Chapter V

— Legislation and Justice

The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. IV, The India Office, 1907 · from page 126 · about 67 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

Law

The indigenous law of India is personal, and divisible with reference to the two main classes of the population, Hindu and Muhammadan. Both systems claim divine origin through revelation and are inextricably interwoven with religion, and each exists in combination with a law based on custom. The Institutes, which Manu declared to be a direct emanation from the deity, remain to this day the foundation of Hindu jurisprudence, although the works of commentators, and the additions necessitated by time and progress, have led to many changes and the formation of various schools. By this ancient code the whole body of substantive law is dealt with under the heads of debt, deposit, sale without ownership, partnership, resumption of gifts, the non-payment of wages, breach of contract, rescission of sale and purchase, relations between husband and wife and master and servant, the settlement of boundaries, inheritance, assault, defamation, theft, robbery, adultery, and gaming. The interpretation of the sacred writings constituting it was from the first entrusted exclusively to Brāhmans, to whom a position of extraordinary sanctity was assigned; and thus the chief part in the work of Hindu legislation was taken by the Brāhmanical order. It must, however, be borne in mind that the British courts have done a great deal towards making these Hindu texts generally binding in matters of marriage, inheritance, and the like.

In like manner the jurisprudence of Islām is based on the Korān. The Korānic law, supplemented where necessary by the Sunnat and Hadīs, or Sayings and Doings of the Prophet, as well as by the decisions of his successors and the writings of the Muftis and Maulvis, who formed a distinct profession and arrogated to themselves its exposition, is most fully developed in the departments of family relations and inheritance, in certain branches of the law of contract, and in the doctrine of pious or charitable endowment, called wakf.

But, besides the Hindu law of the Shāstras, there has ever been recognized a customary law varying with locality; and, side by side with the Muhammadan law proper, there sprang up in the course of Musalmān conquest a species of common law, derived not from the Korān but from local usage, and maintained by the countenance and support of the ruling power.

Except in the case of the island of Bombay, which was obtained through cession in full sovereignty from Portugal, wherever the English first settled in India they did so with the licence of a Native government, and the natural consequence would have been their submission to Native law. But there was, in the first place, really no lex loci to govern the newcomers, for the idea of a territorial, as opposed to a personal law, is of European and modern origin, and the Shāstras and Korān alike know no local limits, but bind individuals united only by a common faith. In the second place, the law of nations clothes Europeans settled in the midst of races differing from them entirely in religion, manners, and habits, with the national character of the parent state, and recognizes their factories and plantations as exclusive possessions. Lastly, many of the provisions of the indigenous law of India were such as no civilized Christian race could enforce. Mutilation and stoning, for instance, are penalties incompatible with Western ideas; and equally so is the principle that the evidence of an infidel could not be received against a Muhammadan, or that there should be a privileged law for the Brāhman alone. Accordingly, the earliest charters assumed that the English had brought their own legal system with them, and that of 1726 introduced the common law and the older Acts of Parliament into the three Presidency towns as regards Europeans, by expressly directing that justice should be administered by the Company in accordance with the laws of England. At first the tendency of the English was to make their law public and territorial, and, on the establishment of the Supreme Court at Calcutta in 1773 and the advent of English lawyers as its judges, they proceeded to apply it to Europeans and Natives alike. The error of this course was, however, rectified by the passing of the Declaratory Act of 1780, by sec. 17 of which Parliament directed that, as against a Hindu, the Hindu law and usage, and as against a Muhammadan the laws and customs of Islām, should be applied. This wise rule, which had already been laid down by Hastings in Bengal, was repeated for the settlements at Madras and Bombay by a statute of 1797 (37 Geo. 3, c. 142); it was incorporated in the old Regulations of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and it was extended by subsequent legislation throughout the Company's territories. In this way the British took the line of least resistance, and to it they have adhered, accepting and carrying on as far as possible what they found, and obtruding only so much of their own law as India from time to time became fitted to receive. Owing to the influence of Western jurisprudence, to the case-law emanating from courts established and moulded on English models, to the advance of enlightened ideas, and to the progress of education, the rules of the Shāstras and the Korān have gradually been altered and relaxed. Moreover, the Acts of Parliament which inculcated their observance are not among those which the legislature in India is forbidden to alter or affect; and, as an inevitable consequence, substantial modifications have been made by direct legislation, such as that contained in the Bengal Satī Regulation, 1829; the Indian Slavery Act, 1843; the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850; the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856; and the various Acts and Codes, criminal and civil, which will be referred to hereafter under the head of codification, to say nothing of the tenancy and rent laws passed for the different Provinces.

A certain number of the older English statutes and the English common law are, therefore, to a limited extent still in force in the Presidency towns as applicable to Europeans, while much of the old Hindu and Muhammadan law is everywhere personal to their native fellow subjects; but, apart from these and from the customary law, which is as far as possible recognized by the courts, the law of British India is the creation of statutory enactment made for it either at Westminster or by the authorities in India to whom the necessary law-giving functions have from time to time been delegated.

The supreme power of Parliament to legislate for British India can scarcely be questioned; but it has nevertheless been explicitly saved by, for example, sec. 51 of the Charter Act of 1833. The application of an unrepealed statute passed before the grant of the charter of 1726 is a matter of doubt and complexity, which can be decided only as it arises with reference to the language used and the attendant circumstances. In connexion with the later statutes, however, the position is simply this, that no Act of Parliament passed subsequently to 1726 has any application to any part of British India, unless it purports to extend to it in express terms or by necessary implication.

At the outset the Company was empowered by its charters to make such new laws as might be found to be necessary or convenient. On the assumption of the Dīwāni of Bengal in 1772 a series of instructions were promulgated as the basis of administration; but, in making these the Company acted, not under the authority of the British Crown, but as agents for the Mughal emperor at Delhi. In the following year, however, the Regulating Act empowered the Governor-General-in-Council to make—subject to registration with the approval of the Supreme Court—rules and regulations for the government of the settlement at Fort William and its subordinate factories. An Act of 1781 next authorized the framing of rules without reference to the Supreme Court, but subject to the approval of the King-in-Council; and in the exercise of this power a fresh set of Regulations was drawn up by Lord Cornwallis in 1793, one of them providing for the formation into a regular code of all the rules from time to time issued for the internal administration of Bengal. In 1797 another Act confirmed ‘this wise and salutary provision’; and statutes passed for Madras in 1800, and for Madras and Bombay in 1807, entrusted to the Governors-in-Council of those Presidencies similar quasi-legislative powers. Under this system there grew up the three ‘codes’ known as the Regulations of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and in accordance with these the Company’s territories were administered until the year 1834. So far the legislative authority conferred was vested in the executive; and this system of law-giving survives in the Regulations and Ordinances, which, as will be shown hereafter, the Government of India and the Governor-General are still competent to make.

But by the Charter Act of 1833 the old series of executive orders was closed and a new system was introduced. The legislative functions of the Madras and Bombay Governments were withdrawn, and the whole legislative authority was vested in the Governor-General and his Council, strengthened by the addition of a lawyer who was not to belong to the service of the Company and whose duties were to be confined to legislation. The body so constituted was authorized to legislate for all persons, places, and courts within the Company’s territories; and the laws made by it were, subject to disallowance by the Court of Directors, to have the effect of Acts of Parliament, registration in a court of justice being finally dispensed with.

The Charter Act of 1853 increased the legislative body to twelve members, four of them to be nominated by the different Local Governments. This Council, to which the chief justice and one of the puisne judges of the Supreme Court at Calcutta were added, was intended for purely legislative work; but, modelling its procedure on that of Parliament, it evinced an inconvenient tendency to interfere with the executive. The position was, therefore, reconsidered, and the next important stage was marked by the passing of the Indian Councils Act, 1861. By that enactment provision was made for the appointment of Additional Members to form a larger Legislative Council. The nature of the business to be transacted was carefully defined, the extent of the powers delegated was categorically described, and the prerogative rights of the Crown, as well as the authority of Parliament, were effectively safeguarded. Simultaneously the opportunity was taken to restore and remodel the local legislatures at Madras and Bombay, and the Governor-General-in-Council was empowered to extend the Act to other parts of British India. In pursuance of these provisions subordinate Legislative Councils have been authorized for Bengal in 1862, for the United Provinces in 1886, for the Punjab and Burma in 1898, and for Eastern Bengal and Assam in 1905. The Central Provinces is now the only large administration unprovided with a local legislature. Finally, by the Indian Councils Act of 1892 all of these legislative bodies, supreme and subordinate, were still further enlarged; the elective element was introduced tentatively; and provision was made for interpellation and discussion of the budget.

To meet emergencies the Governor-General is vested with a power not unlike that which was, for a short time during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, placed in the hands of the King-in-Council in England by the Statute of Proclamations of 1539. Under sec. 23 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the Governor-General alone may, in case of pressing necessity, promulgate Ordinances, which are invested with the same force and effect as enactments of the legislature, but cannot remain in operation for more than six months. This extraordinary power has been resorted to on only five occasions; once with the object of restraining dramatic performances of a character calculated to excite racial animosity, once in order to deal with the disturbed state of part of the Punjab, and thrice in connexion with matters of fiscal importance. The Indian Statute-book also contains several enactments1 which arm the executive with authority, in the event of internal commotion or disturbance, to suspend the regular law and supersede the ordinary courts of justice.

Another kind of quasi-legislative authority has been bestowed by the Government of India Act, 1870, which empowers the Governor-General in (Executive) Council to make Regulations, having all the cogency of Acts of the legislature, for the peace and good government of any tract to which that enactment may have been applied by the Secretary of State. Many Regulations for such territories as Assam, the Andamans, Aden, Ajmer-Merwāra, British Baluchistān, Coorg, the North-West Frontier Province, and Upper Burma, in which the hand of the executive requires to be strengthened, have been made in this way, the object being, as a rule, to bar the operation of the general law and permit the application of certain enactments only, with such modifications as may be deemed necessary in the interests of successful administration. These less advanced tracts, and others specially ‘scheduled,’ may also be dealt with under an Act of the Indian legislature, entitled the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, which empowers the Government to declare, in case of doubt, the law in force in them, and further to extend to them, with or without modification, any enactment in force elsewhere in British India.

The Executive Council of the Governor-General at present (1906) consists—besides the Governor-General himself and the Commander-in-Chief, who is usually appointed by the Secretary of State to be an Extraordinary Member—of six Ordinary Members, of whom one must be an English or Irish barrister or Scottish advocate of not less than five years’ standing. For the purposes of legislation, it is provided by the Indian Councils Acts of 1861 and 1892 that the Governor-General shall summon as an Additional Member the Lieutenant-Governor or Chief Commissioner of the Province in which the Council is assembled, and shall also nominate such other persons, not less than ten nor more than sixteen, as he may think fit. Of these Additional Members, who are appointed for two years at a time, one-half at least must be non-officials1; and, in order to give the Council an elective as well as a representative character, statutory rules now require the nominations to five seats to be made on the recommendation of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce and the non-official members of the local Legislative Councils at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and Allāhābād. The remaining seats may be filled in such manner as appears to the Governor-General most suitable, regard being had to the business in hand and the different classes of the community to be represented. With the latter object it is usual to nominate representatives of as many of the other Provinces as possible; and the care taken to secure the due representation of the native population may be instanced by the fact that eight of the twenty-four persons who, in 1904, formed the Governor-General's Legislative Council were natives of India. The constitution of this legislative body is, by reason of the permanent official element furnished by the Ordinary Members, such as to leave the Government in a majority; but there is ample room for the expression of the views of the non-official public, and standing orders provide for eliciting extraneous opinions by the timely publication of all measures of any importance. In practice, moreover, every consideration is shown for public feeling. Bills are frequently altered and added to in consonance with suggestions received from outside; and legislation, as in the case of the Indian Tea Cess Act of 1903, is occasionally undertaken at the instance of an interested section of the community.

Under the statute of 1861, the only business capable of being transacted at a meeting of the Legislative Council was the consideration and passing of bills; but the amending Act of 1892 permits the asking of questions and the discussion of the annual budget, subject to the proviso that no member shall use either privilege to propose any resolution or to divide the Council. No law has validity until the Governor-General has signified his assent, and the prerogative rights of the Crown are guarded by the provision that the sovereign may disallow any measure. No Act giving power to a court, other than a chartered High Court, to sentence European British subjects to death can be passed without the previous sanction of the Secretary of State1; while the consent of the Governor-General must be obtained before any project is brought forward which affects religion, the public revenues, the army, or foreign relations. The legislative powers conferred do not extend to affecting the provisions of any Act of Parliament passed after the year 1860; nor do they permit the enactment of any law touching the authority of Parliament, or 'any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom whereon may depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the Crown or the sovereignty or dominion of the Crown1.' And, in particular, the Council has no authority to repeal or alter the Army Act, or any of the Government of India Acts of 1833, 1853, 1854, 1858, and 1859, or any Act enabling the Secretary of State for India to raise money in the United Kingdom. But, within the limits and under the conditions above indicated, the Council possesses plenary power to legislate for all persons, courts, places, and things within British India. And, further, it has extra-territorial power in that it may make laws for native Indian subjects of the King-Emperor anywhere; for European British subjects and servants of the Government of India in the Native States of India; and for native officers and soldiers in the army and persons belonging to the Royal Indian Marine wherever they may be serving2.

The Act of 1861 provides for the making and amendment of rules of business, and the practice under them may be thus summarized. The Governor-General presides3 at the meetings, which are held at his official residence, and are, as far as the exigencies of space allow, open to the public. On every motion before the Council each member in turn is entitled to speak once after the mover, and may, with the permission of the president, speak a second time by way of explanation. The mover has the right of reply, but the president usually brings an important discussion to a close by speaking last. The members, of whom seven form a quorum, remain seated round the Council board throughout the proceedings; and all speeches are addressed to the president, through whom likewise all questions must be asked. Every motion is decided by a majority of votes4, and, once it is put, no further discussion is allowed. The president is vested with full discretion to decide all points of order, to adjourn any meeting or business, to direct the withdrawal of strangers, and to suspend any of the rules. The budget discussion permitted by the Act of 1892 is similarly dealt with; and the privilege of interpellation is restricted and safeguarded. Questions must be so framed as to be merely requests for information, and anything defamatory or in an argumentative or hypothetical form is out of order. Notice of every question must be given; the question is read in Council by the member who framed it, or by some other member for him; and no disputation is permitted in respect of the answer, which is given by the Ordinary Member in charge of the particular department of the administration concerned or by some other member designated, pro hac vice, by the president.

The following are the stages which must ordinarily be passed through before a contentious measure becomes law :— (1) Motion, after due notice, for leave to introduce a bill, followed by its formal introduction and publication for criticism. This corresponds with the practice in Parliament up to the first reading.

(2) Reference of the bill, with any opinions received, to a select committee. This corresponds with the second reading in Parliament and the motion that a bill be committed; and it marks the most important stage, when the principle of the measure ought to be discussed and approved or disapproved. In select committee the details are scrutinized, suggestions are considered, and the draft is amended, under the guidance of the Law Member.

(3) Consideration in Council of the select committee's report, and of any further amendments that may be brought forward. This corresponds with the third reading in Parliament.

(4) Motion, as in Parliament, that the bill, as amended, be passed.

(5) Signature of the president to the bill as passed, and of the Governor-General by way of assent, followed by its final publication as an Act.

In the case of a non-contentious project some of these steps may be omitted. There is often no need for waiting for criticism of such a measure or referring it to a select committee, and it may be accepted without amendment. Again, it is sometimes necessary to pass a bill without delay, and the rules have on occasion been suspended so completely as to allow an Act to pass through the Council at a single sitting. The standing orders render it impossible for the proceedings ever to assume the character of a Parliamentary debate, and the machinery provided is such as to make legislation in the direction desired by the Government comparatively easy. It is rare for a bill to become law without being taken up as a Government measure, bills introduced by non-official members being, as is now increasingly the case at Westminster, intended mainly to stimulate the Government to action. For private-bill legislation as such there is no provision, most of the matters which are dealt with in that way in the United Kingdom being made the subject of executive action in India.

The subordinate Legislative Councils are constituted on the same lines generally as the superior legislature of the Governor-General. In Madras and Bombay the Governor is assisted by an Executive Council of two Ordinary Members, and these three form the nucleus of the larger Legislative Council; but in each of the other Provinces the Lieutenant-Governor stands alone at the head of the local administration. The Acts of 1861 and 1892 provide that the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case may be, shall nominate as members, for two years at a time, the Advocate-General of the Province or other officer acting in that capacity, and—subject, save in Madras and Bombay, to the sanction of the Governor-General —such other persons, not less than eight nor more than twenty1, as he may think expedient, at least one-half being non-officials. In Madras, Bombay, Bengal, and the United Provinces some of these members are appointed on the recommendation of groups of municipalities and District boards, Universities, Chambers of Commerce, and the like, and the elective principle is thus to some extent recognized. The Governor-General is empowered to frame rules as to the making of these nominations, while the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor is authorized to regulate the asking of questions and the discussion of the provincial budget, subject to the same conditions as in the case of the Governor-General's Council2. When a bill has been passed it does not become law until it has been published with the assent of both the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor-General, and in the last resort it is liable to veto by the Crown. Finally, provision is made for the framing of rules of business, and in each instance standing orders, similar to those laid down in the case of the Governor-General's Council, have been prescribed. In some cases parliamentary procedure is copied, and provision is made for the ‘reading’ of bills a first, a second, and a third time. The powers of these local legislatures are strictly territorial, and they are debarred from interfering in any way with the provisions of an Act of Parliament. Nor may they, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General, introduce or pass an Act affecting any law or any regulation made by another legislative authority in India, or interfering with religion, the customs duties, imperial taxation, the currency, the transmission of postal or telegraphic messages, the penal code, patents, copyright, the army, or foreign relations.

The modern and convenient practice of empowering public authorities and local bodies to make supplementary rules, orders, or by-laws, to carry out in detail the purposes and objects of a particular enactment, has been largely adopted in India. Apparently the first Act conferring such delegated authority was No. XI of 1850; but nowadays scarcely a measure is passed into law which does not provide an ancillary rule-making power, furnishing such safeguards in the form of preliminary publication for criticism, previous sanction, and so forth, as may be thought expedient.

The lex scripta of British India, or, in other words, the British Indian Statute-book, may, then, be said to consist of: first, Acts of Parliament; secondly, direct legislation in India; and, thirdly, derivative legislation, consisting of statutory rules, orders, and by-laws, supplementing particular enactments. As to Acts of Parliament nothing need be added save this, that the ‘Statutes relating to India’ have been collected, a new edition having recently been published.

The results of direct legislation in India may be resolved under five different heads. First, there is so much as is still unrepealed of the early Regulations of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, which were made prior to 1834 under the quasi-legislative authority then entrusted to the executive. These are to be found in their appropriate places in the various Provincial ‘Codes,’ or collections of enactments of local application, which are issued from time to time for the different Provinces.

Next, there are the Acts of the Governor-General in Council, which may be divided into general Acts, i. e. Acts of more or less general application, and local Acts. All the laws required for the whole, or the greater part, of British India are made by the Governor-General's Legislative Council, and these are published separately, a new edition of them having been brought out in 1898–91. Their range is very extensive; and some idea of the variety of matter dealt with may be gathered from the statement that, in addition to the important enactments which have been, or will be, separately referred to, the list of them contains Acts dealing with the police, prisoners, reformatory schools, vagrancy, leprosy, epidemic disease, female infanticide, divorce, marriage, married women's property, the age of majority, usury, charitable endowments, the naturalization of aliens, the registration of property and of domestic occurrences, copyright, coinage and paper currency, emigration, pilgrim traffic, merchant shipping, ports, sea customs and tariffs, cotton duties, merchandise marks, stamps, court fees, opium, salt, excise, income-tax, mines, fisheries, forests, treasure-trove, factories, banks, electrical enterprise, telegraphs, the post office, carriers, railroads, tramways, land acquisition, the recovery of the public revenue, the prevention of cruelty to animals, the preservation of elephants and wild birds, the provision of courts of justice, arbitration, legal practitioners, municipal administration, arms, explosives, military works, cantonments, the native army, volunteers, and the reserve forces.

Acts of local application are passed by the Governor-General's Legislative Council in cases in which there are no local legislatures to undertake the legislation desired, or where that contemplated is of a kind with which a local legislature cannot, with its limited powers, deal effectively, or which it is for any other reason desirable that the Supreme Legislature should undertake. Important examples of these are the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879; the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1885; the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885; the Allahābād University Act, 1887; the Central Provinces Municipal Act, 1889; the Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900; the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900.

Under the third head fall Regulations which, though issued by the executive in pursuance of the statute of 1870, take the form, and have all the effect, of legislative enactments. Temporary Ordinances promulgated by the Governor-General under sec. 23 of the Indian Councils Act, 1861, constitute the fourth, while Acts of the Legislative Councils of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Burma, form the fifth and last class of Indian legislation proper. The latter are known and numbered as Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, and Burma Acts, respectively. Among the most important of them may be mentioned the Madras Local Boards Act, 1884; the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879; the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1900; the Oudh Settled Estates Act, 1900; the Punjab Descent of Jāgīrs Act, 1900; and the Burma Forest Act, 1902.

As regards derivative legislation, Local Governments have collected and published such statutory rules and orders as are of local application; but no collection of those that are of general application has as yet been made. Lists of them have, however, been prepared, and they are referred to in the various local or Provincial Codes, as well as in the annotated editions of Acts published by the Government of India. Perhaps the best example of the extent to which this delegation of legislative authority can be carried is furnished by the Cantonment Code of 1899, which was issued in exercise of the extensive rule-making power conferred by sec. 26 of the Cantonments Act, 1889, and contains an exhaustive set of nearly 300 rules and by-laws dealing with the details of cantonment administration.

Orders by the King-in-Council in pursuance of Acts of Parliament, such as the Zanzibar Order in Council, 1897, which gives, inter alia, an appeal from the consular courts of Zanzibar to the Bombay High Court, are another species of derivative legislation; but the number of these which relate to India is small.

The Charter Act of 1833 provided for the appointment of a body of experts, to be called the Indian Law Commission, who were to report upon the courts, the procedure, and the law of British India. On this Macaulay, the first Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, was the moving spirit, and with it the work of codification began. It drafted a Penal Code, which was, however, not passed till 1860, for activity declined after Macaulay's return to England, and the draft was strenuously criticized by many of the judges in India. A second Commission, which sat in England and was nominated under an Act of Parliament in 1853, secured the enactment, with some revision, of its predecessor's Penal Code, as also of two Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure. Yet a third Commission was convened in 1861, and by it several measures were drafted; but the members resigned in 1870, and since then the work of preparing, as well as of carrying through, codifying bills has been done almost entirely in India under the guidance of the Law Members of Council. India has been the most successful field of English codification, every important branch of the English law in force in the country, except that of torts, having been incorporated in the form, and reduced to the dimensions, of codes. By far the most important, as it is the best, of these is the Indian Penal Code, which embodies the whole of the substantive criminal law. The bulk of it was drafted by Macaulay; and the most telling proof of its excellence is furnished by the fact that, although it has now been in force for over forty years, it has required little amendment or amplification. Its provisions are based upon the criminal law of England, but the latter has been adapted to suit the circumstances of India. Thus, owing to the unwillingness of the native to protect himself by using force, the right of self-defence is expressed in wider terms than would be employed in England. Again, offences such as dacoity or gang-robbery, judicial corruption, police torture, kidnapping, and the offering of insults or injury to religion or to sacred places, are treated with greater fullness and care than might be necessary in a criminal code for England. Adultery is, in consonance with Eastern ideas, made a subject of criminal proceedings, while the necessity under which many an English judge has laboured of passing a capital sentence only to recommend its commutation to the Home Secretary, has been obviated by making murder punishable with transportation for life as an alternative to death. For the rest, the rules of procedure have been codified in the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure1; those of succession to the property of persons other than Hindus, Muhammadans, and Buddhists in the Indian Succession Act, 1865; the law of evidence in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; the principles of contract in the Indian Contract Act, 1872; the matter of injunctions, performance, and equitable relief in the Specific Relief Act, 1877; the limitation of actions in the Indian Limitation Act, 1877; the law governing promissory notes, bills of exchange, and cheques in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; the subject of trusts in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882; the transfer of property in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; the accrual of easements in the Indian Easements Act, 1882; company law in the Indian Companies Act, 1882; patents in the Inventions and Designs Act, 1888; military and cantonment law in the Indian Articles of War and the Cantonments Act, 1889; and guardianship in the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

In India judges and magistrates are most frequently not professional lawyers, and to them codification must always be welcome. But, apart from this consideration, the work accomplished has, on the whole, benefited the country. The Penal Code is universally regarded as an unmixed gain1; and the same may be said of the two Procedure Codes. The remaining codifying Acts have been subjected to much adverse criticism and condemned as being, in so far as they are not superfluous, calculated to make the law rigid and inelastic; but they have certainly rendered it more accessible and tended to improve its substance. The important branch of the general law relating to torts still remains to be codified, and it has been suggested that the leading principles of Hindu and of Muhammadan law should be similarly dealt with ; but there seems no likelihood at present of the codification of the law on any of these subjects. Of recent years considerable progress has been made in the direction of statute-law revision, and the Indian Statute-book has been materially improved in form and simplified and reduced in matter by the passing of such Acts as the Repealing and Amending Act, 1891, the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the Indian Short Titles Act, 1897. Much has also been done in the useful sphere of consolidation, as distinguished from the more ambitious process of codification. For example, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, repealed and replaced no fewer than eighteen separate enactments, and a revised Code of Civil Procedure, to take the place of a like number of enactments passed since 1881, is now (1906) before the Governor-General's Legislative Council. Law-making is in India a comparatively simple process, for Government measures are, as a rule, passed without serious difficulty. The consequence is that amending legislation is rather freely resorted to, the legislature being at once moved to cure any defect or to remove any doubt that may have been discovered in an Act, however recently it may have become law. In the United Kingdom, an amending bill for the most part merely refers to the Act to be amended and proceeds to lay down the new rule to be enacted. In India the more exact method of textual amendment is adopted : that is to say, the required amendments are precisely drafted for actual incorporation in the original or principal Act. This practice, although it facilitates consolidation and has many obvious advantages, somewhat disguises the fact that the different parts of what is apparently a homogeneous whole date from different periods, and there is always the risk of oversight, which, however, is minimized by the frequent publication of fresh editions of Acts as amended up to date.

European officers and soldiers in India remain subject to English military law, i. e., in the main, to the Army Act (44 & 45 Vict., cap. 58). The native troops, on the other hand, are governed by the Indian Articles of War, which are to be found in Act V of 1869, an enactment passed by the Governor-General's Legislative Council under the authority conferred by Parliament through sec. 73 of the Government of India Act, 1833. Similarly the Governor-General-in-Council has been authorized by Act of Parliament—sec. 2 of the Indian Marine Service Act, 1884—to make laws for all persons employed or serving in, or belonging to, the Royal Indian Marine; and the Indian Marine Act, 1887, has accordingly been passed by the legislature in India.

It has been stated that the supreme legislature in India has certain extra-territorial powers in that it can bind by its laws all Native Indian subjects of the King-Emperor wherever they may be, and all British subjects and servants of the Government of India anywhere within the Native States of India. But the Governor-General-in-Council has, in his executive capacity and as representing the British Crown, still wider powers; for he can acquire and exercise within the territories of Indian Native chiefs, and of adjoining Asiatic States, powers of legislation and jurisdiction obtained by capitulation, agreement, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means, extending to persons who are not British subjects, and similar to those exercised by the Crown in foreign countries in pursuance of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts and the Orders in Council thereunder. The existence of such powers and jurisdiction is declared under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1902.

In the Native States generally the law that runs is that locally imposed by the ruler, guided by the Government of India acting through its political officers. But in numerous circumscribed areas — particularly cantonments, residencybazars, and railway-lands—legislative functions and jurisdiction have from time to time been obtained by cession or otherwise, and for such places the Governor-General in (Executive) Council makes territorial laws, applying Acts of the British Indian legislature or framing distinct enactments, and establishing courts for the administration of justice. For example, in the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore, situated within Mysore, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure have been applied, and under the latter regular courts have been created ; while, for the better conduct of its municipal affairs, there has been framed a separate and self-contained law, entitled the Bangalore Municipal Law, 1897. These laws, which obviously form no part of the British Indian Statute-book, may be found in the volumes published by the Government of India under the style of British Enactments in force in Native States. Apart, however, from areas thus exceptionally situated, and save under such special circumstances as prevail during the minority or incapacity of a ruling chief, the policy of the Government of India is not to interfere with the indigenous law, or oust the jurisdiction of the courts, of a Native State in cases affecting its subjects alone. Within limits fixed by the supervision of the British Government, the native law varies from that of a principality in which the word of the ruler is still despotic, to that of a State like Mysore, which has established a legislature in close imitation of a British Indian Legislative Council and has adopted the Indian Penal Code.

As regards European foreigners in Native territory, the exercise of jurisdiction is assumed by the British Government ; for an Indian native chief is not permitted to have any diplomatic or official intercourse with any foreign power, and it is universally recognized that, for international purposes, his territory must be regarded as a part of the British empire.

Courts

By Hindu law the king is recognized as the fountain of justice, and the Shāstras require him to maintain permanent courts and to preside in them himself. But no judicial system worthy of the name can be said to have been established, for the whole judicial authority, except such as might be exercised by the king in person, was left vaguely in the hands of Brāhmans. By them the law was expounded, and effect was given to it by the executive, the place of regular courts being taken in part by commissions appointed by the ruler in a summary manner and usually from motives of Court favour, and in part by bodies of arbitrators or panchāyats, acting sometimes under the authority of the state and sometimes as arbitrators by consent of parties. The original theory of Islām was that the law is independent of the state ; and justice was administered according to the Korān by Kāzīs, sitting in regular courts with Muftis and Maulvis to assist them, and acting on application under fixed rules of procedure. By this agency matters relating to marriage, adoption, inheritance, and the rights of private property generally, as well as all but the most serious offences and such as threatened the public safety, were dealt with. But the ruler was not altogether excluded, even under Muhammadan usage, from control over the administration of justice, while the customary law of the countries overrun by Musalmān conquest was interpreted according to the will of the conqueror and asserted in an arbitrary manner by his officers. Throughout, indeed, the real power remained in the hands of the executive, who did not hesitate to intervene when and to whatever extent they thought fit. Thus, under the arrangements with which the British were confronted in Bengal, the law was administered at head-quarters by the Nawāb Nāzim himself in capital cases, by his deputy, the Naib Nāzim, in other cases of major importance, and by faujdārs, muhtasils, and kotwāls in cases of a less serious character; while in the interior, or what is known as the Mofussil, zamīndārs were allowed to exercise local jurisdiction, reporting their decisions to the Nawāb in capital cases only, and being otherwise practically uncontrolled.

But, just as the early charters of the East India Company conferred a vague authority to make laws, so did they give the Company a general power to administer justice. In that which Charles II granted in 1683 it was directed that courts of judicature, each to consist of a lawyer and two merchants, should be established at such places as the Company might appoint; and this direction was repeated in the charter of James II in 1686 and in that of William III in 1698. In 1726, however, the necessity for a more regularly constituted judicial authority led the Court of Directors to petition the king to establish Mayor's Courts; and three such courts, composed in each instance of the mayor and nine aldermen, were created at Fort William (Calcutta), Madras, and Bombay, for the trial of actions between Europeans within those towns and the dependent factories. From them an appeal was allowed to the Presidency Governments; and, in cases involving sums exceeding Rs. 4,000, a further appeal lay to the King in Council. In 1753 these courts were re-established under revised letters patent, and Courts of Requests for the determination of suits of value not exceeding Rs. 20 were simultaneously introduced, both classes of tribunal being declared subject to the control of the Court of Directors. As regards the Mofussil, the powers and duties of government in Bengal had been delegated by the Mughal emperor to the Nawāb Nāzim at Murshidābād ; but the victories of the English gradually dislodged the authority of the latter, and in the year 1765 the practical transfer of sovereign rights was secured by Clive through the grant of the Dīwāni. By this grant the Nizāmat or Faujdāri, that is to say, the administration of criminal justice, was left with the Nawāb, and in consequence Muhammadan law was retained and administered, as before, in Muhammadan courts by Muhammadan officers. The collection of the revenue and the administration of civil justice, on the other hand, passed with the Dīwāni ; but, while responsibility in these departments was thus accepted by the Company, they were still conducted through native agency. These arrangements failed, and confusion resulted until, in 1771, the Directors resolved to undertake the entire management of the revenues, together with the administration of civil, as well as criminal, justice.

At this juncture Hastings was transferred from Madras to Bengal, where, on his arrival early in 1772, he proceeded to reorganize the affairs of the Company in general and the judicial system in particular. Mofussil dīwāni adālats, or civil courts of first instance, were located in the Districts, and these were presided over by European Zila judges in the service of the Company, with the assistance of Hindu and Muhammadan law officers ; while, in order to relieve them of the trial of petty suits, Registers and native commissioners, known as Sadr Amīns and Munsifs, were appointed. For the immediate supervision of these, provincial civil courts of appeal, each composed of four European judges, were provided, and over all was placed a Sadr Dīwāni Adālat, or chief civil court of appeal, which was composed of the Governor and Council, assisted by native officers. The impossibility of allowing the crude penal law of the Musalmān system to be followed was at the same time recognized, and here also radical alterations were made. Provincial courts of criminal judicature, or Mofussil nizāmat adālats, were created, and, while Muhammadan officers continued to sit in them, their proceedings were supervised by the Company's servants. Courts of circuit, presided over by the judges of the provincial civil appellate courts above referred to, were constituted as courts of criminal appeal and reference over the inferior courts and magistracy, and a Sadr Nizāmat Adālat was established, as a chief court of criminal appeal, alongside the Sadr Dīwāni Adālat.

The affairs of the country had by this time been brought before the House of Commons, and, on the report of a committee condemning the Mayor's Courts, the Crown was moved to issue another charter of justice for Bengal. The result was the enactment by Parliament of the Regulating Act of 1773, under which the King in Council established a Supreme Court at Fort William, consisting of a chief justice and puisne judges who were professional lawyers. This tribunal superseded the Mayor's Court, but left the Court of Requests untouched; and its charter gave it full power and authority, subject to a right of appeal to the Privy Council in cases exceeding Rs. 4,000 in value, to exercise all manner of jurisdiction throughout Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa. But the Act and the charter were alike silent as to the relations of the new court and the executive, and both altogether ignored the Adālats which had been created under the scheme introduced by Hastings. In the Supreme Court the civil and criminal law administered was English, as also was the procedure followed. In the Sadr Adālat and other courts of the Company, the judges knew nothing of English law, and were required by executive order to proceed according to equity, justice, and good conscience, unless Hindu or Muhammadan law was in point or some Regulation expressly applied. These two judicial systems were, therefore, antagonistic: and the omission of the statute to harmonize them led to difficulties and disputes, which were only increased by the abortive attempt of Hastings to appoint Impey, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, to the bench of the Sadr Dīwānī Adālat, and had in 1781 to be removed by the intervention of Parliament and the passing of the Declaratory Act. By that enactment the Governor-General and his Councillors were exempted from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and not only was the independent existence of the Company's courts recognized, but the Supreme Court was debarred from exercising any jurisdiction in matters concerning the revenue or the Regulations of the Government. Thus the powers of the Supreme Court were limited and distinguished from those of the Sadr and other courts of the Company. Sixteen years later an Act of 1797 extended its jurisdiction, as thus curtailed and defined, to the province of Benares and all places for the time being included in Bengal. In Madras and Bombay there was the same sequence of events, and the judicial system was laid down on similar lines; but there the Mayor's Courts were first superseded by Recorder's Courts, which were Mayor's Courts strengthened by the addition to each of a legal president, and these were not replaced by Supreme Courts till the years 1801 and 1823, respectively. The Southern Presidency appears, moreover, to have been from the first distinguished by the provision made for the disposal of petty cases through the agency of village headmen and panchāyats.

The present system may be said to have been inaugurated by the passing of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861. In 1852 it had been urged upon the Parliamentary Committee for East Indian affairs that it was desirable that the Supreme and Sadr Courts in each Presidency should be consolidated, so as to unite the legal training of the English lawyers who sat in the one with the intimate knowledge of native customs, habits, and laws possessed by the civil servants who presided over the other. The necessary Act of Parliament was passed nine years later, and by it the Crown was empowered to establish High Courts of Judicature for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and eventually for the Province of Agra; and it was enacted that, upon the establishment of these, both the Supreme and the Sadr Courts should be abolished. The judges were to be appointed by the Crown, and to hold office during the pleasure of the sovereign; and, while at least one-third of their number were, in each case, to be barristers or members of the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland, one-third were to be filled from the judicial branch of the civil service, the remaining places being available for the appointment of native lawyers. The jurisdiction and powers of each court were to be fixed by its letters patent; and it was to be charged with the superintendence of all subordinate courts and with the framing of rules, subject to the sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, for the conduct of business. In pursuance of these provisions charters were issued in 1862, and reissued in 1865, to constitute the High Courts of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and in 1866 a similar charter created a High Court at Allahābād. In the case of Bengal1 the High Court is vested with ordinary original jurisdiction in respect of suits of every description (except small causes) within the Presidency town, and an appeal lies from a judge on the original, to a bench on the appellate, side. Its extraordinary original jurisdiction enables it to remove and try any suit on the file of a subordinate court, either with the consent of parties or to further the ends of justice. It is also constituted a court of appeal from all the lower civil courts; and it has, as regards the persons and estates of infants, idiots, and lunatics, the powers which were formerly vested in the Supreme Court. Further, it has jurisdiction as a court for the relief of insolvents; all the admiralty, ecclesiastical, testamentary, and intestate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and jurisdiction in matters matrimonial between Christian subjects of His Majesty. Finally, its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction is in respect of all persons within and without Bengal and not within the limits of the jurisdiction of any other court; it is vested with extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction over all persons residing in places formerly within the reach of the Sadr Court; and it is a supreme court of appeal, reference, and revision. The letters patent of the High Courts of Madras and Bombay are the same in all important respects as the Bengal charter; and the High Court at Allahābād is similarly constituted, save that, there being no Presidency town, provision is not made for the exercise of ordinary original jurisdiction except as regards criminal proceedings against European British subjects. Trial by jury is the rule in original criminal cases before the High Courts, but juries are never employed in civil suits in India.

The establishment of these tribunals was followed by the constitution in 1866 of a Chief Court for the Punjab, framed on the same model but deriving its authority from the Indian legislature, and composed of a chief judge and judges appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council; and in 1900 a similar court was established at Rangoon for Lower Burma. As in the case of the High Court at Allahābād, the Chief Court at Lahore does not exercise ordinary original jurisdiction save in respect of accused European British subjects; but the Burma Chief Court is constituted the principal civil and criminal court of original jurisdiction for Rangoon, which stands very much on the footing of a Presidency town. In each of the other Provinces, the place of a High Court or Chief Court is taken by one or more Judicial Commissioners1, who are appointed by the Government of India and exercise authority by virtue of various Indian enactments.

The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the constitution of inferior criminal courts, styled courts of session and courts of magistrates. Every Province—outside a Presidency town—is divided into sessions divisions, consisting of one or more Districts. For every sessions division the Local Government is bound to establish a court of session and to appoint a Sessions Judge, and provision is made for the further appointment, if need be, of Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges. Subject to the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions, these stationary sessions courts, which take the place of the assizes held by a Judge of the High Court on circuit in England, are competent to try all accused persons duly committed and to inflict any punishment authorized by law; but every sentence of death is subject to confirmation by the highest court of criminal appeal in the Province. Below them come the courts of magistrates, who are partly members of the Indian Civil Service and partly drawn from the locally recruited, and mainly native, Provincial services. Magistrates' courts are of three classes, those of the first having power to pass sentences of two years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000, those of the second sentences of six months' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, and those of the third sentences of one month's imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100. Their powers are also defined by territorial limits, and with reference to the various classes of crime, a schedule to the Code setting forth, in regard to each offence, the grade of magistrate competent to try it. Magistrates of the first class, or of a lower class if specially authorized, are also enabled to commit for trial by the court of session such offences as are not within their cognizance or for which they are incompetent to inflict adequate punishment. The Local Government may, in a non-regulation Province1, invest any magistrate of the first class with power to try, as such, any offence not punishable with death, and it may nominate special magistrates to dispose of particular cases or particular classes of cases in any area outside the Presidency towns. Provision is also made, and largely resorted to in the towns, for the appointment of honorary magistrates, for the formation of benches of magistrates, honorary or stipendiary, and for the appointment in the Presidency towns of Presidency magistrates to try minor offences and commit to the High Court persons charged with more heinous crime.

The Code further confers on the magistracy large powers, carefully defined and safeguarded, for the prevention of offences: as, for example, power to require security for good behaviour or for keeping the peace, power to deal with unlawful assemblies, and power to abate or remove public nuisances.

It is not always possible to empanel an efficient jury in the Mofussil; and trials before courts of session are, therefore, conducted with the aid either of assessors—who merely assist, but do not bind, the judge by their opinions—or of jurors, according to the general orders of the Local Government. And, where the agency of juries is used, the Code directs the Sessions Judge, if he considers that a jury has returned a manifestly wrong verdict, to submit the case to the High Court, which is empowered to set aside or modify the finding. An Indian jury consists of nine persons in trials before a High Court, and in other trials of such uneven number up to nine as may be prescribed by the Local Government; and the opinion of the majority is allowed to prevail. From a conviction by a second or third-class magistrate an appeal lies to the District Magistrate or to any specially empowered first-class magistrate; and, subject to certain limitations, original convictions by magistrates of the first class are appealable to the Sessions Judge, whose own original convictions are in turn appealable to the highest court in the Province. The latter court is empowered to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any subordinate court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, propriety, or regularity of any finding, sentence, or order. A finding of acquittal is ordinarily final, but may be appealed against under the special orders of the Local Government or revised by the chief court in the Province in the exercise of its discretionary powers above referred to. This procedure is not, however, adopted save in the case of some manifest failure of justice. The system of Indian law thus allows considerable latitude in the matter of appeal. The inferior social standing of the native judiciary of the lower grades; the imperfect legal training of all the judges in early days; the general want, so far as the Mofussil is concerned, of the wholesome restraint exercised by a strong bar; and the absence of public opinion and of an intelligent press—these are among the reasons which have rendered a free right of appeal and a wide power of review and revision necessary to prevent injustice. Finally, the prerogative of mercy is exercisable in India by both the Governor-General-in-Council and the particular Local Government concerned, without prejudice to the superior power of the Crown.

The constitution and jurisdiction of the inferior civil courts in each Province are determined by special Acts or Regulations. Under these the arrangements made differ in nomenclature and otherwise; but they are all similar in essential respects, and it will suffice to describe the system which prevails over the widest area, the reader being left to refer to the various enactments passed to regulate the matter elsewhere1. In the first place it may again be mentioned that civil suits are never tried by jury. Throughout Bengal, the Province of Agra, and Assam, there are three classes of courts, those of District Judges, Subordinate Judges, and Munsifs. Ordinarily, one District and Sessions Judge is appointed to each administrative District, and he presides, in the former capacity, in its principal civil court of original jurisdiction. His jurisdiction extends—subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which require every suit to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it—to all original suits, and he is vested with administrative control over, and the distribution of business among, all the other civil courts within the District. For these offices members of the Indian Civil Service, or, in accordance with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission of 1888, members of the Provincial Civil Service, alone are selected. Next to the District Judge come Subordinate Judges with coextensive original jurisdiction; while the lowest courts are presided over by Munsifs, whose jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to suits not exceeding Rs. 1,000 in value, a limit which may be extended to Rs. 2,000. Subordinate Judges and Munsifs are appointed from the Subordinate judicial service, recruitment for which is, in practice, left in the hands of the High Court. The persons selected are, as a rule, natives of India, and are frequently members of the native bar. In the less advanced Provinces, however, there is often no such separate service, the local civil courts being presided over by officers of the ordinary administrative staff, from Commissioners down to tahsīldārs. Besides the civil courts described above, there are in the Mofussil a number of special Courts of Small Causes with jurisdiction to try, in a summary manner and subject to a limited right of appeal, simple money-suits not exceeding Rs. 500 in value, a limit which may be raised to Rs. 1,000 in particular cases; and where such special courts have not been constituted, the Local Government may confer upon selected Subordinate Judges and Munsifs jurisdiction to try, as ‘small causes,’ suits up to such value, not exceeding Rs. 500 in the case of a Subordinate Judge or Rs. 100 in the case of a Munsif, as it thinks fit. Finally, for the trial of petty cases at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, where the chartered High Courts have original jurisdiction within the Presidency towns, Small Cause Courts have since 1850 taken the place of the old Courts of Requests, and are invested with jurisdiction to dispose of money-suits when the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 2,000, and suits of even higher value where the parties consent. At Madras the experiment has been tried of still further relieving the High Court by the constitution, under the Madras City Civil Court Act, 1892, of a City Civil Court with jurisdiction to try, exceptis excipiendis, all suits not exceeding Rs. 2,500 in value. In the Southern Presidency, and also in the United Provinces, the leading residents of villages may be appointed to sit, singly as Munsifs or together on benches, and under a similar procedure to dispose of petty claims valued at not more than Rs. 20, or with the consent of parties, Rs. 200. As insolvency courts the chartered High Courts at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay have jurisdiction in the Presidency towns under an Act of Parliament of 1848; but in the Mofussil there is no special bankruptcy law, although the ordinary civil courts can, under the Code of Civil Procedure, provide a certain amount of relief for insolvent debtors1. As regards appeals, there is much the same latitude, and for the same reasons, as in connexion with criminal cases. Outside Small Cause Court jurisdiction, an appeal lies from every decision of a Munsif to the District Judge, but the latter is enabled to transfer such appeals to Subordinate Judges for disposal. Similarly, every decree or order made by a Subordinate Judge is appealable to the District Judge, unless the value of the original suit exceeded Rs. 1,000, in which case the appeal lies to the High Court. The decisions of a District Judge are liable to be taken on appeal to the High Court, and second or special appeals to the High Court are allowed in certain cases.

The legal abilities of the natives of India have long been recognized, and in the agency provided for the administration of justice the native element largely predominates. The civil courts of grades below that of the District Judge are, as a rule, presided over entirely by natives, and the same may be said of all but the principal magisterial courts. Eight natives of India now (1906) occupy seats on the benches of the chartered High Courts, and two are judges of the Punjab Chief Court. The most exalted judicial offices are, therefore, open to them; and the names of Dwārkā Nāth Mitter in Bengal, Muttuswāmi Ayyar in Madras, and Ranade in Bombay need only be mentioned to prove that they have filled them with distinction.

The Crown has by prerogative an inherent general power, controlled and regulated by Acts of Parliament, Orders in Council, and local rules, to hear appeals from its subjects beyond the seas; and that power is now exercised through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council under a statute of 1833. To the Judicial Committee the sovereign may refer any matter whatsoever for advice; but, apart from this, the conditions of appeal from India are regulated by the charters of the High Courts, supplemented as to civil cases by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In civil matters an appeal at present lies (a) from a final decree passed on appeal by a High Court or other court of final appellate jurisdiction; (b) from a final decree passed by a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; and (c) from any other decree, if the case is certified by the High Court to be fit for appeal to the Privy Council. In the first two cases the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance must be Rs. 10,000 or upwards, as must also be the value of the matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council, or the decree must involve some claim to, or question respecting, property of the like value; and, when the decree appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below, the appeal must also involve some substantial question of law. In criminal cases a right of appeal is given—subject to the opinion of the High Court that the case is a fit one for appeal—from any judgement, order, or sentence of a High Court made in the exercise of original jurisdiction, or in any criminal case where a point of law has been reserved for the opinion of the High Court. The provisions of the law of British India do not, however, restrict His Majesty's prerogative right to give special leave to appeal.

The Procedure Codes leave it to each Local Government to decide what shall be the language of the subordinate courts, and in that language all the proceedings are conducted, unless the parties concerned agree to another arrangement. In this way Hindī and Bengali, as the case may be, are the vernaculars used in the courts of Bengal, Urdū is the court-language of the Punjab, and so on. The records of the proceedings and the judgements delivered may, however, be written in English or (in the case of judgements) in the mother-tongue of the presiding officer, instead of in the language of the court. In the chartered High Courts the language always employed is English, the use of which is, except in so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, becoming more and more frequent in the lower courts.

Side by side with the civil courts are revenue courts, presided over by officers charged with the duty of settling and collecting the land revenue. The interference of the civil with the revenue courts involves a question which has long been a vexed one in India. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court had, it will be remembered, to be restrained by statute in 1781; but the Company's courts showed themselves not a whit less anxious to intervene. Taking the side of the executive, Lord Cornwallis began in 1787 by making the Collectors of revenue also Zila Judges, transferring all revenue cases to them in their dual capacity, and allowing an appeal only to the Board of Revenue and the Governor-General-in-Council. But the experience of six years caused him to execute a complete volte-face, and he ended by adopting the principle that the Government should ‘divest itself of the power of infringing, in its executive capacity, the rights and privileges which, as exercising the legislative authority, it had conferred on the landholders.’ Collectors of revenue were, therefore, not only deprived of the power of adjudicating on the legality of their own acts, but rendered amenable to the ordinary courts. The pendulum has swung backwards and forwards several times since then, and to the present day the rival claims of the two classes of courts remain unsettled; but, on the whole, it may be said that, so far as the assessment and collection of land revenue is concerned, and in purely fiscal matters, the civil courts are now generally excluded from interfering. On the other hand, all questions of title to land have been brought within the cognizance of the civil courts; rent suits, which were long triable by revenue officers alone, are in some parts of India, notably in Bengal, now relegated for disposal to the ordinary courts; and, where such suits are still dealt with by revenue officers, their procedure is assimilated to that of the civil courts, and recourse may be had to the latter on questions of title.

Another controversial matter is the union of executive with judicial functions. The unit of British Indian administration is the District, and the chief executive officer in each is the Collector-Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner. In his executive capacity this official is charged with the collection of the various branches of the revenue, and with a variety of other administrative functions which have been described in chapter ii of this volume. At the same time, he is the chief local magistrate, and is, as such, vested with extensive judicial authority. He is himself a magistrate of the first class, and can undertake such criminal work, original and appellate, as he chooses. He has the widest powers conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code for the prevention of crime, the suppression of disturbance, and the abatement of nuisances. He is competent to transfer cases for trial from one magistrate to another, or to himself. He can call for the records of any proceedings, and submit the case to the High Court for revision. He is empowered to order the commitment for trial of any accused person who has, in his opinion, been improperly discharged. Moreover, other magistrates of the first class are almost invariably also Assistant or Deputy Collectors, so that, although not subject to his appellate jurisdiction qua judicial officers, they are, in their executive capacity, his immediate subordinates. His own decisions are, however, appealable to the Sessions Judge, and he is himself subject to the superintendence and control of the High Court, while, as a matter of fact, he has but little time to devote to criminal cases, and seldom, if ever, interferes with them. But to the Western mind the arrangement may seem anomalous; and it has been urged, not only that the Collector's judicial authority should be taken away, but that, in the subordinate ranks also, executive and judicial functions should be dissociated and assigned to different officers. On the other hand, the union is one to which the people of India are well accustomed, for it has existed from time immemorial in the East, and separation is the rule only of the most advanced Western communities. The matter has often been under consideration, and the question whether, or how far, the suggested separation is practicable is once more engaging the attention of the Government of India.

The exclusive jurisdiction over Europeans long asserted by the Crown Courts, and the complete independence of all other tribunals at first claimed for them, have now almost entirely disappeared. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, a European British subject, as there defined1, may be tried—save for contempt in open court—only before a judge or magistrate who is a justice of the peace1; and, when tried before a District Magistrate, a Sessions Judge, or a High Court, he can claim the right of a trial by jury, of which not less than one-half must be Europeans or Americans. Moreover, when a European British subject is dealt with under the special provisions of the European Vagrancy Act, 1874, he cannot be required to give security for good behaviour under the ordinary law; but on being declared a vagrant or found guilty of certain offences under that Act, he becomes subject to the provisions of the code applicable to a European who is not a British subject. Finally, a right of the nature of habeas corpus is secured to European British subjects in any part of British India, whereas similar protection is afforded to natives only within the Presidency towns. Otherwise Europeans and natives in British India are subject to the same civil and criminal jurisdiction; but the courts in the Native States are not allowed to try the former, who must be taken before British tribunals established locally in the exercise of foreign jurisdiction, or before courts of competent jurisdiction in British India.

The appointment of coroners for the holding of inquests with the aid of juries on the bodies of persons coming to an untimely end was first provided for by the East India Company Act, 1793, the judges of the Supreme Courts being charged with the performance of these functions. Now coroners are appointed for the Presidency towns of Calcutta and Bombay only, and in the rest of British India their duties are undertaken by the ordinary staff of magistrates and police officers, unaided by jurors.

The various classes of legal practitioners in India are advocates, Vakīls, and attorneys (solicitors) of High Courts, and pleaders, Mukhtārs, and revenue-agents. Advocates are admitted by each High Court to practise in it and its subordinate courts, and they alone are allowed to appear on the original side of the chartered High Courts. The majority of them are Europeans; but native barristers are becoming more and more numerous. Vakīls are persons qualified as Bachelors of Law of an Indian University, who are admitted, after having served articles of clerkship and otherwise proved their fitness, to practise on the appellate side of a chartered High Court. They are, with but few exceptions, natives. Attorneys are required to qualify before admission to practise in much the same way as solicitors in England, and their ranks are filled by both Europeans and natives. But the rule that a solicitor must instruct counsel prevails only in practice on the original side of a chartered High Court, and consequently few attorneys are to be found anywhere except in the Presidency towns. Pleaders and Mukhtārs are admitted to practise in subordinate courts in accordance with rules framed by the various High Courts, while the appearance of revenue-agents and others before revenue courts is similarly superintended by the chief controlling revenue authority in each Province. Pleaders are of a higher grade than Mukhtārs, whose practice is confined to the lowest civil and criminal courts, and to the revenue courts; and in the Regulation Provinces the Subordinate judicial services are in the main recruited from the former body. The Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, provides for the suspension and dismissal of legal practitioners for unprofessional conduct, for their supervision generally, and for the suppression of touting.

With the object of diminishing the multitude and expense of the published Law Reports and of improving their quality, the Government of India has undertaken the publication of authorized reports of important cases decided by the chartered High Courts; and the legislature has dealt with the matter by enacting in the Indian Law Reports Act, 1875, that no court shall be bound to hear cited, or shall receive or treat as an authority binding upon it, any but the authorized report of such a case, if decided after the commencement of that Act. Accordingly the Indian Law Reports, so entitled, are prepared by official reporters in four different series, one for each of the High Courts, under the supervision of local councils of lawreporting, on which both the bench and the bar are represented. They contain cases selected from among those decided by the chartered High Courts, as well as cases decided by the Privy Council on appeal. But the provision made by the Act is, on the face of it, incomplete; for, as has been shown, many of the Provinces are without chartered High Courts, and the inferior courts of one Province are not bound by the decisions of even the highest court of another. The system has, therefore, been supplemented by the publication, more or less under official guidance or recognition, of other reports, such as those to be found in the Punjab Record. An alphabetical digest of reported cases decided by the chartered High Courts and the Privy Council has also been compiled under the orders of Government.

Law Officers

The Legislative Department of the Government of India corresponds with the office of the Parliamentary Counsel in England, and is in charge of the Law Member of Council. All Government measures introduced in the supreme legislature are drafted by its officers, and the Secretary is also the Secretary to the Council and attends the meetings both of the Council and of select committees. The Department is responsible for the publication of Acts, for the drafting of statutory rules and orders, and for the settling of Regulations under the statute of 1870, and it is further required to assist the other departments with legal advice in regard to certain specified questions of a non-litigious nature. The Bengal and Burma Legislative Councils have official draftsmen of their own, but the other local legislatures still depend for the drafting of their measures on their ordinary legal advisers.

The principal law officer of the Government of India is the Advocate-General of Bengal, who is appointed by the Crown under sec. 29 of the Government of India Act, 1858, and whose functions, besides those of advising the Government and conducting its litigation, are referred to in sec. 111 of the East India Company Act, 1813, the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, and certain other enactments. The Advocate-General is the leader of the local bar, and is always nominated a member of the Provincial Legislative Council. At Calcutta he is assisted by the Standing Counsel and has also at his disposal the services of the Government Solicitor there. The Governments of Madras and Bombay have each an Advocate-General similarly appointed, as also a Government Solicitor; and the Bombay Government is further provided with the services of a Legal Remembrancer and an Assistant Legal Remembrancer, who are ordinarily members of the judicial branch of the Indian Civil Service. The Government of Bengal consults the Bengal Advocate-General, the Standing Counsel, and the Government Solicitor, and has besides a Legal Remembrancer and a Deputy Legal Remembrancer, the former a civil servant and the latter a practising barrister; the United Provinces are furnished with a civilian Legal Remembrancer and professional lawyers as Government Advocate and Assistant Government Advocate; the Punjab has a Legal Remembrancer, a Government Advocate, and a Junior Government Advocate; and Burma a Government Advocate, besides a Secretary to the local Legislative Council. The minor administrations are less fully equipped; but legal advice can be obtained by them through the Government of India, and throughout the Mofussil native Government Pleaders are appointed at the head-quarters of Districts to assist the local executive officers and appear for them before the courts.

There remain to be noticed the three Sheriffs, who are attached to the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, on their original sides, and are charged with the execution of process, the custody of jurors, and so forth. Each Sheriff is appointed from year to year by the Government on the nomination of the court. He is in practice always a non-official of influence and standing.

Statistics

The following figures will serve to indicate the prevalence of litigation and crime in British India, and the extent to which the courts have been resorted to during the twenty years ending with 1901 :—

TBL-016 · FOLIO 196Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
1881.1891.1901.
Total population . . .198,860,606221,172,952231,901,127
Total suits instituted . .1,431,4861,858,6462,228,556
Suits instituted for money or movables . . .1,035,3911,144,7691,213,063
Rent suits . . .229,870537,365746,093
Title and other suits . .127,384170,511263,985
Miscellaneous . . .38,8416,0015,415
Persons tried . . .1,099,0441,612,8191,636,909
„ convicted . .678,142767,733863,309
Total offences committed .716,2411,082,7951,121,531
Offences against person or property . . .490,398512,318455,772
Offences against other provisions of the Indian Penal Code . . . .63,00691,20795,513
Offences against special or local laws . . . .162,837*479,270*570,246
Sentences of death . .474427500
Sentences of transportation .1,3191,8721,690
Sentences of imprisonment .147,606167,845160,204
Sentences of whipping †. .22,60919,55625,941
Sentences of fine . . .483,541570,827628,065

Bibliography

Peter Auber.—Analysis of the Constitution of the East India Company (1826).

Extracts from Harington’s Analysis of the Bengal Regulations (Calcutta, 1866).

W. H. Morley.—Digest of Reported Cases decided in the Supreme Courts of Judicature in India, in the Courts of the Honourable East India Company, and on Appeal from India by Her Majesty in Council (1849, 1852).

H. Cowell.—History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authorities in India (Tagore Law Lectures; Calcutta, 1884).

J. D. Mayne.—Hindu Law and Usage (Madras, 1900).

Sir H. S. Maine.—Ancient Law (1891); Early History of Institutions (1890); Early Law and Custom (1891); Village Communities in the East and West (1890).

H. T. Colebrooke.—Digest of Hindu Law on Contracts and Successions (Madras, 1874).

Whitley Stokes.—Anglo-Indian Codes, vols. i and ii and Supplement (Oxford, 1887).

R. C. Dutt.—History of Civilization in Ancient India (Calcutta, 1899).

Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.—History of India, edited by Professor Cowell (1889).

Sir C. P. Ilbert.—Government of India (Oxford, 1898).

A. V. Dicey.—Law of the Constitution (1885).

James Bryce.—Studies in History and Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1901).

Notes

  1. 1. See the Bengal State Offences Regulation, 1804; the Madras State Offences Regulation, 1808; the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818; the Madras State Prisoners Regulation, 1819; Bombay Regulation XXV of 1827; the State Offences Act, 1857; and the State Prisoners Act, 1858.
  2. 1. Under the existing statutory rules not more than six of the nominated Additional Members may be officials.
  3. 1. See sec. 46 of the Government of India Act, 1833.
  4. 1. For a judicial interpretation of these words, see the case of Ameer Khan (1870), 6 B. L. R., at pp. 450–2.
  5. 2. See the following Acts of Parliament: the Indian Councils Act, 1869, sec. 1; the Government of India Act, 1865, sec. 1; the Indian Councils Act, 1861, sec. 22; the Government of India Act, 1833, sec. 73; and the Indian Marine Service Act, 1884, sec. 2.
  6. 3. If the Governor-General is unavoidably absent the senior Ordinary Member of Council presides.
  7. 4. The president may vote on every division and has a casting vote when the Council is evenly divided.
  8. 1. These are the maximum and minimum numbers fixed by the statute for Madras and Bombay. As regards the other Provinces, the statute fixes a maximum of twenty for Bengal and fifteen for the United Provinces, but otherwise leaves the numbers to be determined by the Governor-General.
  9. 2. The right to discuss the provincial budget and to put questions on matters outside the business on hand has not yet been entrusted to the recently constituted Councils of the Punjab and Burma.
  10. 1. A supplementary volume containing the Acts up to the end of 1903 was issued in 1904.
  11. 1. The Codes now in force are those of 1882 and 1898 respectively.
  12. 1. 'I do not believe,' said Sir J. Stephen, one of the most distinguished of the Law Members of Council who have held office in India, 'that any English lawyer or judge has anything like so accurate and comprehensive and distinct a knowledge of the criminal law of England as average Indian civilians have of the Penal Code.'—History of the Criminal Law, vol. iii, p. 322.
  13. 1. Assam was originally part of Bengal, and it remains within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Fort William at Calcutta.
  14. 1. In Sind the Judicial Commissioner is designated Judge of the Sadr Court.
  15. 1. As to Regulation and Non-regulation Provinces, see chaps. i and ii of this volume.
  16. 1. The principal enactments referred to are the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869; the Ajmer Courts Regulation, 1877; the Punjab Courts Act, 1884; the Coorg Courts Regulation, 1885; the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1885; the Upper Burma Civil Justice Regulation, 1886; the Bengal, North-Western Provinces, and Assam Civil Courts Acts, 1887; the Madras Village Courts Act, 1888; the British Baluchistan Civil Justice Regulation, 1890; the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Village Courts Act, 1892; the Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900; the North-West Frontier Province Law and Justice Regulation, 1901; and the Central Provinces Civil Courts Act, 1904.
  17. 1. An Insolvency Bill is at present (1906) before the Governor-General’s Legislative Council.
  18. 1. The definition includes colonial subjects of His Majesty of whatever race, and children and grandchildren by legitimate descent.
  19. 1. European British subjects alone may be appointed to be justices of the peace outside the Presidency towns; but certain high officials, as well as Sessions Judges and District Magistrates, are ex-officio justices. Nowadays they have, as justices, no judicial functions to perform, and their existence is of little practical importance save in respect of accused European British subjects.
  20. *. The increase under this head as compared with 1881 is mainly due to greater vigilance in applying sanitary regulations in municipalities, and to the enforcement of fiscal or quasi-fiscal laws, such as the Salt, Excise, and Forest Acts.
  21. †. This penalty is authorized, in the case of males, for theft and certain other offences.