Chapter XII

Civil Justice for Agriculturists.

Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the Punjab, Septimus Smet Thorburn, 1886 · from page 116 · about 33 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

For the first 17 years of its existence as a British Province, what has been aptly called “the patriarchal system” of administration obtained in the Punjab. Under it each District Officer was a little king within the limits of his jurisdiction, and was affectionately called by the people their “father and mother” (ma-bap). In order to temper his autocratic power and secure reasonable uniformity in the dispensation of civil justice, a collection of rules, which soon acquired the name of the “Punjab Civil Code,” was prepared in 1853, under the auspices of the Lieutenant-Governor, and circulated as a manual for information and guidance. Being lucid, simple, and suited to the circumstances of the people, they soon acquired the force of law. In rural tracts they answered their purpose admirably. But in towns, as commerce expanded and business relationships became more complex, occasions arose when less individual latitude and more direction were required.

In 1866 a Chief Court was established in the Punjab, Act VIII of 1859, the Code of Civil Procedure of the Regulation Provinces, was extended to it, and pleaders were permitted to practise in its courts. Since that year the assimilation of the Punjab to the regulation pattern of law-ridden Provinces, like those of Lower Bengal and the N.-W. Provinces, has been forced on by the Legislative Department with hot-house celerity. “Justice, equity, and good conscience," the old desiderata by which the soundness of a judgment was measured by an appellate court, are no longer guides to a right decision. Their place has been usurped by Regulations, Acts, Sections, Clauses, and the latest Rulings of that object of the poor man's dread and the District Officer's sarcasm—the Chief Court. In 1871-72 the dubious legality of the still unsuperseded rules of the "Punjab Civil Code" caused the then Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council (Mr., now Sir FitzJames Stephen) to amend and reduce those rules into the form of a single Bill, subsequently passed as the Punjab Laws Act, 1872.

When the Bill was before the Council, Sir George Campbell, then Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who had served for many years in the Punjab, and been one of the best exemplars of its patriarchal administrators, successfully moved an amendment, whereby a large measure of the simplicity, which characterized the old Punjab Civil Code, was secured.

In moving his amendment, Sir George made the following observations on the legal changes which had crept into the Punjab between 1852 and 1872. He said :—

"* After a quarter of a century of British administration, the state of things was, he thought, such as to disappoint persons who were concerned in the administration of the Province in the early days when he had served there. The plan of administration then pursued had not only been modified, but he might say entirely reversed. The Punjab had come to be as law-ridden, as much ridden over by lawyers, he feared, as any part of British India. He had often expressed in this Council—perhaps it might have been thought in a somewhat jocular way—his abhorrence for the reign of lawyers; but in doing so, he did not in any respect mean to give that opinion in the way of a joke, but in the most serious and sad manner. He did consider that the predominance of lawyers all over the country was a very serious and growing evil; and he wished to declare his opinion that if ever the country became too hot to hold us, it would be the lawyers that had done it. The Senior Judge of the Punjab, an English lawyer, who had, in comparatively recent years, gone to that Province was, he was told, strongly of opinion that the courts were becoming a burden and a disaster to the people of the Punjab. That being so, His Honor had looked to this Bill, in order to see whether its effect would be to give new force to this law-ridden, lawyer-ridden form of administration.

With respect to the part played by lawyers in suits in which agriculturists are concerned, I shall have some remarks to make hereafter. For the present, I call attention to the extract from Sir George Campbell's speech, as the sentiments therein enunciated are largely shared by most experienced district officers.

Lest it be denied that the Punjab is law-ridden, I may mention here that at the close of 1866, five Bengal Regulations and 77 Acts were in force in it, and that since that year to the end of 1882, the average annual outturn from the Legislative Mill of Acts applicable to the Punjab, has been seven. Between the beginning of 1878 and the end of 1882, fifty-two such Acts were passed, being at the rate of a fraction more than ten in each year. Although, however, about 200 Regulations and Acts, and an enormous number of rules framed by the Local Government under them, embody the law administration in the Punjab, acquaintance with 25 or 30 suffices for the ordinary daily requirements of Judicial and Executive Officers.

Out of that number of those dealing with the economic affairs of the every-day life of all classes, either the whole or the greater part of the two marginally named are totally incomprehensible to agriculturists, and only partially so to about 75 per cent. of the Judges who administer them and the practising lawyers who make their livelihood by misinterpreting their sections to litigants and Judges alike. The provisions of one or other of those two Acts, as well as those of the complex but, on the whole, useful “Indian Evidence Act, 1872,” are constantly referred to, even in petty causes between agriculturists and money-lenders, by legal practitioners, by weak and timid Judges who seek to relieve themselves of responsibility by throwing the onus of an unintelligible decision on the law, and by those stronger Judges who care little for equity, provided they can dispose of a suit quickly, and exhibit legal acumen in their decisions.

In the Punjab the costly protraction of litigation and the generally unsatisfactory conclusion which the increasing burden of laws and lawyers are causing,* have induced on the part of Judges of robust independence, who prefer “justice, equity, and good conscience,” to technicalities, an attitude of steady opposition almost amounting to revolt. Such men ride rough-shod over lawyers’ quibbles, and decide their cases on the real merits in judgments remarkable for blunt common sense, and the omission of vexatious references to Acts, Sections or Rulings. Should their judgments reach the Chief Court on appeal or revision, that Court generally strives to uphold the lower Court’s decision; but being bound to interpret the law as it is, and all freedom of reason being cramped by the arguments of watchful pleaders, it is often reduced to the necessity of justifying its conclusions on legal grounds. In other words, the clear direction of the law has to be set aside by special pleading. It is not, however, on every occasion that the Chief Court allows its judgments and instructions to be governed by a healthy sympathy for what is reasonable or desirable. In the case of Barrister-Judges, who have themselves practised at the Bar, the instincts of the old Advocate sometimes operate to cause the evolution of subtle distinctions which, becoming rulings, are often productive of far-reaching consequences of evil.

To illustrate my meaning, I shall give three instances in which the over-technicality and refinement of the law, as now administered by the Chief Court, has caused widespread harm, and tended to bring the law and Chief Court into contempt. I shall then give two instances in illustration of my assertion that, in the interests of the public, the Chief Court readily evades bad provisions of the law by special pleading or otherwise, whenever it possibly can do so.

In 1884 a young Mahomedan lady was married to a suitable husband, also a Mahomedan. A few months afterwards she verted to Christianity, and refused to live with her husband. The subordinate courts decreed him what is called “restitution of conjugal rights,” but the Chief Court ruled * that as by verting she had de facto apostatised and quasi-blasphemed the Prophet, she had therefore ceased to be a wife from the day she had changed her faith. Comment on the absurdity of such a decision is hardly needed, especially when it is remembered that the Prophet licensed the marriages of the faithful with Jews and Christians, and that under the Mahomedan law blasphemers were put to death by stoning. A second instance is the ruling,* in 1879, of the Chief Court, that amongst Mahomedans infant marriage is binding until lawful divorce by the husband after attaining majority. Formerly the practice of the Province had been that until consummation the breach of a marriage contract entered into by guardians, entitled the aggrieved party to compensation only, as in case of a breach of betrothal. The practice had for many years given universal satisfaction. Since the new ruling universal discontent and social demoralisation prevail, and when courts are not strong enough to do right in defiance of the ruling, much confusion in family relationships occurs, as the following case will prove. About 15 years ago a male infant was "married" in Dera-Ismail-Khan to a girl some ten or twelve years older than himself. When the girl grew up she fell in love, and persuaded the boy's mother— who was his sole surviving guardian and had been a party to the marriage—to give her a divorce. The emancipated girl then married her lover, and had a family by him. In 1883 or 1884 the boy-husband sued for restitution of conjugal rights, on the ground that the divorce, having been given without his consent, was invalid. The claim was decreed. The boy then charged his legal wife's illegal husband with committing adultery, and sought also to imprison the woman, as she refused to live with him. Both charge and claims were legally sustainable, but the reductio ad absurdum his persistency had created was so monstrous that when the case came before me, I laughed the boy out of Court. My individual refusal to enforce the law, notwithstanding the effect of the Chief Court's ruling, is that the woman is her natural husband's mistress, he an adulterer, and their children bastards.

The third illustration I take from a case which recently occurred at Rawalpindi, in which the Chief Court, on the revision side, quashed a decision arrived at after lengthy and costly proceedings, on the technical ground that as the officer giving the decision had signed himself “Magistrate of the District” instead of “Deputy Commissioner,” he had acted ultra vires. The merits of the case were not touched upon by the Chief Court. The effect of the order has been, so far as the parties are concerned, to cause them a loss of several thousand rupees, to protract the case uselessly for some months, and, quoad the public, to give lawyers an opportunity for upsetting numerous decisions, otherwise legal, on the quibble that the presiding officer had misdescribed himself, or heard the suit on the revenue instead of on the civil side, or magisterially instead of as an Executive or Political Officer.*

And now to show that the Chief Court has human sympathies and readily evades the provisions of a bad law for the public benefit, when not constrained to interpret it technically by the irresistible logic of watchful counsel.

The law of contract introduced by us into India—following largely the Roman Law—was, and still is, very severe on the debtor. Until 1877 all the debtor’s property was liable to attachment and sale. In that year an amended Code of Civil Procedure (Act X) was passed, and amongst other changes a few insignificant necessaries were exempted. From the first a debtor has been, with certain restrictions, liable to a term of imprisonment at the instance of the decree-holder. The courts having no discretionary powers, have been, since 1866, merely instruments in the latter's hands. When, in the execution of a decree, the attachment and sale of hereditary or jointly-held arable land was applied for, the Collector was empowered to endeavour to avoid the necessity of public sale, by satisfying the decree-holder by a temporary alienation of the land. Strictly up to date the law enables the decree-holder to arrest and imprison his judgment-debtor, and sell him up. Notwithstanding this, the Chief Court, in 1877, took advantage of the sections in the Civil Procedure Code, which authorize the Collector to propose an arrangement by temporary alienations of land, and formulated rules* of such an obstructive character that since then the public sale of hereditary and jointly-held land in execution of a decree has almost ceased.

Collectors, sympathising with the agricultural classes, have been in the habit of reading between the lines of the Circular, and have so manipulated it that even when a saleproposal statement has reached the Chief Court, some loop-hole has generally been given to the Judges for further deferring sanction. Thus the cost, delay, and personal worry to Bunniah-decree-holders have become so intolerable that proceedings to enforce the sale of land are seldom prosecuted by them to the bitter end. In proof of the fact, it is sufficient to mention that between 1880 and 1884, only 273 such sales—being an average of 55, or under two for each district in the year—were sanctioned. It was impossible that such a state of things could continue for an indefinite period. Cases occurred in which decree-holders employing counsel insisted on and obtained their rights. The further separation of the Judicial from the Executive Departments effected in 1884, and the persistence of pleaders, have at last constrained the Chief Court to issue a Circular (No. V—924 of 13th March, 1886), under which, in future, the letter of the law must be obeyed, and civil courts, even though sympathetic with distressed agriculturists, will now have no option but to enforce an execution sale when decree-holders prove obdurate.

I now proceed to instance cases in which the Chief Court and Divisional Judges, directly or by connivance, strain the law by skilful special pleading in order to benefit agricultural debtors.

For many years, as I have already remarked, the whole of a debtor's property was liable to attachment and sale except contingent rights in satisfaction of a decree. Under Section 266 of the new Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), his wearing apparel, implements of husbandry, plough and well-bullocks and house are exempted.* The object of the Section is clearly to leave to the judgment-debtor the means of subsistence. Looking to the spirit rather than to the letter of the law in some districts,† a practice has been allowed to grow up, under which, in addition to the articles specifically exempted, a portion of each crop, sufficient for the maintenance of the cultivator and his family until the next harvest, has also been treated as not liable to attachment and sale. Neither the Chief Court nor the Government, though for over two years officially informed of the extended interpretation put on Section 266 of the Code, has yet interfered with that interpretation's operation; and what is more curious, the rule, wherever locally introduced, has been accepted by money-lenders with little or no demur.

In truth, a study of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 leaves the mind in a dilemma. On the one hand, it broadly declares that every man is liable for his debts, almost to his last asset, and that if he cannot pay them his creditor may arrest, imprison, and sell him up. On the other hand, it, by various enabling Sections, seeks to soften its own harshness. Thus, Section 210 declares that the liquidation of a debt may be decreed "by instalments with or without interest." Thus, too, the sale of land is entrenched behind so many delays, formalities, and incertitudes that, under the vigilant land conservation of the Chief Court and Divisional Judges, it was, until recently, practically unattainable when the decree-holder was a money-lender and the judgment-debtor an agriculturist. Although the Circular, to which I have already referred,* enjoins the observance of the letter of the law, it may be assumed that both the Judges of the Chief Court and Subordinate English Judges will tacitly combine, as heretofore, to mitigate the inelasticity of the law whenever possible. If then, as seems likely, certain enabling Sections were introduced into the Civil Procedure Code, with a view to indirectly encourage Judges to supersede the fundamental canon of the law of contract in respect of debt, that a man is liable in person and property to his last asset for his just debts, it is only natural that English Judges in India, in their sympathy for impoverished agricultural debtors, should endeavour to ignore that canon entirely.

Thus we find the Chief Court* enjoining civil courts to look behind the terms of an agreement, and to decree only reasonable interest† —whether the bond was registered or not—in cases in which it may appear that the "agreement has been entered into through fear or ignorance;" and then we find it gravely ruled that ignorance may be presumed from the bare fact that the borrower is an agriculturist and the lender a village money-lender.‡

Later still we find the decreeing of interest on sums decreed persistently deprecated.

Thus, in reviewing the administration of the Punjab for 1884-85, the Lieutenant-Governor goes so far as to remark :—

Steps have been taken to remove an erroneous but too general impression, that when a rate of interest has been fixed by the consent of the parties, the court is bound to decree accordingly.

"The award of interest after decree has been discussed in the section which deals with disposal of suits. A more difficult matter to deal with is the award of interest in decrees, that is, in the sum substantively decreed. Instructions have been issued for the guidance of Judicial Officers in this matter in Judicial Circular No. XXIV, and in the case noted in the margin it was ruled that the absence of free consent on the part of the borrower might be presumed, under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, from the bare facts of the borrower being a zemindar and the lender a village money-lender. It is to be feared, however, that civil courts are sometimes not as careful as they should be in dealing with claims which are largely, or sometimes even mostly, made up of interest. In cases in which a settlement is come to by the parties under Section 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, the courts are helpless, for they must pass a decree in accordance with the lawful agreement of the parties ; but in other cases the court can exercise its discretion ; and in such cases, even if the claim to interest is not specifically objected to, the court should act in the spirit of the instructions which have been above referred to, and the superior courts should make the most of such opportunities as are afforded them by appeals and inspection of records to see that they do so."

Such rulings, instructions, and interpretations effectually encourage sympathetic civil courts,—i. e., most of those presided over by Englishmen,—to treat a large part of the Indian Law of Contract as a dead letter in cases in which agriculturists are defendants.

A little examination will show to what a reductio ad absurdum the doctrine, that ignorance may be presumed from the bare fact that the borrower is a peasant and the lender a Bunniah, may be brought.

This doctrine was evolved in a Circular issued in 1879* in connection with a judgment, which is published in the Punjab Record of that year as No. 110 (Civil).

In that judgment Smyth, J., ruled that, having regard to the fact that the bond was extortionate and unconscionable (i. e., the interest was high), and considering the relations between the parties (i. e., one obtained his living by cultivation the other by lending money), the Court was justified, in the absence of rebutting proof from plaintiff, in holding that the bond was executed under “undue influence,” and was therefore justified in treating the bond as void, and decreeing to plaintiff the amount equitably due— i. e., the true principal and moderate interest thereon. Plowden, J., held that the bare fact that parties to a contract were a village money-lender and zemindar, raised a presumptio juris that there was not free consent, unless that presumption was inconsistent with the other facts disclosed.

Now here we have the Chief Court of Justice in the Province, not merely adjudicating on defendant’s plea, but going out of its way to invent a plea (i. e., of “undue influence”), of which defendant had never dreamt. There is a story of a man, who employed counsel in a case, that after his counsel's speech he was observed to burst into tears. On being asked the reason, he said "until I heard my counsel to-day, I did not know how much wrong I had suffered." In the case under consideration, a kindly court has assumed the rôle of the counsel in the story.

But there is a more important point to be considered, viz., the effects of "undue influence" on an agreement. For an agreement to be enforceable at law—i. e., cognizable by the courts—it must be made with "free consent" of the parties. Where there is "undue influence" there cannot be free consent. Therefore, when there is "undue influence" the agreement, of which the bond is the outward and visible sign, is void. And yet the Chief Court tells us, as per Circular, that "it is beside our duty to set the agreement aside." That is, if we find that an agreement is void, it is beside our duty to set it aside, but we must award the principal mentioned in it and reasonable interest. Again, "coercion" stands on precisely the same footing as "undue influence" in the Contract Act. If the courts apply this wonderful new doctrine to cases of coercion, we shall have some ruling like this. A forces B to execute a bond by putting a pistol to his head : it is beside the duty of the court to set the agreement aside; any principal mentioned in the bond with reasonable interest must be awarded to A. I have said that an agreement brought about by "undue influence" is void, and this seems to be the meaning of Smyth, J., when he says "the bond is void." I have endeavoured to show by argument above that such an agreement is void. But in Section 19, Indian Contract Act, it is laid down that "when consent to an agreement is caused by 'undue influence,' the contract is voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused." If then, at the time the peasant's case came before the Chief Court, the contract was voidable at the defendant's option, and he voided it, he had, under Section 64, Indian Contract Act, only to restore the benefits which he had actually received, consequently he should not have been compelled to pay any interest, but should himself have been entitled to damages under Section 75. So that if the contract was voidable, the Chief Court ought only to have dismissed the case on the bond, leaving the Bunniah to bring another action, if he pleased, for money advanced under an agreement discovered to be void under Section 65, Indian Contract Act.

It will be seen that in the Chief Court's judgment the Judges do not allude to the ignorance of the zemindar as they do in the Circular. But what does this ignorance mean? Obviously that the intellect of a peasant is not adequate to allow him to form any reasonable opinion as to how the contract will affect his interests. That is, the courts are to presume that peasants are of unsound mind until the contrary is proved!

What the Indian Legislature did, was to transplant the English Contract Act (and in England I need hardly say people are presumed to be sane) to India with some 30 differences of detail, and require the courts to administer it. What the Chief Court of the Punjab has done, is to instruct the courts to do so on the presumption that peasants, when dealing with Bunniahs, are insane!

Now, let us glance at the figures exhibiting the administration of civil justice in the Punjab in 1884—the last year for which figures are obtainable. In that year 2,71,375 original suits, being one to every 21 families of five persons, were decided by courts. Europeans only disposed of 4 per cent. of the whole number: 39 per cent., or 1,03,101, were claims for money brought by money-lenders against agriculturists. The 84 munsifs of the Province, before whom most of those claims were heard, disposed of 1,71,651, or over 63 per cent. of the whole number of civil suits decided in the year. Those "munsifs," I must explain, are a peculiar body, only hear what are called "small cause" cases, and compose the agency by which 71 per cent. of the money-claims of all sorts were decided. They are largely recruited from the Bunniah class, and are mostly men of town extraction and of good education. As a body, they are ignorant of rural affairs, have no sympathy with agriculturists, and do not thoroughly understand their patois. Of suits decided by them, only 28 per cent. were so on their merits, the remaining 72 per cent. being disposed of by compromise, confession, withdrawal, or by dismissal for default.

As regards execution of decrees, 31 per cent. were executed completely, 25 per cent. partially, and 43 per cent. were wholly infructuous. In other words, in 67 per cent. of the cases in which the plaintiff won his cause, he obtained either little or no satisfaction because the judgment-debtor was insolvent. Put in another form, only 28 per cent. of the money-value of decrees was realized. Of suits for money or moveable property, 88 per cent. were for sums not exceeding Rs. 100. This class made up 73 per cent. of the whole litigation of the Province. Statutory costs fell at an average of 11 per cent. on the suit-valuation; but such costs barely represent half of the expenses really incurred.*

The ratio of costs progresses inversely to the valuation. Thus in suits for Rs. 50 and under, which represented 59 per cent. of the whole litigation of the Province, costs, taxable and untaxable, ranged from about 25 to 60 per cent. The above figures prominently show the enormous costliness of litigation compared with results obtained from it, the petty character of that litigation, the insolvency of a majority of the judgment-debtors, and the immense power over agriculturists exercised by munsifs. With respect to this class of Civil Judge, it is curious to note how the establishment of a munsif's court in any township or large village immediately creates or stimulates litigation, and that the chief function performed by this class of Judge is to terrorize defendants into coming to terms with their Bunniah-plaintiffs. Thus, out of 1,71,651 suits decided by munsifs in 1884, in only 48,177, or 28 per cent., were judgments delivered after contest.

Duly weighing the above figures and considerations, —particularly noting that only Rs. 35,27,966, or 28 per cent. of the value in money of decrees, were realized on execution, and that such a figure represents a sum just roundly equal to the costs and expenses of the litigants and no more,—it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the existing system of civil justice, quoad petty causes for money or moveables between agriculturists and Bunniahs, is in a very unsatisfactory and unwholesome state, being too costly, too elaborate, too technical, and, above all, in a majority of cases effecting little result beyond the probable impoverishment of one party and the certain exasperation and demoralisation of both. I am convinced that were the cognizance of disputes of the above kind throughout the tracts in which the agriculturists are still homogeneous and primitive, entirely withdrawn from the civil courts, borrowing and lending classes would agree better together, and the general social tone of both would be improved. I am only deterred from proposing that the payment of small obligations by agriculturists to Bunniahs, in tracts like Marwat and Bhangikhel, in the Bannu district, and parts of Dera-Ghazi-Khan, and of Jhang and Montgomery, should be a moral obligation, and nothing more, by the conviction of the hopelessness of such a proposal.

Now to pass on to the effect of legal practitioners on litigation. Their increasing numbers attracted the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor in 1883. In reviewing the administration of his Province for 1882-83, he regretfully recorded :—

The number of pleaders is annually increasing, and few cases reach the higher appellate court without the entertainment of advocates, however small the value of the subject-matter may be. Whether, in the present state of the Province, it is an unmixed benefit to the people, to be able to avail themselves so freely of professional assistance in the prosecution of their claims, may be matter for consideration.

When these words were written, the number of legal practitioners in the Punjab was 149. Since then—i. e., between the beginning of 1883 and end of April, 1886, the number has more than doubled, there being on the latter date 396. The annual rate of increase for the future will not be under 50. In the first four months of the current year, no fewer than 49 new pleaders and mukhtars were admitted and enrolled. Of the 396 practising in the Province on 1st May last, 308 were men of inferior qualifications, being pleaders and mukhtars of the second grade. At a low computation* the gross annual earnings of the Bar are about 22 lakhs, almost all of which money comes out of

TBL-008 · FOLIO 145Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Class.Number.Annual receipts per head.Total receipts of class.
Rs.Rs.
Advocates2114,0002,94,000
1st grade pleaders,5212,0006,24,000
2nd grade pleaders,1756,00010,50,000
1st grade mukhtars,155,00075,000
2nd grade mukhtars,1331,2001,59,600
Total ...39638,20022,02,600

the pockets of litigants. Of practising lawyers, only 21 advocates and perhaps half of the pleaders and mukhtars of the first grade, received legal educations. All the others have become lawyers under the stress of circumstances, the large majority being failures in, or having failed to obtain Government service. In a lengthy or intricate case a good pleader is undoubtedly of great assistance both to his client and to the Judge who hears the cause; but an indifferent one is a nuisance to both. Those inferior practitioners who take up petty cases and appear in munsifs' courts, are generally unscrupulous pretenders, who prey on the ignorance of their clients. As a rule, a poor man has no wish to engage the services of a pleader or mukhtar unless his opponent first does so, in which case he thinks it necessary to do the same.

Petition-writers playing into the hands of their friends or patrons and cutcherry-touts often induce simpletons— and most agriculturists when litigating are simpletons—to engage pleaders, believing that by so doing they must win. I shall refer to this subject again. For the present I draw attention to the annually increasing number of low class legal practitioners in the Punjab, a large proportion of whom are legal impostors, who live on the credulity of foolish litigants, and impede, rather than help, justice.

To have to enter a court as a principal in a civil case is a real misfortune for a Punjab peasant. It is an education in evil to him. However honest and unsophisticated he may have been when he first approached the contaminating atmosphere of the district cutcherry or munsif's court, by the time the case is over, he has eaten of the tree of knowledge ; he is a fallen man. When he reaches the compound, his bewildered senses are made more confused by the perversions his simple plaint or reply undergo when reduced to writing by a petition-writer, who either personally instructs him what he is to say and how he is to prove it in court, or allows him to be taken possession of by a cutcherry-tout. This class of practitioner does business on his own account by coaching witnesses or explaining " the law " to litigants, or acts as a jackal for inferior pleaders and mukhtars. The peasantry have full antecedent faith in the justice administered by Englishmen, but none at all in that of munsifs, or, in fact, of any native Judges. In rare cases they acquire faith in individual natives, but only after a long experience of them. So convinced are agriculturists that with munsifs law and justice are incompatible, that a large proportion of the exaggerated claims brought by Bunniahs against them are not disputed. Only 28 per cent. of the suits heard by munsifs are contested. Pothi, gawah, digri, represents, as stated once already, the peasant's idea of logical sequence in a munsif's court,—" a bond, a witness, a decree."

Munsifs are not to be blamed for pocketing whatever consciences they may have, and aiming at quantity rather than quality. Each munsif has one clerk on Rs. 20 a month, and is required to decide 170 civil suits per mensem and 130 execution and miscellaneous cases. The average number of working days in a month is 20 ; * hence a munsif has daily to dispose of nine civil suits and five miscellaneous cases. He has also to keep up 22 registers, and submit numerous returns.

Since 1868 the registration of bonds has been optional, hence few bonds are now registered. Their registration used to be a protection to the debtor, but was, in fact, no complete security, as the consideration, though stated in the deed to have been received, was frequently paid—if at all—afterwards. Since the registration of bonds for more than Rs. 50 ceased to be compulsory, the manufacture of false bonds has gradually become a profession. In every district Cis-Indus the trade flourishes. It is a matter of daily occurrence for a frightened peasant to give in petitions to the effect that such and such an one has forged a bond against him. It must not be supposed that Bunniahs enjoy a monopoly of the various means by which

TBL-009 · FOLIO 147Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
52Sundays.
17Mahomedan holidays.
21Hindu„
11Christian„
17Local and conditional holidays.
10Days for indisposition, casual leave, &c.
128

our legal system helps an unscrupulous man to plunder or cheat his neighbours. One case in court teaches a peasant how to meet lying with lying and forgery with forgery. How to procure a false receipt and to assume an air of stolid ignorance, and deny everything, are arts easily acquired.

As an instance of the brazen effrontery with which forgery is carried on, I may mention a case which occurred in May last at Rawalpindi. An Assistant, just arrived from England, happened to return to office after breakfast, and surprised several natives having an altercation in the verandah of his court-room. Being young and still curious, he had the disputants at once brought into his room, and having taken down their statements, made a report to me, his Deputy Commissioner. I tried the case. It was as follows:—A Bunniah had come up to a petition-writer (fortunately a newly-appointed man) with a peasant, and after a feigned dispute as to terms, the latter executed a bond to the former in a false name. The petition-writer then told the debtor and creditor to bring two witnesses to attest the bond. No professionals being at hand, the Bunniah offered to pay for the writing of the bond, and said he would get it witnessed in the city. To his surprise the petition-writer refused. Recriminations ensued, during which the writer put the bond in his pocket, and the Bunniah attempted to wrest it from him. Just then the Assistant Commissioner came up and recorded the statements of the principal actors before time for concocting a story, or arranging a compromise, was given. In the bond an account-debt was referred to. The number of the page in which the account was to be written (for none existed) was left blank. As to the peasant who personated a man whom he did not even know, he had played his part for a wage of two rupees. He was a man who had a knowledge of the ways of courts, having been once a party to a case himself. He had come to the cutcherry to make a complaint, and wanting money for the purpose, was a willing tool in the hands of the wily Bunniah. Hundreds of such bonds are annually executed in every district in the Punjab, are attested by hired witnesses, and supported by book entries in the loose accounts village Bunniahs habitually keep.

In truth, the whole sketch I have drawn of what constitutes civil justice in the Punjab, is not edifying. On the one hand, the Legislative Mill is turning out complicated Acts on English models, which elaborately regulate the simple disputes incidental to rural life, whilst an annually increasing host of hungry pleaders is on the watch to manipulate the law to the protraction of justice and their own benefit. Native Judges, perplexed and amazed at the ever-rising flood of Acts, Rules, Rulings, and suits instituted, in fear of the Chief Court's constant exactions in the form of registers, returns, and outturn of work, and of their immediate Appellate Court's caustic criticisms on the quality of that work, sit in despair and shuffle through their daily task perfunctorily like over-worked slaves. On the other hand, we have a body of English Judges, some bluntly common-sensible, others acutely subtle in the law, and both sympathising with the duped simpletons who throng their courts. Those English Judges strive to counteract the evils of too much law, too much litigation, and too many lawyers, by upsetting unjust decisions, cutting down interest, reducing costs, and prosecuting suspected forgers and false witnesses.

Between the law-practising lawyers, Chief Court, and Divisional and District Judges, the multitude of native courts of first instance fare badly. Their sympathies, if any, lie with rich suitors. Their one aim is to dispose of cases with the minimum of personal inconvenience compatible with retention of appointment or claim to promotion. And if so, is there reason for surprise that the poor struggling cultivator of the soil—that corpus vile on which our legal experts so light-heartedly experimentalise—is circumvented by the wily Bunniah?

Notes

  1. *. Tupper's Punjab Customary Law, Vol. I, page 129.
  2. *. See Appendix E, which gives some extracts from a paper by Mr. A. P. Howell, C. S., entitled Legislation in India, in the Calcutta Review of April 1886.
  3. *. See No. 132, Civil, of the Punjab Record, 1884.
  4. *. See No. 157, Civil, of the Punjab Record, 1879.
  5. *. Query. Is an officer, whether Judge or not, bound to describe the official capacity in which he acts, as well as to sign his name? I know of no provision of law which so compels him ; and if so, would not the tacking on to the signature a misdescription of office be mere surplusage ?
  6. *. Special rules contained in Judicial Circular No. XXV of Volume of Judicial Circulars, 1879.
  7. *. I draw attention to this as one instance of class legislation: an artisan's or village menial's house is not exempted.
  8. †. I believe they are Hazara and the four districts of the Derajat. Rawalpindi and Gujranwala have recently been added to the list. There are probably others.
  9. *. No. V of 1886.
  10. *. Judicial Circular No. XXIV of 1879.
  11. †. See Appendix F, in which part of a judgment by the Allahabad High Court is quoted, together with comments thereon by the Pioneer, in its issue of July 30th, 1886. Some remarks of mine are added, drawing attention to the moral conveyed by the judgment.
  12. ‡. Para. 104 of Civil Administration Report, 1883, is as follows :—
  13. *. Judicial Circular No. XXIV.
  14. *. Statutory costs include the judicial stamp on plaint, process-fees, pleaders' fees at a recognised scale, and diet-money for witnesses, but exclude travelling expenses of parties between home and court, board and lodging at place where court sits, cost of drawing up and writing plaint and numerous petitions and applications, the difference between percentage on value of suit allowed to pleader and sum actually paid, and a great many miscellaneous incidental expenses besides.
  15. *. In a criminal case tried by the District Judge of Rawalpindi in June, 1886, the prosecution and defence cost complainant and accused over Rs. 8,000. The examination and cross-examination of a native expert cost Rs. 1,200. All this money went into the pockets of several Barrister-pleaders in a trial which lasted about six days. As a rule, pleaders fight shy of criminal trials.
  16. *. The deductions are usually— Thus, 365—128 = 237 ÷ 12 = 20 working days in the month.