Chapter VIII: The Wealth of India

I. CONTEMPORARY IDEAS

THE question whether India was a rich country in Akbar’s time can be answered in different ways according to our choice of a criterion of the wealth of nations. Ordinary Europeans of the period would, I think, have pointed as evidence of wealth to the visible stock of what they knew as costly commodities, while statesmen and financiers would have laid stress rather on the persistent influx of the precious metals, and although both these criteria are obsolete, their historical significance calls for a brief notice before we pass to an examination of the question as it presents itself to economists at the present day.

In the sixteenth century the ordinary European had, as I have said in the first chapter, very vague ideas about that large portion of the world which he spoke of in general terms as the Indies. He knew them at best as distant countries possessed of apparently unlimited supplies of commodities like spices, with which he and his neighbours were inadequately furnished; these commodities commanded high prices in Europe, and the fact that they were held in little account in their place of origin did not enter into the calculations of consumers in the West. The Indies were undoubtedly well supplied with spices and similar goods, travellers told tales, not necessarily exaggerated, of the splendours of Courts and Monarchs, and the popular idea of India’s wealth required no further confirmation. The strength of its hold on the

Western imagination is perhaps best seen in the fact that it persisted even when the fear of India’s cheap labour had become established ; India was still accounted fabulously rich when India’s population was known to be miserably poor.

It is unnecessary at the present day to discuss the validity of the alternative criterion adopted by Elizabethan states- men and financiers. If the theory be admitted, their judgment was undoubtedly correct, for the influx of gold and silver into India is one of the permanent outstanding features of the commerce of the world. In the early days of the Roman Empire, as in the sixteenth century, India was eager to sell her produce, but wanted little merchandise in return, and then, as now, the balance of trade was adjusted by imports of the precious metals to an amount sufficient to excite alarm. At the period with which we are concerned, the topic was a commonplace among those travellers who were also men of affairs ; it was discussed at length by Bernier in his Letter to Colbert, and referred to by various other writers, but for our present purpose it is perhaps sufficient to quote Sir Thomas Roe’s remark that “ Europe bleedeth to enrich Asia ” as a concise illustration of the contemporary point of view.

The influx of treasure came from various sources. As has already been noticed, the official exports of Portugal consisted almost entirely of silver, which was expended on Indian com- modities for shipment both eastwards and westwards. The Red Sea trade brought large sums, for a great part of the Indian exports were sold for cash at Mocha. The Persian trade contributed a substantial flow of silver, while the gold obtain- able in East Africa was the main object of the Portuguese settlements at Sofala and Mozambique. Treasure was brought from the East as well as from the West, from Pegu, Siam, the Archipelago, and Japan, that is to say, from practically all countries except China, where the export was prohibited. A similar rule appears to have existed in India : as Terry wrote, the people of any nation were “ very welcome, that bring in their bullion and carry away the other’s merchandise ; but it is looked on as a crime that is not easily answered, to transport any quantity of silver thence." Thus there was a large and regular influx, with at most a small outflow, and consequently a continuous addition to the stocks possessed by the country. The destination of this influx of treasure is a matter of much economic importance. Part of it was gradually used up in coinage, which consumed chiefly silver in the north and both gold and silver in the south. In- dustries also absorbed a substantial amount : gold thread was employed in the more costly cotton fabrics, silver plate was common in wealthy households, jewellery was worn by all who could afford it, and there was a wide scope for the display of both metals on animals, conveyances, and other objects of luxury. Only a part of the influx was, however, devoted to these purposes, and the balance of the precious metals was stored up in circumstances which prevented their employment in production. The accumulation of large hoards was essentially a feature of Hindu civilisation : the hoards were concentrated in the temples and the Courts, and while religious institutions appear to have steadily added to their possessions, the story that a king never touched his predecessor’s treasure but accumulated a new hoard for himself was so widespread during the sixteenth century that it probably had a real foundation in fact. Paes, for instance, records that in Vijayanagar the treasury was sealed on the death of each Emperor, and opened only in the case of great need ; while Babur says that Bengalis regarded the amassing of treasure as a glorious distinction, but it was disgraceful for a new ruler to expend what his predecessors had collected. The best evidence of the magnitude of these hoards is our knowledge of the violent dissipation which occurred from time to time. Thus the early Moslem invaders during the eleventh and twelfth centuries swept the north of India practically clear, and the stock of treasure remained low till it was replenished by Alauddin’s campaigns in the Hindu south, when the soldiers threw away the silver because it was too heavy to carry, and the loot of gold, pearls, and diamonds was recorded in maunds. The fifteenth century again saw a depletion in the stock of Northern India ; we are told that under Ibrahim Lodi gold and silver were procurable only with the greatest difficulty, and the deficiency continued until the Moguls replenished the north from Gujarat, Central India, and the Deccan. It is scarcely worth while to reproduce the chroniclers’ statements of the sums which changed hands on these and similar occasions, but as a single instance it may be mentioned that after the battle of Talikot the royal family of Vijayanagar are said to have carried away treasure in gold, diamonds, and precious stones valued at more than a hundred millions sterling.¹ Compared with this sum, Akbar’s accumulations, estimated by Mr. Vincent Smith at forty millions sterling in cash alone, appear comparatively modest, but it must be remembered that Akbar started with very little in hand, while the Vijayanagar treasure was probably in part at least of old standing.

It is not easy to determine how far this habit of hoarding pre- vailed among the people generally, as distinct from the rulers and the custodians of religious institutions. Tavernier asserts that many of the nobles at the Mogul Court accumulated gold, and, though I know of no direct authority for the statement, it is highly probable that the chiefs of Vijayanagar were intent at this period on amassing treasure in view of the political situation. Successful merchants must have held in the aggregate a large stock of cash, representing what would nowadays be called reserves and funds awaiting employ- ment, and it is hard to draw a line between reserves and hoards. The lower classes can have hoarded very little gold, because of its high value in terms of commodities; a single gold muhr would have cost a peasant the entire produce of from two to three acres of wheat, and to a town labourer would have represented the wages of 200 days.² We are bound, however, to recognise that the habit, which is still prevalent, of keeping a few coins or jewels laid away and adding to the store when possible bears the marks of its antiquity on its face, and I have no doubt that a certain proportion of the influx of silver was absorbed by the more prosperous members of the lower classes. In one way or another, then, the precious metals were disposed of as they flowed into India, or as Hawkins wrote at the time, " All nations bring Coin, and carry away commodities for the same ; and this Coin is buried in India, and goeth not out."

II. MODERN IDEAS

So far we have reached the position that India was regarded as rich by Europeans of the sixteenth century, either because of her visible stock of what they knew as costly commodities, or on account of her continued absorption of the precious metals, and in both cases opinion was substantially in accord- ance with the facts ; we have now to inquire whether India was rich in the sense which the term conveys to modern econo- mists. The modern criterion of wealth is the income of com- modities, or more precisely the relation of that income to the numbers of the population : when we pass from wealth to well- being, we have further to take into account the way in which the income is distributed, because a nearer approach to equality will usually yield a greater aggregate of satisfaction, but so long as we are dealing with the wealth of a country as a unit, the question of distribution does not arise. In the foregoing chapters I have tried to estimate the changes which have taken place in the " average income," that is to say, in the income of commodities yielded relatively to the numbers of the popu- lation by each source in turn, and we may begin this inquiry by summarising the results which have so far been reached.

In the case of agriculture we have seen that while different parts of the country have been affected in different ways, it is improbable that for India, taken as a whole, the gross income per head of the rural population has changed by any large proportion : it may possibly be somewhat smaller, more probably it is somewhat larger than it was, but in either case the difference would not be so great as to indicate a definite alteration in the economic position. We may reasonably assume that the proportion of rural to total population has not changed materially; in Akbar’s time, as at the present day, the population was mainly agricultural, and if there were proportionately more soldiers and domestics then, there are more town-workers now, so that we may conclude that the average income from agriculture per head of the total popula- tion is somewhere about the same. The summary of the results which have so far been reached will then stand as follows:

As regards primary production, agriculture yielded about the same average income as now; forests yielded about the same ; fisheries perhaps somewhat more ; and minerals almost certainly less.

As regards manufactures, agricultural industries show on balance no material change; the average income from miscel- laneous handicrafts, wool-weaving, and transport production other than shipbuilding, has substantially increased, but silk- weaving shows a decline.

No estimate has yet been made of the average income from shipbuilding, cotton and jute weaving, or foreign commerce, while for our present purpose it is unnecessary to take internal commerce into account, commodities being valued at the place of consumption rather than of origin.

In combining these results, allowance must be made for differences in the importance of the various items. The silk industry, for instance, was of small volume, and even a large decrease in its total income would be almost negligible when spread over the entire population of the country, while the other probable decrease, that from fisheries, loses much of its significance in the same way. These two losses are probably much more than counterbalanced by the gains under mineral and transport production and miscellaneous handicrafts, but these gains in turn, substantial though they are, become very small when we set them beside the preponderating item of agricultural income, representing the results of the efforts of a majority of the whole population. So far then as those estimates are concerned, we may conclude that India was almost certainly not richer in Akbar’s days than now, and that probably she was a little poorer; if there has been any change so large as to be capable of recognition by the rough tests which alone are available, we must look for it under the three sources of income for which estimates have not yet been offered, sources which, as we shall find, are very closely inter-related. If India was richer than now, the additional income must have consisted of the ships which she built, the textile goods which formed the most important single item of their outward cargo, and the excess value of the foreign goods which they brought back.

We have no direct knowledge of the annual output of shipping, but it is possible to make a rough estimate of the amount in existence in India at this period, and to calculate within wide limits the output required to maintain the existing supply. We have seen that the vessels leaving annually for foreign ports aggregated probably less than 60,000 tuns, so that by taking this figure as a basis we shall at any rate not under- estimate the annual production. A deduction must be made for the ships built in Europe (about one-tenth of the total), but on the other hand an addition is required for the Indian ships employed in the direct trade between the Red Sea and Pegu, Malacca, Java, and Sumatra, and we may set this item off against the former, though it was probably not so large. No allowance need be made for ships in reserve, because, under the conditions imposed by the seasons, owners were practically compelled to send their ships out; if a vessel did not start at the proper time, the whole year’s income was lost, and the deterioration resulting from a prolonged stay in harbour was perhaps an even more serious matter.¹ We may therefore take the aggregate of Indian sea-going merchant ships at a maximum of 60,000 tuns; 40,000 tuns is probably a liberal allowance for coasting craft, and 20,000 tuns for fighting ships, making 120,000 tuns in all.¹ The annual output required to maintain this amount of shipping depends on the annual rate of loss, which was very high according to modern ideas. The average life of a carrack seems to have been about three years, for Pyrard says that they usually made only two, or at most three, voyages, but a large proportion of the losses of these ships occurred in waters where Indian vessels did not ply, off the Cape of Good Hope or still farther west, and it is safe to say that the latter on the average lasted longer. How much longer they lasted is a matter of conjecture; from a consideration of such details as have been recorded regarding shipwrecks and losses by fire and capture, I think the average life must have been more than five years, but I doubt whether it can have been as much as ten, and on these lines the annual output would lie somewhere between 12,000 and 24,000 tuns, while it would be less if the average life was longer than I have conjectured. The figures I have given are the equivalent in carrying capacity of from 6000 to 12,000 net registered tons, and are thus greater, but not very much greater, than the output in the years before 1914, when from 4500 to 7800 net tons were built annually.² Allowing then for the difference in population, the shipbuilding industry has fallen off, but the loss in income is obviously insignificant when spread over the inhabitants of the whole country.

Turning to the income derived from foreign commerce, it will be remembered that no estimate has been offered of the rate of profit obtainable in the time of Akbar. We can, however, form some idea of what foreign trade meant to the country as a whole by comparing the amount of shipping space per head. We have found that the probable maximum of space was equivalent to 36,000 net registered tons, and using the minimum estimate of population suggested in Chapter I. we can see that, in order to obtain the average income, the profit (whatever it was) which was obtainable from one ton of space must be divided among about 2800 persons at least. For the modern period, the profit from one ton has to be spread over fewer than 45 persons, and without going further into hypothetical calculations, the conclusion may fairly be drawn that the average income derived from sea-borne commerce may well have been less than now, and in any case cannot have been so much greater as to make a material difference in the average total income of the entire population of India, while the information which we possess regarding trade on the land frontiers shows that whatever the rate of profit may have been, its volume was even less significant for the country as a whole.¹

The remaining source of income, the manufacture of cloth from cotton and jute, requires somewhat more detailed examination. We have seen that a substantial portion of the population may have worn jute clothing in the time of Akbar, while it may be conjectured that coarse cotton cloth was at that period used for packing other goods outside the very limited area where jute was grown, and since the uses of the two fibres have been interchanged, any attempt at comparison involves the abandonment of the distinction based on the nature of the material; we must think simply of cloth, and state the facts in terms of yards. The error introduced by neglecting differences in material and quality is much less than it looks, because the value of the material has already been taken into account as part of the income derived from agriculture, and we are now concerned only with the increase in value resulting from the processes of manufacture; we must recognise that the average of quality was probably higher in the sixteenth century than now, because a larger proportion of the cloth was made of cotton, but on the other hand we must take into account the greater width of much of the modern mill-woven cloth. A yard of “average” cloth was thus smaller as well as better in Akbar’s time than now, and on the whole it forms a not unsuitable unit for the rough comparison which alone is possible.

Starting then with the facts of modern times we may say that, on the average of the years 1911-14, and taking produc- tion, imports, and exports into consideration, India consumed annually about 18 1/2 yards of jute and cotton cloth per head of the population, while on a similar basis the production was from 15 to 15 1/2 yards per head, leaving a net import of 3 yards or rather more: the question which we have to consider is thus whether production at the end of the sixteenth century was greater or less than 15 yards per head. At that period there were no imports of cloth made of these materials, and consequently production represented the total of exports and internal consumption. We can arrive at a rough measure of the possible exports from the volume of shipping space available, which we have taken at a maximum of 60,000 tuns. Cloth was the principal article carried, but other exports were numerous, and some of them were bulky; it is rare for a single class of goods to furnish as much as half the exports of a large country, and we shall not run any risk of under- estimation if we assign two-thirds of the total space to cloth. On this assumption it is just barely possible that exports may have reached 200 million yards, though I think myself that this figure is probably far in excess of the truth; and using the minimum estimate of population previously suggested, we may thus put exports at a maximum of about 2 yards per head. Deducting this from present production, there remain 13 yards, and we have to ask whether the former consumption exceeded or fell short of this figure. Consumption falls under two main heads, packing (at present2 1/2 yards), and clothing (at present about 16 yards). The use of packing varies roughly with the volume of com- merce, and the figures already dealt with show that this was trifling compared with the present standard ; we may there- fore infer that the cloth required for packing at the earlier period amounted to only a small fraction of a yard per head. As to clothing, we have seen in the last chapter that all over India clothes were probably less worn by the masses than now, and the present figure (16 yards) is therefore in excess of the standard of the time of Akbar. The amount of this excess is, in the present state of our knowledge, a matter of conjecture : if we guess that the average for clothing was 12 yards, then the total consumption must have been less than 13 yards, and the total production less than the present figure of about 15 yards ; if we guess that clothing took 10 yards, then the total production must have been much less than now, while in order to arrive at a larger production per head we must assume that people in general used nearly as much cloth as now, though they certainly did not wear it in public. Finally, allowance should be made for the large modern export of yarn, to which there was nothing comparable in the time of Akbar : even if the production of finished cloth was as large as now, the scale would be turned against the earlier period by including these partially manufactured goods.

The general result of this somewhat tedious analysis is that we must choose between the following possibilities: (a) a total population of much less than our estimated minimum of 100 millions: (b) a volume of export-shipping much greater than our estimated maximum of 60,000 tuns; (c) internal consumption much larger than is suggested by contemporary accounts; (d) a production of cloth per head almost certainly not greater, and probably somewhat less, than now. Readers who accept the inferences drawn in previous chapters regarding the economic conditions of the period will conclude that the fourth alternative is the most probable, while those who seek to prove that production was substantially greater in Akbar’s time than now must show that some or all of those inferences are mistaken. The average quality of the cloth produced was doubtless higher than now, but the difference may easily be exaggerated: the export markets took a very small proportion of the total, the consumption of the upper classes in India was quantitatively insignificant, and we must regard the great bulk of the cloth woven as similar to the coarse but durable fabrics which are still produced. I do not think, therefore, that the difference in quality requires any large allowance beyond that which has already been made in neglecting the greater average width of the modern production.

Thus a detailed examination of these sources of income— shipbuilding, foreign commerce, and textile manufactures— appears to me to justify the conclusion that they cannot have yielded so much more than now as to raise the average income of the country materially above its present level. The result can perhaps be stated more concisely as follows: If it be admitted that the mass of the people wore fewer clothes than now, then the whole question turns on the proportion of shipping to population. In order to establish the proposition that India was richer under Akbar, it would be necessary to show that a large proportion of the popula- tion was employed in building ships and manufacturing cloth with which to load them: it may be conceded that such an impression might have been formed by a traveller whose observations were limited to the coast from Diu to Goa, but it is to my mind inconceivable that the impression could have survived a journey across the thickly populated Deccan from Surat to Golconda, from Golconda northwards to Lahore, and then from Lahore to the mouth of the Ganges. When we look at India as a whole with the eyes of travellers who made these journeys, we see a population predominantly agricultural, and realise that the numbers employed in connection with foreign commerce can have formed only an inconsiderable fraction of the total.

We have thus passed in review all the important branches of production existing at the end of the sixteenth century, and are in a position to answer in general terms the question which we asked at the beginning of this section, whether India was rich in the sense of having an adequate income per head of the population. The answer is that India was almost certainly not richer than she is now, and that probably she was a little poorer. It is true that the country produced commodities which were eagerly sought for by other nations, and that by the sale of these commodities a steady influx of the precious metals was secured, so that people who viewed India from outside, and under the influence of economic theories which are now discarded, might be excused for form- ing an erroneous judgment of her wealth ; but when we escape from the fascination exercised by a spectacular foreign commerce, and concentrate our attention on the resources of the country as a whole, our final verdict must be that, then as now, India was desperately poor. The information which is available suggests to me that the average income of commodities was probably even smaller than now ; it does not suffice to afford definite proof that the stream of wealth has increased, but it justifies the conclusion that the deficiency of production which is the outstanding fact at the present day was, at the least, equally prominent at the close of the sixteenth century.

III. DISTRIBUTION

We have now to consider the actual distribution of the income which we have hitherto treated as an aggregate, divisible in equal shares among the whole population of the country. The main conclusions which we have reached on this subject may be summarised as follows: (1) The upper classes were able to live much more luxuri-ously in the time of Akbar than now.

(2) The middle classes appear, so far as our scanty know- ledge goes, to have occupied more or less the same economic position as at present, but their numbers were proportionately much smaller, and they formed an unimportant section of the population.

(3) The lower classes, including very nearly all the pro-ductive elements, lived even more hardly than they live now.

The economic system of the period was so simple that it is easy for us to see how these differences arose. Speaking of India as a whole, we may say that producers enjoyed practically no communal benefits, and kept for themselves so much of their produce as was not taken from them, while the consuming classes took from the producers as much as they could; and since the bulk of the consuming classes were dependent mediately or immediately upon the State, the chief agent of distribution was the revenue-system in force. The effect of this system upon the great mass of producers, the cultivators of the soil, has been studied in some detail ; we have seen that in the regulation-provinces of the Mogul Empire, comprising practically the whole of the northern plains as far as the west of Bengal and a substantial portion of the country farther south, the standard of the revenue- demand was about double the modern standard of rent, and we have found reason to infer that the share of the State was at least equally great in the territories of Vijayanagar and in the kingdoms of the Deccan.¹ In order to realise the signifi- cance of this fact, it is necessary to bear in mind that, while the revenue was calculated on the gross yield, it had to be paid from the net income. If the productivity of a holding is to be maintained, a substantial proportion of the gross yield must be expended in ways which are, strictly speaking, necessary ; the peasant must keep himself and his family alive and fit for work, he must maintain the efficiency of his cattle and provide for their replacement, he must renew his implements, and he must pay wages and various other expenses of cultivation. The burden of this necessary outlay varies, but on a representative holding in Northern India it probably approximates to one-half of the gross yield which the peasant hopes to secure in favourable seasons. The revenue or rent is the first charge on the net income left after these expenses have been provided for, and when it has been paid, the balance is at the disposal of the peasant for comforts or luxuries, improvements, and investment or repayment of personal debts; his financial position depends, not on his gross income, but on the amount of the free surplus which remains at his disposal. The surplus for which Akbar’s peasants could hope was at the best very small; if half the produce was required to cover necessary expenditure and one-third was claimed as revenue, there remained only one-sixth of the gross income expected in favourable years, and a very slight loss due to accidents of season would absorb the whole of the anticipated balance. Reduction of the revenue-demand by one-half would obviously double the amount of the free surplus, and thus leave the peasant a comparatively much larger sum of money to spend in prosperous times, while enabling him to carry on his business unaided in less favour- able years. Speaking broadly, that is the difference between Akbar’s times and the present day; the modern tenant- cultivator has more money to spend when seasons are good, and he can stand greater losses when seasons are bad. The peasant holding directly under the State ought to occupy a still more favourable position, since in modern times the revenue is less than the rent, and if the distinction is not so marked in practice as in theory, the reason is that the direct holder has commonly attained to a somewhat higher standard of life, particularly in regard to conventional necessaries. In any case, the reduction in the burden of compulsory payments which has taken place since the time of Akbar is quite sufficient to account for the observed improvement in the position of the peasant; he may not handle a larger gross produce than formerly, but he is able to keep a larger share of it for himself.

We may reasonably infer that the standard of life of the rural labourers was set by that of the peasants who employed them, in the sense that they were ordinarily somewhat worse off than their masters, and we can thus understand the contemporary observations summarised in the last chapter so far as they apply to the rural population as a whole : the standard of life was generally lower than now, for the simple reason that a larger proportion of the income obtained in the villages was diverted to the expenditure of the State. It is not possible to speak with the same confidence regarding the craftsmen and artisans, because we possess very little information regarding the burdens which they bore, but so far as they paid anything in the way of taxes or dues they were correspondingly worse off ; their numbers were, however, small relatively to the agricultural population, and it is the contribution of the villages rather than the towns which marks the system of distribution in existence at the end of the sixteenth century.

The absorption by the State of so large a proportion of the peasants’ free surplus is not necessarily to be considered as an economic evil. So far indeed, the conditions prevailing in the days of Akbar are in accordance with the ideals of some modern socialists, and the advisability of this distribution must be judged by the uses to which the appropriated surplus was devoted. Had it been expended in meeting the peasants’ needs and in enabling them to lead a more reasonable life—in furnishing the various factors of agricultural production, in providing opportunities for education, or in securing medical relief and proper sanitary conditions—then the task of the critic would have been to determine whether the well-being of the people was on the whole promoted or not, and whether the benefits provided by the State gave more or less satisfaction than would have been obtained if the income had been left in the hands of those who earned it. This question, however, does not arise. Apart from a varying and imperfect measure of security, the peasant obtained no return whatever, and the large share of his free surplus which was taken by the State was expended in the interests of other classes forming a very small minority of the population. We have seen in earlier chapters how the share of the State was eventually disbursed ; the bulk of it went on the purchase of articles of luxury, the increase in the stock of treasure, and the maintenance of a large mass of unproductive employment, and while these features still characterise the economic life of India, there can be no doubt that their relative importance has diminished. To complete our comparison between the two periods, it is desirable to trace the destination of that portion of the income of the country which has been diverted from these objects.

So far as I can see, the account is balanced by three main items, increase in communal expenditure, growth of the middle classes, and the modest improvement which, as we have found, has been effected in the standard of life of the masses of the people. The extension of communal expenditure is obvious in the provision now made for education, medical relief and sanitation, means of communication, and assistance to production in various forms; it cannot indeed be asserted that the needs of the country have yet been adequately met, but the mere enumeration of the objects of a modern adminis- tration is sufficient to mark the change since Akbar’s days. The growth of the middle classes in numbers and resources is at least equally obvious. We may regard the great terri- torial magnates as in part the successors and representatives of the official nobility of the sixteenth century, but the ordinary landholder of Northern India is a new and distinctive feature, as is practically the whole of the professional class, lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, engineers, and the rest. Here again it cannot be maintained that, except perhaps in the case of landholders and lawyers, the needs of the country have been adequately met, but the progress already made is substantial, and speaking generally, our conclusion must be that, though the average income of India may be no greater than it was three centuries ago, the changes which have taken place in its distribution have resulted in a material increase in the well-being of the people taken as a whole. I should not like it to be thought that I regard the existing distribution as entirely satisfactory: unsolved problems which directly concern it are important now, and will be more important in the near future, but the standard of well-being, while it has improved, is still so deplorably low that nothing but a large increase in the national dividend will suffice; vary the distribution as we may, there is not at present enough to go round, and if this comparison of two widely different periods has any lesson for modern statesmen and administrators, it is the paramount need for concentra- tion of effort to secure an adequate increase of production.

IV. CONCLUSION

We have now reached the final stage of our study. We have seen that the economic life of India at the end of the sixteenth century was characterised essentially by inadequate production and faulty distribution, and it remains only to take account of the tendencies at work; did the situation existing at the death of Akbar hold out a promise or a threat for the future prosperity of the country? The answer to this question must be that the whole tendency of the economic environment was still further to discourage production, and to enhance the existing faults of distribution, so that a period of increasing impoverishment was to be expected, but that other and less conspicuous forces were just beginning to operate which offered a more hopeful prospect for the distant future. In regard to the immediate outlook, we need only recall that producers as a whole were at the mercy of an administration conducted by men who were accustomed to extremes of luxury and display, who were discouraged by the conditions of their tenure from taking measures to foster the development of their charge, and who were impelled by the strongest motives to grasp for themselves the largest possible share of each producer’s income. Productive enter- prise was penalised, while the demands on the existing stream of commodities were certain to increase; the incentive to effort was bound to diminish, and the superior attractions of an unproductive life to become more and more apparent to all the most active elements of the population. Such was the immediate prospect: the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will show to what extent it was realised, but we are justified in saying that the position was unstable, and that the seed had been sown of economic and political collapse.

An Indian statesman of the period might well have recog- nised the dangers that lay ahead, but he could scarcely have detected the first inconspicuous signs of a further change. We have seen in a previous chapter that the demand of the upper classes for luxuries and novelties led to the patronage and encouragement of foreign merchants, and it is to the extension of the area of trade that the change in the economic situation is ultimately due. The foreigners who were attracted to the country pursued indeed a strictly self-regarding policy. Incidentally their activities stimulated production through the increased demand for commodities and the introduction of new staples and improved processes, but they did not at first exercise any influence on the administrative exploitation, which in Akbar’s time and from a much earlier period domin- ated and sterilised the energies of the population of India. Contact with this root-evil was established only through the political changes of the eighteenth century, and thenceforward the main interest of Indian economic history lies in the gradual transition from the régime of exploitation, through indifference, to conscious effort for improvement. According to the theories current in England during the nineteenth century, the transition to administrative indifference should have sufficed, but subsequent experience has shown that the lesson of the past had been learned too well, and the slow and halting progress which has been achieved in recent years proves at once the force of the old evil tradition, and the need for conscious and organised effort directed towards its complete and final eradication.

AUTHORITIES FOR CHAPTER VIII

SECTION 1.—The absorption of the precious metals is referred to in Bernier, 202; Roe, 496; Purchas, I. iii. 221; Terry, 112, and various other writers. The sources are indicated by Bernier, l.c., also by Tavernier, 393, and by other authorities quoted in Chapter VI. For the position in the early days of the Roman Empire, see Chap. II. of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall (with Professor Bury’s note, i. 55, of the edition of 1900); the evidence on the subject is noticed in Rawlinson.

The violent movements of accumulated wealth are recounted in Thomas’ Chronicles, and can be followed in detail through the pages of Ferishta’s History. For gold coins in Northern India, see Tavernier, 14-16, and Terry, 112, 113; for the sanctity of hoards, see Sewell, 282, and Babur, 483; for the scarcity of gold and silver under Ibrahim Lodi, see Elliot’s History, iv. 476; for the Vijayanagar treasure, Sewell, 199; and for that of Akbar, V. Smith, Akbar, 347.

The remaining sections recapitulate results which have been reached in previous chapters, and it is unnecessary to repeat the references which have already been given.

Notes