The history of the army of India falls naturally into three periods. To the first belongs the history of the military forces of India under the East India Company ; to the second the armies of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Presidencies under the Crown ; while the history of the third period is concerned with the unified Indian army.
I. The Presidency Armies under the Company
The Indian army sprang from very small beginnings. Guards were enrolled for the protection of the factories or trading posts which were established by the East India Company at Surat, Masulipatam, Armagon, Madras, Hooghly, and Balasore in the first half of the seventeenth century. These guards were at first intended to add to the dignity of the chief officials as much as for a defensive purpose, and were not really soldiers, but as time went on their military character became slightly more marked. The original ‘ensign and thirty men’ of Bengal received a reinforcement in the shape of ‘the gunner and his crew’; the small force sent out, in 1662, to hold the island of Bombay for Charles II became the nucleus of the military forces of Bombay ; and the ‘peons’ of the Madras factories were formed into bodies which had some sort of military organization. But the origin of the regular native army of India may be more accurately traced to the enrolment of sepoys, in Madras, in 1748, under Major Stringer Lawrence, ‘father of the Indian army.’ War had broken out in 1744 between Great Britain and France, and the capture of Madras by the latter power in 1746 obliged the Company to commence the formation of a military establishment. It is, indeed, hardly too much to say that we owe our native army to France. In 1676 François Martin, Governor of Pondicherry, obtained 300 native soldiers to supplement his scanty force of Europeans ; but it was not till 1740 that his successor, Dumas, formed a military force consisting of a body of European infantry and 4,000 to 5,000 Muhammadans armed in the European fashion. The brilliant Swiss officer, Paradis, was one of the first to make the fullest use of this instrument of war; and his successes led Robert Clive to follow the example of the French, and to give to the native soldiery a discipline they had never before experienced.
The military forces of each British Presidency were at first necessarily separate and distinct. Communication by sea or land was long and tedious; and although in early days the Bengal establishment was subordinate to that of Madras, it was soon placed on an independent footing. The geographical situation of the first settlements thus gave rise to local or Presidency armies which were practically independent of each other. The gradual growth of those forces up to the reorganization of 1796 was very similar in character. The nucleus of the white portion of the army in India may be found in detachments of soldiers sent out from England, supplemented by European mercenaries, deserters, and prisoners of war from other foreign settlements, and sailors from the Company's ships. Small bodies of European cavalry were raised; the infantry were formed into companies and battalions; while artillerymen were sent from home and recruited locally, some companies of Royal Artillery being transferred bodily to the service of the Company. The 'European Infantry' of Bombay eventually became the 1st Bombay European regiment (Fusiliers); in Madras (1748) the European companies were formed into a battalion, ultimately to be the 1st Madras European regiment (Fusiliers); while in Bengal the companies were similarly regimented and became the 1st Bengal European regiment (Fusiliers). Swiss companies, 'French Rangers,' formed from the Irish and other regiments of Lally's force after the capture of Pondicherry, and, later, Hanoverians, supplemented the ordinary 'European infantry.' Gradually Royal regiments were sent out to India, the 39th Foot being the first to arrive in 1754: four years later many of the officers and men were received as volunteers into the Company's army, and several King's regiments were transferred to that service.
Before the battle of Plassey (1757) Clive had set to work to improve the native troops. The peons and watchmen, armed and equipped in the native style with swords and targets, bows and arrows, lances and matchlocks, had disappeared. India was swarming with military adventurers, and Rohillas and Rājputs were found ready to enlist in the British service. This material was shaped by Clive into a battalion of sepoys, drilled, disciplined, and clothed on a European model; his first successes soon caused its augmentation; and immediately after Plassey a second battalion was raised. In Madras six battalions were organized in 1759; while in Bombay the congeries of Arabs, Abyssinians, Indian Muhammadans, and Hindus, constituted as an auxiliary to the European battalions, were formed into independent native companies in 1760, and into battalions in 1767. From independent companies commanded by native captains, to battalions with native commandants, supervised by one or two British officers, the organization was successively developed into one with European commandants of battalions and a subaltern to each company.
The forty years following the battle of Plassey witnessed the extension of the Company’s rule in every direction. The enunciation of a policy opposed to the aggrandizement of territory, remonstrances from home, and even the desire of the Company’s agents in India to refrain from territorial extension were of no avail against the conditions of the country and the circumstances of the time. India was a vast camp. The viceroys of the Mughal emperor and their lieutenants, the independent princes and their feudatories, were all scrambling for power. The military strength of the Marāthās asserted itself in every direction, while the European settlers—at first, and for many years, peaceful traders anxious only to amass wealth, and existing by the sufferance of the Native powers—became formidable factors in the universal struggle for dominion, employing their officers or soldiers on this or that side according to the degree of advantage which seemed likely to accrue to them. A conflict for supremacy between these representatives of European power was inevitable, and gradually the strength of the French and Dutch waned and disappeared before the forces of the English East India Company. The constant campaigns and expeditions in which these forces were engaged naturally led to repeated augmentations, changes, and reorganizations. During this period serious mutinies took place. In 1764 the Bengal sepoys mutinied for higher pay and gratuities, and were only put down by the firmness of Sir Hector Munro. Two years later the European officers conspired because their batta had been withdrawn in cantonments, but were defeated by the resolution of Clive. But even admitting the want of discipline thus shown, nothing is more remarkable than the achievements of our troops in the vast territory which formed the theatre of war, if we consider the material of which they were composed, the great distances, often in unknown territory, they had to traverse, and the frequent failure of supplies and equipments.
Two years after the battle of Plassey the Dutch were overpowered at Chinsura, and later the Nawāb of Oudh was defeated at the battle of Buxar (1764). Soon afterwards the Madras Government joined the Nizām and the Marāthās against Haidar Alī, and a new coalition of the latter with the Nizām was overcome. Then came the Rohilla War of 1773, the wars with the Marāthās in which the Bombay troops were engaged, and during which the wonderful march of General Goddard from the banks of the Jumna to the western coast took place, and the escalade and capture of Gwalior by Popham and Bruce. In 1779 a confederacy of nearly all the chief princes of India to destroy the growing power of the Company was only frustrated by the genius of Warren Hastings, the prowess of the Company's troops, and their good fortune in war. The conflict with the French in Southern India and the brunt of the Mysore campaigns against Tipū fell upon the Madras army, but both Bengal and Bombay troops were engaged. The capture of Pondicherry in 1793 was a final blow to the French power in Southern India ; and the advance of the Company's rule along the valley of the Ganges as far as Allahābād, the undertaking of the defence of Oudh and the garrisoning of Cawnpore and Fatehgarh, the conquest of Gujarāt, and the acquisition of territory as the fruits of the Mysore Wars formed a series of operations which carried with them the constant development of the army. The native troops were formed into brigades with proper staffs, the artillery was increased and the power of field guns recognized, Presidency Commanders-in-Chief were appointed, and the military administration was improved in many ways. The chief reorganization of the army took place in 1796 ; but before entering into the details of this change, it is desirable to consider the character of the native forces of the Company during this first period of their formation, and of the adversaries whom they were called upon to meet.
It is not easy to state with exactitude how the Company's armies were then recruited. We know that the times were turbulent, that fighting was a trade followed by thousands, and that violence and the 'art of cutting throats' were practised at every native court in the country. Many of these roving adventurous spirits naturally found their way to the South, and there is evidence to show that, attracted by good and regular pay and by the magnetic influence of military success, they readily enlisted in the Company's forces. The French had recruited their battalions chiefly from the people of Southern India. We apparently took men farther afield, and Pathāns, Rohillas, Rājputs, Arabs, and Abyssinians were enfolded in the recruiting net. And though the Madras and Bombay battalions contained a considerable share of the inhabitants of the South, it must be remembered that in those days fighting was more or less continuous, and that years of peace had not enervated the martial qualities of men who may now be reckoned as belonging to the non-warlike Indian races. In Bengal, besides the mixed classes of adventurers who ranged themselves under our standards, we gradually drew Hindustānis from Oudh, and from 1776 onward the native army in Bengal was almost entirely recruited from the tract of country between the Ganges and the Gogra, the men being described as mostly Brāhmans and Rājputs, and as 'a brave, manly race of people.' It is not necessary to suppose that the discipline was exact or the training perfect, but both were infinitely superior to anything of the kind possessed by their opponents. The power of marching and manoeuvring in solid formations and of concentrating fire, and the use of well-served guns, enabled small bodies of the Company's soldiers to overcome the loosely arrayed hordes of their adversaries.
Allowing for the exaggeration of Oriental historians—a fault not entirely confined to the East—in estimating the numbers of a defeated enemy, it is certain that the native armies of those days were of huge dimensions, dragging in their train ten times the number of the fighting men in the shape of followers, and constituting a series of moving bazars. As a rule these armies had no cohesion. They were merely great bands of men following the standards of their chiefs. In the Mughal armies, for example, the emperor was supposed to have at his disposal fifteen or sixteen Rājās, each of whom could bring 25,000 horsemen into the field. Of these only a fraction was maintained on what we should call the 'establishment,' and the rest were called up when an emergency occurred. Thousands of free-lances were employed, and roving adventurers were ready to bid for any service which offered some pay and more plunder. Ponderous guns were dragged by oxen, and the lighter artillery by horses, but the service of the guns was slow and inefficient. Corruption and disloyalty, intrigue and indulgence, were rampant in such forces. The chiefs were often playing their own game, while the masses were mutinous or, if not openly disloyal, were only waiting till the happy hour arrived when their course of plunder and rapine could be pursued unchecked. There was no training, no discipline, no watchful commander to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat or to retrieve desperate fortunes by a dogged resistance and firm retreat. When the supreme moment came and the opposing forces entered into the fight, the death or flight of the commander wouldalyse the action of the army even in the height of victory, and the safety of the zanāna would be more considered than that of the army. Courage was displayed by individuals and by masses, but panics would occur on the slightest provocation. It can be readily seen what great odds there were in favour of the attack, on such loosely bound masses, of disciplined bodies led by European officers, after well-sustained and, for those times, well-aimed musketry fire, preceded by and accompanied with comparatively rapid and efficient fire from field and heavy guns. As time went on the native princes endeavoured to imitate our system of training; but the best characteristics were wanting, while the want of equipment and material and the slackness of discipline operated against the attempt. Led by really good soldiers in their own way, these enormous bodies of horsemen and foot-soldiers were foemen who might succeed by sheer numbers; but directly they half-copied their adversaries they became easier to overcome, because they had neither the training, the European officers, the equipment, nor the tactical skill to cope with the smaller forces of the British, animated by a common spirit and commanded by resolute men. After the French forces in the field had been disposed of, there were, for many years, French officers to train and direct native operations against us. Sometimes they would even be employed on opposite sides by the native princes, as when Raymond was with the Nizām and Perron with Sindhia. But these officers were not sufficiently numerous, nor had they the advantages of the British officers in continuous employment, in material and in power, while their troops, mercenaries like our own, were not regularly paid. Sindhia's army, which had been trained by De Boigne, was perhaps an exception to this rule, and might have become a formidable power had Mahādji Sindhia lived longer.
The Marāthās did not generally favour the regularization of their troops. They had their own military system, which was one of great mobility based on secure fortresses in their own mountainous country. Constant war had turned a race of husbandmen inhabiting a hilly region into predatory soldiers. Hardy and active, small in stature but wiry, they were formed by Sivajī into corps of light horse and footmen, the former mounted on the tough and enduring ponies of the Deccan, who subsequently ravaged nearly every part of India. Subsisting on the country, these corps were joined by the free-lances who abounded in India at the time, and their common object was plunder. They were accustomed to frugal fare and could endure every kind of hardship and privation. To lay waste the country in which they were operating, to cut off supplies, and to attack their enemy's forces in detail formed the basis of the Marāthā system of warfare. But the genius of Sivajī was far from limiting itself to these predatory efforts. He established a series of fortresses in Mahārāshtra whose garrisons were organized with minute care into combatant, commissariat, and intelligence departments; supplies and ammunition were collected, and a complete system of watch and ward was maintained. Great mobility, combined with security of base, enabled the Marāthās to acquire power over a large part of India, and to create almost a national spirit among a people of one race and religion. But the Marāthās were not soldiers by reason of inherited qualities. The times produced their armies, and the genius of a great captain fostered them; but when they were finally overthrown the Marāthā spearmen passed back into the ranks of the husbandmen from which they had emerged, and it is now no easy task to draw from this race even the limited number of soldiers that we require.
Another military power arose in the far North to trouble the Muhammadan rulers of India, and eventually the British. Founded as a religious community, towards the end of the fifteenth century, by Nānak, the first Guru; based on monotheistic worship, absence of forms, ceremonies, and castes, and the equal acceptance of good Hindus and Muhammadans by God, Sikhism was at first a blending and union of the best in the two opposing creeds. But in the course of a century the persecution of the Muhammadans converted this peaceful sect into a military and religious commonwealth of magnificent fighting men, engaged in a policy of plunder and rebellion against the Mughals, the strictest followers of the now warlike creed being called Singhs, or 'lions,' and the body receiving the itle of the Khālsa, the ‘pure’ or ‘elect.’ The Khālsa army eventually became a most formidable instrument of war, and only terminated its splendid career after fighting six pitched battles with the British. The admirable qualities of the soldiers of this army were innate. In the early days of their history the Sikh horsemen were renowned, but, in the course of time, the Sikh matchlock-men replaced them to some extent and became equally known for their stanchness and firepower. Ventura and Allard, Court and Avitabile, did something towards the training of the troops, but the material and the martial ability were there already. In 1809–10 Ranjīt Singh began to form regular infantry of Sikhs, Hindustānis, and Gurkhas. Every battalion had its commandant and adjutant, and was about 700 strong. The administrative government was by means of committees or panchāyats, and the army was divided into divisions and brigades. In 1844 the Khālsa army consisted of from 40,000 to 50,000 regulars, with a large force of irregulars and a number of light and heavy guns. At Gujrāt (1849), ‘the battle of the guns,’ the Sikh power was finally overthrown and the glorious history of the Khālsa army closed. Many of the soldiers gave up the pursuit of arms to follow the plough again, while numbers took service with us; and they and their descendants have proved to be the finest and most loyal soldiers of the native army, second to none in the whole empire for constancy, fidelity, and military prowess.
The year 1796 marked the first general reorganization of the native armies. The European troops, including the white soldiers of the Company, were then about 13,000 strong; the native troops about 57,000, of whom the Madras and Bengal armies had 24,000 each, and Bombay 9,000. The army in Bengal was now organized as follows :—
European artillery, 3 battalions of 5 companies each. „ infantry, 3 regiments of 10 companies each. Regular native cavalry (replacing two irregular cavalry regiments), 4 regiments of 6 troops each. Native infantry, 12 regiments of 2 battalions each.
Each native cavalry regiment consisted of 1 field officer in command, 15 officers, including the regimental staff, 4 European non-commissioned officers, 12 native officers, 39 native non-commissioned officers, and 426 troopers. A major-general was appointed to command the cavalry brigade, and the cavalry officers were separated from the infantry and placed on a general cavalry list.
The native infantry regiments were formed by linking existing battalions and amalgamating half-battalions of reduced regiments with these. Thus the new 12th regiment consisted of two battalions, the first comprising the old 12th battalion and the right wing of the 21st, the second the old 17th battalion and the left wing of the 21st. The conversion was haphazard and, in the instance given, resulted in the oldest battalion of the Bengal army, raised by Clive, becoming the second battalion of the junior regiment on the list. The establishment of each regiment of two battalions was 1 colonel commandant, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 22 lieutenants, 10 ensigns, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 40 native officers, 200 non-commissioned native officers, 40 drummers and fifers, 1,600 sepoys, and the usual regimental staff. Each battalion had 2 grenadier and 8 battalion companies. In the organization which had previously existed there was a commandant and adjutant to each battalion, and a subaltern to each of the ten companies. Up to this time, also, the officers had been on a general list for promotion, and the proportion of senior to junior ranks was so low that advancement was slow. Under the new arrangement the officers up to the rank of major were on regimental lists for promotion, the lieutenant-colonels and colonels being placed on separate lists for each Presidency, and an establishment of general officers was instituted. Furlough regulations were introduced, and improvements were made in the interior economy of regiments.
In the Madras and Bombay armies changes were made similar to those effected in Bengal. The Madras army was reorganized as follows. The cavalry into 4 regiments, of 6 troops each, with 12 officers and 474 natives of all ranks. The artillery into 2 battalions of 5 companies each, with 15 companies of lascars. The native infantry into 11 regiments of 2 battalions each, and 8 companies to each battalion. Each regiment had a colonel, and each battalion 22 European officers, 20 native officers, 50 non-commissioned officers, and 900 privates. A few corps were maintained as extra to the establishment. There were, in addition, 2 battalions of European infantry of 10 companies each. In the Bombay army 12 battalions of native infantry were formed into 4 regiments of 2 battalions each, with establishments similar to those in Madras, but very shortly a fifth and a sixth regiment were raised. A marine battalion was extra, and in 1798 the European artillery was organized in 6 companies, with lascars.
This reorganization was not of a masterly kind. The battalion commanders were not invested with sufficient authority, even the promotion of non-commissioned officers, the approval of recruits, and the granting of leave resting with the colonels of regiments. Proposals of a far more drastic character had been framed by Lord Cornwallis, but had to be modified in view of the discontent they evoked among the Company's officers.
The next sixty years saw immense changes in India, which were reflected in the army. In 1798 Lord Wellesley became Governor-General, and to his administration must be traced the final predominance of British power. French influence was extinguished at Hyderābād, the Mysore campaign resulted in the defeat and death of Tipū, the Carnatic became a British province, and British influence was established at the capital of the Peshwā. The campaigns of General Wellesley and Lord Lake against Sindhia and Holkar not only broke the strength of the Marāthās, but dealt a heavy blow at French influence, which had maintained itself in hostile activity in Hindustān after being driven out of the South. Under Lord Hastings, the Nepāl War gave us the Gurkha soldier. Then came the crushing of the Pindārīs, the first Burmese and Afghān Wars, the campaigns againt Sind and Gwalior, the two Punjab campaigns, and the second Burmese War. During this period vast territories had been annexed, the larger part of India had become subject to the Company, and the great Native States were influenced and controlled by its agents. These events necessarily resulted in large increases to the Presidency armies. The reduction effected by the reorganization of 1796 was only temporary. The end of the eighteenth century saw fresh augmentations; and even when the Marāthā War of 1803–5 had terminated and the armies had been placed on a peace footing, their establishment stood, approximately, as follows:—
| British. | Native. | Total. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal . | 7,000 | 57,000 | 64,000 |
| Madras | 11,000 | 53,000 | 64,000 |
| Bombay | 6,500 | 20,000 | 26,500 |
| Total | 24,500 | 130,000 | 154,500 |
The year 1806 was notable for a mutiny in the Madras army. The sepoys garrisoning the fort at Vellore, exasperated at the introduction of innovations which they considered an attack on their religion, massacred European officers and soldiers. In 1809 the European officers again combined in mutinous conduct against the Government. This time it was in Madras. The Madras officers were discontented, their allowances had been touched, their pay was less than in Bengal, and the 'Royal' officers monopolized most of the good appointments, while the dissensions between the Governor (Sir George Barlow) and the Commander-in-Chief fanned the flame into a blaze. In one instance (at Seringapatam) the mutiny spread partially to the sepoys, but it was quelled by the energetic measures of the Governor and the Governor-General (Lord Minto).
In 1824 a mutiny took place at Barrackpore. In connexion with the Burmese War, three regiments of Bengal native infantry had been ordered to march by land for Arakan. The service was unpopular and even terrifying to the sepoys; they were ordered to provide bullock transport at their own expense; many of the officers were strangers to the men; and the latter feared they might have to cross the sea. The affair was mismanaged: the men had represented that bullocks were unprocurable, but their petition was treated with contempt and they were shot down and sabred on parade. The court of inquiry recorded that 'the mutiny was an ebullition of despair at being compelled to march without the means of doing so.' It is only fair to add that the Commander-in-Chief strongly controverted the justice of this conclusion.
In 1824 the double battalion regiments were finally separated, and the new single battalion regiments were numbered according to the date on which they had originally been raised. After this reorganization, which gave a colonel and 22 officers to each infantry battalion and cavalry regiment, the Bengal army comprised 3 brigades of horse artillery (9 European and 3 native troops), 5 battalions of foot artillery (20 companies), a corps of engineers of 47 officers, a corps of sappers and miners and a corps of pioneers, 2 regiments of European infantry, 8 regiments of regular native cavalry, 5 regiments of irregular cavalry, and 68 battalions of native infantry. It also included local and provincial corps, such as the Rāmpur local battalion, the Cuttack legion, and many others.
The Madras army consisted of 2 brigades of horse artillery (1 European and 1 native); 3 battalions of foot artillery, each of 4 companies, with 4 companies of gun-lascars attached; 8 regiments of native cavalry of 4 squadrons each; 2 battalions of pioneers; 2 regiments of European infantry; 52 battalions of native infantry; and 3 extra and local battalions. The Bombay army had on its establishment 4 troops of horse artillery, 8 companies of foot artillery, a corps of engineers and pioneers, 3 regiments of regular cavalry, 2 regiments of irregular cavalry, 2 regiments of European infantry, and 24 battalions of native infantry.
The enrolment of irregular cavalry was but following the example of our opponents, who always had levies of horse attached to their armies. These horsemen were not clothed or armed by the state, but were on the silladār1 system, each man furnishing his own horse and equipment, while the horse supply was kept up by means of a ‘Chandā fund’ supported by monthly subscriptions. There were only two or three European officers with each of these corps.
As territorial expansion took place, local corps, more rough and ready than the regular army, were raised for the particular part of the country to which it was desired to afford protection. In 1846 a frontier brigade was raised in the Sutlej States for police and general purposes; the corps of Guides was formed; and in 1849 the ‘Punjab Irregular Force’ was enrolled for duty on the frontier. In 1851 the establishment of this force was fixed at 3 light field batteries, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 5 of infantry. A garrison company was added in 1852, a sixth infantry regiment (formed from the Sind Camel Corps) in 1853, one mountain battery in 1856, and a second in 1862. The light field batteries were converted into mountain batteries in 1876. The force was originally under the Provincial administration, and was not placed under the Commander-in-Chief until many years later. A local force was raised on the annexation of Nāgpur in 1854, and the ‘Oudh Irregular Force’ after Oudh was annexed. The latter force disappeared in the Mutiny, while the former was broken up a few years later. By the treaty of 1800 the Nizām of Hyderābād maintained a ‘contingent’ of 9,000 horse and 6,000 foot, which was officered from the Company’s service. In 1853 a new treaty was negotiated, Berār being assigned for the payment of the Contingent, and the force ceased to be a part of the Nizām’s army. It was to be maintained for his use, but available for service elsewhere. It consisted of 4 regiments of cavalry, 4 field batteries, and 6 battalions of infantry, commanded by a general officer under the civil authority of the Resident at Hyderābād. Besides this special force, which was thus practically incorporated in the Indian army, many other Native States maintained ‘contingents’ of troops, representing the military aid which they were supposed to render to the British Government. These bodies, aggregating from 30,000 to 40,000 men, were recruited mainly from Hindustān and were of no military value, being poorly disciplined mercenaries without loyalty to the State they served or to the British Government.
On the eve of the great Mutiny the establishment of the Company's armies was as follows:—
| British*. | Native. | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry. | Artillery. | Infantry. | Total. | Cavalry†. | Artillery. | Sappers and Miners. | Infantry†. | Total. | |
| Bengal | 1,366 | 3,063 | 17,003 | 21,432 | 19,288 | 4,734 | 1,497 | 112,052 | 137,571 |
| Madras | 639 | 2,128 | 5,941 | 8,708 | 3,202 | 2,407 | 1,270 | 42,373 | 49,252 |
| Bombay | 681 | 1,578 | 7,101 | 9,360 | 8,433 | 1,997 | 637 | 33,861 | 44,928 |
| Local forces and contingents | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6,796 | 2,118 | .. | 23,640 | 32,554 |
| „ „ | „ | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | (Unclassified) | 7,756 |
| Military police | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 38,977 | |
| Total | 2,686 | 6,769 | 30,045 | 39,500 | 37,719 | 11,256 | 3,404 | 211,926 | 311,038 |
| Grand Total, British and native troops | 350,538 | ||||||||
Thus the native troops outnumbered the Europeans by nearly eight to one.
In 1857 nearly the whole of the Bengal army, regular and irregular, revolted. The Punjab Frontier Force not only stood firm, but proved itself of the utmost value in the suppression of the Mutiny. The Hyderābād Contingent, and the Madras and Bombay armies with few exceptions, remained steadfast; but there was well-founded anxiety at the time, and it is fair to believe that cordial dislike of the Bengal army had a good deal to do with the loyalty of the other forces. This tremendous explosion of military rebellion cannot be traced to any one particular cause. The sepoy army had built up the fabric of the British empire in India; the races we had conquered enlisted freely under our colours in voluntary service, attracted by regular pay, fair treatment, and much active employment. They trusted their British officers, and could rely on their British comrades to support them in the hour of need and to bear the brunt of the fighting. Their pay and pension, and the provision for their families, were sufficiently powerful incentives to such fidelity as would ensure their fighting even against their own countrymen. In taking service with us they merely followed their old precedent of fighting under the banner of the conqueror; and if plunder was more restricted than in former days, they had compensating pecuniary advantages, present and prospective. We were justified, therefore, in regarding with some complacency this marvellous army of mercenaries. But as the years went on we forgot how slight were the bonds which united this great mass of Asiatic soldiers to their conquerors; such warnings as we had passed by unheeded; and we ignored the effect of the measures political, domestic, and military, which were carried out to satisfy the craving for improvement according to Western ideals. It has been said that the absorption of Sātāra, Nāgpur, and Jhānsi by right of lapse, and the annexation of Oudh, were among the political causes of the Mutiny; and whatever doubt may be felt as to the effect of the first-mentioned measure, there can be none as regards the last. The greater portion of the native army of Bengal was drawn from Oudh and the adjacent territories; and it is small wonder that they should have been affected when they saw their king deposed, and their privilege, as British sepoys, of precedence for their cases in Native civil tribunals passing away from them. As to the domestic causes of the Mutiny, the religious question, the basis of Eastern life, was the most important. Rites justly considered barbarous had been suppressed; the Brāhmans thought they saw some fell design to lessen their influence; an Act had been passed permitting Hindu widows to marry again; the new innovations of railways and telegraphs were represented as a part of the plot; caste was to be destroyed, and the first step was to christianize the army. Reports were assiduously spread that force was to be used to this end, and years before the Mutiny every kind of report and rumour was abroad that our aim was to subvert the faith of Hindu and Muhammadan alike. Nor did the educational policy of the day, the action of the civil courts, and the depreciation of the land-holding classes lessen the feeling of alarm. If the army had been sound, this seed would have fallen on soil where it could not have fructified. But the army was ripe for rebellion; and many causes, operating through many sources and for many years, combined to bring about its self-destruction.
The native army had a splendid history; but, as with all mercenary Asiatic armies, insubordination had stained its colours from the first. There had been, as has been shown, mutinies in the Bengal and Madras armies, sometimes sternly repressed and at other times weakly condoned. There had been widespread combinations, and isolated instances, more numerous than have been recorded in this sketch. The deterioration of the army had thus commenced many years before, and the reorganizations which had taken place had done nothing to foster the union of officers and men. It is a mistake to suppose that this or that statesman or soldier prophesied what was coming. Defects were indeed pointed out, and so far back as 1821 the state of the army was described as unsatisfactory : the paucity of British officers, the evils of caste in the Bengal army, the inferior physique of the armies of Madras and Bombay, and the inefficiency of the officers had all been severely commented on. Later, Sir Charles Napier, originally confident in the loyalty of the sepoy, had become mistrustful. On the other hand, in 1851 Henry Lawrence saw no impending danger ; although he considered we should take warning from the past, he thought we had ‘ no present cause of alarm,’ and he denounced ‘ the loud talk, even in mess-rooms, of general insurrection.’ The native officers, who had originally great power, had lost this, but it had not been gained by the British officers ; for little by little whatever these possessed was taken from them, the authority of the commanding officer becoming so restricted that at last he seemed to be a mere automaton whose strings were pulled by a centralized head-quarters. Of the twenty-five or twenty-six officers nominally on the rolls of a regiment rarely more than half were present, the rest being on the staff, in departments, in civil or political employ, or with irregular corps. Those who remained with their regiments were dissatisfied with their inferior position ; and as all promotion was by seniority, the officers arriving at high commands were long past the age for activity and efficiency. Nor were things better in the native ranks. The native officers were, as a rule, ignorant, and too old for their work, promotion being by seniority of the strictest kind. In most regiments, too, Brāhmanical influence was all-powerful and acted perniciously on military discipline. Enlistment for general service was cordially disliked, as the dread of crossing the ‘ black water ’ was intense at that time ; there was no high reward for native officers ; the pay had remained stationary while expenses and duties had increased ; and the intimate intercourse between officers and men had diminished. Nor was their military training in time of peace of a kind to raise the tone of the sepoys : it was the merest routine, and ill-calculated to foster a true military spirit.
Other and more general causes were at work in the direction of evil. Success in war had undoubtedly been the most potent attraction to the service of the Company, but the disasters in Afghānistān broke the charm. The stoppage of batta also furnished a powerful weapon to discontent. When Sind was annexed the extra allowance, or batta, granted on foreign service was discontinued, and in consequence several Madras and Bengal regiments refused to march. Similar difficulties took place on the annexation of the Punjab. Here, too, several Bengal regiments conspired to resist the order stopping the foreign-service allowance they had formerly received, and to refuse their pay. The mutiny was tided over, but only by measures of alternate coercion and concession. The native army was perfectly aware of its own strength and numbers, and of the weakness of the European force, and extraordinary stories were circulated about our difficulties in the Crimea.
An unsound and centralized military system; a large army of high-caste men drawn from one part of the country, confident in its own strength, and acted on by intense religious fears, with other less direct causes, constituted a highly inflammable material which thousands of secret agents were conspiring to ignite. They were helped in a remarkable way by our own action. The old musket was to be replaced by the Enfield rifle, and dépôts of instruction were formed. Cartridges were made ‘agreeably to instructions received from home’; and not only had the cartridge paper itself, which was sent out from England, a glossy or greasy appearance, but the end of the cartridge containing the bullet was greased. The previous lubricating compound was composed of coco-nut oil and bees-wax. The new stuff was concocted of one part of bees-wax and six parts of tallow; and there was ‘no official knowledge’ of what the components as supplied by the contractor consisted, or from what animal’s fat the tallow was made. At all events the sepoys thought that the grease used was a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows, the animals most abhorrent and sacred to Musalmāns and Hindus respectively. It was in vain that the suggestion of the men that only wax and oil should be used was adopted; that they were allowed to prepare their own mixture; and that steps were taken to disabuse their minds of any sinister intention against their religion. The mischief had been done, the native officers were afraid of their men, and emissaries to every regiment in the army spread disaffection successfully among an excited and credulous soldiery. Even then, had there been a strong Government and a sufficient European force, the Mutiny might have been confined within narrow limits. As it was, the Bengal army dissolved itself; a remnant only remained faithful; and when, after two years of fighting, peace and order were restored, a new army had to be organized from the faithful few and from the corps and levies which had been hastily raised.
II. The Armies of India under the Crown
In November, 1858, Queen Victoria assumed the direct government of India, and the East India Company practically ceased to exist. Two momentous questions pressed for decision: first, the form of European army which should be adopted for Indian service; second, the reconstruction of the Bengal native army, and the strength, composition, officering, and organization of the native armies generally. A local European army was proposed by Lord Canning, the Governor-General, and by others, because they considered that it would be more fully at the disposal of the Government of India, and more economical; and that officers and men would identify themselves with the country and its inhabitants, providing a source from which officers could be drawn for various civil employments. On the other hand, it was urged with equal strength that the British army should be truly imperial, and ought not to be divided into two parts serving different masters; that the spirit and traditions of the British army could be preserved only by the return of regiments to England; and finally that a local army is worse disciplined and more liable to disaffection than one which is relieved by units. The advocates of a local army were also at a disadvantage because what was known as the 'White Mutiny' contributed to the condemnation of a local European force. The local European troops objected to being transferred to the Crown without their wishes being consulted, and without a bounty. Much discontent, a good deal of open insubordination, and even more covert disaffection, were manifested, and 10,000 men took their discharge.
It was accordingly decided that the European army of the East India Company should be transferred to the Crown. The infantry became regiments of the line; and the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay artillery, and the corresponding corps of Indian engineers, were amalgamated with the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers. A Royal Commission, appointed to advise on these changes, laid down that the British force should be 80,000 strong, and that the native troops should not exceed it by more than two to one in the Bengal army and three to one in Madras and Bombay; they also recommended that native regiments should be formed by a general mixture of all classes and castes. The British force was 69,000 strong at first, but sank very low in ‘actuals’ in some subsequent years. The proportion of British to native troops has been fairly maintained, taking the regular army as a whole: the ‘general mixture’ system in native regiments was never wholly adopted, and has now ceased to exist altogether.
Before passing to the consideration of the native armies as they were organized after the close of the Mutiny, a few words are necessary in respect to the employment of the British army in India. Since the amalgamation of the Company’s European troops with the Royal forces, regiments and batteries have been sent to India and relieved on the same system as for any other part of the empire, the tour of service being about nine years for cavalry and sixteen for infantry regiments, and from eleven to fifteen years for artillery units. Royal Engineer, Medical, and Veterinary officers come out to India for a term of five years, but may extend it. While in India, British troops are lent to and paid for by the Indian Government, and are in many respects under Indian regulations as regards pay, equipment, and various other matters.
The Company had always been liable for the cost of the British troops serving in India; and by the Act of 21 Geo. III, cap. 70, it had ‘to pay to the king, in the East Indies, two lakhs of current rupees per annum for each and every regiment consisting of 1,000 men.’ In 1788 this was altered to a charge for ‘raising, transporting, and maintaining such forces.’ From 1834 to 1857 the average payment was about £195,000 annually. In 1860–1 a capitation rate of £10 was fixed, the expenses having largely increased, but this plan was abandoned for one based on ‘actual expenses.’ Finally, after much discussion, a capitation rate of £7½ was decided on and came into force in 1890–1. This ‘capitation rate’ is based on the charges for enlisting and training the recruit, the pay of young officers before they go to India, a share of the cost of educational establishments, and the expenses of men sent home time-expired or invalided. It does not include ‘deferred pay’ or gratuities, and transport and non-effective charges are paid separately. For the ‘non-effective’ charges (pensions, &c.) a capitation rate of £3½ was paid from 1861–2 until 1870–1, when the Indian share of the valuation of pensions granted annually was capitalized. In 1884–5 a new system was introduced, spreading the charge over a series of years. All changes and improvements in the pay and organization of the British army necessarily react on Indian finances ; the measures introduced, as for example the short-service system created by Lord Cardwell in 1870, are judged best for the whole Imperial Army ; and India has to meet any additional expenditure which these may entail, although they may not be specially adapted to her requirements. The ordinary term of a soldier's service in India has been calculated at five years and four months, but bounties are given when it is desirable or necessary to prolong the service of men who could otherwise claim to go home. The details of interior economy, discipline, and equipment of units of the British Army serving in India are much the same as for those serving at home, but, as above observed, there are certain minor differences.
When the dying embers of the Mutiny had been stamped out, the Government found itself confronted with the task of replacing, on a sounder basis of organization, a native army which had broken up in rebellion. The Madras and Bombay armies, the Hyderābād Contingent, and the Punjab Frontier Force did not need reconstruction as a consequence of internal disruption ; but reorganization was general, and the principles accepted were applied to them also. What had to be dealt with more immediately were the new corps of horse and foot which had been raised, and the remnants of the regiments which had remained faithful.
In 1861 the reorganization of the cavalry and infantry was announced. Many regiments of irregular horse were disbanded or incorporated with others. Some regiments and levies of infantry were broken up ; others were transferred to the newly organized police force (see chap. xii), which took over various duties, such as the escort of treasure and the guarding of civil treasuries, hitherto performed by the army. All native artillery was abolished, except the batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force, the Bombay mountain batteries, and the field batteries of the Hyderābād Contingent.
It was decided to organize the whole native army on the irregular system, and the cavalry (except in Madras) on the silladār system. The term ' irregular ' was not well adapted to the new plan, which was in every respect ' regular,' except that there were fewer British officers under this arrangement than with the old ' regular ' native regiments of the line. In order to remedy one of the crying evils of the past organization, it was resolved that every appointment of a British officer to a native regiment should be deemed a ' staff ' appointment, and should carry with it a staff salary in addition to pay of rank. The powers of commanding officers were at the same time much increased.
The native cavalry regiments were to consist of 420 sowārs or troopers, with a due proportion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, organized in six troops. Each regiment was to have a British commandant, a second-in-command, two squadron officers, an adjutant, and a general-duty officer. The native infantry regiments were reduced to a strength of 600 privates, with native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, in eight companies. The European officers were : a commandant, two wing commanders, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and a general-duty officer. Cavalry and infantry regiments had therefore six officers each, double the number of the European officer establishment of the old irregular corps, but only a fourth of the nominal establishment of the old regular regiments. The general order effecting these changes was not published till 1863, and it took some time to apply the system to the Madras and Bombay armies.
After this reorganization had been completed, the native armies stood as follows :—
| Cavalry regiments. | Artillery batteries. | Infantry battalions. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bengal army | 19 | ... | 49 |
| Madras army | 4 | ... | 40 |
| Bombay army | 7 | 2 | 30 |
| Punjab Frontier Force | 6 | 5 | 12 |
| Local corps | 2 | ... | 5 |
| Hyderābād Contingent. | 4 | 4 | 6 |
This reduction did not take place at once, and even in 1864 several corps existed which were ultimately reduced. In that year the armies in India had an aggregate strength of 205,000 men, of whom 65,000 were British. As compared with the establishment prior to the Mutiny, there was thus a decrease of about 40 per cent. in total strength, but an increase of 60 per cent. in the number of British troops.
The question of officering the reorganized native armies was an important and difficult one. It was solved by the institution in 1861 of a Staff Corps for each of the three Presidencies, to provide a body of officers ‘by whom various offices and appointments hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several corps or regiments’ of the Indian forces should in future be held. These Staff Corps were thrown open to British as well as Indian officers, the Company’s military college at Addiscombe was closed, and henceforth all fresh appointments to the Indian army were to be made from the British army. In recent years cadets from Sandhurst have also been posted direct to an unattached list for the Indian army, and, after a year's duty with a British regiment in India, have been appointed to native regiments. Promotion in the Staff Corps was to be governed by length of service. Officers, after twelve years' service (subsequently reduced to eleven), were to become captains ; after twenty years' service, majors ; and after twenty-six years' service, lieutenant-colonels ; while five years in this rank gave the brevet rank of colonel. The Staff Corps were to provide for the native regiments and for the staff and army departments, as also for civil and political appointments in which military men might be required. The introduction of this system was at the outset attended by considerable difficulty. Officers already in employ had the option of joining the Staff Corps or remaining on the old conditions, and there was a large number of surplus officers arising from the disbandment of regiments, or from reductions in the strength of the regimental establishments. At the same time the 'cadres' of the old regiments were retained, resulting in the unduly rapid promotion of those who had not joined the Staff Corps, and in their early attainment of 'colonel's allowances' (which had now been granted to every lieutenant-colonel after twelve years' service in that rank), a special prize corresponding to the colonelcy of a British regiment, and carrying with it emoluments amounting to £1,124 per annum. These allowances were termed 'off-reckonings,' and were a survival of the far-off days when the colonels of regiments received contract allowances for the clothing of their men, a custom obtaining in the British and Indian services alike. For many years the result of the above measures was a long list of officers drawing colonel's allowances, and an unsatisfactory state of regimental as contrasted with Staff Corps promotion.
Between 1860 and 1878, the native armies were not engaged in any great campaign. There were many expeditions on the north-west frontier ; the China War of 1860 ; various expeditions on the eastern and north-eastern frontiers ; the Abyssinian War of 1867–8 ; the expedition to Perak ; the dispatch of an Indian contingent to Malta in 1878 ; but no field operations on a large and important scale. The period was comparatively restful, and much was done to consolidate the new armies and to meet the difficulties which reorganization had brought in its train. The establishment of the three armies remained practically the same, but many changes took place in dress, equipment, and armament : the Enfield rifle was issued to the native troops, and in 1874 the first issue of the Snider rifle was made.
The strength of European officers with native regiments was increased to seven, and in 1874–5 one or two ‘probationers’ were added to each corps to take the place of absentees. In 1875–6 a review of the ‘irregular’ system took place. The conclusions arrived at were that it had been successful and that the establishment of officers was sufficient; but as the cost of living had increased during the previous twenty years, certain increases in allowances were given to native officers and soldiers, and the pension rules were revised.
The Afghān War of 1878–80, involving the employment of a considerable army and a strain upon the military resources, was fruitful of lessons in every branch of the art of war and of army organization. Many defects had been observed, and the Army Organization Commission of 1879 was assembled by Lord Lytton not only to devise means for the reduction of military expenditure, but to test how far the existing system had been found adapted to the requirements of troops on active service. The British forces in India at this date consisted of 9 cavalry regiments, 50 infantry battalions, and 86 batteries of horse, field, heavy, garrison, and mountain artillery, while the composition of the native armies was much the same as that indicated on page 345. The British troops numbered nearly 65,000, the native troops about 135,000.
The Commission made a most exhaustive and comprehensive inquiry which eventually gave rise to many important reforms, but the only immediate outcome was the reduction (in 1881) of four regiments of native cavalry and eighteen of native infantry, and an addition of one British officer to each of the remaining corps. The strength of each regiment was at the same time generally increased from 499 to 550 of all ranks in the cavalry, and from 712 to 832 in the infantry. This gave as nearly as possible the same total establishment as previously existed, and the Commission were satisfied that increased efficiency and fighting power would be gained.
The reductions were distributed as follows :—
| Native cavalry. | Native infantry. | |
|---|---|---|
| Bengal army | 2 | 5 |
| Madras „ | ... | 8 |
| Bombay „ | 1 | 4 |
| Punjab Frontier Force | 1 | 1 |
There was also a net reduction of eleven batteries of British Artillery.
Meanwhile the way was being prepared for the larger reforms proposed by the Army Commission and the Government of India which had not been accepted by the Secretary of State. In 1864 the three Presidency departments of military account and audit had been consolidated into one, under an Accountant-General attached to the Military Department of the Government of India. In 1876 the general management of the three Remount departments was placed under one head. In 1884 the three Ordnance departments, which had hitherto been entirely separate and had conducted their business on different methods, were amalgamated under one head and placed under the Government of India. A partial reorganization of the transport service was also carried out, and commissariat regulations were compiled for all India. The enlistment of certain low-caste Hindus, whose military efficiency had not been satisfactory, was prohibited ; and an endeavour was made to carry out the principles of segregation by eliminating Punjābis from Hindustāni regiments and vice versa, while the mixed troops and companies of the Punjab Frontier Force were replaced by ‘class’ troops and companies. Pioneer corps were instituted for Madras, and Army Hospital native corps were raised. After the evacuation of Afghānistān, the army saw some active service in an expedition against the Mahsūd Wazīrs, in the Egyptian campaign of 1882, and at Suākin in 1885.
The year 1885 witnessed three events of the first magnitude : the preparation of a large force for the defence of the north-western frontier, the commencement of an increase of the army, and the third Burmese War. The first measure was necessary in consequence of the conflict between Russian and Afghān troops at Panjdeh. A force over 65,000 strong, with 168 guns, was mobilized, and an immense quantity of supplies and transport was collected. Fortunately peace was preserved, but it was felt that the army in India was no longer strong enough for the task which might be before it. After the Mutiny the accepted policy had been the reduction of the native armies to a strength sufficient for internal security and the local defence of the border : the possibility of war with a great European power now rendered it necessary to increase the number of both British and native troops. It was decided that each of the nine regiments of British cavalry should receive a fourth squadron ; the artillery was to recover the eleven batteries reduced in 1881 ; the British infantry was to be augmented by three battalions, and every battalion was to have 100 men added to it. The total increase amounted to 10,600 men.
The native armies were to be increased in the following manner : three new cavalry regiments were to be raised, two in Bengal and one in Bombay; and a fourth squadron was to be added to all the Bengal and Bombay cavalry regiments, while the Madras cavalry were to have a regimental strength of 489 in place of 387 of all ranks. The native mountain batteries were each to have six instead of four guns. The native infantry of the Bengal army was to be increased by 9 battalions: namely, 5 of Gurkhas, 2 of Sikhs, and 1 of Dogrās, with 1 of Mazhabi Sikhs as pioneers, while every battalion was to be 912 instead of 832 strong. Various subsequent additions, such as two native mountain batteries, brought up the increase of the native army to 20,000 men. These increases, which were completed in 1887, were calculated to cost about two millions sterling annually, and when they had been carried into effect the strength of the British and native armies was as shown below :—
| British. | Native. | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry. | Artillery. | Royal Engineer Officers. | Infantry. | Total. | Cavalry. | Artillery. | Sappers and Miners. | Infantry. | Total. | |
| Bengal . | 3,786 | 7,084 | 203 | 34,442 | 45,515 | 15,202 | 1,508 | 1,438 | 58,944 | 77,092 |
| Madras . | 2,524 | 2,658 | 35 | 11,143 | 16,360 | 2,146 | 271 | 1,495 | 28,737 | 32,649 |
| Bombay . | 631 | 2,947 | 45 | 8,104 | 11,727 | 4,667 | 452 | 935 | 22,490 | 28,544 |
| Local corps . | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1,598 | .. | .. | 5,669 | 7,267 |
| Hyderabad Contingent | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2,000 | 536 | .. | 5,004 | 7,540 |
| Total | 6,941 | 12,689 | 283 | 53,689 | 73,602 | 25,613 | 2,767 | 3,868 | 120,844 | 153,092 |
| Grand Total, British and native troops | 226,694 | |||||||||
The third Burmese War in 1885, which was followed by a series of further operations against guerilla bands and dacoits, resulted in the annexation of Upper Burma, so that the increased garrison which was there necessary absorbed a considerable portion of the augmentation above referred to.
In 1886 the battalions of the native armies were linked together in regiments of three, or sometimes two, battalions each. The linked battalions could thus supply trained men to battalions in the field, whereas under the single battalion system previously in existence battalions in the field could only be strengthened by volunteers from other corps or by recruits. In 1888 regimental centres were fixed upon for these groups, and were placed at such stations as it would be obligatory to garrison in case of a large mobilization of the army. It was intended that one battalion should always be at the regimental centre, so that the men might periodically return to their own neighbourhood.
Another military reform, instituted at the same time as the linking of battalions, was the formation of a reserve for the native army. Two such forces were formed, the active and the garrison reserve. The latter was to comprise men pensioned after twenty-one years' colour, or colour and reserve, service; but this has been allowed to die out as, since no training was exacted, the men were found to be useless. The active reserve was to consist of men who might be allowed to pass to the reserve with not less than five (since reduced to three) or more than twelve years' colour service (now a thirty-two years of age limit). The numbers were originally limited to 218 for an infantry battalion in the Bengal and Punjab armies, 160 for those of the Madras and Bombay armies, and 300 for the sappers and miners. This reserve system was later on extended to native mounted batteries and to native artillery drivers; also to railway employés attested to serve with military railway companies. In 1904 the reserve amounted to about 25,000 men; and it was then decided to increase its strength gradually to 50,000 men, reducing the reserve pay from Rs. 3 to Rs. 2 a month, and also to extend the reserve system to silladār cavalry regiments. Arms and accoutrements are kept in the arsenals and issued at the periods of training, and kits are stored at the regimental centres. Reservists were at first called up annually for one month's training, but in future they will come up every two years for a two months' period. Reservists obtain a pension of Rs. 3 or Rs. 3-8 a month after twenty-five years' total service. The reserve system has worked very well in Hindustān and the Punjab, and fairly so in Bombay, but has never taken strong root in Madras. Opportunity was at the same time taken to improve the rates of good-conduct pay and to revise the pension rules, an ordinary pension being given to all soldiers on completion of twenty-one years' service; the scale of gratuities was also made more liberal.
Two further measures were specially consequent on the Burma War. In March, 1886, levies and military police, composed of Gurkhas, Punjābis, and Hindustānis, were raised for service in Burma. These battalions were increased until they attained a strength of 18,500 men, which on the pacification of the country was reduced to about 16,000, and they now constitute the Burma military police. The second measure did not come into force until 1893, when, in order to improve the material of the Madras army for service in Burma, local battalions were formed of Sikhs, Punjābi Muhammadans, Gurkhas, and other races; and in the course of a few years eight battalions of the Madras army were thus reconstituted. An elimination of the lower classes of Hindus had already taken place in the Bengal army, their place being filled by Rājputs, Jāts, and others.
In the Afghān War of 1878-80 contingents from some of the Native States of the Punjab did good service in the Kurram valley; and when war seemed imminent in 1885, the Native princes of India placed the resources of their States at the disposal of the Government of India. From this offer arose (in 1889) the body of ‘Imperial Service troops,’ which are under the control of the States furnishing them and are commanded by native officers, subject to the supervision of British inspecting officers who are responsible to the Foreign Department of the Government of India.
Many other changes and improvements were brought about during this period. We can only mention the most important, and in doing so must necessarily anticipate the course of events in some cases. As has been explained in chapter x, the execution and supervision of military works, which had formerly been carried out by the Department of Civil Public Works, was, between 1882 and 1890, transferred to a separate Military Works Department; and this in 1899 was completely militarized as the Military Works Services.
The first step in the amalgamation of the Presidency Commissariat departments was made in 1885, when a Commissary-General-in-Chief was appointed. In 1886 a plan of mobilization was started, and that year also saw the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force from the control of the Punjab Government to that of the Commander-in-Chief. In 1888 the departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General in the military districts were amalgamated, the intention being to form a higher staff for important military work, routine duties being relegated to a garrison or station staff. In 1890 the number of trans-frontier men in the army was increased. In 1891 the four regiments of Madras cavalry were reorganized in three regiments of four squadrons each. In the same year the three Staff Corps were amalgamated into one ‘Indian Staff Corps’; four old ‘levy’ regiments were re-formed with better material; the pay of non-commissioned officers and sowārs of the native silladār cavalry was raised by Rs. 4 per mensem; and four years afterwards the pay of all non-commissioned officers and men in the native artillery, the sappers and miners, and the native infantry was raised by Rs. 2 per mensem, the pay of the sepoy becoming Rs. 9 instead of Rs. 7, a figure at which it had remained for a great many years. This latter measure was extended to the Madras cavalry, which is not on the silladār system. In 1891 recruiting dépôts for the various classes of which the Bengal army is composed were established, and placed under District recruiting officers, a system subsequently applied to Madras and Bombay. The Bombay army likewise shared in the effort to recruit better material, two regiments being reconstituted as Baluchistān frontier regiments, composed of Pathāns, Hazāras, Baluchis, and Brāhuis, Punjābi Muhammadans, and Sikhs. A little later a further change took place, undesirable classes being eliminated, and the ‘class company’ system introduced in lieu of the ‘general mixture’ organization. A similar measure was, after prolonged investigation and discussion, applied to the Madras army.
In 1891–3 the native infantry were armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, the Lee-Metford magazine rifle having been issued to the British troops. In the latter half of the decade 1885–95, assistance was given to the Imperial Government by the employment of soldiers from the Indian army in temporary service in Central Africa, East Africa, and Uganda, and also in West Africa. In 1893 the sixteen Hindustāni regiments of the Bengal army became ‘class’ (instead of ‘class company’) regiments, composed of Brāhmans, Rājputs, Muhammadans, Jāts, and Gurkhas. This change was introduced because the class system attracted a better stamp of men, regiments were more contented, a sound spirit of rivalry between corps was created, and the separation of classes was felt to be more consonant with the general policy than the mixture, for example, of Brāhmans and Rājputs in one body. In the same year the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department at Army Head Quarters was reorganized and strengthened.
During this period the army was engaged in military operations in Burma for several years; on the eastern and north-eastern frontier against the Chins and Lushais (1890–3); in Manipur (1891); and against the Abors (1894). The north-west frontier was the scene of the Black Mountain expedition in 1888, of the two Mīrānzai expeditions in 1891, and of the Hunza Nagar fighting in the same year. Fighting in Wazīristān in 1894–5 was followed by the defence and relief of Chitrāl in 1895.
The year 1893 is memorable for the passing by Parliament of the Madras and Bombay Armies Act (56 & 57 Vict., cap. 62), abolishing the office of Commander-in-Chief in those separate armies, and withdrawing the power of military control hitherto exercised by the Governments of the two Presidencies. This measure, which took effect in April, 1895, brings to a natural conclusion the section recounting the changes which took place in the Presidency armies after the great Mutiny of 1857. Of lower strength than their predecessors, but more powerful in efficiency and armament, their quality was tried in many campaigns; the general reorganization consequent on the reconstruction of the Bengal army was followed by alternate periods of rest, reform, and reduction; and then by increase, improvement, and the unification of the great departments of military business. The time was now ripe for the consolidation of military control and the application of a more modern system of army administration.
III. Unification of the Armies and present Military Organization
The Army Organization Commission of 1879 had recommended the abolition of the Presidency army system, and the division of the Indian army into four territorial army corps under one supreme authority. The cause of the existence of the separate armies has been explained: they were the actual result of military establishments formed at three independent bases far distant from each other. In the course of years it had come to be an anachronism that the Central Government should have but little authority, and the Commander-in-Chief in India none at all, over the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which were, moreover, largely stationed outside those Presidencies. The evils of this state of things were many and varied. But this was not all. The Bengal army, occupying an area of immense extent, had become unwieldy for a single command and was in danger of becoming homogeneous. It was accordingly felt that the division of the army into four great parts, primarily connected with the Punjab, Hindustān proper, Bombay, and Madras, would best prevent its fusion into one huge body of soldiers. As already stated, various measures subsidiary to this end, such as the unification of military departments, had been gradually carried out before the Madras and Bombay Armies Act was passed. After much deliberation and discussion, the new system came into being in April, 1895, and India was now divided into four territorial commands, named after the Punjab, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Speaking generally, the Punjab command covered the Punjab and what is now the North-West Frontier Province; the Bengal command included Assam, Bengal, the United Provinces, and parts of the Central Provinces and Central India; the Madras command comprised the Madras Presidency, the British garrisons in Hyderābād and Mysore, and Burma; while the Bombay command included the Bombay Presidency (with Aden), Baluchistān, and Rājputāna, and parts of Central India and the Central Provinces. The troops in these commands comprised the British soldiers stationed therein and the native troops naturally belonging to the areas or specially attached thereto. Each command was placed under a Lieutenant-General, who was supplied with a complete army and departmental staff, and was given power to transact a certain amount of business which had formerly been dealt with at Army Head-Quarters or by the Military Department. Before further describing the constitution and organization of the army as it existed in 1904, we may note the successive changes introduced since 1895.
The period 1895–1903 was marked by important military operations. Between 1895 and 1898 the campaigns on the north-west frontier engaged a large body of troops, British and native; 1899–1900 saw the dispatch to South Africa of a force of British troops from India which saved Natal, and the supply of large quantities of stores of all kinds; in 1900–1 the expedition to China took place; and in 1901–2 operations in Wazīristān.
It is not possible to deal in detail with the changes and improvements made during the last few years, but progress has been very marked. The causes of this increased activity are —first, that owing to financial difficulties and the frontier campaigns of 1897, many desired reforms and improvements had been postponed; secondly, these campaigns taught many lessons which had to be considered, while the march of events in Central Asia and the Far East showed that India is now more than ever connected with world-politics; and thirdly, the South African War conveyed an object-lesson of the greatest significance. To deal first with changes in the army, and its composition. In 1897 certain local corps, hitherto under the Foreign Department, viz. the Central India Horse, the Bhopāl battalion, the Deoli and Erinpura Irregular Forces, and the Merwāra battalion, were brought under the Commander-in-Chief and allotted to the commands according to their geographical situation. The Mālwā and Mewār Bhīl corps were exempted from this change, but these corps will probably be converted into military police. The cavalry and infantry of the Hyderābād Contingent were reorganized on the class squadron and company system. In 1898–1902 the establishments of British and native mountain batteries were strengthened, and two native mountain batteries and five native infantry battalions were added to the Punjab and Bengal commands. The infantry battalions were raised to replace five corps lent to the Imperial Government for service at colonial garrisons, such as Mauritius, Ceylon, and Singapore. Indian troops were first employed in colonial garrisons in 1898, but the larger measure arose from the call made on India during the South African War and is now accepted as a permanent arrangement. Other important changes have been the reconstitution of four regiments of the Bengal portion of the army, three as Muhammadans of the Eastern Punjab and Hindustān, and one as a pioneer regiment of Lobāna Sikhs and Jāts; and the incorporation of the Punjab Frontier Force as an integral part of the Punjab command. The Madras army has undergone considerable changes. In 1895 Telugus were eliminated, and the remaining material gradually improved. Between 1902 and 1904 two infantry battalions were reconstituted from Moplahs, and one battalion was converted into a Gurkha corps, while nine others have been transformed into battalions of Punjābis, leaving the locally recruited Madras regiments at thirteen. The former material of a regiment of Madras cavalry has also been replaced by a large infusion of men from Rājputāna and the Punjab. The Bombay army has not undergone any important change, but its material has been gradually improved by the elimination of the less efficient elements. The Bombay sappers were increased by two ordinary companies in 1902–3, and by a fortress company for Aden. The Hyderābād Contingent was broken up in 1904, in consequence of the arrangement concluded with the Nizām in respect to Berār. Its cavalry was formed into three regiments of four squadrons, instead of four regiments of three squadrons each, and was transferred to the Bombay command; the field batteries were abolished; and the six battalions of infantry were transferred to the Madras command. Aurangābād and Bolārum are the only old stations of the Contingent now retained.
In 1896 the three Presidency Medical services were amalgamated under a Director-General. In 1897–8 the British infantry in India was reduced by one battalion, twenty men being added to each of the remaining fifty-two battalions; the military factories were placed under the direct administration of the Director-General of Ordnance; and the issue of cordite was commenced to the artillery. Sanitary officers were appointed to commands and to Army Head-Quarters; and a messing allowance of 3d. per diem to British soldiers, following the measure introduced in the home army, was granted in India. In 1899 it was decided to withdraw regular troops from the Khyber, and from the Kurram, Tochi, and Shahūr valleys, and to garrison these outlying positions by militia or military police. These changes, which were intended to effect a greater concentration of the regular forces on the frontier, have since been gradually carried out.
The years 1899–1901 witnessed special activity in remodelling and improving armament, equipment, mobilization, and defences, while many measures then resolved upon were carried out in 1902 and 1903. In 1900 a considerable change took place in the regimental system of the native army, by the introduction of the ‘double company’ organization in place of ‘wings’ or half-battalions. The change followed the squadron system of the cavalry. While retaining the native officers in command of companies, it linked the eight companies of a battalion in four pairs of double companies, each in command of a British officer, the object being to give more definite responsibility to the British officers and to obtain a more manageable unit than the ‘wing’ of four companies. Between 1900 and 1904 about 400 British officers were added to the native army, so as to increase the number on duty with cavalry and infantry regiments. In January, 1903, the designation ‘Indian Staff Corps,’ as applied to the British officers with the native army, was superseded by the more appropriate term ‘Indian Army,’ since most of these officers are on regimental and not on staff duty. In 1900 the reorganization of the transport service was finally authorized. The idea was to substitute organized corps and cadres of camel, mule, and cart transport, commanded by European officers, for the unorganized transport allotted to regiments and to dépôts, and, by means of ‘enumeration officers,’ to ascertain the resources of the country so that it might be possible to expand the peace transport to meet the exigencies of war. The re-armament of the British infantry with the Lee-Metford rifle was completed in 1899, the cavalry having been armed with the Lee-Enfield carbine in 1897. In 1900–1 the ·303 magazine rifle was introduced for the native army, and the re-armament of the regular troops was completed in 1902–3. A new mountain gun was introduced ; many improvements were made in the field artillery ; a large number of machine guns were obtained ; a cordite factory was established ; additional ammunition was issued for practice ; and the coast defences were improved. The year 1900–1 also saw the inception of other measures of reform, such as mounted infantry schools ; improvements in the Commissariat department, whose title was now changed to ‘Supply and Transport Corps’ ; increase in artillery horses and the establishment of mountain batteries ; development of the plan of mobilization, and increased equipments and stores ; the completion of frontier defences and communications ; simplification in the methods of military audit and accounting ; and reform of the Horse-breeding and Remount departments. The commissariat service has received special attention of recent years ; besides various reforms in its internal economy, the staff of officers and subordinates has been increased, and their pay and prospects improved ; and new administrative appointments have been made. In a cognate business, the supply of fodder, milk, and butter, great progress has been made in the establishment of grass and dairy farms. In 1901 promotion in the Staff Corps (now ‘Indian Army’) was accelerated, the ranks of captain and major being attainable in nine and eighteen years instead of in eleven and twenty years.
In April, 1902, consequent on the grant of increased pay to the army at home, the pay of the British soldier in India was increased by 2d. a day ; and in April, 1904, a further increase of from 4d. to 7d. a day was given, in the form of service pay, augmenting Indian military expenditure by £700,000 annually.
In 1902–3 the scattered ambulance establishment was organized into an Army Bearer Corps. Three howitzer batteries were added to the artillery ; a corps of frontier garrison artillery was formed from the existing native garrison battery ; and various improvements were made in the Army Hospital Corps, in the nursing service, and in the body of military Hospital Assistants. The ‘brigade’ system for mounted artillery—i.e. the association of three field or two horse-artillery batteries, under a lieutenant-colonel, as a tactical and administrative unit—was introduced, and ammunition columns were reorganized.
In 1903–4 various further measures were carried out. The transport organization was more fully developed by the establishment of thirteen additional mule corps and cadres, and horses were partially substituted for bullocks in four heavy batteries. In every battalion of British infantry, and in the majority of native infantry battalions, not less than 160 men are to be trained in mounted infantry duties, so that on mobilization two battalions of four companies each (one British and one native) will be available for each division. Coast defences were, and are still being, developed in pursuance of a definite scheme. A consecutive renumbering of native cavalry and infantry regiments, which had previously been numbered in the separate series of the old armies, was carried out. A military railway company was added to the army, and a second company has since been raised. Burma was separated from the Madras command, and constituted an independent military charge. The Ordnance department was greatly developed, in pursuance of the policy that India should be self-supporting as regards munitions of war.
In a sketch of this kind it would be impossible to do justice to the great improvement which has taken place in the sanitary conditions of British and native troops in India. A more rational system of clothing and head-protection, more temperate habits, vastly improved barracks, better opportunities for recreation and exercise, better food, improved water-supply and drainage, greater care of the soldier when sick and attention to hygiene generally, the development of stations and hutted camps in the hills to which more than a third of the British army proceed in the summer months, the practice of sending fresh arrivals from England to the hills, have all contributed to the better health of the soldiers in India, and that of their native comrades has also undergone great improvement1. Nor must omission be made of the fact that the moral, as well as the material, welfare of the British soldier has been advanced. The command of Lord Roberts (1885–93) will ever be associated with this progress, and especially with the establishment of soldiers' institutes.
The result of the changes introduced in 1895, and of subsequent developments, was, as we have seen, the division of the army of India into four large commands, or territorial forces, with the independent military district of Burma, which became practically a fifth command. These commands were subdivided into military districts, but they were not in any way organized army corps, nor were the troops in the military district organized in divisions and brigades. The total number of regular troops in each command in 1903 is given below :—
| Command. | Number of British troops. | Number of native troops. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Punjab | 20,051 | 53,496 | 73,547 |
| Bengal | 24,048 | 33,191 | 57,239 |
| Bombay | 16,209 | 34,843 | 51,052 |
| Madras | 9,440 | 29,630 | 39,070 |
| Burma | 4,422 | 6,781 | 11,203 |
| Total | 74,170 | 157,941 | 232,111 |
The reserve of the native army numbered about 25,000 men1, and the auxiliary forces (British volunteers, Imperial Service troops, frontier militias, and military police) about an additional 76,000 men.
A new scheme of military organization, which owes its inception largely to the present Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener, is now, however, in process of development. The leading features of this scheme are the recognition of the fact that the main function of the army is the defence of the north-west frontier, and that the army in peace should be organized and trained in units of command similar to those in which it would take the field. As a result, a number of small military stations are being abandoned; the bulk of the troops will be concentrated in large cantonments; and their distribution is in three army corps and ten divisional commands, as shown below :—
| Army corps command. | Divisional command. |
|---|---|
| Northern | 1st. (Peshāwar.) 2nd. (Rāwalpindi.) 3rd. (Lahore.) |
| Western | 4th. (Quetta.) 5th. (Mhow.) 6th. (Poona.) |
| Eastern | 7th. (Meerut.) 8th. (Lucknow.) |
| Directly under the Commander-in-Chief | 9th. (Secunderābād.) Burma. |
Each divisional command (excluding Burma) will, in the event of wholesale mobilization, supply a full division to take the field. Below the divisional organization comes that of brigades, details of which are given on pp. 366–7. It will thus be seen that the old Madras command has been abolished, being replaced by the independent Secunderābād division.
Subject to the control of the Crown exercised by the Secretary of State for India, the supreme authority over the army in India is vested in the Governor-General-in-Council. One of the members of Council, commonly called the ‘Military Member,’ formerly dealt directly with the administrative and financial business of the army, and was the medium for the submission to the Government of India of the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, who was, and still is, responsible for discipline and executive control. The post of Military Member dates from 1861, and the holder of it was always an officer of the British or Indian army. He presided over what was known as the Military Department : namely, the Military Secretariat of the Government of India, which had under it various executive departments. The Commander-in-Chief is practically always appointed to be an Extraordinary Member of Council, ranking there next after the Viceroy ; and being thus ‘in the Cabinet’ and superior in rank to the Military Member, he occupies a more important position than that formerly held by the Commander-in-Chief at home.
Since March, 1906, the system of administration of the army has been recast. The supreme authority still vests in the Governor-General-in-Council, subject to the control referred to above ; but the business connected with military affairs is now conducted through two Departments—the Army Department and the Department of Military Supply—which have taken the place of the former Military Department. The Army Department, in charge of the Commander-in-Chief, deals with all affairs concerning the army except those specially allotted to the Department of Military Supply, and also disposes of business connected with cantonments and the volunteers. The Department of Military Supply, which is in charge of an Ordinary Member of Council, deals with matters connected with important army contracts, and the supply and registration of transport animals ; and also controls the working of the departments of Ordnance, Remounts, Military Works, Army Clothing, and the Royal Indian Marine, as well as the military work of the Indian Medical Service. The Military Accounts department, formerly under the Military Department, has now become a branch of the Finance Department. A Secretary has been appointed to each of the Army and Military Supply Departments, with the usual powers of a Secretary to the Government of India.
The administrative departments under the Military Supply Department thus deal with supply and transport (in part) ; clothing ; ordnance ; medical stores ; and horse-breeding and remount work. The Military Works Services are also under the Military Supply Department, so far as the financial and technical side of their business is concerned.
Up to 1905 the Supply and Transport Corps, until recently known as the Commissariat Transport department, was entirely under the Military Department. The Military Supply Department is now responsible for the supply and storage in bulk of all provisions and stores, and for the registration and provision of transport animals and attendants. The executive control of the corps, the administration of transport units when formed, and questions relating to the distribution of stores to troops have, however, been transferred to the Commander-in-Chief. The officers of the corps are recruited from both the Indian and British armies. Between 1899 and 1904, ninety British officers were added to the corps. In its supply branch it deals with the food of the British troops and of the horses of British mounted corps, and with bedding, barrack, and hospital supplies ; in certain localities, too, this corps supplies native troops ; and it undertakes the whole of the supply of both British and native troops when on active service1. The recent reorganization of the transport has already been mentioned. This now consists of 21 mule corps, 18 cadres of mule corps, 9 silladār camel cadres, and 2 pony cart train cadres. A mule corps is commanded by a British officer, and is divided into two subdivisions, each in charge of a warrant officer. Those for use with cavalry brigades are divided into six draught and four pack troops, each under a daffadār, and have a total strength of 552 of all ranks, with 936 mules. Those for use with other arms are divided into nine pack troops, each under a daffadār, and have a total strength of 388 of all ranks, with 840 mules. Cadres of mule corps are commanded by a British officer, and maintain practically the full number of supervising and artificer establishments. They have, however, a much smaller number of mules. A silladār camel corps is commanded by a British officer, and is divided into four subdivisions, each in charge of a native officer. The total strength of the corps is 405 of all ranks, with 357 camels (augmented on mobilization to 1,068). Four camel corps have recently been raised in connexion with the grant of lands for colonization under the Chenāb Canal in the Punjab, camel-owners who receive such lands being required to keep a specified number of camels available for military service. Each transport corps and cadre has a fixed head-quarters station, situated where possible in the area whence additional animals would be drawn, and here reserves of gear and equipment are maintained. Reserves of drivers and artificers have been formed, and a large staff of officers is employed in the enumeration and registration of the animals available in case of war. Though the organization of the transport is of comparatively recent date, considerable success has been achieved, and some of the silladār camel corps were recently sent to Somāliland. The Army Clothing department, now under a separate Director, has factories and stores at Calcutta and Madras, whence clothing is supplied to the British army and the native infantry. Boots are manufactured at Messrs. Cooper, Allen & Co.’s factory at Cawnpore, which also supplies, direct, a large quantity of equipment to the native army.
The Ordnance department issues all munitions of war, and many kinds of military stores, for the army and volunteers. It also supplies arms and ammunition to the Imperial Service troops, the frontier militia, and the police. Large reserves of ammunition and military stores, siege trains, and engineer and ordnance field parks are maintained in the arsenals, of which there are nine, with four dépôts. The department is controlled by a Director-General of Ordnance, and is divided into northern and southern circles of supply with an Inspector-General at the head of each. The manufacturing establishments, which are in charge of an Inspector-General of Factories, are as follows: a gun and shell factory at Cossipore, near Calcutta; small-arm ammunition factories at Dum Dum in the same neighbourhood, and at Kirkee in the Bombay Presidency; a cordite factory at Wellington in the Nīlgiri Hills; a harness and saddlery factory at Cawnpore, and a similar but smaller institution at Madras; and a central gun-carriage factory at Jubbulpore (Central Provinces). A rifle factory and rolling mills at Ishapore (near Calcutta) are now at work; and when the manufacture of field guns at Cossipore is carried into effect, India will be practically independent of England for all war material except the heaviest guns.
The Military Accounts department is composed of officers drawn from the army, with a subordinate account and a clerical service, and has at its head an Accountant-General. It is charged with the duty of auditing army accounts and the compilation of the expenditure; and at present its principal officers are four Controllers of Military Accounts, stationed at Calcutta, Poona, Madras, and Rāwalpindi, each of whom is assisted by a staff of paying, auditing, and accountant officers. As stated above, the Military Accounts department is now under the control of the Finance Department.
The Medical Store department, which is administered by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, maintains medical store dépôts at Lahore, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Rangoon, containing all kinds of medical stores and hospital equipments. At these dépôts, except that at Rangoon, which is a supply dépôt only, drugs of various kinds and medicines are manufactured. The Director-General, Indian Medical Service is under the Home Department as regards civil duties; but he is also the adviser of the Military Supply Department on all questions relating to the Indian Medical Service and the Indian subordinate medical department. It may be mentioned here that the Indian Medical Service is primarily a military service; but while each unit in the native army has a medical officer from this service attached to it, and certain commands and military districts have drawn their administrative medical officers from the same source, a large number of the members of the service are employed in civil duties, a considerable proportion being held available for military duty when active service requires their presence.
The Remount department, under a Director-General, deals with the breeding and supply of horses for the army. There are five remount dépôts, at Sahāranpur and Hāpur (United Provinces), Mona (Punjab), Ahmadnagar (Bombay), and Hosūr (Madras). The control of horse, mule, and donkey-breeding in certain selected Districts of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Baluchistān and Sind, and the Bombay Deccan has been transferred from the Civil Veterinary to the Army Remount department; outside these areas the former department continues to control breeding. The system is to purchase young stock at an early age, and rear them on Government runs. Australian horses are also imported, for the British mounted services chiefly, while Arabs are likewise obtained for cavalry in limited numbers. Country-bred horses, on which the native cavalry are mainly mounted, have been improved in the last thirty years, and are superior in hardiness and endurance to the Australian.
Officers of the Royal Engineers in India are primarily employed on military works, with the native sappers and miners, in the submarine mining corps, and on the army staff. A considerable number are also employed in the Public Works and other civil departments, and would, in the event of mobilization, be drawn upon for the requirements of the army. The Director-General of Military Works, who deals with fortifications, defences, and military works generally, is in that capacity under the Military Supply Department, but he is also head of the Royal Engineers in India and the adviser of the Commander-in-Chief on technical questions.
The Head-Quarters Staff of the army, which is directly under the Commander-in-Chief as such, comprises the following chief staff officers : the Chief of the Staff, the Quartermaster-General, the Adjutant-General, the Principal Medical Officer, His Majesty’s Forces, and the Military Secretary. Each of these officers has various deputies and assistants.
The Chief of the Staff deals with questions of military policy ; the organization and distribution of the army, and its preparation for war ; intelligence ; mobilization ; plans of operations ; the higher training and education of the army ; and manœuvres. The Quartermaster-General is responsible for the organization, training, and administration of the Transport, Veterinary, and Supply services ; the accommodation and movements of troops, and questions relating to cantonments. The Adjutant-General is concerned with recruiting, and the discipline, training, education, and equipment of units.
The Principal Medical Officer, His Majesty’s Forces in India, is the responsible adviser of the Commander-in-Chief on all points connected with the health, the sanitary arrangements, and the medical institutions of troops. He is the head of that portion of the Military Medical Service in India which comprises the officers of the Army Medical Staff and Royal Army Medical Corps, who come out to India for a term of duty (usually five years), and those officers of the Indian Medical Service, and members of the Indian subordinate medical department (military assistant-surgeons and hospital assistants), who are on military duty. He also controls the Army Hospital and Army Bearer Corps, and Queen Alexandra’s military nursing service for India, consisting of eighty-four nursing sisters. Each command has a special sanitary officer, whose duties are to investigate the causes of disease, to give practical advice in sanitary matters, and to carry out scientific investigations ; and there is a similar officer at Army Head-Quarters.
The Military Secretary deals with appointments, promotions, exchanges, and retirements.
Since 1895 the powers of the Commander-in-Chief as such have been much extended, while at the same time he has been freed from a good deal of petty business. For filling up the higher commands and staff appointments, the approval of the Secretary of State for India is required, besides that of the Governor-General-in-Council; and in the case of British service officers the concurrence of the Army Council has to be obtained for all appointments of any consequence. Minor staff and regimental posts, again, are dealt with by the Lieutenant-Generals of the commands, and the Military Supply Member has the right of appointment in the departments subordinate to him; but subject to these exceptions, all important army patronage vests in the Commander-in-Chief, and much of the business that formerly used to go before the Government of India is now dealt with at Army Head-Quarters. The Commander-in-Chief's direct financial powers are limited to sanctioning expenditure not provided by regulations up to a limit of Rs. 50,000 a year.
The Lieutenant-Generals of the main commands are each assisted by an army and departmental staff, the principal officers in which are the following: Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel on the Staff (Brigadier-General) for Royal Artillery, Chief Engineer, Principal Medical Officer, Inspector-General of Ordnance (two for the former four commands), and Inspector of Supply and Transport. The Controller of Military Accounts in each command is also the financial adviser of the Lieutenant-General of the command.
The local heads of the Army departments carry on their duties under the general regulations applicable to the department, but in their executive work act under the Lieutenant-General of the command.
Each of the four commands formerly existing was divided into first and second class military districts as follows :—
Punjab Command.
Three first-class districts: Lahore, Peshāwar, and Rāwalpindi. Three second-class districts: Derajāt, Kohāt, and Sirhind.
Bengal Command.
Two first-class districts: Meerut and Oudh. Six second-class disrticts: Assam, Presidency, Allahābād, Bundelkhand, Rohilkhand, and Nerbudda.
Bombay Command.
Three first-class districts: Mhow, Poona, and Quetta. Five second-class districts: Aden, Bombay, Deesa, Sind, and Nāgpur.
Madras Command.
One first-class district: Secunderābād. Four second-class districts: Bangalore, Madras, Southern, and Belgaum.
Adding the Mandalay second-class district in Burma, we get in all 9 ordinary first-class and 19 second-class districts.
The reorganization scheme referred to on pages 359–60 has, however, materially altered the distribution of military districts and their component stations, and the former have been rearranged so that each may supply a brigade on mobilization. The present arrangement is as shown below; but eventually each division outside Burma will be constituted so as to comprise one cavalry and three infantry brigades for mobilization, besides the necessary divisional troops (artillery, sappers, pioneers, &c.), and a sufficient garrison force for the maintenance of internal order:—
| Division. | Brigades. | Former military Districts comprised in new Division1. |
|---|---|---|
| 1st. Peshāwar | Naushahra (infantry) Naushahra (cavalry) | Peshāwar. |
| 2nd. Rāwalpindi | Abbottābād Jhelum Siālkot (cavalry) | Rāwalpindi. |
| 3rd. Lahore | Jullundur Sirhind Ambāla (cavalry) Ferozepore | Lahore and Sirhind. |
| 4th. Quetta | Karāchi | Quetta and Sind. |
| 5th. Mhow | Nasīrābād Jubbulpore Jhānsi | Mhow, Deesa, Nāgpur, Nerbudda, and Bundelkhand. |
| 6th. Poona | Bombay Ahmadnagar Belgaum | Poona, Bombay, and Belgaum. |
| 7th. Meerut | Bareilly Garhwāl Meerut (cavalry) | Meerut and Rohilkhand. |
| 8th. Lucknow | Allahābād Fyzābād Presidency (Calcutta) Assam | Oudh, Allahābād, Presidency, and Assam. |
| 9th. Secunderābād. | Bangalore (cavalry) „ (infantry) Secunderābād (cavalry) „ (infantry) Madras Southern | Secunderābād, Bangalore, Madras, and Southern. |
| Burma . . | { Mandalay . . Rangoon . . | } Mandalay. |
| Independent brigades — Northern command. | { Kohāt. . . Derajāt . . Bannu . . | Kohāt. } Derajāt. |
| " Western command. | } Aden . . . | Aden. |
The distribution and organization of the army in 1906 is shown in Appendix I.
The officer commanding a division is ordinarily a major-general, while the brigades are commanded according to their importance by major-generals, brigadier-generals, or colonels on the staff. The divisional commanders have been entrusted with wide powers, thus relieving the Lieutenant-Generals of commands of much routine work and setting them free for a more thorough inspection of their troops.
The head-quarters staffs of divisions and brigades are amalgamated, i.e. they all belong to one department, the Adjutant-General's; but certain officers perform routine duties; others those relating to training and preparation for war, e.g. armament, instruction, and organization; and others again those relating to maintenance and movement, e.g. camps and mobilization.
Commands and army staff appointments are as a rule divided equally between the British and Indian services; but certain classes of appointments are generally reserved to Indian officers, e.g. those in the Military Accounts, Remounts, and Judge Advocate-General's departments. The maximum number of general officers of the Indian army is limited to 3 generals, 5 lieutenant-generals, and 22 major-generals. Promotion is by selection to fill a general officer's appointment, or as a reward for distinguished service.
Officers in India must either have obtained a staff college certificate or have qualified for promotion to field rank and passed the higher standard examination in Hindustāni, in order to attain to the staff. The establishment of an Indian Staff College at Quetta has been sanctioned2, and measures have been taken to improve the regimental training of officers. There are special veterinary, signalling, supply, transport, pioneer, explosives, and gymnastic classes, while engineer officers can go through courses of instruction in submarine mining and in telegraphy. The general tactical training of the army is carried on by means of annual field training, and by manœuvres on varying scales.
The organization and interior economy of the units of the British army serving in India are similar to those of the units at home; the arms, equipment, and uniform are the same generally, but khaki drill (red or blue serge in the cold weather) and lighter helmets are worn. Every unit has an establishment of native followers, including a quartermaster's establishment of lascars for the care of tents, pakhālis (water-carriers with bullocks), sweepers, &c., and a ‘conservancy’ establishment of bhistis (water-carriers), sweepers, and carts. Mounted units have, in addition, native artificers and ‘syces’ (grooms). Every unit has camp equipage in its charge, and can usually move at a few hours’ notice.
The authorized strengths of the units of the British army serving in India are as follows:—
| Unit. | Officers. | Warrant N.-C. officers and men. | Total. | Native N.-C. officers and men, additional. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry regiment . . . | 29 | 599 | 628 | ... |
| Horse or field battery . . | 5 | 157 | 162 | 7–9 |
| Howitzer field battery . . | 5 | 180 | 185 | 11 |
| Heavy battery (half horsed) . | 5 | 91 | 96 | 104 |
| ” ” (bullock draught) | 5 | 89 | 94 | 110 |
| Mountain battery . . | 5 | 129 | 134 | 197 |
| Garrison company . . | 5 | 140 | 145 | ... |
| Infantry battalion . . | 29 | 1,005 | 1,034 | ... |
The composition of the regular native army is very varied. As already explained, regiments are organized either on the ‘class,’ or on the ‘class squadron’ or ‘class company,’ system. In the former case, as in Gurkha regiments, they are all of one class; in the latter case four companies may (for example) be Sikhs, two Panjābi Musalmāns, and two Pathāns. About one-third of the regiments are on the ‘class’ system.
The principal races and castes enlisted in the regiments of the various commands are as follows:—
Northern command—Pathāns and Panjābi Muhammadans, Sikhs, Dogrās, and some Gurkhas.
Eastern command—Hindustāni Muhammadans, Brāhmans, Rājputs, Jāts, Gurkhas, Garhwālis.
Secunderābād division—Muhammadans of the Punjab and of Madras (including Moplahs), Tamils, Sikhs, and Hindus of the Punjab.
Western command—Muhammadans of the Deccan, Rājputāna, and the Punjab; Pathāns and Baluchis; Marāthās; and Hindus from Rājputāna and Hindustān.
Burma division—Muhammadans from the Punjab, Sikhs, and Gurkhas.
The recruiting of the native army is now largely undertaken by recruiting staff officers who are permanently allotted to particular areas, but (in the cavalry especially) men often join through the agency of their relatives and friends. Enlistment is for general service, within or without British territories, and beyond sea if necessary. The age of enlistment is from sixteen to twenty-five years; and the standard of height for dismounted services is 5 feet 4 inches, except in the case of Gurkhas, who are accepted at 5 feet. The height for cavalry recruits is at the discretion of the Officer Commanding the regiment. In times of peace the soldier may take his discharge after three years' service.
Cavalry regiments and infantry battalions are organized in four squadrons or double companies, each commanded by a British officer, who is responsible to the Commandant for the training and efficiency and everything connected with his squadron or double company. A junior British officer is also, as a rule, attached to each squadron or double company. An adjutant and a quartermaster are allowed for each unit.
Native officers, termed risāldārs and ressaidārs in the cavalry and sūbahdārs in the infantry, command each half-squadron or company, and all orders to the native ranks are issued through them. The senior of them has the title of risāldār-major or sūbahdār-major. They are assisted by a junior native officer, called a jemadār; and a jemadār is also allowed to assist the British adjutant.
The authorized strengths of the units of the native army are as follows:—
| Unit. | British officers. | Native officers. | Native N.-C. officers and men. | Total. | British N.-C. officers, additional. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry regiment . . | 15 | 17 | 608 | 640 | ... |
| Mountain battery | 5 | 3 | 323 | 331 | ... |
| Frontier garrison artillery . | 3 | 3 | 272 | 278 | ... |
| Company sappers and miners | 2 | 3 | 189 | 194 | 2 |
| Military railway company . | 1 | 3 | 193 | 197 | 1 |
| Infantry battalion recruited in the Madras Presidency . | 13 | 16 | 584 | 613 | ... |
| Infantry battalion recruited elsewhere than in the Madras Presidency . . | 15 | 16 | 896 | 927 | ... |
The powers of commanding officers of native regiments are considerable, but it is held by many authorities that they could be increased with advantage. They can make promotions in the non-commissioned ranks, but appointment to or promotion in the commissioned grade can only be recommended to superior authority. They have, however, no power to reduce or discharge non-commissioned officers, or to discharge men (save in the case of cavalry men who fail to become good riders), such as existed for some years after the Mutiny. These powers are exercised by the officer commanding the brigade, while the Lieutenant-General of the command has the power of dismissing or discharging a native officer. The commanding officer of any corps or detachment has, however, a large power in the ‘summary court martial,’ which may be held by him alone, ‘attended’ only by British or native officers, and may try most military offences. Such a court martial may pass any sentence allowed by the articles of war, except death, transportation, or imprisonment for more than a year, and may carry it out at once. Corporal punishment not exceeding fifty lashes may be given for certain offences, but is rarely awarded, and the amount of military crime is, on the whole, very small in the native army. The native officers have power to inflict minor punishments.
The pay of the officers of the Indian army is on two lines, pay of rank plus pay of appointment. The pay of rank rises from Rs. 225 monthly as lieutenant to Rs. 827 as lieutenant-colonel. The pay of appointment in native regiments rises from Rs. 150 to Rs. 700 in cavalry, and from Rs. 100 to Rs. 600 in infantry regiments. Thus the total pay of a lieutenant of cavalry and squadron officer would be Rs. 375, and of a lieutenant and double-company officer of infantry Rs. 325 monthly. The staff pay attached to non-regimental appointments rises to Rs. 1,000 monthly, but the pay of the higher staff appointments and commands is consolidated.
The promotion of officers of the Indian army continues to be regulated by a time scale which gives nine years as lieutenant; nine years as captain, and eight years as major, promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel being thus attainable after twenty-six years’ service. Promotion is in all cases subject to the required professional examinations being passed satisfactorily. Accelerated promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel is, however, allowed in the case of a major selected for the command of a regiment or battalion, or for certain prescribed staff or administrative appointments. A lieutenant-colonel who has held for three years such a command or appointment may be promoted to the brevet or substantive rank of colonel. Otherwise, six years' service in the rank of lieutenant-colonel is required before promotion. The rank of colonel does not carry any increase of emoluments in India. The tenure of regimental commands is now ordinarily for five years, which may be extended to seven. A regimental officer appointed to the staff or to a military department for any but a brief period is seconded in his regiment. If permanently appointed to civil or political employ, he is struck off the roll of his regiment and, after ten years, off the effective list of the army, rising on a supernumerary list to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but no higher.
Hindustāni may be regarded as the common language of the Indian army; but officers have to pass not only the higher standard examination in this, but also an examination in the language mostly used by the men of their corps : e.g. Hindī, Marāthī, Parbattia, Punjabi, Pashtū, Persian, or Tamil.
One of the great difficulties in Indian army organization is the supply of officers. As has been shown, the establishment has been increased lately, but in the event of a serious war a further large addition would be required. There is a small body of reserve officers in India, drawn from civil life and from the volunteers, but this would prove quite insufficient.
In early days the pay of the sepoy was Rs. 5 per mensem, but the batta or allowances varied in different parts of the country. At the end of the eighteenth century, the general monthly pay was Rs. 7, which was increased to Rs. 9 in 1895. A non-silladār cavalry sowār receives Rs. 2, and a native gunner R. 1, more than the infantry sepoy. A silladār sowār receives Rs. 31 a month, out of which he has to provide and maintain everything except his rifle, including transport and camp equipage. Pay is supplemented by compensation for dearness of provisions. This has varied in detail in the different Presidencies; but the general principle is that when the chief articles of what is supposed to be a sufficient ration rise in price above a total of Rs. 3½ per mensem for combatants or Rs. 2½ for followers, the Government steps in and pays the excess. The plan has some defects and many alterations in detail have been tried, but in its general lines it is well understood and appreciated by the men. Silladār cavalry soldiers are also protected from loss, if the price of forage for their horses and transport animals rules high.
Extra pay, called 'good-service pay,' is given to non-commissioned officers as a reward for efficiency, zeal, and good conduct; and soldiers whose behaviour has been exemplary receive similar encouragement in the shape of 'good-conduct pay.' Batta is also given when marching or in the field, and when transport is not provided by the state. Pensions (Rs. 4 monthly for a sepoy) are given after twenty-one years' service, and at superior rates after thirty-two years' meritorious service. There are also scales of gratuities for less periods, and pensions for wounds and injuries. Family pensions, granted to the son, widow, daughter, father, or mother of a soldier killed, or dying, on foreign service, form a special feature in the pay system of the native army.
Two 'Orders' are specially reserved for the native army. The 'Order of British India,' conferred on native commissioned officers for long, faithful, and honourable service, has two classes (Sardār Bahādur and Bahādur), with allowances attached. The 'Indian Order of Merit' is given for personal bravery, irrespective of rank or service. It is in three classes, with monthly pay attached.
The uniform of the native army is serge for the cold weather and parade, with khaki drill for ordinary work or active service. The colour of the uniform varies. The artillery wear blue and the sappers red, assimilated to the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer colours, respectively. The infantry wear serge tunics, blouses, or jackets—red, dark green, blue, or drab—with knickerbockers and putties or gaiters, and ankle boots. The native infantry are armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle, and the cavalry with this rifle and with swords and lances.
The auxiliary forces are the volunteers, the Imperial Service troops, militia, and levies, and the military police.
The volunteers of India may be classed under the head of British forces. They existed in the early days of the British occupation as militia at the chief settlements. They were allowed to die out in the first years of the nineteenth century; but a volunteer corps was raised for the Straits Settlements, then under the Government of India, in 1854, and several corps were enrolled during the Mutiny, some of which did excellent service. Since that time the volunteer force has steadily developed, and now consists of sixty-one corps with a total strength, including reservists, of about 34,000, of whom 32,000 are efficient. Calcutta and Rangoon possess portdefence corps, which comprise naval, artillery, and electrical engineer units, and in the case of Calcutta a submarine mining unit. There are seven cavalry or light horse corps, five corps of garrison artillery, and four corps of mounted rifles ; and twelve ordinary rifle corps have detachments of mounted rifles. The Bombay and the Karāchi garrison artillery corps have electrical engineer companies, and the East Indian Railway rifle corps includes an ordinary engineer company. Thirteen rifle corps are recruited from railway employés, forming valuable bodies for the defence of their respective railways. The ordinary rifle corps number thirty, including cadet battalions. There are also reserve companies, but the formation of a volunteer reserve has made very slight progress since this measure was introduced in 1889, the numbers at present being under 1,700. The organization of volunteer corps follows that of the British army, from which the adjutants and sergeant-instructors are detailed. Rifle corps are armed with magazine rifles ; cavalry and artillery units with carbines. The rôle of the volunteers being the defence of ports, railways, cantonments, and civil stations, their equipment is limited accordingly.
All volunteer corps are under the general officers of the military areas to which they belong, and they are occasionally brigaded with regular troops. Junior officers are elected by the corps, but promotion or appointment to the rank of captain is made by the Local Government, which also appoints field officers. Commanding officers are appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council on the recommendation of the Local Government. The inspection of volunteers throughout India is vested in a general officer (the Inspector-General of Volunteers), who is directly under the Adjutant-General.
The origin of the Imperial Service troops has already been given. The authorized strength is a little over 18,000 : namely, cavalry 7,100, artillery 421, sappers 570, infantry 9,384, camel corps 665, besides six transport corps and two signalling units ; and they are furnished by most of the important Native States. The cavalry consists of 17 corps varying in size. Gwalior furnishes three regiments, Hyderābād and Jodhpur two each, and Mysore, Patiāla, and Alwar one each. Kashmīr has two mountain batteries. The sappers are furnished by Sirmūr Farīdkot, and Māler Kotla ; the infantry by Kashmīr, the Punjab States, Alwar, Bharatpur, and Gwalior. Bīkaner supplies a camel corps 500 strong, and the transport corps are furnished by Jaipur, Gwalior, Bharatpur, Mysore, Indore, and Bahāwalpur, while the last-named state has an escort of 165 riflemen.
The cost of the Imperial Service troops is borne by the Native States, the charges for the British inspecting staff (an Inspector-General assisted by a Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General for Musketry and nineteen other officers) falling on the revenues of British India. The troops, though available for Imperial service when placed at the disposal of the British Government by their rulers, belong absolutely to the States, and are recruited from their subjects. Their armament is the same as that of our native army, and in training, discipline, and efficiency they have reached a high standard of excellence. They have recently won commendation in China and Somāliland, and have also done good service on the north-west frontier and in garrison. The Kashmīr Imperial Service troops now garrison Gilgit.
The Imperial Cadet Corps, organized by Lord Curzon, consists of about twenty young men of noble birth who have been educated at the Chiefs' Colleges. The object is to give a military training to these youths, so that they may take their places as officers in the Imperial army and furnish trained officers to the Imperial Service troops. The cadets have British officers as commandant and adjutant, and also a native adjutant. The course of instruction lasts between two and three years, and the cadets are taught military exercises and military science. The head-quarters of the corps are at Meerut in the cold weather and at Dehra Dūn in the hot season.
The reorganization of the existing militia corps on the north-west frontier, and the creation of new corps, formed a necessary part of the plan above referred to (p. 356) of withdrawing the regular troops from advanced frontier posts, and employing the local tribes in military service to guard these posts, regular troops being concentrated at main positions in support.
These corps are mainly employed under the Agent to the Governor-General in the Frontier Province, and consist of two battalions of Khyber Rifles, under one commandant, two battalions of Kurram militia, and the North and South Wazīristān militia, supplemented by certain tribal levies : namely, the Chitrāli Scouts, and the Dīr, Swāt, Chitrāl, and Bhittāni levies. The Zhob Levy Corps (horse and foot) is under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistān. All these bodies of militia and levies are for service on the frontier and in tribal country. The militia number in all about 6,000 men, and are armed with Martini-Henry rifles and equipped in much the same way as the regular army, but with only two or three officers per battalion. They are entirely under the civil power, except when associated in war service with the regular troops, when they come under the officer commanding these. The levies number about 5,700 men, and are ordinarily commanded by native officers. They are generally armed with Snider rifles and carbines, except in the case of the local Baluchistān levies, who find their own arms.
The military police consist of the Sāmāna Rifles and border military police of the North-West Frontier Province; a border military police corps in Dera Ghāzi Khān District, under the Punjab Government; six battalions in Assam, and fourteen in Burma; but some of the Assam corps are not of the strength of an ordinary battalion. The military police are distributed as follows (in round numbers): —
| Frontier Province and Punjab | 3,000 |
| Assam | 3,000 |
| Burma | 15,500 |
| Total | 21,500 |
The military police in the Frontier Province are officered by military civilians or police officers; the Assam battalions are commanded by officers of the army. These corps occupy the frontier outposts and stockades. The Burma military police garrison frontier and other posts: ten battalions are stationed in Upper Burma, two in the Shan States, and two in Lower Burma. Well organized, commanded by officers of the Indian army, and constituted of the best material, they are, in fact, soldiers as well as police. The armament of the military police is generally the Martini-Henri rifle.
Besides the Imperial Service troops, the Native States maintain, according to their position, large or small bodies of soldiers as local military forces. These number collectively about 16,000 cavalry, 7,000 artillery, and 70,000 infantry, or 93,000 in all, with many guns; but, with some exceptions, they are of little military value, and are armed with smooth-bore muskets, while the guns are smooth-bore and few are movable. Gwalior, Hyderābād, and Kashmīr have fairly good troops, while the forces of the Sikh and Rājputāna States contain capital material.
A few words may be added about the Nepāl and Afghān armies. The Nepāl army consists of about 45,000 men, regular and irregular, including 2,500 artillery, with about 900 guns; the troops are armed with Snider and Martini-Henry rifles and smooth-bores manufactured in Nepāl. The military system is on a voluntary basis, with a short service of three years and liability to recall. There are practically no cavalry. A much larger army could be raised in Nepāl if circumstances required it.
The standing army of Afghānistān consists of between 65,000 and 70,000 regular troops: that is, troops which are organized in regiments on a plan somewhat similar to that obtaining in the Indian army, and formed into brigades and divisions. The irregulars, about 20,000 in number, comprise the mounted levies of the chiefs and the khāsādārs or foot levies who perform police work. The armament consists of Lee-Metford, Martini-Henry, Snider, and Enfield rifles, machine-guns, and rifled guns, besides others of smooth-bore pattern. Munitions of war are manufactured and stored at Kābul. The strength of Afghānistān lies in the warlike instincts of the inhabitants generally. Every adult Afghān is a fighting man, and, if furnished with a rifle and allowed to fight in his own way, would be a formidable enemy.
Having thus dealt briefly with the various constituents of the army in India, something must be said regarding mobilization and the defences. The plan of mobilization in India has hitherto been based on the preparation of a ‘Field army,’ the ordinary ‘commands’ being merely territorial. The organization of the field army was made up of units, told off in divisions and brigades, from particular stations. A division consists of three infantry brigades of four battalions each; divisional troops of cavalry, artillery, and sappers; a cavalry brigade; ammunition columns; ordnance and engineer field parks; field hospitals, &c., with a total strength of about 15,000 troops. There are also large reserves of supplies and stores in charge of the Supply and Transport Corps, and at arsenals. As above indicated (p. 366), the new system now in process of development contemplates the rearrangement of the army (outside Burma) in nine divisional commands, so that each may supply a full division for field service in addition to providing the number of troops which would still be necessary for internal security.
Units go on service at a lower strength than the peace establishment. Thus, an ordinary native infantry battalion is 912 strong; but as it has to leave the sick and unfit behind at its dépôt, its field-service strength is fixed at 752, the reservists of the native army being used to form, with the dépôts of mobilized battalions, ‘reserve battalions’ at the regimental centres. These battalions supply drafts to the battalions on service, and enlist and train recruits. The transport organization has already been mentioned. The more this is expanded, and the greater the number of the excellent transport trains furnished by Native States, the more perfect and complete will mobilization be.
Great strides have been made between 1885 and 1903 in the frontier and coast defences of India. A total of £11,000,000 has been spent on strategic railways, roads, and defences, the cost of the last being somewhat over £3,000,000. On the frontier, the main passes have been secured and strategical points in rear strongly fortified, while the ports have been furnished with adequate defences.
Information as to military expenditure at different periods from 1876 will be found in chap. vi (Finance), and it will be sufficient to quote the following figures here. They give the net total of ordinary charges, including pensions, &c., and outlay on military works:—
| 1881-2. | 1891-2. | 1901-2. | 1902-3. | 1904-5. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total net expenditure, in crores of rupees | 17·9 | 22·6 | 23·6 | 25·9 | 30·2 |
The expenditure in the last-mentioned year represented 46 per cent. of the net revenue of the Government of India as shown in Table II appended to chapter vi (ante, p. 201).
The main causes of increase in army expenditure are larger numbers, improvements of all kinds, the rise in prices and wages, the increased cost of equipments and war material, and the enhancement in the pay of British and native troops.
In 1895 a Royal Commission was constituted to inquire into Indian expenditure, and the apportionment of charges between England and India. They reported in 1900, and recommended, among other things, that half the military charge for Aden, and half the cost of the transport of troops to and from India, should be borne by the Imperial Government1. The question of payment for Indian troops employed out of India had been under discussion for many years; and the Commission held that ordinarily all charges in respect to troops lent must be borne by the country which had a special interest in the expedition, but that if the country supplying the troops had also a direct and substantial interest, it should bear a portion of the burden. The question of geographical distribution was laid down, and the various possible theatres of operations were examined. It was held that India had no direct and substantial interest in the employment of forces in Europe, in Africa west of the Cape of Good Hope, or in Eastern Asia; but that she had a direct and substantial interest in keeping open the Suez Canal, and in the maintenance of order in Egypt as affecting the Canal. These principles were accepted, and now regulate the incidence of charges in respect of troops supplied by the Indian Government for Imperial needs: thus the whole cost of the Indian troops sent to South Africa in 1899, and to China in 1900, was borne by the Home Government. The capitation and other charges for which India is liable on account of the training, transport, and pensions of the British troops she employs have been already referred to on p. 343.
The Indian army has played a considerable part in Imperial policy, from early days down to the most recent dates. Its soldiers have crossed the seas to fight for Britain; they have cheerfully endured hardship in remote lands where everything has been strange and unhallowed to them; and in the late campaigns in China and South Africa India has shown how much she contributes to the military strength of the Empire.
In this sketch has been traced the rise, from an initial handful of half-trained retainers, of a great Eastern military power. It has been shown that many causes combined to impair its strength, and led to disaster; and, following this, the history of a new army has been told. The lessons we may learn are clear enough. For the external defence of India, and to be able to render assistance to the empire at large, the Indian army must be prepared at all points, ready to act, and organized for expansion. For the internal security of India, the greatest weight must be given to the composition of the native army, to the avoidance of homogeneity, the employment of the European population as an auxiliary force, and perfect readiness to maintain order. During the first twenty years after the Mutiny the labours of administrators were directed to the reconstruction of a large portion of the native army and to the reorganization of the whole, and economy was more regarded than perfect efficiency. In the period that has followed great progress has been made in administration, organization, mobilization, and defence. India has entered on a new phase of connexion with Imperial politics; and successive administrations from Lord Lytton to Lord Curzon have carried out a continuous policy of preparation and defence, enunciated by the distinguished men who have filled the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member of Council, among whom Sir Donald Stewart, Lord Roberts, Sir George Chesney, and Lord Kitchener deserve special mention1.
Bibliography
Captain Williams.—Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Native Infantry from its Formation to 1796 (1817). Captain Broome.—History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army (Calcutta, 1850). Lieutenant Cardew.—Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army (Calcutta, 1903). Major Stubbs.—History of the Bengal Artillery (1877–95). Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson.—History of the Madras Army (Madras, 1882–9). Sir J. B. Kaye and Colonel G. B. Malleson.—History of the Indian Mutiny (1898). Sir J. B. Kaye.—Lives of Indian Officers (1875). Colonel Malleson.—History of the French in India (1868). General Stuart Beatson.—History of the Imperial Service Troops of Native States (Calcutta, 1904). Sir George Chesney.—Indian Polity, chapters xii to xvi (1894). Army Book for the British Empire (1893).
APPENDIX I
Army Statistics, January 1, 1906
| Commands, &c. | British Army. | Native Army. | Auxiliary Forces. | |||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry regiments. | Horse artillery batteries. | Field and howitzer batteries. | Heavy batteries. | Mountain batteries. | Garrison companies. | Mobile guns. | Infantry battalions. | Cavalry regiments. | Mountain batteries. | Frontier garrison artillery. | Mobile guns. | Sapper and miner companies. | Submarine mining companies and sections. | Military railway companies. | Infantry battalions. | Volunteer corps. | Imperial Service corps. | Militia battalions. | Military police battalions. | |
| Northern command . | 3 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 120 | 14 | 15 | 9 | 1 | 54 | 3 | ... | 1 | 45 | 61 | 41 | 6 | 21 |
| Eastern „ . | 3 | 3 | 10 | 1 | ... | 7 | 82 | 15 | 6 | ... | ... | ... | 6 | 1 | ... | 22 | ||||
| Western „ . | 1 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 146 | 14 | 17 | ... | ... | ... | 7 | 3 | 1 | 42 | ||||
| Secunderābād division | 2 | 2 | 8 | ... | ... | 1 | 60 | 5 | 2 | ... | ... | ... | 9 | ... | ... | 24 | ||||
| Burma „ . | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2 | ... | 4 | ... | 2 | ... | 12 | 1 | 1 | ... | 7 | ||||
| TOTAL | 9 | 11 | 45 | 6 | 8 | 22 | 408 | 52 | 40 | 11 | 1 | 66 | 26 | 5 | 2 | 140 | 61 | 41 | 6 | 21 |
| Commands, &c. | British. | Native. | Grand Total, British and Native troops. | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry. | Artillery. | Royal Engineers. | Infantry. | Total. | Cavalry. | Artillery, including those with Brit. units. | Sappers and miners and I.S. Mule corps. | Railway companies. | Infantry. | Total. | ||
| Northern command . | 1,884 | 3,708 | 10 | 14,494 | 20,096 | 9,420 | 4,496 | 582 | 197 | 41,669 | 56,364 | 76,460 |
| Eastern „ . | 1,884 | 3,425 | 52 | 15,516 | 20,877 | 3,950 | 483 | 1,088 | … | 20,363 | 25,884 | 46,761 |
| Western „ . | 628 | 5,516 | 82 | 14,482 | 20,708 | 10,562 | 1,155 | 1,421 | 197 | 34,266 | 47,601 | 68,309 |
| Secunderābād division | 1,256 | 1,877 | 34 | 5,170 | 8,337 | 1,307 | 311 | 1,071 | … | 18,761 | 21,450 | 29,787 |
| Burma „ . | … | 298 | 32 | 4,136 | 4,466 | … | 654 | 243 | … | 6,147 | 7,044 | 11,510 |
| TOTAL | 5,652 | 14,824 | 210 | 53,798 | 74,484 | 25,239 | 7,099 | 4,405 | 394 | 121,206 | 158,343 | 232,827 |
The reserves and auxiliary forces numbered approximately 111,500, made up as shown below :— British (volunteers) . . . . . . . 34,000 Native. { Reserves of regular army . . . . . 27,500 Native. { Imperial Service troops . . . . . 18,000 Native. { Military police battalions . . . . . 17,500 Native. { Frontier militia and levies . . . . . 14,500† 111,500
APPENDIX II
The Royal Indian Marine
As the Royal Indian Marine is, administratively, under the Military Supply Department of the Government of India, it is desirable to add a brief account of this service.
The East India Company necessarily began its existence as a maritime body, and its ships soon became vessels of war as well as of trade. The armed naval force of the Company was created by the charters of Charles II and James II, but it was not till 1829 that the Bombay fleet was united with that of Calcutta and became the Indian Navy. The Indian naval force performed its duties with great efficiency and distinction. It fought with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French, and with pirates and slave-traders in every Eastern sea. It co-operated with the Royal Navy on various occasions, and an Indian naval squadron was for some time associated with that navy in the China seas.
The Indian Navy was abolished in 1862, for reasons of economy, and because it was thought that the naval defence of India should be entrusted to the Royal Navy. The ‘Bombay Marine’ was then created, and was eventually amalgamated with the ‘Bengal Marine’ in 1877 under the title of ‘Her Majesty's Indian Marine,’ changed in 1892 to ‘Royal Indian Marine.’ Its duties were to be the local transport of troops and stores, the guarding of convict settlements, the suppression of piracy, marine surveys, and the protection of the ports. In 1891 the turret ships, torpedo vessels, and gunboats belonging to the Indian Marine were transferred to the Admiralty. The Indian Marine has developed in the course of years into a highly efficient force, which has done admirable service in numerous expeditions over-sea and in scientific surveys. Its officers are appointed by the Secretary of State, from qualified officers of the mercantile marine; they hold rank as in the Royal Navy up to that of commander, and wear a somewhat similar uniform. The establishment of officers in 1904 was 26 commanders, 64 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, 10 chief engineers, and 61 engineers and assistant-engineers, in addition to the Marine Survey establishment.
The fleet consisted in that year of eleven sea-going vessels (troopships, surveying vessels, and a dispatch boat), four inland river steamers, and many smaller steamers and launches; and armaments are available for the equipment of the vessels for war and service. There are excellent dockyards at Bombay and Calcutta. The service has at its head a Director, usually a naval officer, with head-quarters at Bombay, and a Deputy-Director at Calcutta. Officers of the Indian Marine are also employed as Port Officers at the various Indian ports. The Marine Survey department referred to in chapter xv is under the Director of the Royal Indian Marine, and is ordinarily manned by Indian Marine officers. The trooping between India and England is carried out mainly by hired transports, Indian Marine vessels being occasionally used. India pays a subsidy of £100,000 annually for the up-keep of certain ships of the East India squadron, which are not to be employed beyond particular limits except with the consent of the Government of India.
Notes
- 1. Silladār means ‘bearer of weapons.’
- *. Including Company's European troops.
- †. Including irregulars, and local units not in 'forces' or 'contingents.'
- 1. For statistics, see Vol. I, chap. x (Public Health, &c.).
- 1. In 1904 it was decided gradually to increase the native army reserve to 50,000.
- 1. In times of peace native troops usually provide their own food.
- 1. These correspondences are approximate only.
- 2. Pending the completion of buildings at Quetta, instruction was begun at Deolāli in 1905.
- 1. This principle has been applied in practice by the Home Government contributing annually £100,000 for Aden, and £130,000 on account of the transport service.
- 1. To these names should be added that of Sir Edwin Collen, late Military Member, who has contributed the material for the present chapter, and who bore a long-sustained and distinguished part in the organization of the Indian army on its present basis.
- *. These figures represent the full strength of the army, and include the units serving out of India.
- †. Including some local levies under purely tribal organization.