanpur, while Cambay witnesses the successful effort of the family of the Sūbahdār of Ahmadābād to establish itself on the break-up of Mughal rule. Farther south a Sesodia of the Udaipur clan is settled at Dharampur. More interesting traces of ancient history are to be found at Sachīn, Janjīra, and Jāfarābād, where chiefs of a foreign ancestry, descended from Abyssinian admirals of the Deccan fleets, still remain in the enjoyment of ruling powers which they received before the break-up of the Mughal empire. But, as has already been said, the majority of the Bombay States were founded by Marāthās in the general scramble for power, when the control of the Peshwās laxed weak, in the middle of the eighteenth century. The most important of these is the territory of the Baroda Gaikwār, which, though in direct relations with the Government of India, is geographically a part of the Bombay Presidency. Kolhāpur also deserves mention as being ruled by a chief who traces his descent (through adoption) from the great Sivajī. A few aboriginal chiefs, Bhīls or Kolīs, exercise an enfeebled authority in the Dāngs and the hilly country that fringes the Mahī and the Narbadā (Rewah) rivers. The Khairpur State, in Sind, is a survival of the former rule of the Baluchi Tālpur Mīrs in that province.
In the centre of the Deccan, Hyderābād, the premier State of India, fills a large space on the map. Since its rulers held office as Sūbahdārs or provincial governors of the Delhi empire, and entered into alliance with the East India Company on their own account when the emperor was a mere puppet in the hands of the Marāthās, they may fairly be regarded as established and legitimate princes when the British supremacy commenced. Mysore, the next largest principality in the South, is a modern creation in so far as it was restored by the British in 1799, after the capture of Seringapatam, and again in 1881, when the regular succession had failed. But it was a revival of the former rule of the Hindu Wodeyars, whose existence as princes dates back to the fifteenth century, although suppressed during the usurpation of Haidar Alī and his son Tipū. The States in direct relations with the Government of Madras are few and, with the exception of Travancore, unimportant, because the southern part of the Peninsula was the scene of prolonged struggle during which none but strong powers could protect themselves, and the work of consolidation had preceded the final shock of arms, in which large territorial units fell to the victor as the fruits of conquest. The wars fought involved the very existence of the combatants, and the States which still survive threw in their lot at an early date with the power which eventually subdued the Carnatic and Mysore. Travancore and Cochin may claim to be ancient, since they can trace their existence to a period which preceded the struggles between the French and the English; and the small jāgīr of Sandūr carries the memory back to an early time when Marāthā adventurers, first in the service of Bījāpur and afterwards on their own account, acquired principalities in Southern India. The Central Provinces chiefs are largely Rājputs, or soi-disant Rājputs, ruling over populations in which the aboriginal element is strong; and the Shan States are fragmentary relics of a dominion which once extended widely over Burma proper. The States, or Tributary Mahāls, attached to the Chotā Nāgpur and Orissa Commissionerships of Bengal are of much the same character as those in the Central Provinces, and, like them, were previously subject to the Bhonsla Rājās of Nāgpur.
The policy pursued by the Government of India in its relations with the Native princes has been modified at various times in order to adapt itself to the changing conditions of the suzerain and the protected powers. At one time a sharp line of distinction was drawn between ancient and modern States, or those classed as independent and those reckoned subordinate or dependent. The brief sketch just given suffices to show that under the Himālayas, in the desert tracts of Rājputāna, in the forests and mountainous tracts of the Peninsula, and in provinces which lay remote from Delhi, there existed a fair number of principalities in which the local authority was tolerated, if not respected, by the central government before the East India Company entertained any idea of widespread dominion. At the same time it is a fact that the British gained little help from their predecessors in solving the difficult problem of maintaining friendly relations with the Native princes. The foundations of the present political system are not rooted in the past. The administration of the country under the direct dominion of the King-Emperor owes much to former rulers of India, and particularly to the genius of Akbar; but the protectorate is almost exclusively the creation of the last century and a half, and has been built up, like British India itself, out of the ruins left by the Mughal empire. The Marāthās, who for a few years seemed likely to succeed to that empire, had no idea of respect for the rights of others, or of duty even to their own subjects. They used their armed forces to extract revenue at the spear's point, and regarded suzerainty as merely conferring upon them the right to levy chauth or a fourth part of the revenue.
It is impossible to give more than a bare outline of the situation when the Mughal empire finally collapsed, on the assassination of Alamgīr II in 1759. The salient historical features are the entire break-up of the old Delhi empire in the middle of the fourteenth century, its reconstruction by Akbar, and the final collapse of Mughal authority, leaving the whole country a scene of chaos and disorder. In the reign of Muhammad Tughlak (1325–51) the rule of Delhi extended over the greater part of the Peninsula. But the extravagance and folly of the Sultān, his exactions, and above all his forcible removal of the inhabitants of Delhi to Daulatābād, caused his own troops to rebel and drove the provinces into revolt, and the whole country was once more split up into local states. The Carnatic Rāyās established their famous kingdom of Vijayanagar; the Rājās of Warangal, about 90 miles from Hyderābād, recovered their old possessions from the empire; while the Muhammadan power of the Bahmanis asserted its independence in the Deccan, and made its capital first at Gulbarga in 1347, and in the next century at Bīdar. The Bahmani kingdom broke up, towards the close of the fifteenth century, into the five separate States of Bīdar, Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur, Berār, and Golconda. So long as the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar constituted a danger to them, some sort of combination enabled these states to hold their own, and they succeeded in destroying the power of the Hindus at the decisive battle of Tālikotā in 1565. But when this danger had passed the Muhammadan States quarrelled among themselves, and so opened the way for the rise of the Marāthā power, which won its first successes against Bījāpur.
At the accession of Akbar in 1556 there were many other kingdoms in the central and northern parts of India. Gujarāt, Khāndesh, Sind, Kashmīr, and Bengal were under separate Muhammadan dynasties; Rājput houses ruled in Rājputāna, Bundelkhand, and Baghelkhand; and numerous petty states under the Himālayas existed as independent sovereignties. The problem which Akbar (1556–1605) was called upon to solve was in many respects the same as that which, two centuries later, presented itself to Warren Hastings and his successors. The country was broken up into territorial fragments: should the whole of them be brought under one uniform dominion, or should the tie of suzerainty suffice? Akbar solved it in his own fashion. He brought his own subordinates to order, recovered most of the former dominions of Delhi, and introduced a just administration. He parcelled the country out into great provinces, and each province or sūbah included the Native States within it. Rājputāna was, however, able to preserve much of its independence. It bent before the storm, and its ancient families, with the exception of Udaipur, formed matrimonial alliances with the imperial house. Khāndesh, Gujarāt, Bengal, Kashmīr, and Sind were conquered; and attention was then turned to the Deccan, where the Muhammadan States had now been reduced to three—Ahmadnagar, Bījāpur, and Golconda. Akbar's hand fell heavy on Ahmadnagar; but the kingdom was not finally absorbed till the time of his grandson, Shāh Jahān, who also weakened Bījāpur and Golconda.
When at length Aurangzeb was free to complete the work begun by Akbar, he found that he had to reckon with Sivajī as well as with his Muhammadan rivals. His military commanders made a fatal mistake. After exchanging a few blows with the Marāthās, they imprudently came to terms with them. Sivajī was recognized as Rājā and allowed to turn his army against Bījāpur. Aurangzeb finally took the field himself, and destroyed Bījāpur in 1686, and shortly afterwards Golconda, overrunning the country as far south as Tanjore. The Marāthās meanwhile had been turned into implacable enemies of the empire by the cruel treatment of Sivajī's son, whom the emperor captured and put to death, and the closing scene of the life of Aurangzeb was his inglorious retreat to Ahmadnagar. These operations impoverished the treasury of the empire, destroyed Muhammadan States which might have served as breakwaters against the tide of Marāthā invasion, and spread disorder throughout the country. The home policy of Aurangzeb was even more ill-judged. His bigotry alienated the Hindus, whom Akbar had conciliated, and the severity of his measures against the Rājputs was never forgotten. After the reign of Aurangzeb the empire began to fall to pieces. Nādir Shāh, attracted by the jewels and treasures which the imperial house had amassed, invaded India and permitted a general massacre of the inhabitants of the capital in 1739. Bājī Rao Peshwā, who was now head of the Marāthās, saw his opportunity and took it. He and his successor, Bālāji Rao Peshwā, continued the war against their Muhammadan neighbours, and Marāthā cavalry advanced into Bengal and the home districts of Delhi. While this danger from the South confronted the empire, Ahmad Shāh, Durrāni, invaded India from the north-west and completed the ruin of the capital in 1757, repeating the horrors of Nādir Shāh's invasion. It will thus be seen that the Mughal emperors had a clear field before them when Akbar established his grip on India. Their policy, however, was destructive so far as the Native States were concerned. They aimed at dominion and not at suzerainty. They did not even spare the principalities of their co-religionists in the South, and when their empire fell the whole country relapsed into worse confusion than that which prevailed after the death of Muhammad Tughlak.
The Marāthās exhibited few of the redeeming features of Mughal rule. They quarrelled among themselves, and the absence of all discipline in their armies rendered their visitations a scourge to the countries which they overran. Plunder and not the restoration of order was their declared policy. Fortunately for those upon whom the task of reconstruction was to fall, the Marāthās provoked, by their invasion of the Punjab, the vengeance of Ahmad Shāh, who inflicted a crushing defeat upon them at Pānīpat in 1761, where, according to report, nearly 200,000 Hindus were left dead on the field of battle. Thereafter the Marāthā confederacy existed only in name; and the policies pursued by its chief leaders, Sindhia, Holkar, and the Bhonsla of Nāgpur, often brought their forces into collision with each other. Ahmad Shāh retired with his Afghān and Persian levies to his own country, and left others to settle the fate of India. It then became evident that periods of dissolution and disorder are also periods of gravitation. The Marāthā territorial chiefs, jealous of the central authority at Poona, and quarrelling among themselves for the spoil, were incapable of creating a political system. It was reserved for the clear-headed merchants from London, working up from the sea-coast, to succeed where their predecessors had failed, and to show that they were as able to maintain the rights of the Native States as they were to administer their own dominions.
Their intervention was not directly due to events in Asia : it was created by European politics and the rivalries of Dutch, French, and English. The London East India Company, which was England's answer to the Dutch East India Company, a national concern, obtained Queen Elizabeth's charter at the end of 1600, and established its factory at Surat under a farmān from Delhi granted in 1612. In 1639 Madras was occupied, and became the seat of a Presidency in 1653. When the Portuguese handed over Bombay as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the head-quarters of the Company in Western India were, after some interval, transferred to that island in 1687. Calcutta was acquired about the same time. The year 1693 witnessed a change in the position of the London East India Company, which was threatened by a new English Company. Eventually a compromise was effected by the arbitration of Lord Godolphin, and the two rivals were amalgamated in 1702. Their undivided forces were then ready to deal with the French, who had lately recovered from the Dutch their settlement at Pondicherry on the Coromandel Coast.
The stirring events of the second half of the eighteenth century which, operating first in the south of the Peninsula, drove the East India Company into alliances with the Native States, can only be understood by reference to the history of France and Great Britain. Five separate conflicts occurred between the two European nations. First came the contest about the Austrian succession. The French declared war on England in 1744, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) terminated hostilities without much advantage gained by either side in India. The French had taken Madras, which was restored by the peace, and the British had failed to take Pondicherry. The interests of the two powers in India were ably represented by Clive and Dupleix when the war came to an end. Immediately, and while the nations were at peace in Europe, a war of succession of the utmost moment to the French and English Companies broke out in Southern India. Asaf Jāh, the great Sūbahdār or Nizām of the Deccan, died in 1748. Dupleix supported Muzaffar Jang in his claims to succeed, against Nāsir Jang, whom the English favoured. The Carnatic was a subordinate division of the Deccan, with its capital at Arcot; and Muzaffar Jang appointed as its Nawāb Chanda Sāhib, whose claims were presently disputed by Muhammad Alī, supported by the English and the Marāthās. Hostilities were at once actively prosecuted in the Carnatic. The capture and subsequent defence of Arcot by Clive in 1751, and the defeat of the French at Trichinopoly by Lawrence, secured the ascendancy of English influence in the South. At Hyderābād the French were more successful; for on the death of Muzaffar Jang they secured the succession of Salābat Jang, who assigned to Bussy the Northern Circārs for the pay and equipment of a French auxiliary force. While these events were taking place in India, the French Government at Paris was not yet in a position to go to war with England; and, in reply to English remonstrances, it recalled Dupleix in 1753 and sent out in his place M. Godeheu, who made an arrangement with the East India Company, the effect of which was to recognize Muhammad Alī as Nawāb of the Carnatic.
The third conflict was soon to begin—the Seven Years' War which was declared in 1756, and closed by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The French allowed a fatal delay before dispatching a fleet to the East. They had lost the services of Dupleix; and Lally, after capturing Fort St. David, committed the mistake of summoning Bussy from Hyderābād, thus weakening French influence at that centre. Clive, who had proceeded to Bengal to avenge the outrage of the Black Hole, not only settled its affairs after the battle of Plassey (1757), but thereby secured revenues to supply the sinews of war in Madras. The siege of Madras by the French was raised, in 1759, by the timely arrival of the English fleet, and the tide of war turned against Lally at a time when English victories at Quebec and Quiberon Bay were hampering French action in other fields and seas. The Nizām agreed to exclude the French from his dominions, and the Northern Circārs passed into the hands of the English, who, in 1765, obtained the emperor's confirmation of their title. The decisive blow, so far as the French were concerned, was struck at Wandiwāsh by Eyre Coote in 1760; and in its results in Southern India this was an event hardly less important than the battle of Pānīpat which, in the following year, shattered the Marāthā confederacy. Pondicherry surrendered; and when the Peace of Paris was concluded, although the French settlements were restored and Salābat Jang was recognized as Nizām of Hyderābād, the cause of the French was practically lost.
Muhammad Alī was now established as Nawāb of the Carnatic, but he owed large sums to the Company for its help, and his debts were presently increased by the war with Mysore. As he was unable to pay, the Company took over certain districts and eventually the entire management of the Carnatic. Meanwhile the storm began to blow from the direction of Mysore. Haidar Alī led a force into the Carnatic and, appearing before Madras, compelled the British to make an alliance with him in 1769. In 1775 the War of American Independence broke out, and in 1778 France engaged in a maritime struggle with England. This was the fourth conflict. The rival Companies could now fight without scruple, and their quarrels at Mahé and in the Circārs brought down the enmity of Haidar Alī and the Nizām upon the British. Haidar Alī overran the Carnatic, but was defeated in 1781 by Eyre Coote at Porto Novo. When the war in Europe ended, in 1783, with the Treaty of Versailles, France recovered her possessions, but not her influence, in India. She continued, however, to intrigue with Tipū Sultān, who had succeeded his father in 1782; but when, in 1793, she again declared war on England and the fifth conflict occurred, her maritime power was broken by the battles of Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, and in 1799 the fall of Seringapatam brought down with a crash the ambitious projects and the dominion of Tipū.
Thus French hostilities and intrigue forced the East India Company into alliances and conflicts with the Native princes in Southern India. On the conclusion of the Mysore wars, Hyderābād was granted some of the conquered districts, while the relations of the Nizām with the Company were fixed on a friendly basis of subordinate co-operation and internal independence. Mysore was restored to the family from whose hands Haidar Alī had wrested power, and, like Travancore and Cochin, was admitted into the protectorate. The Carnatic remained subject to its titular Nawāb till 1801, when it was brought under direct British administration. The political consequences of the wars in the South did not however end here. The Marāthās had asserted claims to chauth against Haidar Alī; and when a temporary peace was concluded by the British with Tipū in 1784, on the basis of mutual restoration of conquests, the court of Poona resented it as an infringement of a treaty made with the Peshwā. Then, in 1795, the Marāthās fell out with the Nizām; and although after the fall of Seringapatam part of the spoil was offered to the Peshwā, he listened to the advice of Sindhia and refused to receive it. The final settlement of 1799–1800, by removing the anti-British influence of a Muhammadan Government in Mysore, and by uniting the Nizām and the British in alliance, made a final rupture with the Marāthās merely a question of time and opportunity. In short, it had become evident that the conflict in Madras was only part of a greater problem, and that some political settlement in the West must follow that concluded in the South. But before the situation in Bombay is examined, some account must be given of the position in Bengal.
Events in Bengal, by pushing the Marāthās back from that side, prepared the way for action in the West. The necessity which here forced the Company into action was mainly due to local and not to European causes. The Sūbahdār or Nawāb of Bengal was not as wise in his generation as the Nizām, and his practical independence of the emperor's control rendered him disinclined to treat with respect a small body of British traders, whose only farmān was one of ancient date (1624). Aurangzeb, moreover, had at a later time threatened them with extinction, and had partly carried out his designs. It is true that Aurangzeb's son, the provincial governor of Bengal, had at the end of the seventeenth century granted them leave to purchase Calcutta. But what one Sūbahdār had allowed another might disallow; and when Nawāb Sirāj-ud-daula entered upon that office in 1756, he ordered the Governor of Calcutta to deliver up to him an official who had sought shelter in the factory, and demanded that its fortifications should be razed. On refusal, the settlement was captured in June, 1756, and the tragedy of the Black Hole ensued. A force dispatched from Madras under the command of Clive recovered Calcutta in January, 1757, and the battle of Plassey was won on the twenty-third of June following. The next step taken by Clive was to install Mīr Jafar as Nawāb of Bengal; but he did not give satisfaction to the servants of the Company, and Mīr Kāsim was appointed to fill his place in 1760. Meanwhile, the newly established British ascendancy had been threatened by the French and the Dutch, as well as by the Sūbahdār (Nawāb Wazīr) of the neighbouring province of Oudh, with whom Shāh Alam, the emperor's son, was in league. The French were driven out of Chandernagore, and a Dutch squadron, which appeared in the Hooghly in 1759, was attacked and defeated by the British. The danger which threatened from the north-west was not so easily settled. Shāh Alam and his allies had retired from Patna in 1758; but when the British quarrelled with Mīr Kāsim and restored Mīr Jafar (1763), the Nawāb Wazīr of Oudh, Shujā-ud-daula, espoused the cause of Mīr Kāsim and invaded Bengal. The battle of Buxar (1764) completed the work begun at Plassey, and laid Oudh and Allahābād, as well as Bengal, at the feet of the British. Shāh Alam, now emperor, received Allahābād and Korā, and in turn, in August, 1765, confirmed the Company in their possession of Calcutta, and granted them the Dīwāni of the provinces of Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa. Oudh was at the same time recognized as under the dominion of its Nawāb Wazīr, and shortly afterwards a restriction was put upon his army, which was limited to 35,000 men. The object of Clive was to create in Oudh a barrier against the Marāthās, who replied by extorting from the emperor a cession of Allahābād. The main political result of these events was that Bengal became a part of British India, with Oudh as a buffer state, under British protection, on its north-west frontier. The Marāthās were left for the time being to pursue their operations in the Provinces of Agra and Delhi, and in the countries now known as the Central India Agency and the Central Provinces. The Mughal empire had fallen, but a final settlement with the Marāthās was yet to be made.
The overthrow of the central government of the Marāthā confederacy was necessarily delayed until the wars with Mysore had been concluded. The Bombay factories had not been driven into political relations with the Native States in the interior by the pressure of European wars, as in the case of Madras. The geographical position of Bombay, however, rendered peace on the sea of vital consequence to its Government. Accordingly, the rulers of the maritime states—Kolhāpur, Sāvantvādi, Janjīra, Jāfarābād, and Cambay—had been induced to enter into treaties for the suppression of piracy. The earliest treaty with the Peshwā in 1739 was likewise a maritime and commercial arrangement. The attempt at interference in the dynastic succession at Poona made by the Bombay Government in 1775 was unfortunate; but subsequently the British were compelled by the wars in Madras to enter into closer relations with that court. At the same time events in Northern India induced the Peshwā to turn to the British for support. France, which had lost her influence in the South, was still in evidence in the North, where the armies of Sindhia were commanded by French officers. Sindhia had already secured the fort of Ahmadnagar, had taken possession of a large part of the territories of Indore, and had acquired a complete control over the phantom emperor of Delhi ; while the British on their part had acquired Rohilkhand and the country round Allahābād from the Nawāb Wazīr, thus enveloping Oudh in British territory. When, therefore, the British, by the Treaty of Bassein in 1802, ensured their influence at Poona and established a subsidiary force there, Sindhia at once entered into an alliance with the Bhonsla to defeat its object. War ensued, and the power of Sindhia and his ally was broken. The emperor was released from custody, the limits of the Gwalior and Nāgpur States were reduced, while Baroda became a subordinate ally of the British. Holkar, however, notwithstanding what he had suffered from Sindhia, was not pleased to see his rivals thus humiliated. He hoped to create a diversion by allying himself with the Sikhs, but he was pursued by Lord Lake and compelled, in 1805, to sign the treaty of the Beās by which his remaining territories were reduced. These events, while they freed the Peshwā from the pressure of his powerful confederates, also precluded the possibility of his combining with them to overthrow the British. Relations between the British and the court at Poona accordingly remained for a while on a friendly footing, until the assassination of the Minister of the Gaikwār, whose safety had been guaranteed by the British, led to the Treaty of Poona, in 1817, whereby the Peshwā's authority over Kāthiāwār, Bundelkhand, and Mālwā was transferred to the Company. The Pindāri hordes had meanwhile gathered strength, being recruited from the disbanded forces of the Native States, and strengthened by the then policy of non-interference. The Peshwā, encouraged by these disorders, broke his engagements and attacked the British Residency. The defeat of his troops at Kirkee, and the events which followed, compelled him to surrender his dominions to the British. The Pindāri War was brought to a conclusion (1817–8), and one of its effects was to place Rājputāna, as well as the minor States of Central India, under the protection of the Company. The three Marāthā States of Gwalior, Indore, and Nāgpur were at the same time brought within the British protectorate, and from this date the definite establishment of the British empire in India may be said to commence.
The Nepāl War (1814–6) fixed our present relations with that State (vide footnote on p. 92). Sind and the Punjab now alone remained outside the British system of protection. The former was brought under the Company's dominion in 1843, with the exception of Khairpur, which was retained as a Native State. The Lahore kingdom continued until 1849, when the Punjab was annexed, but the cis-Sutlej States and Bahāwalpur were preserved, having previously been brought within the protectorate.
This short sketch of the expansion of British dominion, and of the admission of the Native States into relations with the suzerain power, may serve to show the foundations upon which the present system is based. Sheer necessity drove the Company from point to point, and its plans were necessarily altered to suit the circumstances of the time. At the outset the policy of non-intervention was followed, and it was sought to avoid entangling alliances. Where the French went the British had to follow. When in the general chaos a Native ruler expelled the merchants from Calcutta, or the usurper of Mysore threatened to destroy Madras, there was only one course to pursue. Respect could only be ensured by adequate proof of superior power; but when the British, driven to hostilities, had beaten off the foe and secured the territories needed to supply the sinews of war and self-defence, they hoped to rest there. Accordingly they gave back Oudh after Buxar, to serve as a barrier against the Marāthās in Hindustān; they restored Mysore to its legitimate princes when Tipū Sultān was killed; and after the victory of Sītābaldī (1817) they regranted Nāgpur to the Bhonsla, just as, at a later date, the kingdom of Lahore was reconstituted after the first Sikh War. In short, during the first period of their connexion with the Native States the British endeavoured, as far as possible, to live within a ring-fence. The treaties which they concluded with the Native rulers were at that time made as if they were dealing with independent princes, sovereigns according to international law. They even continued for some years to regard themselves as acting under the authority devolved upon them by the emperor of Delhi; but when Shāh Alam left their protection and became the prisoner of the Marāthās, it was impossible to act any longer upon that fiction. Thereafter they had as good right to protect themselves as others had, and they proceeded accordingly, merely taking care that they did not incur responsibilities which they could not fulfil. The position thus taken up was sound from a common-sense point of view, and it was also strictly legal. At the trial in Chancery of the suit brought by the Nawāb of Arcot against the Company, for an account of profits and rent derived from its management of the Carnatic, Commissioner Eyre dismissed the bill on the ground that the transaction was a case of mutual treaty between persons acting in that instance as states independent of each other. The treaties were between two sovereigns, 'and consequently not a subject of private municipal jurisdiction.'
It is difficult to fix a precise year as the end of one period and the beginning of another. Changes of policy are of gradual growth. Nevertheless an examination of treaties, and the well-known views of Governors-General, may justify the selection of the year 1813 as marking the period when the theory of the independence of the Native princes, and the policy of non-intervention, gave way, in the hands of Lord Hastings and his successors, to the doctrine of 'subordinate isolation' and a general system of British suzerainty in India. It is true that Lord Wellesley foresaw the need for a change, and during his term of office (1798–1805) he advanced beyond the ring-fence, formed alliances with some of the Rājput States, and introduced phrases of 'obedience' as well as alliance into his treaties, as for instance with Datiā. But his successor, Lord Cornwallis, dissolved some of these engagements, and so late as 1809 Lord Minto refused to enter into an alliance with Bhopāl. It is therefore not unreasonable to select 1813, when Lord Hastings entered upon his office, as the date of departure and the commencement of the new policy of subordinate isolation.
The treaty of 1802 with the Peshwā foreshadowed the final abandonment of his sovereignty in 1817. The leading members of the former Marāthā confederacy were now isolated, and their territories reduced within fixed limits. Shāh Alam, the blind emperor, died in November, 1806; and although the Delhi Districts were administered in the name of his successor until 1832, when they were incorporated in the British dominions, every vestige of Mughal authority was gone when Lord Hastings assumed office as Governor-General. The old order had passed away, and in 1813 the suzerainty of the Peshwā over the other Marāthā chiefs was no longer an asset of value. There was only one strong power in India, that of the British Company which had triumphed over its European rivals and scattered its native enemies. Its victories had cost money, and the whole country required peace and breathing time after the scenes through which it had passed. When, therefore, the Pindāri robbers exposed the Company and its allies not merely to fresh expense, but to the horrors of uncivilized warfare, it became necessary for Lord Hastings to abandon a policy of non-interference and to undertake the task of settling the affairs of the Native States, so far as their relations with the British were concerned. A policy of subordinate isolation, including all States up to Sind, the Punjab, and Burma, took the place of the empty professions of non-interference which Parliament had preached and the logic of hard facts had contradicted. This policy lasted until the Mutiny, and it included the period during which Lord Dalhousie gave effect to the doctrine of lapse by annexing ‘dependent’ Native States on the failure of male heirs to their Hindu rulers.
Most of the treaties or engagements concluded with the protected States were made during this period. But many petty States have been brought under protection without formal engagements. In the same way there are engagements, dating between 1813 and 1857, which have not been amended and yet are profoundly modified by tacit agreement, the logic of facts, and public declarations of policy. In the transactions of states, as well as of individuals, documents must be interpreted by overt acts and long-continued practice to which the parties have conformed. For instance, in 1850, when civil war broke out in Bahāwalpur owing to a disputed succession, Lord Dalhousie decided that, so long as hostilities did not occur across the border of the State, the Government of India was not called upon to interfere, even though the chief whose succession had been acknowledged by the suzerain power should be expelled by his rival. This attitude was consistent with the practice then prevailing of non-interference in the domestic concerns of independent States. But after the Mutiny the practice was changed ; and the Secretary of State, in July, 1891, publicly announced the universal practice and intentions of the British Government in these terms, with particular reference to the case of Manipur :—‘It is admittedly the right and the duty of Government to settle successions in the protected States of India generally. Your interference was necessary also in the interests of the British Government, which has of late years been brought into much closer relations with the State of Manipur and its subject tribes than was formerly the case, and cannot safely tolerate disorders therein.’ It is therefore necessary to bear in mind the action of usage and altered circumstances upon the relations of the suzerain power as recorded in its written agreements with the protected princes of India. With this explanation, it is convenient to take a brief survey of the conditions which existed in the period under discussion.
The main change introduced by Lord Hastings was the extension of British suzerainty over the whole of India east of the Punjab and west of Burma. But when the Peshwā’s sovereignty was extinguished, it was found that the disorders which had prevailed in the west had fissured the territorial dominions nominally under the Marāthā Government at Poona with many scores of petty chiefships, especially in Kāthiāwār, Pālanpur, and the Mahī Kāntha, where the power of the Peshwā had long been weakened by the pretensions of the Gaikwārs of Baroda. Although, therefore, it was a cardinal feature of the policy of the Government to treat Native States as independent in their internal affairs, it was obvious that some distinction must be drawn between large States and petty estates. The largest as well as the small were to lose their international life. The external independence of all was to be surrendered. The suzerain power must act for its subordinate allies in external affairs: it must even keep a tight hand upon their military forces. But it had no agency to spare for the control of their domestic affairs, and it was considered wise to repudiate ‘any manner of concern’ in the administration of the protected chiefs. This object might be attained by leaving rulers who had adequate revenues to bear the entire burden of internal sovereignty. But it was otherwise with a number of petty chieftains whose authority extended over a few villages and who were unfit to administer justice. The difficulty was solved by dividing States into two classes: those in which the rulers exercised full civil and criminal jurisdiction, and those in which the jurisdiction was divided between the suzerain and the subordinate ally. The British Government did not choose, for instance, to incorporate Kāthiāwār in its dominions. It was at the same time unwilling to allow the stronger States, such as Junāgarh, to extend their rule over the weaker. That had been the policy of the ring-fence or of non-interference. Under a new system of subordinate isolation, it mattered not whether ten or one hundred instruments of rule existed in a territorial area. But justice must be administered, and therefore the British introduced a political settlement into compact areas of extraneous territory where numerous petty chiefs held sway. They divided the chiefs into classes, giving to each ruler, according to his means, a larger or smaller share of territorial jurisdiction, and exercising in the minor territorial units such powers as were not entrusted to the chief. This ‘residuary jurisdiction’ is exercised by the British Government or its officers on behalf of petty chiefs within their territories. Many instances of it are to be found in Bombay, in Central India, in Orissa, and in Chotā Nāgpur.
At a later date within the same period another distinction attained prominence. When the country became settled, and the need began to be felt for consolidating the British dominions by improved means of communication, it was realized that the Company had committed a mistake in re-creating principalities such as Sātāra or Nāgpur, which had fallen to it as lawful prize of conquest and now lay as blocks of foreign territory between one Province and another. It was determined, therefore, to look closely at the terms of these regrants and, in all cases where the consent of the Government was needed to the continuance of a Hindu dynasty by adoption, to consider carefully whether public interests would not be served by refusing to give such sanction. A distinction was therefore drawn between 'dependent' and 'independent' States, or States subordinate and not subordinate. The phrase 'dependent' was not a happy choice. For instance, when Lord Hastings, by a treaty of September, 1819, determined 'in consideration of the antiquity of the House of His Highness the Rājā of Sātāra to cede in perpetual sovereignty to the Rājā, his heirs and successors, the districts specified,' he went on to say that the Rājā, then a minor, 'shall ultimately have the entire management of the country.' In course of time the Rājā and his successor did rule over Sātāra and were frequently described as independent. But when the question of adoption was mooted, on the death of Shāhjī in 1848, the decision of the Court of Directors was to the effect that Sātāra was a dependent principality, and the grounds of that decision were the limitations imposed by the treaty of 1819, and the circumstances under which the State was then created. The death-bed adoption made by the late Rājā was not recognized and the State lapsed to the Company. The same doctrine was applied to Nāgpur, Jhānsi, and some smaller States; but it was held inapplicable to Orchhā, and to Karauli in Rājputāna, on the ground that they were ancient and independent principalities. It should be added that in the cases where the doctrine of lapse was held to be justly applicable, it was applied on grounds of policy. Into that policy two considerations entered. The first was the desirability of consolidating British dominion by linking up the Provinces. The second was the extension of the advantages of British rule to the inhabitants of Native States. This consideration rested upon the principle, which was not challenged during the period from 1813 to 1857, that the protected princes of the larger States were, so far as internal affairs were concerned, independent. The right to interfere except under the gravest conditions, in the absence of such a power as that which the Oudh treaties expressly conferred, and which was exercised by the annexation of that long-misgoverned State in 1856, was considered contrary to the policy and doctrines of the time. Since, therefore, the paramount power did not ordinarily intervene to redress misgovernment, it seemed to be a duty owed to the oppressed subjects of Native States that a rightful opportunity should not be lost of ‘ensuring to the population of the State a perpetuity of just and mild government.’
The transfer of the government of India to the Crown, after the suppression of the Mutiny, left the British Government, in name as well as in reality, the suzerain power. As Lord Canning wrote in 1860, ‘The last vestiges of the royal house at Delhi, from which we had long been content to accept a vicarious authority, have been swept away. The Crown of England stands forth the unquestioned ruler and paramount in all India, and is brought face to face with its feudatories.’ The immediate consequence was to abolish all reserve as to timely interference to prevent misrule. The distinction between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ States lost its significance. Sanads of adoption and succession were conferred upon the rulers of the larger States. The doctrine of lapse gave place to a public assurance of the desire of the paramount power to perpetuate the houses of the principal ruling families. Treaties were no longer made as if between equals: engagements and sanads breathed a new spirit of subordinate co-operation on the part of the Native princes. The process of consolidating British dominion was continued by arrangements with the States and not by annexation of them. Conventions to promote railways, canals, and other common public works; arrangements to protect Imperial revenue and to provide for a common postal and telegraph system; and united efforts to put down thagī and dacoity, and secure the prompt surrender of criminals, added largely to the collection of public agreements. The territories under the suzerainty of the Crown became at once as important and integral a part of India as the territories under its direct dominion. Together they form one care, and the political system which the Mughals had not completed, and the Marāthās never contemplated, is now an established fact of history.
An account may now be given of the rights and obligations of the Native States as at present established by written agreements, by tacit consent, or by usage. The chiefs have, without exception, gained protection against dangers from without and a solemn guarantee that their protector will respect their rights as rulers. The paramount power acts for them in relation to foreign powers and other Native States. Parliament has recognized this in 39 & 40 Vict., cap. 46, of which the preamble runs, ‘Whereas the several Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty have no connexions, engagements, or communications with Foreign Powers, and the subjects of such Princes and States are, when residing or being in the places hereinafter referred to, entitled to the protection of the British, and receive such protection equally with the subjects of Her Majesty.’ Next, as the passage just quoted and many Acts of the Indian Legislature show, the inhabitants of Native States are subjects of their rulers, and, except in the case of personal jurisdiction over British subjects and of ‘residuary jurisdiction’ as already explained, these rulers and their subjects are free from the control of the laws of British India. Accordingly, criminals escaping into a Native State must be handed over by its authorities: they cannot be arrested by the police of British India without the permission of the ruler of the State. The Native princes have therefore a suzerain power which acts for them in all external affairs, and at the same time scrupulously respects their internal authority. Nor are they secured only against dangers from without: the suzerain also intervenes when the internal peace of their territories is seriously threatened. Finally, they participate in all the benefits which the protecting power obtains by its diplomatic action or by its administration of its own dominions, and thus secure a share in the commerce, the railways, the ports, and the markets of British India. Except in very rare instances, no guarded customs-line marks the frontier of a British District; no passports are required to cross it; and notwithstanding the fact that the subjects of a Native State are foreigners in the eye of the law of British India, they are admitted into most of the public offices of the British Government.
It is obvious that these rights carry with them corresponding obligations; and the latter may be considered under the heads of obligations in respect of foreign relations, those affecting the common defence, and those necessary for the good government and welfare of the States themselves. The duties discussed under the first and second of these heads are common to all the States in principle, although they may be affected in details by special agreement, while those in the third category are much modified by the extent of the powers of government left with the various princes when they were admitted into the protectorate. For it has already been explained that in some petty States a mere fraction of jurisdiction was left with the chief; and there are even cases where such a State has become so small that the whole management of it now devolves upon officers of the paramount power, acting on behalf of a chieftain incapable of exercising even criminal jurisdiction over those who are nominally his subjects.
The wars, alliances, and counter-alliances which resulted in the establishment of British supremacy show that, when once the internal authority of a State was guaranteed, it became necessary to lay down the principle that such authority had no existence outside the territory thus recognized. At the outset, then, an obligation was imposed, and accepted by even the largest States, which prevented their rulers from entering into relations with foreign nations or other States. The doctrine of isolation was carried so far that the employment of the subjects of European nations, or of Americans, without the previous sanction of the Government, was strictly forbidden. As a consequence, no protected prince may now receive even the commercial agent of a foreign power at his capital; the paramount power being the sole fountain of honour, he may accept no title, honour, or salute from any foreign court or foreign body; and he can issue no passports to his subjects when they travel abroad. If he is to participate in the benefits of a commercial treaty between the Government of India and a foreign power the matter must be arranged for him; if he requires the extradition of a criminal he must trust to the paramount authority to obtain it. His subjects when outside his dominions become, to all intents and purposes, British subjects, as shown by the treaty with Maskat in 1873, which declares that the words ‘British subjects’ in all treaties between the British Government and the Maskat State shall include subjects of Indian Native States. If an American or a Frenchman should be accused of committing an offence in a Native State, his Government would expect that he should receive justice, and the suzerain power must take the responsibility of ensuring that result. In short, in all circumstances where foreign interests are concerned, the paramount power must act so that no just cause of offence may be given by its subordinate allies, and they, in turn, must fulfil the obligations incurred on their behalf. So too, the external boundary of a frontier or maritime State is regarded for international purposes as a British frontier, and Native chiefs can have no admiralty rights save such as are specially allowed to them by the paramount power.
The same principle is observed in dealings between one Indian principality and another. Experience had proved that no stable engagements between them were possible. House was set against house, and too often a house was divided against itself. Differences of religion, caste jealousies, the memories of wrongs done in the past, and animosities handed down from generation to generation, divided Brāhmans and Sūdras, Shiahs and Sunnis, Jāts and Sikhs, Rājputs and Marāthās. Suddenly neighbours were required to sheathe their swords and forget their wrongs. The only hope of peace lay in imposing upon all alike the obligation of referring to the British every question or dispute with others. The political isolation of the protected States involves corresponding activity by their protector. If a boundary question is to be adjusted, an amicable arrangement made for the mutual surrender of criminals, or joint action taken to complete a line of railway or canal that passes from State to State, the British Government must arrange the business and its arrangements must be binding upon the parties concerned. Aggressions and breach of engagements must be punished by the suzerain. Instances of this are afforded by the severance of Lāwa from Tonk, owing to the misconduct of the Tonk chief, in 1867, and by the punishment of Bānswāra in the previous year.
Since a chief can neither attack his neighbour nor fall out with a foreign nation, it follows that he needs no military establishment which is not required either for police purposes, for personal display, or for co-operation with the Imperial Government. The treaty made with Gwalior in 1844, and the instrument of transfer given to Mysore in 1881, alike base the restriction of the forces of the State upon the broad ground of protection. The former explained in detail that unnecessary armies were embarrassing to the State itself and the cause of disquietude to others : a few months later a striking proof of this was afforded by the army of the Sikh kingdom of Lahore. The British Government has undertaken to protect the dominions of the Native princes from invasion and even from rebellion within : its army is organized for the defence not merely of British India, but of all the possessions under the suzerainty of the King-Emperor. It follows, therefore, that its allies must not embarrass the military defence of the empire ; must render active co-operation in securing the efficiency of the Imperial army ; and must take, in times of emergency, the part assigned to them. Under the first of these three heads comes the limitation of their own forces as to numbers, armament, and equipment. The treaties with most of the larger States are clear on this point. Posts in the interior must not be fortified, factories for the production of guns and ammunition must not be constructed, nor may subjects of other States be enlisted in the local forces. In the second place, the duties of the allies are not merely passive or negative; they are also active. They must allow the forces that defend them to obtain local supplies, to occupy cantonments or positions, and to arrest deserters; and in addition to these services they must recognize the Imperial control over railways, telegraphs, and postal communications as essential not only to the common welfare but to the common defence. As to the third head, it may be observed that the extent of their obligations in time of war rests partly upon treaties, and partly upon good understanding and loyalty, which may be expected to determine all doubtful points should the occasion arise. In the days before general peace had been established, the Company imposed upon the larger States payment for what was called a subsidiary force, or it required them to retain an auxiliary or contingent force ready to act in co-operation with the subsidiary or other troops of the Company. Subsidiary forces were troops of the paramount power stationed in or near the territory of the chief who paid for them, and they were intended to act against invaders from without or, under certain conditions, against disturbers of internal peace. In days when there were no adequate means of communication this system admirably suited the need for prompt action, and it also enabled the Company to plant on the spot a substantial proof of Imperial power and concern. The localities chosen were distant from the centres of British power, and were also, as a rule, those in which danger to the new order was most to be apprehended, as the following list will show: Hyderābād, Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Indore, Travancore, Cochin, and Cutch. Other States which have passed away, such as Poona, were supplied with similar forces. Contingent forces represented the reformed troops of the Native States themselves, kept ready to preserve internal order and to act with British troops if need be. They were maintained in Hyderābād, Baroda, Bhopāl, Gwalior, Jodhpur, Kotah, and Pālanpur; but they generally proved neither efficient nor reliable, and after the Mutiny none of them, except the Hyderābād Contingent, which had remained staunch in its loyalty, continued in existence. That force also has now, under arrangements made with the Nizām by Lord Curzon in 1902, been reorganized upon another footing.
The Subsidiary and Contingent forces dated from the time when the policy of non-intervention held the field. They were continued under, and were in harmony with, the policy of subordinate isolation. But the changes in modern warfare, requiring, if need be, the mobilization and dispatch of a large army to the external frontiers of India, have involved a change of system. Greater efficiency and better equipment, concerted action upon a prearranged plan, and above all the willing subordination of each State to the general scheme, are required by the altered conditions of the twentieth century. To meet these conditions, several States in Rājputāna, Central India, and the Punjab, as well as Kashmīr, Hyderābād, Mysore, and a few States in Bombay, maintain Imperial Service troops, which now number in all about 18,000 men. These troops, which are under regular inspection by British officers, though available for Imperial service when placed at the disposal of the British Government by their rulers, belong absolutely to the States and are recruited from their subjects. Their armament is the same as that of our Native army, and in training, discipline, and efficiency they have reached a high standard of excellence. They have recently won commendation in China and Somāliland, and have also done good service on the north-west frontier. The other military forces maintained by the Native States aggregate about 93,000 men, but these troops are kept only for purposes of internal order or ceremony and have little military value.
The broad duties affecting external relations and military defence are common to all States irrespective of the terms of their treaties : they have also, except in matters of detail, undergone little change from one period to the other. The case is otherwise with those obligations which concern the internal administration of the chiefs. Over most States, and over the engagements that record their relations to the paramount power, have passed the usage of many years and the facts of history. The Crown protects one and all, and the suzerain has granted sanads of adoption and abandoned the policy of lapse. Although old and unaltered treaties declare that the British Government will have no manner of concern with any of a Mahārājā's dependents or servants, ‘with respect to whom the Mahārājā is absolute,’ logic and public opinion have endorsed the principle, which Lord Canning set forth in his minute of April 30, 1860, that the Government of India is not precluded ‘from stepping in to set right such serious abuses in a Native Government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming temporary charge of a Native State when there shall be sufficient reason to do so.’ Of that necessity the Governor-General-in-Council, subject to the control provided by Parliament, must be the judge from time to time. Liability to intervention in case of grave misrule is an incident common to all the States. There are also some other occasions for interference which are likely to be taken whenever they occur. The dismemberment of a State by division or legacy would destroy the territorial unit upon which the local sovereignty rests. Such arrangements cannot, therefore, be permitted: and value is attached to the principle of primogeniture, or at least to the selection of an heir by a chief during his lifetime, as a means of avoiding disputes between rival claimants or injury to the integrity of the State. Disputed successions and rebellion are no longer tolerated in the interests of public order. The suzerain power, which expects the people to submit quietly to the rule of a protected prince, must therefore restrain him from gross misrule. British public opinion will not tolerate infanticide, satī, slavery, or barbarous punishments, and the Government of India has interfered, when necessary, to prevent them. There are, on the other hand, many objects of common welfare in which the paramount power presses for co-operation and tenders advice, but in regard to which it waits for the willing co-operation of the Native princes: such are reforms of administrative or revenue systems, and currency.
But it is in the direction of jurisdiction that the widest differences prevail between one State and another. In all of them it is natural that, where the law of British India confers jurisdiction over British subjects or other specified persons in foreign territory, this power should be exercised by the British courts which possess it. By analogy, and in view of the relations of the King-Emperor with European powers and the United States, it is reasonable that their subjects should be put on the same footing in Native States as British subjects of European extraction. But the jurisdiction exercised in some Native States goes far beyond this. It extends sometimes to a territorial population who are neither British officials nor British subjects. In such cases the exercise of jurisdiction in the Native State is justified by the express or tacit consent of its ruler. When a British cantonment, or a civil station under British management, exists in a protected principality, it is convenient that jurisdiction over all persons and things therein, and not merely over the British troops or officials, should rest with the suzerain power. Sometimes this jurisdiction is conceded by treaty, sometimes it rests upon long usage and acquiescence. There are also, as already explained, petty chiefs whose powers of internal government were, from the very first, restricted to the exercise of a limited jurisdiction in civil or criminal cases. The residue of the full powers of government by which a ‘State’ is constituted in any territorial area vests in the suzerain power, which shares the internal sovereignty with the chief and exercises all authority that does not remain with him.
The powers which thus devolve upon the suzerain are exercised through political officers who, as a rule, reside in the States themselves. In the larger States the Government of India is represented by a Resident; and where a number of States form a natural group, as in Rājputāna and Central India, there is a single Agent to the Governor-General for the whole group, assisted by local Residents or Political Agents according to the importance of the State or States within it. These officers form the sole channel of communication that the Native States possess with the Government of India in its Foreign Department, with the officials of British India, or with other Native States; and they are expected to advise and assist the ruling chiefs in any matters, administrative or otherwise, on which they may be consulted. As regards the larger States under the control of Local Governments, Political Agents are similarly employed; but in the case of petty States scattered about British Provinces it is usual to entrust the duties of Agent to the Collector or Commissioner within whose territorial jurisdiction they lie. In such cases the Agent does not, as a rule, reside within the Native State; but it is desirable that, when he is exercising judicial or magisterial powers in respect of persons or things within it, he should hold his court within the area of his foreign jurisdiction. It has been seen that the Local Governments control British relations with a very large number of Native princes and chiefs; at the same time their dealings with all protected chiefs are in a special sense under the supervision of the Supreme Government, and in the personal charge of the Governor-General.
This is not the place for any attempt to weigh the comparative merits of administration in British Provinces and in Native States, or to forecast the development and future prospects of the latter. While the paramount power steadfastly maintains the rights of Native rulers, lends them the services of its own trained officers, renders them help in time of famine, and admits them and their subjects to its coveted honours1 and distinctions, it must look to them to reform their administration and act the part of good neighbours. . The institutions of Native States are becoming profoundly modified, under modern conditions of communication, by infiltration from what is proceeding around them in British India. All are not, it is true, equally able to assimilate new principles. Their forms of government are almost as various as the races ruled by them. There are States in almost every stage of development, tribal, feudal, and constitutional; but the common features of all of them, even of those which are most advanced, are the personal rule of the chief and his control over legislation and the administration of justice. There is, however, an increasing tendency to follow British models in financial arrangements and educational systems, while many States have adopted civil and criminal laws from the codes of British India. Great stress is now laid upon the education of the sons of chiefs, and upon the proper administration of States during a minority. Chiefs' colleges have been founded at Ajmer, Rājkot, Lahore, and Indore, where a special course of instruction is provided. Tutors and guardians are appointed to take charge of young chiefs not at those colleges, and an Imperial Cadet corps has been established for the military training of scions of ruling and noble families. Lastly, every effort is made to encourage friendly relations between the rulers and their Political Agents, and also with the heads of Local Governments. The Viceroy constantly visits the Native States, invites the chiefs to participate in state ceremonies, such as the great Darbār at Delhi in 1903, and encourages them to visit him at Calcutta, where a house has recently been purchased for their special accommodation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sir Charles Aitchison.—Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads relating to India and neighbouring Countries (Calcutta, 1893). Eleven volumes. Published by authority of the Foreign Department of the Government of India. Sir Alfred Lyall.—Rise of the British Dominion in India (1894). Colonel G. B. Malleson.—An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India (1875). Sir C. L. Tupper.—Our Indian Protectorate (1892). Sir W. Lee-Warner.—The Protected Princes of India (1894). Sir Alfred Lyall.—Asiatic Studies (1899). Vol. i, ch. vii, gives an account of Native State Institutions in Rājputāna. Colonel James Tod.—Annals of Rajasthan (1829). Frequently reprinted. Sir John Malcolm.—Memoirs of Central India (1824). T. H. Thornton.—Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatory States of Central and Southern India (1898). B. L. Rice.—Mysore (1897). A complete description of an advanced Native State. Sir Lepel Griffin.—Rājās of the Punjab (1873). Sir W. Lee-Warner.—The Life of Dalhousie (1904).
APPENDIX
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nepāl * . . . | 54,000 | 4,000,000 (approximate), Hindus and Buddhists. | 1,50 | Mahārājā, Rājput : Hindu. | 21 | Resident in Nepāl. |
| Hyderābād . . | 82,698† | 11,141,142†, chiefly Hindus and Muhammadans. | 3,59 | Nizām, Turk : Sunni Muhammadan. | 21 | Resident at Hyderābād. |
| Mysore . . . | 29,444 | 5,539,399, chiefly Hindus . | 1,90 | Mahārājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 21 | Resident in Mysore. |
| Baroda . . . | 8,099 | 1,952,692 „ „ | 1,23 | Mahārājā, Marāthā: Hindu. | 21 | Resident at Baroda. |
| Kashmīr and Jammu . | 80,900 | 2,905,578 (including Gilgit, Skārdu, Ladākh, and Pūnch), chiefly Muhammadans. | 87 | Mahārājā, Dogrā Rājput : Hindu. | 19 (21 within Kashmīr territory). | Resident in Kashmīr. |
| Total | 255,141 | 25,538,811 | 9,09 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gwalior . | 25,041 | 2,933,001, chiefly Hindus . | 1,63 | Mahārājā, Marāthā : Hindu. | 19 (21 within Gwalior territory). | Resident at Gwalior. |
| Indore . | 9,500 | 850,690 „ „ | 72 | Mahārājā, Marāthā : Hindu. | 19 (21 within Indore territory). | Resident at Indore. |
| Bhopāl | 6,859 | 665,961 „ „ | 29 | Nawāb (m.), Begam (f.), Afghān: Muhammadan. | 19 (21 within Bhopāl territory). | Political Agent in Bhopāl. |
| Rewah . | 13,000 | 1,327,385 „ „ | 29 | Mahārājā, Baghel Rājput: Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in Baghelkhand. |
| Orchhā | 2,080 | 321,634 „ „ | 6 | Mahārājā, Bundelā Rājput: Hindu. | 17 (including 2 guns personal to the present chief). | Political Agent in Bundelkhand. |
| Datiā . | 911 | 173,759 „ „ | 9 | Mahārājā, Bundelā Rājput: Hindu. | 15 | „ „ |
| Dhār . | 1,775 | 142,115 „ „ | 11 | Rājā, Ponwār Marāthā : Hindu. | 15 | Political Agent in Bhopāwar. |
| Jaorā . | 568 | 84,202 „ „ | 9 | Nawāb, Pathān : Muhammadan. | 13 | Political Agent in Mālwā. |
| Pannā . | 2,492 | 192,986 „ „ | 5 | Mahārājā, Bundelā Rājput: Hindu. | 11 | Political Agent in Bundelkhand. |
| Chhatarpur . | 1,115 | 156,139 „ „ | 4 | Mahārājā, Ponwār Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | „ „ |
| Charkhārī | 703 | 123,954 „ „ | 4 | Mahārājā, Bundelā Rājput: Hindu. | 11 | „ „ |
| 137 Minor States*. | 13,351 | 1,538,491 „ „ | 80 | . . . | . . . | Distributed through the charges of the above-mentioned officers. |
| TOTAL | 77,395 | 8,510,317 | 4,21 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Udaipur (Me- wār). | 12,691 | 1,018,805, chiefly Hin- dus and Bhīls. | 24 | Mahārānā, Sesodia Rājput : Hindu. | 21 (including 2 guns personal to the present chief). | Resident in Mewār. |
| Jaipur . | 15,579 | 2,658,666, chiefly Hindus | 62 | Mahārājā, Kachwāha Rājput : Hindu. | 21 (including 4 guns personal to the present chief). | Resident at Jaipur. |
| Jodhpur (Mār- wār). | 34,963 | 1,935,565 " | 56 | Mahārājā, Rāthor Rājput : Hindu. | 17 | Resident in the Western States of Rājputāna. |
| Bharatpur . | 1,982 | 626,665 " | 35 | Mahārājā, Jāt : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in the Eastern States of Rājputāna. |
| Bīkaner . | 23,311 | 584,627 " | 23 | Mahārājā, Rāthor Rājput : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in Bīkaner. |
| Kotah . | 5,684 | 544,879 " | 33 | Mahārao, Hāra Chauhān Rājput : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in Kotah and Jhālawār. |
| Tonk (partly in Central India). | 2,553 | 273,201 " | 13 | Nawāb, Pathān : Muham- madan. | 17 | Political Agent in Haraoti and Tonk. |
| Carried over | 96,763 | 7,642,408 | 2,46 |
| Brought forward | 96,763 | 7,642,408 | 2,46 | |||
| Būndi . . | 2 220 | 171,227,chieflyHindus. | 7 | Mahārao Rājā, Hāra Chauhān Rajput : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in Haraoti and Tonk. |
| Karauli . | 1,242 | 156,786 " " | 5 | Mahārājā, Jādon Rājput : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in the Eastern States of Rājputāna. |
| Alwar . | 3,141 | 828,487 " " | 30 | Mahārājā, Kachwāha Rājput: Hindu. | 15 | Political Agent in Alwar. |
| Dholpur . | 1,155 | 270,973 " " | 10 | Mahārājā Rānā, Jāt : Hindu. | 15 | Political Agent in the Eastern States of Rājputāna. |
| Bānswāra . | 1,946 including Kushāl-garh. | 165,350, chiefly Animists (Bhils). | 1½ | Mahārāwal, Sesodia Rājput : Hindu. | 15 | Assistant to the Resident in Mewār. |
| Sirohi . | 1,964 | 154,544,chiefly Hindus. | 3 | Mahārao, Deora Chauhān Rājput : Hindu. | 15 | Resident in the Western States of Rājputāna. |
| 7 Minor States | 20,487 | 451,990 . . | 17½ | . . . | . | Distributed through the charges of the above-mentioned officers. |
| TOTAL | 128,918 | 9,841,765 | 3,20 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kalāt . | 71,593 | 372,531*, chiefly Sunni Muhammadans. | 8 | Khān or Wālī, Brāhui : Sunni Muhammadan. | 19 | Political Agent in Kalāt. |
| Las Bela . | 6,441 | 56,109 ” | 2 | Jām, Kureshi Arab : Sunni Muhammadan. | Nil | ” ” |
| Total | 78,034 | 428,640 | 10 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Travancore . | 7,091 | 2,952,157, chiefly Hindus and Christians. | 1,00 | Mahārājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 21 (including 2 guns personal to the present chief). | Resident in Travancore and Cochin. |
| Cochin . | 1,362 | 812,025 ” | 27 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 17 | ” ” |
| Pudukkottai . | 1,100 | 380,440, Hindus. | 11 | Rājā, Kallar : Hindu. | 11 | Collector of Trichinopoly (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| 2 Minor States | 416 | 43,464 | 3 | |||
| Total | 9,969 | 4,188,086 | 1,41 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kolhāpur . | 2,855 | 910,011, chiefly Hindus. | 48 | Mahārājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 19 | Political Agent for Kolhāpur. |
| Cutch . | 7,616 | 488,022 „ | 20 | Mahārao, Jādeja Rājput : Hindu. | 17 | Political Agent in Cutch. |
| Khairpur | 6,050 | 199,313, chiefly Muhammadans. | 13 | Mīr, Tālpur Baloch : Muhammadan. | 15 | Political Agent for Khairpur. |
| Idar . | 1,900 | 168,557, chiefly Hindus. | 5 | Mahārājā, Rāthor Rājput : Hindu. | 15 | Political Agent for Mahi Kāntha. |
| Bhaunagar | 2,860 | 412,664 „ | 30 | Thākur Sāhib, Gohel Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | Agent to the Governor in Kāthiāwār. |
| Junāgarh | 3,284 | 395,428 „ | 27 | Nawāb, Pathān : Muhammadan. | 11 | „ „ |
| Navānagar | 3,791 | 336,779 „ | 31 | Jām, Jādeja Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | „ „ |
| Pālanpur | 3,177 | 222,627 „ | 7 | Dīwān, Pathān : Muhammadan. | 11 | Political Agent for Pālanpur. |
| Gondal . | 1,024 | 162,859 „ | 19 | Thākur Sāhib, Jādeja Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | Agent to the Governor in Kāthiāwār. |
| Rājpīpla | 1,514 | 117,175 „ | 7 | Mahārānā, Gohel Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | Political Agent, Rewā Kāntha. |
| Bhor . | 1,491 | 137,268 „ | 5 | Pant Sachiv, Brāhman : Hindu. | 9 (personal to the present chief) | Collector of Poona (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Sāngli . | 1,112 | 226,128 „ | 9 | Thākur, Brāhman : Hindu. | Nil | Political Agent for the Southern Marāthā Country. |
| 342 Minor States. . | 29,087 | 3,131,817 | 1,99 | |||
| TOTAL | 65,761 | 6,908,648 | 4,20 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sikkim . | 2,818 | 59,014, chiefly Bud- dhists and Hindus. | 1 | Mahārājā, Tibetan : Buddhist. | 15 | Political Officer, Sikkim. |
| Cooch Behār . | 1,307 | 566,974, chiefly Hindus and Muhammadans. | 24 | Mahārājā, Kshattriya : Brah- mo. | 13 | Commissioner of Rājshāhi (ex- officio Political Agent). |
| Hill Tippera* | 4,086 | 173,325, chiefly Hin- dus. | 7 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 13 | Commissioner of Chittagong (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Bhutān . | 20,000† | 250,000†, Buddhists. | 2 | Deb Rājā, Bhotia : Buddhist. | Nil | Commissioner of Rājshāhi (ex- officio Political Officer). |
| Mayūrbhanj (Orissa Tribu- tary Mahāls). | 4,243 | 610,383, chiefly Hin- dus. | 8 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | Nil | Commissioner of Orissa (ex- officio Superintendent of the Orissa Tributary Mahāls). |
| Surguj⇠(Chotā Nāgpur Tributary Mahāls). | 6,055 | 351,011 " | 1 | Rājā, Ruksel Rājput : Hindu. | Nil | Commissioner of Chotā Nāg- pur (ex-officio Superintendent of the Chotā Nāgpur Tribu- tary Mahāls). |
| Keonjhar (Orissa Tributary Ma- hāls). | 3,096 | 285,758 " | 3 | Rājā, Rājput : Hindu. | Nil | Commissioner of Orissa (ex- officio Superintendent of the Orissa Tributary Mahāls). |
| Dhenkānāl (Orissa Tributary Ma- hāls). | 1,463 | 273,662 " | 4 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | Nil | " " |
| Gāngpur (Chotā Nāgpur Tribu- tary Mahāls). | 2,518 | 238,896 " | 1 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | Nil | Commissioner of Chotā Nāg- pur (ex-officio Superintendent of the Chotā Nāgpur Tribu- tary Mahāls). |
| 21 Minor States . | 13,066 | 1,189,521 | 27 | |||
| TOTAL | 58,652 | 3,998,544 | 78 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rāmpur . . | 899 | 533,212, chiefly Hindus and Muham- madans. | 33 | Nawāb, Pathān: Muham- madan. | 13 | Commissioner of Bareilly (ex- officio Political Agent). |
| Tehrī (Garh- wāl). | 4,180 | 268,885, chiefly Hindus. | 3 | Rājā, Kshattriya: Hindu. | 11 | Commissioner of Kumaun (ex- officio Political Agent). |
| TOTAL | 5,079 | 802,097 | 36 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bahāwalpur . | 15,000 | 720,877, chiefly Muhammadans. | 24 | Nawāb, Daudputra : Muhammadan. | 17 | Political Agent for the Phūlkiān States and Bahāwalpur. |
| The Phūlkiān States: Patiāla . | 5,412 | 1,596,692, chiefly Hindus and Sikhs. | 57 | Mahārājā, Sidhū Jāt : Sikh. | 17 | Political Agent for the Phūlkiān States and Bahāwalpur. |
| Nābha . | 928 | 297,949 „ | 12 | Rājā, Sidhū Jāt : Sikh. | 15 (including 4 guns personal to the present chief). | „ „ |
| Jīnd . | 1,259 | 282,003 „ | 15 | „ „ | 11 | Commissioner of the Jullundur Division (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Kapūrthala | 630* | 314,351, chiefly Muhammadans and Hindus. | 13 | Rājā, Ahlūwālia : Sikh. | 11 | Commissioner of the Jullundur Division (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Mandi . | 1,200 | 174,045, chiefly Hindus. | 5 | Rājā, Chandrabansi Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | „ „ |
| Sirmūr (Nāhan). | 1,198 | 135,687 „ | 5 | Rājā, Rājput : Hindu. | 11 | Commissioner of the Delhi Division (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Chamba . | 3,216 | 127,834 „ | 3 | „ „ | 11 | Commissioner of the Lahore Division (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| Farīdkot . | 642 | 124,912, Sikhs, Hindus, Muhammadans. | 4 | Rājā, Barār Jāt : Sikh. | 11 | Commissioner of the Jullundur Division (ex-officio Political Agent). |
| 25 Minor States | 7,047 | 650,048 „ | 17 | |||
| Total | 36,532 | 4,424,398 | 1,55 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (a) Northern Shan States. | ||||||
| Hsīpaw (Thī- baw). | 5,086 | 104,700, Buddhists. | 3 | Sawbwa, Shan : Buddhist. | 9 | Superintendent, Northern Shan States. |
| 5 Minor States | 9,508 | 216,390 „ | 2 | . . . . | . | |
| (b) Southern Shan States. | ||||||
| Kengtung . | 12,000 | 190,698 „ | 1 | Sawbwa, Shan : Buddhist. | 9 | Superintendent, Southern Shan States. |
| Möngnai . | 2,717 | 44,252 „ | 1/2 | Sawbwa, Shan : Buddhist. | 9 | |
| Yawnghwe . | 2,400 | 95,339 „ | 1 1/2 | Sawbwa, Shan : Buddhist. | Nil | |
| 35 Minor States | 21,374 | 440,270, Buddhists and Animists. | 4 | . . . . | . | |
| (c) 5 Karen States | 4,830 | 45,795 „ | 1/2 | . . . . | . | |
| (d) 3 Minor States under separate po- litical con- trol. | 9,096 | 40,543† | 1† | |||
| TOTAL (approximate) | 67,011 | 1,177,987 | 13 1/2 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approximate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kālāhandi* (or Karond). | 3,745 | 350,529, chiefly Hindus. | 2 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | 9 | Political Agent for the Chhattīs-garh Feudatories. |
| Bastar . | 13,062 | 306,501, chiefly Animists. | 3 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu. | Nil | ’’ |
| Patnā* . | 2,399 | 277,748, chiefly Hindus. | 2 | Mahārājā, Chauhān Rājput : Hindu. | Nil | ’’ |
| Raigarh . | 1,486 | 174,929 ’’ | 1 | Rājā, Gond (Aboriginal). | Nil | ’’ |
| Sonpur* . | 906 | 169,877 ’’ | 1 | Rājā, Chauhān Rājput: Hindu. | Nil | ’’ |
| Bāmra* . | 1,988 | 123,378 ’’ | 1 | Rājā, Gangābansi Rājput : Hindu. | Nil | ’’ |
| 9 Minor States | 5,849 | 593,421 ’’ | 11 | ... | ... | ... |
| TOTAL | 29,435 | 1,996,383 | 21 |
| Name of State. | Area in square miles. | Population in 1901. | Approxi- mate revenue (in lakhs of rupees). | Title, race, and religion of Ruler. | Salute of Ruler in guns. | Designation of local Political Officer. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manipur . | 8,456 | 284,465, Hindus and Animists. | 4 | Rājā, Kshattriya : Hindu . | 11 | Political Agent in Manipur. |
| The Khāsi States (25). | 3,900 | 110,519, Khāsis and Christians. | 1/2 | . . . . . . | . . . | Deputy Commissioner, Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills. |
| Total | 12,356 | 394,984 | 4 1/2 | |||
| Grand Total (approximate) | 824,283 | 68,210,660 | 25,29 |
Notes
- 1. Among these honours may be specially mentioned the grant of salutes, with a varying number of guns, and the title of His Highness accorded to every ruling chief with a salute of more than ten guns.
- *. Nepāl differs from the other Native States dealt with in this chapter in that it is independent in respect to its internal administration. Its foreign relations are, however, controlled by the Government of India; it is bound to receive a British Resident; and it cannot take Europeans into its service without the sanction of the Government of India.
- †. Excluding Berār.
- *. Of these, however, sixteen are not really States, as their chiefs now possess no land but only guaranteed cash revenues.
- *. This is the census figure as modified with reference to a subsequent transfer of territory to British administration : the population of Khārān and Makrān is estimated further at about 98,000.
- *. In 1905 Hill Tippera was transferred to the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam.
- †. The figures for Bhutān are estimates only.
- ‡. In 1905 Surgujā, with four other of the Chotā Nāgpur Tributary Mahāls (Jashpur, Udaipur, Koreā, and Chāng Bhakār), was transferred to the Central Provinces.
- *. The Rājā of Kapūrthala also holds large estates in Oudh (about 700 square miles).
- *. All these States, with the exception of the five Karen States forming Karenni, are included in British India, as defined on pp. 59, 60.
- †. Excluding population and revenue of Kantgye, which are unknown.
- *. In 1905 Kālāhandi, Patnā, Sonpur, and Bāmra (with the Minor State of Rairākhol) were transferred to Bengal.
- *. In 1905 Hill Tippera was transferred from Bengal to the new Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam