The editorial note is as follows :— The attention of Judicial Officers will be willingly given to the important judgment of the Allahabad High Court, given elsewhere in our Law Report to-day. The case in question was only a flagrant instance of a familiar evil, which everyone recognises and reprobates, but which the law courts too often do not see their way to check — the ruin of an agriculturist by the extortions of a usurer. In 1875 a ryot in the Jalaun district was found owing the sum of Rs. 97 to a professional money-lender. In order to renew he executed a mortgage-deed, agreeing to pay—though he was giving landed security—24 per cent. per annum on this Rs. 97, with compound interest in default of payment. He also agreed to pay a fine of one anna per rupee on the Rs. 97, to be added yearly to the amount bearing interest thereafter; or if he did not pay the interest regularly, it was to be calculated on the Rs. 97; plus interest or compound interest, and then added. The effect of these conditions was, that in ten years the Rs. 97 had swollen into Rs. 873, and when the unhappy borrower brought the case into the Assistant Commissioner's court, his suit was dismissed with costs, making him liable in all for Rs. 1,002. Had the decree been upheld, he would, of course, have been sold up, and while his paternal acres passed into the hands of the money-lender, he himself would probably have begun life afresh as a farm servant of the man who had supplanted him. The process is one which we see going on every day around us, and everyone is familiar with the special attempts which the Indian Legislature has made to counteract it. Fortunately the High Court have not felt bound to give the sanction of the law to oppression and fraud. The elaborate judgment of Mr. Justice Mahmood and the forcible language of Mr. Justice Straight speak for themselves. It is hardly necessary to say that it will be acceptable to all who have the interests of the country at heart to find the law harmonising so thoroughly with our natural ideas of justice. The hands of the lower courts should after this be strengthened to deal with the multitudinous cases where advantage is taken of the ignorance and helplessness of the people to wring from them terms iniquitously unjust, but often enforced through thick and thin in virtue of a belief—as it now appears an exaggerated belief—in the sanctity of contract.
As to the judgment itself, it is only necessary to quote here the concluding remarks of Mr. Justice Mahmood.
“I wish to add that I have considered it my duty to deliver such an elaborate judgment in this case because I am aware that a general notion prevails in the Mofussil that, ever since the repeal of the usury laws, the Courts of Justice are bound to enforce contracts as to interest, regardless of the circumstances of the case or the relative conditions of the parties, and irrespective of the unconscionableness of the bargain. Courts of Justice in India exercise the mixed jurisdiction of the Courts of Law and Equity, and, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, whilst bound to respect the integrity of private contracts, they must not forget that cases which furnish adequate grounds for equitable interference must be so dealt with, not because such a course involves the least contravention of the law, but because by reason of undue advantage having been taken of the weak and the ignorant, the contract itself is tainted with fraud in the broad sense in which that term is understood in the Courts of Equity in England and in America—a remark which seems to me fully justified by the rule of justice, equity, and good conscience, which we are bound to administer in such cases. For these reasons I do not think that this is a case in which we should interfere, and I would dismiss this appeal with costs.”
In concurring with his brother Mahmood, the Chief Justice, after quoting from various leading cases by the Court of Chancery, continued as follows:—
I draw particular attention to the lines I have had printed in italics.
“I gather therefore, according to the rule of equity laid down by Lord Hardwicke, that equitable relief of the kind described by him may be extended to the cases of ‘persons under pressure without adequate protection,’ or to transactions with ‘uneducated ignorant persons,’ and that it lies upon him, who seeks to fix them with a liability which, upon the face of it, appears unconscionable, to establish that the contract out of which it arises was ‘fair, just, and reasonable.’
Now what is the state of things here? The plaintiff, an uneducated ignorant countryman of one of the most rural districts within our jurisdiction, found himself unable to pay Rs. 97 to his creditor. The creditor, an astute Brahman money-lender, knowing that, in their relative positions one to the other, he can dictate almost any terms, proceeds to put forward the agreement, the onerous conditions of which I have explained at the outset of my judgment. It is obvious that, in reality, the debtor had little or no choice but to accept them, and that, much in the same way as a young spendthrift will give his promissory note for a large amount so long as he gets a small sum of present cash, the plaintiff in his case was willing to consent to any proposal to escape from his immediate embarrassment. It is equally clear to my mind that the object the defendant had in view, knowing the plaintiff's pecuniary capabilities, was to put him under such terms that unless he obtained funds from foreign sources he would never be able to redeem his share, and it would thus inevitably fall into his hands.
“It is bargains of this description between the small village proprietors and the money-lenders that are gradually working the extinction of the former class in many of the country districts, and producing results which are not only a serious scandal, but a positive mischief. For it is to be borne in mind that the pecuniary difficulties of the persons I have mentioned are as often as not the result of misfortune rather than improvidence, and that bad seasons have as much to do with causing them as waste or extravagance. Whichever way it be, this is certain, that the money-lenders, as anyone who sits in this court must see, are to an alarming extent absorbing proprietary interests in the village communities, and that the body of ex-proprietors is enormously on the decrease. It is, of course, not my business here to discuss the policy that should govern the action of the State in dealing with this state of things; but as a Judge having power to enforce equitable principles, I am resolutely determined, until I am set right by higher authority, to give effect, in cases of this kind, to the principle propounded by the eminent lawyers to whose utterances I have referred, and to see that justice is done. It may be said that the repeal of the usury laws prohibits me from adopting the course I propose to take. As to this, it is enough to say that Lord Selbourne, Lord Hatherley, and Sir George Jessel, in the judgments to which I have adverted, remarked in the clearest and most emphatic language that the repeal of the usury laws in England had in no way touched or affected the power claimed by the Court of Chancery to grant relief in such matters. I entirely concur in and approve the order proposed by my brother Mahmood.”
That a converging fire of legal big guns of English, American, and Indian manufacture, was found necessary to coerce fraud into " the inequitable " was, some will think, a ridiculous exercise of force.
The case itself was simple enough.
A needy cultivator being unable to borrow money except at high interest, deliberately agrees to the lender's terms, and executes a formal mortgage-deed, which satisfies all the requirements of the law. For ten years the debtor staves off the day of reckoning, and when it comes, is heartbroken to find that a debt of Rs. 97 has grown into one of Rs. 873. The Assistant Commissioner found that "the evidence shows that Ram Pershad was quite aware of the clauses in the deed relating to interest and penalty; and since the terms of the deed have been acted up to, it may reasonably be presumed his declaration of ignorance is false." Under the facts found, the Assistant Commissioner (court of first instance) acted in strict conformity with the law in decreeing the claim in full. When the case reached the Allahabad High Court, that court sympathised with the debtor, and being unable to circumvent the law of contract in any other way, stretched fraud into covering a meaning of inequitable, and so wiped out more than half the sum the debtor was otherwise legally bound to pay.
The ruling will, in effect, enable Judges to set aside the terms of any "inequitable" contract, no matter how secured by any formal execution and registration. The ruling will, I fear, have little influence, as almost all the original civil litigation of the Province is disposed of by native Judges, who will certainly prefer to be guided by the Contract, Specific Relief, Evidence, Stamp, and Registration Acts, none of which are designed to save fools from the consequences of their own folly. In being so guided,