3.—Civil Law and Procedure. 4.—Specific Miscellaneous Reforms.
Civil law reform is such a wide subject that it is impossible in a few pages to do more than suggest a few specific changes, and indicate generally the lines which, in my opinion, should be followed in simplifying procedure, and in securing that the decision of causes shall be on their merits rather than on technical grounds.
In an able paper* on the subject, written in 1879, Colonel Wace, now Junior Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, fairly represented native views on the shortcomings of our administration of civil justice in the following passage :—
Native opinion condemns most thoroughly the great power which our law gives to a creditor over his debtor, and the blind way in which we enforce rates of interest that are obviously destructive of the debtor's prosperity. Besides the instance† referred to at the end of the previous paragraph, an agriculturist is liable to be summoned at the caprice of his creditor at all seasons of the year,—sowing time, harvest time, or any other time. No matter how necessary his presence on his land, the summons is issued, and must be obeyed, under risk of heavy penalties if neglected; the summons often involving a journey of 20 miles and back, or several such journeys, according to the number of hearings necessary to the decision of the case. Again, when a decree has been passed, it is not the business of the court to provide any reasonable method of satisfaction; the law allows the creditor to settle that, and the time when he will enforce it, for the most part with sole regard to his own interests.
And finally, we have instituted a system of bonds, registration, and balancing of accounts at short intervals, which was unknown in the country before our rule, and the practical result of which is to discharge our Civil Judges from the duty of considering the merits of the debts claimed before them; and we enforce contracts for the payment of interest, which are oppressive to debtors, and frequently ruin them, and which lack any sufficient jnstification as necessary to the prosperity of the creditor.
Native tradition and their conceptions of justice, are strongly opposed to all these features in our civil law. According to their view, civil causes against agriculturists should be decided as much as possible in the immediate vicinity of the village where the parties reside. In deciding the amount of debt that is due, the Judge should be bound by no devices of bonds, registration, periodical balances and agreements (in truth, entirely one-sided), to pay extravagant rates of interest, but should ascertain what is really due, and adding a liberal allowance for interest—(their ideas as to what is a fair rate of interest are much more liberal than our own)—forthwith settle between debtor and creditor a reasonable arrangement for the payment of the debt. In so far as such an arrangement may assign to the creditor a share in his crops, native opinion expects that provision should be made first for the payment of the rent or revenue, and that of the balance a fair allowance, not exceeding, nor usually less than a moiety, should be left for the agriculturist's support. The spectacle of the unnecessary and profitless imprisonment of an agriculturist, merely to enforce payment of a debt, is condemned by them as both cruel and wasteful. Obviously, it either incapacitates him for paying, or throws him into worse debt. While the spectacle of the attachment and sale of an agriculturist's crop, without sparing him food wherewith to live or to feed his cattle till the next harvest ripens, is one against which their feelings of justice and mercy alike rebel.
The employment of pleaders and barristers in petty agricultural causes is equally condemned by native opinion. The native view is, that the matters at issue are extremely simple, that the employment of such an agency unnecessarily adds to the cost of the litigation,—an addition which, in most instances, the parties can very ill afford,— and that the lower classes of legal practitioners are usually men of bad motives, who foment more litigation than they cure. These assertions are unquestionably true. It is, moreover, also true that for centuries prior to our rule the community have found it practicable to adjust their disputes without the intervention of any legal practitioners; and all the better men among them regard with regret the complication of their dealings with Government by an agency of this nature.
Reforms should, I conceive, be directed towards protecting the weak and ignorant many against the more intelligent few who take advantage of their weakness and ignorance. Each dispute therefore should be decided on its real merits on equitable grounds, and when a decree is given against an agriculturist, it should be executed at a time and in a manner which shall least interfere with the debtor's obligations to the State and to his family. In both of these respects the Civil Procedure Code fails, because its provisions are based on the erroneous assumption that litigants know the law, that Judges do their best to administer it equitably, and that decree-holders execute their decrees considerately. The facts are the reverse. Rural litigants, whether agricultural or industrial, are ignorant simpletons : civil courts mostly seek only clear files—which compliance with the letter of the law gives at little personal labour—and decree-holders naturally consider nothing but the full and speedy execution of their decrees.
The Civil Procedure Code assumes knowledge where none exists, enables Judges to dispose of from 5 to 10 cases daily in a sitting of five or six hours, and deliberately makes the court the blind instrument of the decree-holder. Thus the permissive "may" in Sections 118 and 155 enables courts, when so disposed, to ignore equity; whilst, on the other hand, the absolute "shall"* of the sections enumerated in the foot-note, sometimes compels them to do positive injustice.
The law should compel courts to examine the plaintiff before summoning the defendant, and on his appearance when summoned, to ascertain the real issues by the oral examination of the parties in each other’s presence. Further, each case should be decided on its merits: no compromise or confession of judgment being accepted until the court has satisfied itself that both parties understood the consequences of their action, and that such action was fair and reasonable. In debt cases the court should be compelled to separate the original principal from the interest— bond or book entries notwithstanding—and to decree only principal and reasonable interest. Then all the elaborate procedure which requires a written amendment of the plaint to enable the court to go beyond it, and restricts inquiry and judgment to the actual claim as drawn up by a careless petition-writer, should be swept away, and full latitude be given to the court to decide any case according to “equity, justice, and good conscience.”
Resort to arbitration should be encouraged by a revival of the former authority possessed by the courts of modifying an award. As the law stands, arbitration is rendered either impossible or unsatisfactory by the compulsion the court is under Section 522 to decree in accordance with the award.* Moreover, the procedure necessary to validate an award is so elaborate that the whole proceedings are frequently quashed on appeal, because some technicality in the mode of reference or of drawing up of the award was omitted.
In its decree the court should be required to state the manner in which, with reference to the judgment-debtor’s status, it recommends that the decree be executed. Moreover, upon execution, a large latitude should be allowed to the court as to time and terms of execution, and the court should be compelled, when satisfied of the honest inability of the debtor to liquidate his debt and of the improbability of his circumstances improving within a reasonable time, to recommend his discharge to the District Judge,* who should be authorized to grant it. Further, as to time, the law should protect agriculturists from being summoned to court during the fifteen or twenty days in the year when their presence is necessary in the field at the crisis of the reaping operations. The season for sowing is more prolonged, hence no similar protection is necessary during it. As to terms when grain or cattle, or any property the market value of which is liable to great fluctuations from calamity of the season, has been attached, the court should be empowered to impose a fair valuation, and make the property over to the decree-holder at that valuation. As the law stands, such property is auctioned at any time the decree-holder may elect, with the result that it is generally knocked down at less than half its value. I need hardly add that in seasons of drought there is no market for cattle, and that cattle and stored grain are the sole wealth and means of subsistence of an agriculturist and his family.
4.—Specific Miscellaneous Reforms.
Owing to the bigness of the subject and the necessity of curtailing space, I have so far only indicated the direction in which the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code seems advisable. There are, however, various specific reforms, in favour of which overwhelming arguments can, I think, be condensed into a few lines or a page. I proceed to state them in the following order :—
- (1). Exemption of all necessaries from attachment and sale in execution of a decree.
- (2). Exemption from imprisonment for debt of honest insolvents.
- (3). Extension of the period of limitation.
- (4). The keeping of accounts in a business-like manner.
- (5). Extension of compulsory registration of bonds over Rs. 49.
- (6). Exclusion of legal practitioners from the courts of munsifs and tahsildars.
(1).—Exemption of all necessaries from attachment and sale in execution of a decree.
In Section 266, Civil Procedure Code, all property is declared liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree except wearing apparel, tools of artisans, implements of husbandry, necessary plough and well-cattle, and the houses of agriculturists. The intention of the Section is to save judgment-debtors and their families from starvation by reserving for their use the means by which they gain a livelihood. In the case of agriculturists, the law, as it stands, is a snare and delusion. To leave cultivators their plough cattle, but deprive both of grain and straw requisite to keep them alive until the next harvest, is a cruel mockery. In every case a share of the crop, equal to that retained by a tenant-at-will in tracts where competitive rents obtain, should be exempted. In the Kapurthalla State* since 1879, in the case of owners and tenants paying revenue or rent in cash, two-thirds of the grain and one-third of the straw can be attached in execution of decree, provided that the decree-holder first pays into court the whole of the revenue or rentcharges on the crop. In the case of tenants paying rent in kind, half of the tenant's share of the grain is reserved for his use.
If the execution files of any munsif's court be examined, it will be seen with what brutal callousness the straveling bailiff* attaches a cultivator's grain-safe, grain, beds, spinning-wheel, cooking vessels, and other insignificant necessaries not specially excepted by Section 266 of the Code. In a large proportion of the decrees returned as "partially executed," the amounts realised by the sale of the household articles seized is only a few rupees, and barely covers the costs incurred. In the interests of justice and mercy, the law requires immediate amendment, so that all the necessaries, without which the judgment-debtor cannot tide over the next few months, be included in the list of "particulars," which are not liable to attachment and sale.†
(2).—Exemption from imprisonment for debt of honest insolvents.
Under Sections 336-358 of the Civil Procedure Code, a judgment-debtor may be arrested and imprisoned for a period of six weeks if the debt do not exceed Rs. 50, and for six months if over that sum. The judgment-debtor may apply to be declared an insolvent, and on being so declared, is discharged, but his property remains liable to attachment and sale until one-third of his scheduled debts, if they do not exceed Rs. 200, are paid, or until the expiry of 12 years from the date of his discharge. Practically, insolvency is never sought, chiefly because of the severity of the law,* and perhaps also because the procedure being long and troublesome, the courts seldom apprise judgment-debtors of the provisions of the law.
The following table exhibits some particulars regarding the number of persons arrested and imprisoned in the Punjab in execution of decrees during the last five years :—
| Year. | Number arrested. | Number imprisoned. | Percentage imprisoned to arrested. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1880 | 10,772 | 990 | 9 | |
| 1881 | 7,090 | 948 | 13 | |
| 1882 | 9,011 | 989 | 11 | Thus in 89 per cent. of cases the threat of imprisonment im-plied by arrest sufficed to con-strain debtor to come to terms with his creditor. |
| 1883 | 9,691 | 1,167 | 12 | |
| 1884 | 8,310 | 1,033 | 12 | |
| Total... | 44,874 | 5,127 | 11 |
In most civilized countries the imprisonment of honest debtors is no longer legal. Whether similar enfranchisement shall be extended only to the N.-W. Provinces or to the whole of India, is now before the Council.† The question will probably be decided before these pages are printed. The great argument against the abolition of imprisonment for debt—except in the case of fraudulent debtors—is that without it arrest would lose its terrors.
In mountain warfare against undisciplined men shells do little harm. But their “moral effect” is tremendous, because they occasionally commit great havoc. Were it known that the shells never exploded, they would be little feared. Similarly, were it known that arrest would not be followed by imprisonment, the “moral effect” of arrest would be nothing. On the whole, I think, the only change in the existing law of arrest and imprisonment which is necessary is, that imprisonment should only be enforceable provided that the court is satisfied that the debtor has the ability to pay the decree, but does not do so. If not so satisfied, the court should be required to discharge the debtor. I am aware that Section 21 of the Deccan Ryots Relief Act, 1879, curtly declares “no agriculturist shall be arrested or imprisoned in execution of a decree for money.” After much consideration and consultation with natives of all classes on the effect of such a law in the Punjab, I deliberately hold that the power to imprison must be retained—safe-guarded in the way I propose—because of its coercive force. To the above extent the question of imprisonment should, I think, be left to the discretion of the court.*
(3).—Extension of the period of limitation.
At page 74 I have shown how the period has been gradually reduced from 12 years to what it has been since 1877, viz., three years for unsecured debts and six years for debts secured by registered bonds. The Limitation Act, XV of 1877, is an instance of over-refinement in legislation —no one without referring to it knows what the period is for more than half-a-dozen descriptions of suit. The periods are graduated with absurd minuteness from days and months to one, two, three, six, twelve, thirty, and sixty years. If the 180 articles of the Act could be reduced to a dozen, both the public and the courts would feel satisfied. Were the period for money claims, secured and unsecured, made six years, or even twelve, debtors would have a longer term wherein to arrange their liabilities, would not be forced—failing renewal of their bonds—into court every third year as at present, and both lending and—what is of cogent importance—borrowing classes would approve of the change. When the Deccan Ryots Relief Bill was before the Council in 1879, the question of extending the period of limitation was discussed, and the evidence collected proved "there was a general consensus of native opinion that the reduction of the period operated very prejudicially to the interests of the cultivator." Accordingly, the Act raised the period for agriculturists to twelve years for debts on registered bonds and six years in other cases (Section 72). Were the law similarly altered for the whole of India, general relief would be felt. The argument that the longer the period the greater the encouragement to improvident borrowing fails because it is open to the creditor to sue whenever he likes within the period. Moreover, as a matter of fact, under the Government which preceded ours, there was no Limitation Law, and yet reckless borrowing was unknown. The same is the case in most Native States to this day. Further allowance must be made for the prudential restraint which contraction of credit will impose on money-lenders and village shop-keepers.
Should all necessaries be exempted from attachment and sale, and any or all the other reforms advocated in these pages become law, existing inducements to improvidence will be effectually closed.
(4).—The keeping of accounts in a business-like manner.
The village Bunniah keeps his accounts in a Hindi character only intelligible to men of his own class in his own immediate neighbourhood. The accounts are roughly jotted down in books, or on sheets loosely stitched together. No endeavour is made at close writing, hence interpolation is easy. The very pages are seldom numbered. Correctly each constituent's transactions ought to be recorded in three books, namely, the roznamcha or sur bahi, equivalent to our day-book, in which each day's transactions are recorded in order as they occur; the khata bahi or ledger, in which each constituent's personal account is similarly entered under his name; and the rokar bahi or cash balance account, in which the nett results of debits and credits are daily or periodically exhibited. In practice, few petty village traders, until they emerge from that status into the superior position of banker, keep more than the first two account-books, and keep them in such a slovenly way that their correct interpretation, even when translated, is more or less a matter of guess-work. No periodical audit and balancing is attempted. The account runs on from month to month and year to year, interest being added and merged into principal from time to time, and a bond executed whenever the period of limitation draws near. In order to create business habits and protect debtors, traders and money-lenders should be required by law to maintain all the three account-books regularly, and the way to effect this would be to declare that accounts otherwise kept should not be admitted as evidence of the transaction to which they relate. Unregistered instruments, where registration is compulsory, are not admissible as evidence. À fortiori accounts kept in an unbusinesslike manner should not be so either.* The protection of simpletons is equally the duty of the State in both cases. In furtherance of the above objects, cheap forms of blank account-books, with each page consecutively numbered, and the total number of pages stated at the beginning and end of the book, should be prepared by Government agency, and sold by all stamp-vendors and petition-writers at cost price.
To attempt anything more than I have here proposed would be a mistake. It would be useless to require receivers to give written receipts for every payment or pass-books to their agricultural constituents, because such a provision of law would not be carried into practice. Chapter IX of the Deccan Ryots Act entitles agriculturists to written receipts for each payment, whether they “demand the same or not,” to annual statements of accounts, and to have them made up from time to time in a pass-book. Should the creditors neglect or refuse to do what the law requires of them, they are liable to fine. The law has here demanded too much, and consequently it is a dead letter.
(5).—Extension of compulsory registration to bonds over Rs. 49.
The law is contained in Act III of 1877. Briefly put, it makes the registration of instruments affecting immoveable property, worth Rs. 100 and upwards, compulsory, and leaves that of most others optional. Further, it provides that in the former case, when the law has not been complied with, unregistered documents shall not be received as evidence, and that registered documents shall take effect against unregistered and, à fortiori, against oral agreements. Notwithstanding the superiority of registered over unregistered documents, the number of the former, in cases in which option is permitted, has been steadily decreasing of late years, so much so that in 1884-85, the last year for which returns have been published, 11,305 optional documents relating to immoveable property, and only 3,611 concerning money obligations, were registered. Thus, it may be said that bonds for small amounts are practically not registered at all in the Punjab. We have seen at page 136 how easily bonds are forged, and the transactions described in them supported by false entries in account-books and other corroborative evidence. I think, and I believe, that most officers of district experience will agree with me that compulsory registration should be extended to all bonds over Rs. 49, and that registering officers should be compelled to record particulars as to the state of the account between the parties, and of the nature and mode of payment of the consideration. Were the law so amended, both the people of the Punjab and our civil courts would experience great relief. Such a change would only be a reversion to the rule* which obtained in the Punjab from 1859 until the beginning of 1868, when the Registration Act XX of 1866 was extended to it. From that time the registration of all bonds has been, as now, optional.
Most registrars content themselves by having the instrument read over before the executants and their witnesses, and by receiving an affirmative answer to the stock-question whether or not the consideration has been received. A short oral examination would frequently disclose that the bond either does not contain a true recital of the transaction therein described, or omits the mention of important particulars,—e. g., the fact that the consideration or part of it has not yet been paid, or that a separate account is still running on. The necessity of better protecting agriculturists by the extension of compulsory registration is recognised in the Deccan Ryots Act, Chapter VIII of which provides for the appointment of village registrars— analogous to our Punjab non-official registrars—declares that instruments executed by agriculturists shall not be deemed valid unless executed before such an officer, and requires that the amount and nature of the consideration shall be fully stated and attested.
(6).—Exclusion of legal practitioners from the courts of munsifs and tahsildars.
I have described the effect of legal practitioners on civil justice at page 133 of this volume. Munsifs and tahsildars dispose of 75 per cent. of the petty civil and revenue-judicial cases in which natives, whether agriculturists or not, are concerned. The parties are generally one or both poor, and their disputes of such a simple nature that in most cases the arbitration of an honest local, when procurable and willing to act, would settle them better than a court of law. The employment of outside lawyers by one or both parties only doubles costs and prolongs litigation. Even if, as is certain, increasing competition will gradually raise the qualifications of lawyers who take up cases in the courts of munsifs and tahsildars, the practical effect would be an increase in the evils just noticed. Superior qualifications would require higher remuneration, and would multiply pleas on points of law. I believe I am correct in asserting that there is a concensus of opinion amongst English administrators of all grades, which native feeling loudly endorses, that the unlimited license of practice permitted by law to pleaders and mukhtars, stimulates reckless litigation, demoralises litigants, ruins families, and—in which lies the pity of it—does no good. It is no argument to urge that litigants would not employ pleaders were they not useful. Ignorant natives must be protected against the consequences of their own ignorance. What the attractions of the gambling tables of Monte Carlo are to weak-minded visitors, the plausible promises of pleaders are to weaker-minded natives. The chances of success alluringly unfolded is a bait which ruins both. The European gambler, however, knows what the chances are, the Indian litigant does not.
Notes
- *. Settlement Commissioner's No. 1009, dated 5th September, 1879, to Secretary to Government, Punjab.
- †. " For instance, a munsif can attach the whole crop; and if the cultivator pleads that the law consequently leaves his family without any food for the next month, and also compels him to defraud the State of its share, the munsif can only reply that this is not his concern ; that his duty is confined to administering the civil law."
- *. Sections 102, 138, 139, 258, 371, 443, 508, 509, 522.
- *. See page 77.
- *. This involves a consideration of the question of an amended Insolvency Law for rural India. Chapter XX, Sections 344-360 of the Civil Procedure Code, contains the existing law on the subject. I made suggestions in favor of certain changes in the law in 1884, which will be found in Appendix G, together with a note now added.
- *. See Appendix H for the detailed rules.
- *. He receives Rs. 5 or Rs. 6 a month—less than a coolie's wage— according to the grade he is in. The appointment is much sought after.
- †. Section 79 of the Punjab Land Revenue Bill, now before the Council, extends the exemptions recommended here to the case of a revenue-defaulter. If this Section becomes law, similar exemptions must be conceded to the judgment-debtor. Government has a first claim on the produce for its land revenue. If then the first claimant cannot attach a certain reasonable portion of a crop, inferior claimants must be treated in the same way also.
- *. See Appendix G.
- †. See " The Debtors Bill" now being circulated. Section 4 (d) enables a court to imprison a defaulter when satisfied he can pay, but does not.
- *. The law, as it stands, is brutal. Inspecting the Mansehra tehsil, Hazara district, to-day, 12th August, 1886, I found a miserable looking Mahomedan cultivator in the lock-up—the only occupant. A Hindu creditor had obtained a decree of Rs. 10 against him, and had kept him in solitary imprisonment for over a month, spending Rs. 4-8 in order to satisfy his spite. I released the man, though it was illegal to do so until six weeks’ imprisonment had expired.
- *. In 1858-59 the maintenance of a day-book as well as a ledger was made obligatory in the Punjab, and models of such books were circulated. The scheme was admittedly tentative.—Punjab Report for 1858-59, p. 2.
- *. See Judicial Circular No. 29 of 1859 ; also No. 68 of 1860 ; and foot note at page 15 of Rivaz's Registration Act III of 1877.