JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF INDIA.
1. Question. Have you observed the operation of the Judicial System in India?
Answer. I have long turned my attention towards the subject, and possess a general acquaintance with the operation of that system, more particularly from personal experience in the Bengal presidency, where I resided.
2. Q. Do you think that the system hitherto acted upon is calculated to secure justice?
A. The judicial system established in 1793, by Lord Cornwallis, was certainly well adapted to the situation of the country, and to the character of the people as well as of the government, had there been a sufficient number of qualified judges to discharge the judicial office, under a proper code of laws.
3. Q. Explain particularly in what points you consider the practical operation of the system defective?
A. In the want of a sufficient number of judges and magistrates, in the want of adequate qualification in many of them to discharge the duty in foreign languages, and in the want of a proper code of laws, by which they might be easily guided.
4. Q. Can you explain what evils result from the want of a greater number of judges?
A. 1st, The courts being necessarily few in number in comparison to the vast territories under the British rule, many of the inhabitants are situated at so great a distance from them, that the poorer classes are in general unable to go and seek redress for any injury, particularly those who may be oppressed by their wealthier neighbours, possessing great local influence. 2ndly, The business of the courts is so heavy that causes often accumulate to such an extent, that many are necessarily pending some years before they can be decided; an evil which is aggravated by subsequent appeals from one court to another, attended with further delay and increased expence. By this state of things wrong-doers are encouraged, and the innocent and oppressed in the same proportion discouraged, and often reduced to despair. 3rdly, Such a mass of business transacted in foreign languages being too much for any one individual, even the ablest and best intentioned judge, may be disheartened at seeing before him a file of causes which he can hardly hope to overtake; and he may therefore be thus induced to transfer a great part of the business to his native officers, who are not responsible, and who are so meanly paid for their services, that they may be expected to consult their own interests.
5. Q. Will you inform us what evils arise from the want of due qualification in the judges?
A. It is but justice to state that many of the judicial officers of the company are men of the highest talents, as well as of strict integrity, and earnestly intent on doing justice. However, not being familiar with the laws of the people over whom they are called to administer justice by these laws, and the written proceedings of the court, answers, replies, rejoinders, evidence taken, and documents produced, being all conducted in a language which is foreign to them, they must either rely greatly on the interpretation of their native officers, or be guided by their own surmises or conjectures. In one case, the cause will be decided by those who in point of rank and pay are so meanly situated, and who are not responsible to the government or the public for the accuracy of the decision; in the other case, a decision founded on conjecture must be very liable to error. Still, I am happy to observe that there are some judicial officers, though very few in number, whose judgment and knowledge of the native languages are such, that in cases which do not involve much intricacy and legal subtlety, they are able to form a correct decision independent of the natives around them.
6. Q, Can you point out what obstructions to the administration of justice are produced by the want of a better code of laws?
A. The regulations published from year to year by the local government since 1793, which serve as instructions to the courts, are so voluminous, complicated, and in many instances, either too concise or too exuberant, that they are generally considered not a clear and easy guide ; and the Hindu and Mahommedan laws administered in conjunction with the above regulations, being spread over a great number of different books of various and sometimes doubtful authority, the judges, as to law points, depend entirely on the interpretations of their native lawyers, whose conflicting legal opinions have introduced great perplexity into the administration of justice.
7. Q. Is there any other impediment to the fair administration of justice besides these you have stated?
A. The first obstacle to the administration of justice is, that its administrators and the persons among whom it is administered have no common language. 2ndly, That owing partly to this cause and also in a great measure to the difference of manners &c., the communication between these two parties is very limited; in consequence of which the judges can with the utmost difficulty acquire an adequate knowledge of the real nature of the grievances of the persons seeking redress, or of the real character and validity of the evidence by which their claims are supported or opposed. 3dly, That there is not the same relation between the native pleaders and the judge as between the British bar and the bench. 4thly, The want of publicity owing to the absence of reporters and of a public press, to take notice of the proceedings of the courts in the interior: consequently there is no superintendence of public opinion to watch whether the judges attend their courts once a day or once a week, or whether they attend to business six hours or one hour a day, or their mode of treating the parties, the witnesses, the native pleaders or law officers, and others attending the courts—as well as the principles on which they conduct their proceedings and regulate their decisions; or whether in fact they investigate and decide the causes themselves, or leave the judicial business to their native officers and dependants. (In pointing out the importance of the fullest publicity being afforded to judicial proceedings by means of the press, I have no reference to the question of a free press, for the discussion of local politics, a point on which I do not mean to touch). 5thly, The great prevalence of perjury, arising partly from the frequency with which oaths are administered in the courts, having taken from them the awe with which they were formerly regarded, partly from the judges being often unable to detect impositions in a foreign language, and to discriminite nicely the value of evidence amongst a people with whom they have in general so little communication; and partly from the evidence being frequently taken, not by the judge himself but by his native officers (Omlah), whose good will is often secured before hand by both parties, so that they may not endeavour to detect their false evidence by a strict examination. Under these circumstances the practice of perjury has grown so prevalent that the facts sworn to by the different parties in a suit are generally directly opposed to each other, so that it has become almost impossible to ascertain the truth from their contradictory evidence. 6thly, That the prevalence of perjury has again introduced the practice of forgery to such an extent as to render the administration of justice still more intricate and perplexing. 7thly, The want of due publicity being given to the regulations which stand at present in place of a code of laws. From their being very voluminous and expensive, the community generally have not the means of purchasing them; nor have they a sufficient opportunity of consulting or copying them in the judicial and revenue offices where they are kept. As these are usually at a distance from the populous parts of the town, only professional persons or parties engaged in suits or official business are in the habit of attending these offices. 8thly, and lastly, Holding the proceedings in a language foreign to the judges, as well as to the parties and to the witnesses.
8. Q. In what language are the proceedings of the courts conducted?
A. They are generally conducted in Persian, in imitation of the former Mohammedan rulers, of which this was the court language.
9. Q. Are the judges, the parties, and the witnesses sufficiently well acquainted with that language to understand the proceedings readily?
A. I have already observed that it is foreign to all these parties. Some of the judges, and a very few among the parties, however, are conversant with that language.
10. Q. Would it be advantageous to substitute the English language in the courts, instead of the Persian?
A. The English language would have the advantage of being the vernacular language of the judges. With regard to the native inhabitants, it would no doubt, in the mean time, have the same disadvantage as the Persian; but its gradual introduction in the courts would still, notwithstanding, prove ultimately beneficial to them by promoting the study of English.
11. Q. Does the native bar assist the judge, and form a check on the accuracy of the decisions?
A. It is no doubt intended to answer this most useful purpose, and does so to some extent; but, from the cause alluded to above (Ans. 7. No. 3.), not to the extent that is necessary to secure the principles of justice.
12. Q. Do the judges treat the native pleaders with the consideration and respect due to their office?
A. They are not always treated in the inferior courts with the consideration due to their office.
13. Q. To what do you attribute it, that the bar is not treated with respect?
A. The native pleaders are so unfortunately situated from there being such a great distance between them and the judges who belong to the rulers of the country, and from not being of the same profession, or of the same class as the judges, and having no prospect of promotion as English barristers have, that they are treated as an inferior caste of persons.
14. Q. Do not the native judicial officers employed under the judge assist him in his proceedings?
A. Of course they assist him, and that very materially.
15. Q. What kind of assistance do they render to the judge? A. They read the proceedings, viz. the bill (darkh'ast, or arzī), answers, replies, rejoinders, and other papers produced in the court; they write the proceedings and depositions of the witnesses; and very often, on account of the weight of business, the judge employs them to take the depositions of the witnesses: sometimes they make abstracts of the depositions and other long papers, and lay them before the judge for his decision.
16. Q. Are they made responsible with the judge for the proceedings held?
A. They are responsible to the judge, but not to the government or the public.
17. Q. Are not the judges assisted also by Hindu and Mohammedan lawyers, appointed to act as interpreters of the law?
A. They are: learned natives of this description being attached to the courts to give their opinion on the Hindu and Mohammedan law points which may arise in any case.
18. Q. Are natives of the country empowered to decide causes of any description?
A. Yes: there are native Munsifs, or commissioners, for the decision of small debts; and Sudder Aumeens who are authorised to try causes under five hundred rupees, whether connected with landed or moveable property.
19. Q. Are they qualified to discharge the duties entrusted to them? A. Many of them are fully qualified; and if proper care can be taken in the selection, all the situations might be filled with well-qualified persons.
20. Q. What is your opinion of the general character and conduct of the judges in their official capacity as such?
A. I am happy to state that in my humble opinion the judicial branch of the service is at present almost pure; and there are among the judicial servants of the Company gentlemen of such distinguished talents, that from their natural abilities, even without the regular study of the law, they commit very few, if any, errors in the administration of justice. Others are not so well gifted, and must therefore rely more on the representations of their native officers, and being free from any local check on their public conduct, their regularity, attention to business, and other judicial habits, are not equal to the wishes of their employers, nor calculated to give general satisfaction.
21. Q. Do they borrow money to any extent from the natives?
A. Formerly they borrowed to a great amount; at present this practice is discouraged.
22. Q. Why are the natives prevailed upon to lend to the judges, and other civilians, money to such an extent?
A. Natives not having any hope of attaining direct consideration from the Government by their merits or exertions, are sometimes induced to accommodate the civil servants with money, by the hope of securing their patronage for their friends and relatives, the judges and others having many situations directly or indirectly in their gift; sometimes by the hope of benefiting by their friendly disposition when the natives have estates under their jurisdiction; and sometimes to avoid incurring the hostility of the judge, who, by Regulation IX. of 1807, is empowered not only to imprison, but inflict corporal punishment, by his own authority under certain legal pretences on any native, whatever his respectability may be.
23. Q. What is your opinion of the judicial character and conduct of the Hindu and Mohammedan lawyers attached to the courts?
A. Amongst the Mohammedan lawyers I have met with some honest men. The Hindu lawyers are in general not well spoken of, and they do not enjoy much of the confidence of the public.
24. Q. What is your opinion of the official character and conduct of the subordinate native judicial officers?
A. Considering the trifling salaries which they enjoy, from 10, 20, 30, or 40 rupees to 100 rupees a month, (the last being the allowance of the head native officer only,) and the expenses they must incur, in supporting some respectability of appearance, besides maintaining their families; (the keeping of a palankeen alone must cost the head man a sum of between 20 and 30 rupees per month,) and considering also the extent of the power which they must possess, from their situations and duties as above explained (Q. 15.), and the immense sums involved in the issue of causes pending in the courts, it is not to be expected that the native officers, having such trifling salaries, at least many of them, should not avail themselves sometimes of their official influence, to promote their own interests.
25. Q. What is your opinion of the professional character and conduct of the pleaders?
A. Many pleaders of the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut are men of the highest respectability and legal knowledge, as the judges are very select in their appointment, and treat them in a way which makes them feel that they have a character to support. Those of the provincial courts of appeal are also generally respectable, and competent to the discharge of their duties. In the Zillah courts some respectable pleaders may also be met with, but proper persons for that office are not always very carefully selected; and in general, I may observe, that the pleaders are held in a state of too much dependence by the judges, particularly in the inferior courts, which must incapacitate them from standing up firmly in support of the rules of the court.
26. Q. Is bribery and corruption ever practised in the judicial department, and to what extent?
A. I have already intimated my opinion in the answers to Questions 20 and 24.
27 and 28. Q. Have the respectable and intelligent native inhabitants generally confidence in the purity of the Company's courts and the accuracy of their decisions; and have the native community confidence in the integrity of the subordinate judicial officers?
A. Whilst such evils exist as I have above noticed, in my reply to Queries 5, 6, and 7, as well as to Queries 20 and 24, the respectable and intelligent native inhabitants cannot be expected to have confidence in the general operation of the judicial system.
29. Q. Are the judges influenced in their decision by their native officers?
A. Those who are not well versed in the native languages, and in the Regulations of government, must necessarily be very much dependent on their native officers, as well as those who dislike to undergo the fatigue and restraint of business, which to Europeans is still more irksome in the sultry climate of India.
30. Q. Can you suggest any mode of removing the several defects you have pointed out in the judicial system?
A. As European judges in India are not generally expected to discharge judicial duties satisfactorily, independent of native assistance, from not possessing a thorough knowledge of the languages, manners, customs, habits, and practices of the people, and as the natives who possess this knowledge have been long accustomed to subordination and indifferent treatment, and consequently have not the power of commanding respect from others, unless joined by Europeans, the only remedy which exists is, to combine the knowledge and experience of the native with the dignity and firmness of the European. This principle has been virtually acted upon and reduced to practice since 1793, though in an imperfect manner, in the constitution of the courts of circuit, in which the Mufti (native assessor) has a voice with the judge in the decision of every cause, having a seat with him on the bench. This arrangement has tolerably well answered the purpose of government, which has not been able to devise a better system in a matter of such importance as the decision of questions of life and death, during the space of forty years, though it has been continually altering the systems in other branches. It is my humble opinion, therefore, that the appointment of such native assessors should be reduced to a regular system in the civil courts. They should be appointed by government for life, at the recommendation of the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, which should select them carefully, with a view to their character and qualifications, and allow them to hold their situations during life and good behaviour, on a salary of from 300 to 400 rupees per mensem. They should be responsible to the government as well as to the public for their decisions, in the same manner as the European judges, and correspond directly with the judicial secretary. A casting voice should be allowed to the European judge, in appointing the native officers, in case of difference of opinion; the native assessor, however, having a right to record his dissent. These assessors should be selected out of those natives who have been already employed for a period of not less than five years as assessors (Mufti), lawyers (Zillah Court Maulavis), or as the head native officers in the judicial department.*
Par. 2. This measure would remove the evils pointed out in the answers to Q. 5 and to Q. 7. Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and also afford a partial remedy to the evils noticed in Nos. 5, 6 and 8 of Answer 7, as well as provide against the evils referred to in answer to Query 24.
Par. 3. In order however to render the administration of justice efficient and as perfect as human efforts can make it, and to remove the possibility of any undue influence which a native assessor might attempt to exercise on the bench under a European judge of insufficient capacity, as well as to do away the vexatious delays and grievous suffering attending appeals, it is necessary to have recourse to trial by jury, as being the only effectual check against corruption, which, from the force of inveterate habit, and the contagion of example, has become so notoriously prevalent in India. This measure would be an additional remedy to the evils mentioned in the reply to Query 5 and 7, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, 6, 8, and also in the replies to Query 4, Nos. 2 and 3, as well as in Query 24.
Par. 4. With a view to remove the evils arising from want of publicity of the Regulations, as noticed in No. 7 of Ansr. to the Query 7, two or three copies in each of the principal native languages used in that part of the country should be kept in a building in the populous quarter of the town, under the charge of a keeper on a small salary, and all persons should be freely admitted to read and copy them at leisure from sunrise to sunset. The expence of this would not amount to two pounds a month for each station, and the benefits of it would be incalculable.
Par. 5. In order to remedy the evils arising from the distance of the courts as noticed at Question 4th Ansr. No. 1, I beg to suggest as follows : The Sudder Aumeens, or superior commissioners for the decision of causes under 500 rupees, afaffecting moveable or immoveable property, are at present stationed at the same place where the zillah judge holds his court, and plaints are at first laid before the judge, who turns them over to one of these commissioners at his own discretion ; consequently they afford no remedy for the great distance of the courts from many under their jurisdiction, as this often embraces a circle of 60 or 80 miles. I therefore propose that these Sudder Aumeens should be stationed at proportionate distances in different parts of the district, so that suitors may not have to travel far from their homes to file their bills and afterwards to seek and obtain justice ; and that one of the assistants of the judge should be stationed in a central position which might enable him (without any additional charge to government as I shall hereafter show) to visit and personally superintend these Aumeens, when the judge's station is on or near the border of his district. If it is otherwise situated, one of the assistants of the judge may remain at the head station with the judge and superintend the commissioners nearest to him, while another assistant being stationed at an appropriate distance, may superintend those who are more remotely situated from the first assistant. There will thus be as complete a check over them as under the present system, and justice will be brought home to the doors of a great majority of the inhabitants of each district, since causes under 500 rupees are exceedingly numerous in every Zillah or City Court.
Par. 6. These assistants may, at the same time, be very usefully employed in checking the dreadfully increasing crime of forgery, by which the course of justice is now so very much impeded in the judicial courts. Written documents of a diametrically opposite nature are, as is well known, constantly laid before these courts, and serve to confound justice and perplex a conscientious bench. Therefore under the proposed system of assistant judges' courts in two different quarters of a district, I would recommend, as highly necessary and expedient to check materially the practice of forgery, that parties to any deed should be required, in order to render the same valid, to produce it in open court before the nearest assistant judge, within a certain number of days from the time of its execution. This rule should apply* to all sorts of deeds, contracts and agreements regarding property above 100 rupees in value, such as wills and bills of sale, &c. and money bonds for debts payable at a certain period beyond six months, and upon receiving a fee of from one to two rupees, according to its importance, the assistant judge, after ascertaining the identity of the parties in open court, should immediately affix his signature as witness to the deed, and retain a copy of the same in a book of record kept on purpose, duly authenticated and marked to prevent the possibility of interpolation, or any other species of fraud. The sum above allowed as a fee on registering, with a small fixed charge per page for retaining a copy, would be more than sufficient to remunerate any extra trouble attending the duty and the labour of transcribing. To induce the proprietors of land and other respectable persons to appear without reluctance in open court on such occasions, they should be invariably treated with the respect due to their rank. Further to encourage the public to have papers registered, and to satisfy the government that no improper delay takes place in registering them, as well as to prevent the copyists from extorting perquisites, a book should be kept in which the party presenting a paper should in open court enter a memorandum of the day and hour on which he presented it for registration, and of the day and hour when it was produced and returned to him. This system would materially remedy the evil referred to in answer to Q. 7. No. 6.
Par. 7. The assistant judges should also receive appeals from the Sudder Aumeens, and try them in conjunction with a native assessor appointed by the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, on a salary smaller than that of the judges' assessor, that is, perhaps not exceeding 200 rupees a month. In the event of difference of opinion between the assessor and the assistant judge on any case, it should be appealable to the Zillah judge, whose decision should be final; and as the Sudder Aumeens are now paid from the duties on the stamps used and the fees received on the papers filed, so the assistant judges' assessor may be paid in the same manner from the fees and stamps imposed on the appeal causes.
Par. 8. The assistant judge, though not empowered to interfere with the police officers of the interior in the discharge of their duties, should notwithstanding be authorised to receive written complaints of any abuse of their power from persons who feel themselves oppressed by the police, and to forward the same to the head magistrate of the district for his investigation; as very often the poor villagers or peasants are oppressed by the local police officers, but despair of any relief, from being unable to leave their homes and travel to a distance to the station to seek redress.
31. Q. Is trial by jury (or any thing resembling it) resorted to at present in any case?
A. The principle of juries under certain modifications has from the most remote periods been well understood in this country under the name of Punchayet.
32. Q. What is the difference between the Jury system and the Punchayet?
A. The Punchayet exists on a very defective plan at present, because the jurors (members of the Punchayet) are not regular in their meetings, have no power to compel the attendance of witnesses, unless by appealing to the court; they have no judge to preside at their meetings and direct their proceedings, and are not guarded in any manner from partiality or private influence. They are in fact at present only arbitrators appointed by the court with consent of the parties in a cause, each party nominating one arbitrator and the judge a third; and sometimes both parties agree to refer the decision of the case to one arbitrator.
33. Q. Why and when was the Punchayet system discouraged?
A. It has not been totally discouraged, but rather placed on a different footing. In former days it was much more important in its functions. It was resorted to by parties at their own option, or by the heads of tribes, who assumed the right of investigation and decision of differences; or by the government, which handed over causes to a Punchayet.
34. Q. Do you really think the introduction of any system of jury trial or Punchayet would be beneficial?
A. Undoubtedly, as shewn by the 3d Par. of my answer to Question 30. Since a Punchayet composed of the intelligent and respectable inhabitants, under the direction of a European judge to preserve order, and a native judge to guard against any private influence, is the only tribunal which can estimate properly the whole bearings of a case, with the validity of the documentary evidence, and the character of the witnesses, who could have little chance of imposing false testimony upon such a tribunal.
35. Q. Do you think it would be acceptable to the inhabitants?
A. As the Punchayet even in its present very imperfect form is still practised by the inhabitants, it would without doubt be much more so, were it reduced to a regular system, guarded by proper checks, and dignified by judicial forms, which would inspire the whole community with higher respect and confidence for this ancient institution. But whatever length its popularity may go, it is the only system by which the present abuses consisting of perjury, forgery, and corruption can be removed.
36. Q. Will you explain, in detail, the modification of the Punchayet-jury system which you think best suited to the circumstances of the country?
A. I am of opinion that the Punchayet system should be adopted in conjunction with the plan above stated. (Q. 30.) It would be easy to adapt it to the object in view, without imposing any heavy duty on the respectable portion of the native community. Three jurymen, or at most five, would, I conceive, answer the purpose as well as a greater number, and any zillah (district) could easily supply a list from which these might be taken without inconvenience. Three times the number required for sitting on a trial should be summoned, and the persons actually to serve should be taken by lot, so that neither the judges nor the parties may be able to know beforehand what persons will sit on the trial of a cause. The general list of jurymen should be as numerous as the circumstances of the city or zillah (district) will admit. It should be prepared by the European judge at the station, and altered and amended by him from time to time as may seem proper and requisite. He may easily select well qualified juries from respectable and intelligent natives known to be versed in judicial subjects, who reside in considerable numbers at every station. A necessary concomitant to the introduction of jurymen will be the sole use of the vernacular dialect of the place to the exclusion of the Persian language in proceedings. Publicity should be as much fostered as possible, and the jury should be kept apart and required to decide without separating, as in the English courts of law. In a trial thus conducted the resort to appeal will cease to be useful, and for the purposes of justice, need only be allowed where there is a difference of opinion betwixt the bench and the jury. For, where judge and jury are unanimous, an appeal would be more likely to produce injustice by vexatious expense and delay, than to rectify error on the part of the inferior court, and ought therefore to be prohibited.
37. Q. Do you think the natives of the country qualified to discharge judicial functions of this nature, and from what class would you select the jurors?
A. They are assuredly qualified, as I observed before, in answer to Query 19, and the jurors at present may be judiciously selected from retired pleaders (wakīls) and retired judicial officers, from agents employed by private individuals to attend the court (mukhtars) who are generally well qualified, and from the other intelligent and respectable inhabitants as above observed (Answer to Q. 30 and 36.) To avoid any undue bias or partiality, both parties in a suit should have a right of objecting to any juryman, who can be shewn to have an interest in the cause, or particular connection with either party.
38. Q. Do you think the natives competent and eligible to all judicial situations, or only subordinate ones?
A. As many of them, even under the present manifold disadvantages, already discharge all the judicial functions, even the most arduous (see Q. 15.), it will not be very difficult, I think, with proper management, to find qualified persons amongst the natives for any duty that may be assigned to them. Many, however, as in other countries, are only fit for subordinate situations.
39. Q. What advantage do you conceive this Punchayet-jury system would possess over the judicial system now established?
A. First, from the thorough knowledge of the native character possessed by such a tribunal, and of the language of the parties and witnesses, it would not be so liable to error in its decisions. Secondly, the jury would be guarded from undue influence by the judge and his assessors. Thirdly, it would guard the assessor from the use of undue influence. Fourthly, it would secure the dispatch of business, and the prevention of delay, and of the need of appeals. The checking of perjury and forgery may also reasonably be hoped from it, besides many other advantages already pointed out.
40. Q. Are the provincial courts of appeal conducted on the same principles as the district courts to which you have referred?
A. As they are presided over by gentlemen of more experience and longer residence in the country, these courts are generally conducted with greater regularity.
41. Q. What is the nature of the difference existing between them?
A. Under the Bengal Presidency, in causes above 10,000 rupees, the action must be laid in the provincial court of appeal, and may be decided by one judge. This court takes cognizance also of any case of inferior amount below 10,000 rupees, which may be carried to it by appeal from the decision of, or proceedings held by, the judge of the city or district court, and from these provincial appeal courts, appeals can only be made to the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, the highest civil tribunal.
42. Q. Can you point out any defects in the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, and their remedies?
A. Government has always been very careful in its selection of judges for the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, both as regards their ability and integrity; and they are fully competent to remove any defects which may exist in the court over which they preside. It is, however, highly desirable that judges of the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut should have the power of issuing the writ of habeas corpus, on seeing sufficient grounds for the exercise of this peculiar power, according to the practice of the English courts. But when the person imprisoned is situated at a greater distance from the Sudder courts than fifty miles, the judges of this court, to save useless expense, might direct one of the circuit judges, on whom they could best rely, to investigate the case, and report to them.
43. Q. What other duties are assigned to the judges of the provincial courts?
A. They are a medium of communication between the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut and the inferior courts, and were also judges of circuit.
44. Q. How many provincial courts are there?
A. There are six provincial courts in the provinces attached to the Bengal Presidency, viz. that of Calcutta, Dhacca, Moorshedabad, Patna, Benares, and Bareilly.
45. Q. Are not the judges of the provincial courts still judges of circuit?
A. No: they were so formerly; but about two years ago the local government transferred the duties of judges of circuit from them to the revenue commissioners.
46. Q. Does any inconvenience arise from making the revenue commissioners also judges of circuit?
A. Such an union of offices is quite incompatible and injurious. The judge of circuit discharges duties of the highest importance, being invested with the power of life and death, and imprisonment during life in chains, the infliction of corporal punishment, and the confiscation of property. He is, besides, charged with the preservation of peace and good order in several extensive districts; and it is morally impossible, therefore, that he can fulfil the expectation of Government and the public, if his attention be at the same time engrossed and distracted by political, commercial, or revenue transactions. In criminal suits, moreover, he labours under a peculiar disadvantage, not being assisted by a bar composed of persons of liberal education, or by a body of honest, intelligent, and independent jurors. The former often proves of essential service to the bench in the king's courts, by able expositions of the law as applicable to every case, by great acuteness in cross-examining witnesses, and in the detection of false evidence; while the importance of the jury is universally acknowledged.
Par. 2. Formerly, when the judges of the provincial courts of appeal did the duties of the circuit, one or two of them used to remain at the station, to attend to the necessary current business, while the others (one, or sometimes two,) were on circuit. But on the present system, the commissioner of revenue being also judge of circuit, when he goes on circuit, all references to him, by the collectors under his jurisdiction, often remain unanswered, and the most important matters in the revenue business are entirely suspended for months together. Although the former Mohammedan governments were subject to the charge of indifference about the administration of justice, they yet perceived the evils liable to arise from an union of revenue and judicial duties. No judge or judicial officer empowered to try capital crimes, (as Cazees or Muftis) was ever suffered to become a collector of revenue.
Par. 3. The separation of these two offices has also been established by long practice under the British government, being one of the leading principles of the system introduced by Lord Cornwallis. Accordingly those young civilians who attached themselves to the revenue line of the service, have advanced by successive steps in that line; while those again who preferred the judicial, have been in like manner continued and promoted through the different grades in that department of public duty. Therefore, by overturning this system, a gentleman may now be appointed to discharge the highest judicial duties, who never before tried the most trivial cause; and another to superintend the collectors of revenue, to whose duties he has been all his life a stranger. Mr. E. R. Barwell, Revenue Commissioner and Judge of Circuit of the 24 Purgunnahs, Baraset, Jessore and Burrisal, is an example of the former case; and Mr. H. Braddon, Revenue Commissioner and Judge of Circuit of Burdwan, Jungul Muhal, and Hooghley is an instance of the latter.*
Par. 4. The remedy I beg to propose, without further expence attending the establishment, is to separate the duties between two distinct sets of officers, and double the jurisdiction of each. By this arrangement each gentleman discharging one class of duties would find them more easy and simple, though the field embraced was more extensive, and the expence would be the same as under the present system.
Par. 5. The duties of judges and magistrates are not so incompatible as those of the judges of circuit and the commissioners of revenue; but still separation of these duties is advisable on account of the great weight of the business in the Zillah and city courts. Therefore these two offices (the office of judge and that of magistrate) should be exercised by different individuals. However, the magistrates should assist the judges in the execution of their decrees or orders as they have hitherto done in those districts where the offices of judge and magistrate are separate.
47. Q. What delay generally takes place in the decision of causes?
A. In the Zillah courts a cause may be pending on an average about two or three years; in the courts of appeal four or five years; and in the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut the same period. But if the property in dispute amount to the value of about 50,000 rupees, so as to admit of an appeal to the king in council, the probable period of delay in the decision of such an appeal is better known to the authorities here than to myself.
48. Q. What is the cause of such delay?
A. It must be acknowledged that irregularity in attending to the discharge of the judicial duties, and the want of proper discipline or controul over the judicial officers, are the main causes of obstruction in the dispatch of the judicial business; and these daily growing evils in every branch of the judicial establishment, have in a great measure defeated the object which the government had in view in establishing it. For example, a bill of complaint written on stamp, the first paper in a suit, cannot easily be got on the file unless it be accompanied with some perquisite to the native recorder, whose duty it is to ascertain, first, whether the sum in dispute correspond with the value of the stamp, an act which may be accomplished in a minute or a week, just as it suits the inclination of the examiner. The case is the same with respect to the issuing of the summonses prepared by another native officer, to command the attendance of the person sued, either in person or by a pleader to put in his answer. Summonses, subpœnas, and the processes of the provincial courts are issued against individuals through the judge of the district in which they reside, and a certain period is always allowed for the serving these processes; but neither are the Zillah judges, whose time is otherwise fully occupied, punctual in observing those subordinate duties, nor does the higher court, which is occupied by other important business, take any early notice of the expiration of the time allowed for making the return. The parties are therefore obliged to cultivate a friendly understanding not only with the officers of the provincial court, but also with those of the Zillah or city court. Whether the defendant attends immediately or long after the time allowed him, or whether he files his answer within the regular prescribed period, or a year afterwards, is treated as if practically immaterial. But delay unintentionally allowed to the parties in filing the requisite papers and in producing their documents and witnesses, is the too frequent source of great abuses; as the opportunity thus afforded by delay is embraced to invent stories and forge documents in support of them, to procure false witnesses and to instruct them in the manner that appears best calculated to serve the purposes in view.
Par. 2. Moreover, some of the judges are very irregular in calling on causes, choosing any day and any time that suits their convenience to occupy the bench singly. The pleaders being natives of the country have little or no influence over the conduct of the judges to prevent such irregularities, and dare not hint dissatisfaction.
Par. 3. I would suggest, with a view to remove irregularities originating in a want of official controul, without disregard to economy, that the head writer in each court be required to discharge this duty with some extra remuneration for the same, and be made strictly responsible under an adequate penalty, with proper sureties for his conduct, liable, jointly with him, for any fine he may incur, by want of punctuality proved against him by either party, on complaint to the judge of the court, or of a superior court, or to the judicial secretary.
Par. 4. This superintendant or clerk of the papers, should be required to place on the file in open court, bills of complaint as well as answers and replies, &c. within the period prescribed in Regulation IV. of 1793. These should not be admitted to the records after the time allowed, unless the judge, on motion publicly made, find sufficient reason for prolonging the period, say a week or two in particular cases.
Par. 5. The clerk of the papers should vigilantly watch that no delay takes place in issuing summonses, subpœnas, and other process of the court; and that the day on which these are ordered to be issued, and the day on which their return is expected should be correctly registered in a separate book kept on purpose.
Par. 6. In case of neglect or wilful disobedience, the superintendant of the papers should immediately submit the circumstance to the notice of the judge. Should the neglect be on the part of the prosecutor, the judge ought immediately to pronounce nonsuit, and if on the part of the defendant, proceed ex parte without allowing the neglect to be remedied. Or if the judge do not attend to these rules, the clerk of the papers should be bound to report the circumstance to the superior court, or the judicial secretary on pain of forfeiting his situation. A separate register of the returns should also be kept, as well as a register shewing the time when the defendant's answer must be filed — say one month from the day when the summonses are served, as is the case with equity suits in Calcutta; also shewing the hours during which the judge may attend on public duty, and likewise his occasional absence from court with the alleged cause thereof. The superintendant should transmit monthly a copy of each register, with his own remarks, to government through the secretary in the judicial department, for its particular attention to every breach of regularity therein mentioned.
Par. 7. With a view to the same end, every person who chooses should have a right to be present during the trial of causes in any court: the courts, as is generally the case at present, should be so constructed as to afford facilities for a considerable number of persons hearing and witnessing the whole proceedings: any one who chose should be entitled to make notes of the same and publish them, or cause them to be published, in any manner he may think proper for general information, subject to prosecution for any intentional error or misrepresentation that might be judicially proved against him before a competent tribunal, and to incur such penalty as it might award. This measure would tend to remove the evil pointed out in answer to Query 7, No. 4.
49. Q. What number of causes may be pending at one time, and undisposed of in the district courts and courts of appeal?
A. This depends partly on the comparative degree of industry and attention to business bestowed by the judicial officers, partly on the extent of the district, and amount of business within the jurisdiction of the respective courts. However the average number of causes pending may be ascertained by a reference to the registers kept, which are not at present accessible to me. My impression is that in some districts they are very numerous. But to shew how much the vigilance and activity of a public officer may accomplish, even in so extensive a district as Hoogley, I may mention that there, under Mr. D. C. Smith, every case is decided in the course of four, five or six months. In the courts of appeal the causes pending are very numerous. Conscientious and active as Mr. Smith is, he is often obliged, from the pressure of business, judicial and magisterial, to authorise his native judicial officers to take the depositions of witnesses in the civil suits.
50. Q. Could the number of appeal cases be reduced without any disadvantage?
A. Yes, certainly, not only without disadvantage but with great positive advantage. 1st, By introducing a more regular system of filing papers and bringing on causes, as above suggested, in answer to Q. 48. 2nd, By the aid of a jury and joint native judge, as proposed in reply to Q. 30. 3d, By allowing of no appeal unless when there is a difference of opinion in the zillah or city court in giving sentence, as noticed in reply to the Query 36. By these means the business would be at once conducted with more dispatch, and with more accuracy; so many litigious suits would not occur; and there would be very little need of appeals to revise the decisions.
51. Q. Has the right of appeal to the King in Council proved beneficial or otherwise?
A. Owing to the vast distance, the heavy expence, and the very great delay which an appeal to England necessarily involves, owing also to the inaccuracies in the translations of the papers prepared after decision and sent to this country, and to other causes, I think the right of appeal to the king in council is a great source of evil and must continue to be so, unless a specific court of appeal be created here expressly for Indian appeal causes above 10,000l. At the same time to remove the inaccuracies above noticed, three qualified persons (a European, a Mussulman, and a Hindu) should be nominated joint translators, and the translations should be furnished within one year from the conclusion of the proceedings in India, and both parties should be allowed to examine the accuracy of the translations thus prepared.* But if the appellant neglect to pay the fees of translation within two months after the decision, the appeal should be quashed.
52. Q. What is the nature of the duties assigned to the revenue commissioners?
A. They exercise a general superintendence and controul over the revenue collectors, with powers similar to those vested in the board at Calcutta, formerly called the board of revenue, and in the board of commissioners for the upper provinces. That board at Calcutta is now the superior authority to which an appeal may be made from the decisions of the present commissioners, (it is in consequence now generally termed the Sudder or supreme board), and thence to the government itself. In other words the office of commissioner is a substitute for the board of revenue, but an appeal being allowed from the one to the other, of course there is abundance of appeals and a great part of the business is thus transacted twice or thrice over.
53. Q. What is the nature of the duties assigned to them as judges of the circuit?
A. As judges of circuit they exercise control over the magistrates, and try the higher classes of criminal causes, which involve a question of life or death, or severe punishment; and an appeal lies from them to the Sudder Nizamut Adawlat, the highest criminal tribunal.
54. Q. Does not the discharge of one class of duties interfere with the discharge of another class, which seems to be of a very different nature?
A. As above noticed (Ans. to Q. 46.), while they are engaged in the duties of their circuit court, the reports and references from the revenue collectors must remain for several months unanswered; and not only do the people suffer in consequence, but the public business stagnates, as already observed.
55 and 56. Q. What is the nature of the functions of the judge of circuit, and his native law assessor? Do they afford each other reciprocal assistance in the discharge of their duties?
A. Both take cognizance of the charges brought before the magistrates and sent to their court; both hear the evidence and examine the witnesses, and both give their voice in passing the decision, as I observed in Par. 1st, of my Ans. to Q. 30. In a vague sense the Mohammedan law assessor may be considered as analagous to the jury in English courts, while the European judicial officer is the judge.
57. Q. Are the judges generally competent to the discharge of their duties?
A. Some of them are highly qualified; but it is not expected that European judges should be generally competent to determine difficult questions of evidence among a people whose language, feelings, and habits of thinking and acting are so totally different from their own.
58. Q. Are the native law assessors generally competent?
A. They are generally so: some of the Muftis (Mussulman law assessors) are men of such high honour and integrity, that they may be entrusted with the power of a jury with perfect safety; and they are all of the most essential utility, and indeed the main instrument for expediting the business of the criminal courts. However highly or moderately qualified the European judges may have been, the business has been advantageously conducted through the assistance and co-operation of these Mohammedan assessors for a period of 40 years past.
59. Q. If they should differ in opinion, what course is adopted? A. The case is then referred to the Nizamut Adawlat (the highest criminal tribunal).
60. Q. What course do the judges of the Nizamut Adawlat adopt?
A. If the judge of the supreme criminal court, before whom the referred case comes, should, after consulting with the Muftis of that court, concur in the opinion of the circuit judge, his decision is confirmed and carried into execution. But should the Sudder Nizamut (supreme criminal) judge differ from the opinion of the circuit judge, the case is then submitted to a second, or if necessary, to a third Sudder Nizamut judge, and the opinion given by two Sudder judges against one, is final.
61. Q. Are the judges of the supreme criminal court also judges of the highest civil court?
A. Yes; and very deservedly.
62. Q. Are they generally competent to the discharge of their duties?
A. I have already observed (Q. 42.) that they are highly competent.
63. Q. As it is of the highest importance that the courts of circuit should be above all corruption; can you suggest any means of improving them?
A. Courts which have the disposal of life and death are undoubtedly of very high importance; and I would therefore propose instead of only one law assessor (who stands in place of a jury) that three or five (at least three) law assessors should be attached to each court, while trials are going on.
64. Q. From what class of men would you select the juries in the criminal courts?
A. The criminal law now established in India has been very judiciously founded on the Mohammedan criminal law. It has however been so greatly modified by the acts of government from time to time since 1793, that it, in fact, constitutes a new system of law, consisting partly of its original basis, and partly of the government regulations. But it has been made a regular study only by the respectable Mohammedans, who when they attain a certain proficiency are styled Maulavies, a term equivalent to Doctors of Law. Formerly two of these were attached to each court of circuit, and one to each district court. Of late the office of Maulavi of circuit having been abolished, the Maulavi or Mufti of the Zillah (district) court has been ordered by government to officiate as Mufti of circuit, while the judge of circuit is engaged in the trial of the criminal causes of that district. Thus he alone, as assessor of the judge of circuit, is entrusted with the powers usually assigned to a jury in a British court; having the power of delivering his opinion on every case at the close of the trial.
Par. 2. With a view to lessen the abuse of the great power thus given, it is highly desirable that government should adopt the following precaution : The judge of circuit previous to his departure for any Zillah (district) or city to try criminal causes, should summon, through the magistrate, one or two additional Maulavis attached to the adjacent courts, with a few other learned, intelligent and respectable inhabitants of that district or city, to join him on his arrival with a moderate extra allowance for their services, and every morning before he takes his seat on the bench, the judge should, without previous intimation, direct three of them to sit with him during the whole trials that may come on for that day as his law assessors ; and they should be required to deliver their opinions in each case in open court, immediately after the close of the proceedings, without previous opportunity of communicating with any one whatever, on the same principle as an English jury : and the judge should immediately inform the parties of the verdict, to put an end to all intrigues. The judge of circuit should also be required to keep a vigilant watch over the proceedings of the magistrates within his jurisdiction, and to institute an investigation personally and on the spot, into any complaint preferred against them, whenever he sees sufficient ground for adopting this prompt measure ; and the judge of circuit only should have the power of inflicting corporal punishment; not any magistrate as injudiciously authorised by Regulation IX. of 1807, Sec. 19th.
65. Q. What would be their duty? precisely like that of a jury, or like that of the law assessors as hitherto employed?
A. More resembling that of the law assessors as hitherto employed. The difference between them is not important, and the result would be the same.
66. Q. Should not the jury be selected from persons of all religious sects and divisions?
A. Since the criminal law has hitherto been administered by the Mohammedans; to conciliate this class, the assessors should still be selected from among them, until the other classes may have acquired the same qualifications, and the Mohammedans may become reconciled to co-operate with them.
67. Q. Do you think any alteration necessary in the system of criminal law now established?
A. As the criminal laws now established are already in general very familiar to the natives, I think they may better remain in their present state, until the government may be able to introduce a regular code.
68. Q. In what manner do you think a code of criminal law could be framed suitable to the wants of the country?
A. A code of criminal law for India should be founded as far as possible on those principles which are common to, and acknowledged by all the different sects and tribes inhabiting the country. It ought to be simple in its principles, clear in its arrangement, and precise in its definitions ; so that it may be established as a standard of criminal justice in itself, and not stand in need of explanation by a reference to any other books of authority, either Mohammedan or Christian. It is a subject of general complaint that persons of a certain high rank, however profligate some of them may be, are, from political considerations, exempted from the jurisdiction or controul of the courts of law. To remedy this inconvenience, in the proposed code, so as to give general satisfaction, without disregarding the political distinctions hitherto observed, it may perhaps be expedient for government to order such persons to be tried by a special commission, composed of three or more persons of the same rank. This very regulation, when once known to them, would, in all probability, deter them from committing any very gross act of tyranny or outrage upon their dependents or others.
69. Q. What period of time would it take to frame such a code, and by whom could it be done satisfactorily?
A. It must require at least a couple of years to do it justice ; and it ought to be drawn up by persons, thoroughly acquainted with Mohammedan and Hindu law, as well as the general principles of British law.
70. Q. Are the judges capable of regulating their proceedings by such a code of laws?
A. At present they are not generally capable of performing their judicial duties independent of the aid of the assessors; but with a proper code, as above supposed, they might most of them, in no great period, by making it a regular study, become much more capable of administering justice by it than they are by the present system.
71, 72. Q. Would not the detention of the young civilians in England to obtain a regular legal education be injurious by delaying their proceeding to India for several years, at that period of life, when they are best capable to acquire the native languages? Do you conceive that any disadvantages arise from civilians going out at an early age?
A. This is a subject which merits the deepest consideration of the legislature. Young men sent out at an early age, before their principles are fixed, or their education fully matured, with the prospect of the highest power, authority, and influence before them, occupying already the first rank in society immediately on their arrival, and often without the presence of any parent, or near relative to advise, guide or check them, and surrounded by persons ready, in the hope of future favours and patronage, to flatter their vanity and supply money to almost any extent to their too easily excitable passions — are evidently placed in a situation calculated to plunge them into many errors, make them overstep the bounds of duty to their fellow creatures and fellow subjects, and to relax whatever principles of virtue may have been implanted in their yet inexperienced minds. The excuse made for so injudicious an arrangement, that it is favourable to the acquisition of the native languages, is of no weight; for it may be observed that the missionaries, who are usually sent out at the age of from 25 to 35 years, acquire generally in two or three years so thorough a knowledge of these languages as to be able to converse freely in them and even to address a native audience with fluency in their own tongue. In fact the languages are easily acquired at a mature as well as at an immature age by free communication with the people. Moreover, by the system of native assessors, juries and other helps to the judges and magistrates, and by the gradual substitution of English for Persian, as above proposed, so extensive and minute a knowledge of the native languages would not be requisite, In short from the present system of sending out youths at so early an age very serious evils arise to themselves, as well as to the Government, and to the public. 1st, With respect to themselves, they are too often seduced into habits which prove ruinous to their health and to their fortunes, becoming thereby involved in debts from which many of them are never afterwards able to extricate themselves without having recourse to improper means. 2dly, These embarrassments interfere very seriously with their duty to Government and the public, as the persons to whom they are indebted generally surround them, and seize every opportunity of enriching themselves which their situation and influence put in their way. 3dly, Their indiscreet choice of native officers from youthful partialities, and the thoughtless habits acquired in early days, amid power and influence, prove very injurious to the community. Therefore no civil servant should be sent to India under 24 or at least 22 years of age, and no candidate among them should be admitted into the judicial line of the service, unless he can produce a certificate from a professor of English law to prove that he possesses a competent knowledge of it. Because, though he is not to administer English law, his proficiency therein will be a proof of his capacity for legal studies and judicial duties, and a knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence as developed in one system of law will enable him to acquire more readily any other system; just as the study of the ancient and dead languages improves our knowledge of the modern tongues. This is so important, that no public authority should have the power of violating the rule, by admitting to the exercise of judicial functions any one who has not been brought up a lawyer.
73. Q. How are the laws of inheritance regulated?
A. The property of Mohammedans descends and is divided according to their own law of inheritance ; and the property of Hindus according to theirs ; and of other sects also agreeably to their respective laws of inheritance.
74. Q. What books do the Hindu lawyers officially attached to the courts follow as law authorities?
A. There are various books, but in Bengal they chiefly follow the Dāyabhāga, with occasional reference to other authorities ; and in the western province, and a great part of the Dakhan they follow the Mitaksharā principally.
75. Q. What books do the Mahommedan lawyers follow as authorities?
A. The majority of the Mussulmans of Hindustan follow the doctrines of Abū Hanīfah and his disciples ; consequently the Hidāya is their chief law authority ; but they also refer to some other books of decision or cases, such as the Fatāwae Ālamgīrī and others.
76. Q. Is there any mode by which the law authorities, now so voluminous and perplexing, might be simplified in such a manner as to prevent the native lawyers from misleading the courts, and confounding the rights of property?
A. To effect this great and pre-eminently important object, a code of civil law should be formed on similar principles to these already suggested for the criminal code, and this, as well as the former, should be accurately translated, and published under the authority of government. By printing off large impressions, and distributing them, at prime cost, in the current languages of the people, they might render the rights of property secure; since, these being clear and well known to the whole community, it would be impossible for any designing man to induce an intelligent person to enter upon litigious suits. The law of inheritance should, of course, remain as at present with modifications peculiar to the different sects, until by the diffusion of intelligence the whole community may be prepared to adopt one uniform system. At present when a new regulation, drawn up by any officer of government and submitted to it, is approved of, it immediately becomes law when promulgated, the same as an act of parliament in this country, when approved of, discussed, and sanctioned by king, lords and commons. From the want of sufficient local knowledge and experience on the part of the framers of such regulations, they are often found not to answer in practice, and the local government is thus frequently obliged to rescind the whole or part of them. I would therefore suggest that if any new regulation be thought necessary before the completion of the civil and criminal codes above proposed, great care and precaution should be observed in its enactment. With this view every such project of law before it is finally adopted by the government, should be printed and a copy sent directly from government, not only to the Judges of the Sudder Dewanee Adawlat, and the members of the Board of Revenue &c., but also to the advocate-general on the part of the Honourable Company, to the principal Zamindars, such as the Rajahs of Burdwan, Behar, Benares, &c., and to the highly respectable merchants such as Jaggat Set at Murshedabad, Baboo Bajnath at Patna, and the representatives of Baboo Manōhar Dass at Benares, also to the Muftis of the Sudder Dewannee Adawlat, and the head native officers of the Boards of Revenue, for their opinion on each clause of the Regulation to be sent in writing within a certain period. Because these being the persons who are affected by the Regulations, they will be cautious of recommending any that is injurious.* It should still be optional, however, with government to be guided or not by their suggestions. But a copy of the minutes made by the different parties above named should accompany the Regulations, when these are to be transmitted to England for the consideration of the court of directors, and parliament; and there should be a standing committee of the House of Commons, to take the whole regulations and minutes into consideration, and report to the House from time to time on the subject, for their confirmation or amendment.
In such matters as those of war and peace, it may be necessary that the local government should act on its own discretion and responsibility according to existing circumstances, notwithstanding the opinion of the government in England. But as the affairs of India have been known to the authorities in Europe, for such a series of years, in matters of legislation, the local government should be bound to carry into effect any regulations or orders in judicial and revenue matters sent out, formally enacted by the British government, or the Court of Directors under the express sanction of the Board of Commissioners for the controul of the affairs of India, although the local Government might still remonstrate against them to the home authorities.
The attention thus shewn by the government at home and abroad, to the feelings and interests of the Zamindars, and merchants, as principal members of the community, though it would not confer upon them any political power, would give them an interest in the government, and inspire them with greater attachment to it, and also the whole community, as being under their influence, and in general receiving its opinions from them.
77. Q. Should the civil servants, in the judicial and revenue departments, be educated expressly for the particular line of the service in which they are engaged, or is it advantageous to transfer them from one branch of it to another?
A. It is found by experience that persons, by long habit in the performance of any particular duties, become not only more dexterous in but more reconciled and even attached to them, and find them less irksome than others to which they have not been accustomed. In my humble opinion, the duties of a judge are not inferior in difficulty to those of any other profession whatever, nor is the qualification requisite for them to be acquired with less experience. It has been alleged that the revenue officers, when converted into judicial officers, must be better judges of revenue causes; But on this principle, commercial officers ought to become judges for the sake of commercial causes, agriculturists for agricultural causes, and mechanists for mechanical disputes. However, as matters of revenue, commerce, agriculture, &c. are decided on the general principles of law and justice, any such special preparation has never been found necessary: therefore these two classes of duties should be kept quite distinct, if it is wished that either of them be performed well.
78. Q. Can you offer any other suggestions for the improvement of the Judicial Establishment?
A. 1st. In order to keep the judicial officers above temptation, their salaries should not be reduced. 2dly. With the additional aids and checks of joint native judges, assessors, and juries above proposed, (Ans. to Q. 30.) all civil courts of appeal may be dispensed with, except the supreme civil court (Sudder Dewanee Adawlat,) and thus a very considerable saving may be effected by the government. One tenth of this saving will suffice to support all the native assessors, juries &c. above recommended (Q. 30.) 3dly, By gradually introducing the natives into the revenue departments under the superintendance of European officers, (as I proposed in my Appendix A, on the revenue system,) and in the judicial department in co-operation with them, the natives may become attached to the present system of government, so that it may become consolidated, and maintain itself by the influence of the intelligent and respectable classes of the inhabitants, and by the general good will of the people, and not any longer stand isolated in the midst of its subjects, supporting itself merely by the exertion of superior force.
Par. 2. Should the gradual introduction of the natives into places of authority and trust as proposed, be found not to answer the expectations of Government, it would then have the power of stopping their farther advancement, or even of reversing what might have been already done in their favour. On the contrary, should the proposed plan of combining Native with European officers have the effect of improving the condition of the inhabitants and of stimulating them with an ambition to deserve the confidence of the government, it will then be enabled to form a judgment, of the practicability and expedience of advancing natives of respectability and talent to still higher situations of trust and dignity in the state, either in conjunction with or separately from their British fellow subjects.
Par. 3. In conclusion, I deem it proper to state, that in preparing my replies to these queries, I have not been biassed by the opinions of any individual whatsoever; nor have I consulted with any person or even referred to any work which treats on the subject of India. I have for the facts consulted only my own recollections; and in regard to the opinions expressed, I have been guided only by my conscience, and by the impressions left on my mind by long experience and reflection. In the improvements which I have ventured to suggest, I have kept in view equally the interests of the governors and the governed; and without losing sight of a just regard to economy, I have been actuated by a desire to see the administration of justice in India placed on a solid and permanent foundation.
(Signed,) rammohun roy.
london, Sep. 19th, 1831.
Notes
- *. The native judicial officers are generally versed in Persian, and therefore the proceedings hitherto generally held in that language would be familiar to them.
- *. By Regulation XXXVI. of 1793, the registering of deeds is authorised, but left in the option of the parties.
- *. Vide the Directories containing the list of civil servants in Bengal.
- *. In noticing this circumstance, I by no means intend to make the least insinuation to the prejudice of the present translators ; but make the statement from my own observation of various translations, and my own experience of the great difficulty, or rather impracticability, of rendering accurately large masses of documents from an oriental tongue, and frequently a provincial dialect, into a European language, of which the idioms are so widely different, unless the translator be assisted by persons possessing peculiar vernacular knowledge of the various localities.
- *. In the case of those parties who do not understand English, the draft regulations, when sent to them, should be accompanied with a translation.