PAST FAMINES
IN THE
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY.
COMPILED BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL A. T. ETHERIDGE,
ALIENATION SETTLEMENT OFFICER S. D.
WITH THE RESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT THEREON.
Bombay: PRINTED FOR GOVERNMENT AT THE EDUCATION SOCIETY’S PRESS, BYCULLA. 1868.
General Department.
From Lieut. Col. A. T. ETHERIDGE, Alienation Settlement Officer S. D.,
To the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, BOMBAY.
Bombay, 18th May 1868.
Sir,—I now do myself the honor to submit, for the approval of Government, the results of my labour in the collection of information respecting past famines in the Bombay Presidency, as desired in their Resolution No. 1152, dated 24th June 1867.
2. At first I regarded it as matter of regret that Government had not seen fit to confide this interesting but important work to abler hands. I also regretted that it should have been superadded to my other duties. It appeared to me that the subject was one which required great intelligence, and an ability and experience which I might not possess. Still less did I think that a divided attention could do it justice.
3. As the task proceeded, however, I found I was mistaken. Instead of the ample materials which I imagined might be at hand, or could be collected with but little trouble, I found an almost total absence of authentic account of any past famine or drought whatever. It was not, apparently, a part of the system of revenue management under the Native Governments to register statistics of famines or droughts, and all the information that can be gleaned from ancient records forthcoming of a nature to throw light upon he subject is the extent of the remissions of revenue, &c. (Vide Appendices A to G annexed.)
4. Nor have matters improved in this respect in Native States since the introduction of the British Government, for from the important State of Baroda even the Resident reports that no authentic details are forthcoming. Colonel Barr regrets that he can give no information, 5. It is also matter of concern that valuable papers which were once on the records of the Secretariat have disappeared. Among those which cannot now be traced are the proceedings which called into existence the old Road and Tank Department. It is said that this Department (now merged in the Public Works) was originally organized with the object of affording employment to the people who were suffering most severely from the scarcity then prevailing, but the correspondence relating to this subject cannot now be found; the files are supposed to have perished in a fire which occurred some years ago. It is unfortunate that these papers should not be at hand, as it would be most interesting to note the deliberations of the Government of the day to find relief for the distressed poor in the construction of works of such great public utility.
6. In prefacing this report it will not be necessary that I should venture any remarks of my own upon the general characteristics of famines and droughts, such as their periodicity, different features in different countries, and the much vexed question as to the extent to which State interference may be beneficial under certain circumstances, and must be prejudicial under others as calculated to aggravate, by a disturbance of the market, the very evils which it seeks to diminish.
7. These points, fortunately, have recently received from abler and more experienced men that full measure of attention which they deserve. I shall abstain, then, from obtruding upon the notice of Government any crude notions of my own, and content myself with quoting the opinions of those with which I agree.
8. The compilation of the Presidency Famine Report was entrusted to me in June 1867. Up to that time nothing had occurred specially to direct my attention to these matters, and Government will readily understand from the Alienation Report* just sent in, No. 271, dated 13th April 1868, that I could have had no leisure since last June to make them a special study.
9. Colonel Baird Smith in 1861, General Sir Arthur Cotton in 1865, and especially Mr. Dalzell, of the Madras Civil Service, in 1867, have placed on record luminous reports on this subject, and have exhausted it in all its phases. Part IV of the latter gentleman's Memorandum on the Madras Famine of 1866 is particularly deserving of attention, as containing towards its close a clear, able and most interesting exposition of the various arguments deducible from facts and experience in opposition (so far as India is concerned) to the supposed infallible laws of the great Masters of Economic Science.
10. Mr. Dalzell is clearly of opinion that the experience of the late famine in Orissa, and the experiences of former famines, tend to the conclusion that a rigid and invariable adherence to the received rules of the great Masters of Economic Science have not had the desired effect in preventing an Indian dearth from becoming a famine. He thinks it may further be demonstrated that had those rules been strictly adhered to on such occasions of famine as have occurred, they would, in almost every case, have occasioned a still greater loss of life than actually took place. He shows that the action of these so-called rules of political economy were found to be ineffectual for the purpose intended; that though, generally, State interference was to be deprecated as likely to drive merchants out of the trade, it was found that, notwithstanding prices were enormously high, the natural course of trade did not supply the locality suffering from scarcity with sufficient expedition. That the famine in Orissa was a notable instance of this, inasmuch as private trade altogether failed to take advantage of the high prices ruling, and the loss of thousands of lives was the result of a blind reliance on the action of these supposed infallible laws. Mr. Dalzell's chief objection to them is that they pre-suppose a certain set of circumstances which may not exist in India, and therefore that they should not be blindly accepted in India. They assume, for instance, that the merchants of any place, in which people are suffering from scarcity, would be sufficiently alive to their own interests to import large supplies of food; that while this assumption might be correct generally, it was not so universally, as it involved the necessity of the merchants being largely supplied with capital, and being prepared to take rapid and decided action upon the state of the markets; whereas, in point of fact, it was very questionable whether the grain merchants of inland districts in India fulfilled either of these conditions, for, usually, they were not people of large means, and were apathetic and slow of action even when their own interests were deeply concerned; that when wedded by custom to a particular course of action they were loath to extend its basis of operations. And, finally, Mr. Dalzell cites the instance, in 1846, when the late Sir Robert Peel, under certain circumstances, did not hesitate to act in opposition to the received rules, and import Indian corn into Ireland upon Government account. Also, how his successor, Lord Russell, in the following year, likewise departed from them in the establishment of dépôts for the sale of food in those quarters of the country which were far removed from the sources of supply. Mr. Dalzell concludes by observing that since his views were expressed they have met with confirmation by the general opinions given in the London Journals regarding the policy adopted by the Bengal Government in Orissa; that in fact, as remarked by the Saturday Review, there is a vast difference between acting in default of laws of political economy, and acting in contravention of them, and that when it was found that, from natural or artificial causes, the demand for food was wholly unanswered, the Government was not only justified but bound to provide for the exceptional necessity.
11. I shall make no apology, therefore, for adopting as a preface to my own report the following paragraphs from Mr. Dalzell's, which, so far as I am capable of judging, contain sound common sense arguments particularly applicable to the present condition of India.
“ 154. It remains then to be considered what lesson has been learnt from the calamity through which the Madras Presidency has passed, and to decide what steps should be taken should the country ever be threatened with a recurrence of famine, in spite of all the efforts made to prevent it.
“ 155. In an interesting pamphlet on the subject of the famine of last year, General Sir Arthur Cotton, of the Madras Engineers, has laid down, in a few words, the proper procedure of Government in such a case. This course was recommended to the Home Government by him in a letter dated 28th December 1865, and it would have been well for Orissa, it would have been well for Ganjam, and it would have been well for Bellary, if these suggestions had been telegraphed to the Governments of Bengal and Madras for immediate adoption. General Sir Arthur Cotton proposes that w there is such a serious failure of crop as to cause the Authorities to antipate serious consequences, preparation should be made by —
- “ 1st.—Sending Officers to plan, estimate, and mark out some great and important works in that part of the country, which should be of permanent benefit.
- “ 2nd.—To organize a complete staff of Officers, &c., to superintend the execution of the works, distribute the food, and organize the system of relief.
- “ 3rd.—To collect tolls and materials on the spot.´
- “ 4th.—To collect food, provide shelter, &c.
“ 157. The real objection to the adoption of Sir Arthur Cotton's proposals, and the reason, doubtless, why they were not adopted when suggested by him on former occasions, is that they are apparently opposed to what has hitherto been the recognized system of political economy, which seems to forbid any direct interference by the State on such occasions, except in the last-extremity, and which is decidedly opposed to any Government action in the way of collecting food, as tending to disturb the ordinary operation of the grain market. And it is, doubtless, to this politico-economic theory that is to be ascribed the hesitation on the part of the District Officers to recommend, and of the State to undertake, those decisive measures which would have saved, perhaps, a million of lives in Orissa, and would have materially mitigated the distress which has been felt in Ganjam, in Bellary, and in other parts of this Presidency.
“ 158. It is at any rate desirable that after a crisis, such as that through which a great part of India has recently passed, the correctness of these principles, as applicable to the present condition of India, should be considered, for it has been shown that they were laid down as infallible at the beginning of this century, but that they were then as flagrantly departed from as they were in the recent case of Orissa.
“ 159. Dr. Adam Smith, the great pioneer of true political economy, was the first person who set forth, in a complete form, the principles which have been so generally admitted and adopted. He states as follows :—
“ ‘ Whoever examines, with attention, the history of the dearths and famines which have afflicted any part of Europe, during either the course of the present or that of the two preceding centuries, of several of which we have pretty exact accounts, will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen from any combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other cause, but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes perhaps, and in some particular places, by the waste of war, but in by the greatest number of cases by the fault of the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of Government attempting by improper means to remedy the inconveniences of a dearth.
" ' In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which there is a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the most unfavorable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine; and the scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will maintain through the year the same number of people that are commonly fed in a more affluent manner by oue of moderate plenty. The seasons most unfavorable to the crop are those of excessive drought, or excessive rain. But as corn grows equally upon high or low lands, upon grounds that are disposed to be too wet, and upon those that are disposed to be too dry, either the drought or the rain which is hurtful to one part of the country is favorable to another; and though both in the wet and the dry season the crop is a good deal less than in . one more properly tempered, yet, in both, what is lost in one part of the country is in some measure compensated by what is gained in the other. In rice countries, where the crop not only requires a very moist soil, but where in a certain period of its growing it must be laid under water, the effects of a drought are much more dismal. Even in such countries, however, the drought is perhaps scarce ever so universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the Government would allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal a few years ago might probably have occasioned a very greath dearth. Some improper regulations, some injudicious restraints imposed by servants of the East India Company, upon the rice trade contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.
" ' When the Government, in order to remedy the inconveniences of a dearth, orders all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable price, it either hinders them from bringing it to market, which may sometimes produce a famine even in the beginning of the season, or if they bring it thither it enables the people, and thereby encourages them, to consume it so fast as must necessarily produce a famine before the end of the season. The unlimited unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventive of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth; for the inconveniences of a real scarcity cannot be remedied ; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much, because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium.
" 160. The arguments so powerfully adduced by Dr. Smith in the same part of his work also go far to show that the inadvertent action of the grain dealer is the best preventive of real famine; that his own interests are identical with those of the public; and that the prices which his foresight adopts in the market will, supposing there be free trade in grain in all the neighbouring countries, cause an influx of food to those places most requiring it. At the same time, Dr. Smith admits that there are circumstances, though he does not detail them, which justify an interference with free trade in grain. He observes —
“ ‘ That to hinder the farmer from sending his goods, at all times, to the best market, is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a sort of reason of State; an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only, in cases of the most urgent necessity. The price at which the exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.’
“161. All the greatest English political economists who have written on the subject, during the century which has nearly expired, since the first publication of Dr. Smith’s work appear to have concurred in the views expressed by him regarding the impolicy of any interference with the grain market in seasons of scarcity, and one of the greatest of the French School of writers on this subject, M. Say, though he does not absolutely condemn the practice of storing grain on Government account on such occasions, evidently has serious doubts of the expediency of such a proceeding, and concurs with Dr. Smith in considering that in large and populous countries the best security against famine is the total absence of all official interference.
“162. Mr. John Stuart Mill, when considering this important subject, writes as follows :—
“ ‘In cases of actual scarcity Governments are often urged, as they were in the Irish emergency of 1847, to take measures of some sort for moderating the price of food. But the price of a thing cannot be raised by deficiency of supply beyond what is sufficient to make a corresponding reduction of the consumption; and if a Government prevents this reduction from being brought about by a rise of price, there remains no mode of effecting it unless by taking possession of all the food and serving it out in rations as in a besieged town. In a real scarcity nothing can afford general relief except a determination by the richer classes to diminish their own consumption. If they buy and consume their usual quantity of food, and content themselves with giving money, they do no good. The price is forced up until the poorest competitors have no longer the means of competing, and the privation of food is thrown exclusively upon the indigent, the other classes being only affected pecuniarily. When the supply is deficient somebody must consume less, and if every rich person is determined not to be that somebody, all they do by subsidizing their poorer competitors is to force up the price so much the higher, with no effect but to enrich the corn-dealers, the very reverse of what is desired by those who recommend such measures. All that Governments can do in these emergencies is to counsel a general moderation in consumption, and to interdict such kinds of it as are not of primary importance. Direct measures at the cost of the State to procure food from a distance are expedient when from peculiar reasons the thing is not likely to be done by private speculation, In any other case they are a great error. Private speculators will not, in such cases, venture to compete with the Government; and though a Government can do more than any one merchant, it cannot do nearly so much as all merchants.’
“163. It thus appears that though Mr. Mill is strongly averse to Government interference in such cases, he admits that there may be circumstances which justify an interference with private trade by Government, to the extent of obtaining supplies of food from a distance. It is true that he limits this sanction to such cases as where this is not likely to be done by private speculations, but his dictum in another part of his very valuable work, that the only real limit which can properly be applied to the interference of Government with the affairs of its subjects is ‘expediency,’ would seem to justify this course whenever the State has any reason to fear that the people are likely to be reduced to famine in consequence of the high price of food. His remarks on the subject of the English poor laws are additional proof that, in his opinion, it is the positive duty of Government to take such measures as will hold out to its subjects the certainty of subsistence.
“164. It will, however, be clearly perceived from the foregoing extracts that all the greatest political economists of the century are of opinion that any State interference with the natural price of grain is, as a rule, to be deprecated. The effect of these opinions has been entirely to alter the policy of Government in India on the occurrence of famines, for, while in probably nearly every scarcity which took place in the last century the Government, whether Native or British, fixed the price of grain by a tariff (as was described in a former part of this paper to have been done in Bengal in 1782 with marked success), no such action has ever been taken in the present century, and as early as 1806 the Government of this Presidency issued a General Order to its local Officers laying down rules framed on the most rigid principles of political economy, and the effect of the change cannot be said to have been altogether satisfactory, though a return to a Government price for provisions could never be advocated.
“165. It is much to be regretted that not one of the great masters of economic science have deliberately prescribed the course which a Government ought to follow when its subjects are positively dying in large numbers from starvation. The principles advocated are self-apparent to every one up to a certain point, and the advantages derived from those high prices which restrict consumption in a year of scarcity must be manifest to all, but if these prices are pushed beyond this, and not only check consumption, but stop it altogether in the case of certain classes, it surely would never be advocated that this state of things was for the general good. Possibly, the rigid political economist might hold that it was for the general good that prices should so rise as to create a famine and mortality in order that the food supply might be sufficient for the reduced population, but such views could never be adopted by a Christian Government, and the consideration still remains what should be the action of Government when prices rise to such high rates as to cause starvation among the poorest classes of the people. The question is undoubtedly beset with difficulty, but the experience of last year in Orissa and the experiences of former famines, as detailed in a previous part of this paper, certainly tend to the conclusion that a rigid and invariable adherence to the received rules of the economists have not had the desired effect in preventing an Indian dearth from becoming a famine. It may further be demonstrated that had they been strictly adhered to on such occasions of famine as have occurred they would, in almost every case, have occasioned a still greater loss of life than actually took place.
"166. The theory is that the high prices produced by a scarcity in any locality must cause supplies of food to be sent there in the natural course of trade, and that any interference of Government, either in the way of prohibiting exports or offering a bounty on imports, is unnecessary, and that to import grain on Government account would be mischievous, as being likely to drive merchants out of the trade. From the accounts of the previous famines which have taken place in Madras, there can, however, be little doubt that the pressure was greatest on these occasions on which the Government endeavoured to adhere most closely to the received rules of economic science, for, though much distress was experienced in 1782 and 1806, it does not appear to have been so severe as that felt in 1824 and 1833. This is by no means positive evidence either in favor or against the correctness of those rules. Nevertheless, it is, at any rate, worthy of remark that on each occasion on which the Madras Revenue Board and the Madras Government have laid down the infallibility of these rules at the commencement of a scarcity, they have subsequently, as the pressure of the distress increased, found it impossible entirely to rely upon them; in fact, they have proved them to be in themselves ineffectual, and they have either disregarded them, or have, at any rate, endeavoured to aid their action. Thus in 1807, though the Government at first expressed the strongest disinclination to any interference with the grain market, they afterwards found it necessary to offer a high fixed price for all grain imported, and eventually ordered the sale of grain on Government account at low rates. Again in 1824 and 1833 they deemed it advisable, as the pressure of the famine advanced, to offer bounties on grain imported. It is clear, therefore, that on these occasions the action of these so called rules of political economy was found to be ineffectual for the purpose intended. In other words, though prices were enormously high, it was found that the natural course of trade did not supply the locality suffering from scarcity with sufficient expedition. A reference to the price list given in paragraph 110 of this paper will also show pretty clearly that the supposed laws of supply and demand did not operate in the Bellary, Cuddapah and Kurnool Districts when the late scarcity was at its height, for it is impossible to suppose that the carriage of grain from the two latter places to Bellary, distances of 150 miles and 100 miles, respectively, would, under any circumstances, have cost nearly 1d. per lb., which was about the average difference of price. The last notable instance of the failure of these so called principles is the famine in Orissa, where private trade altogether failed to take advantage of the high prices ruling, and the loss of thousands of lives was the result of a blind reliance on the action of these supposed infallible laws.
“167. The fact is, however, that these laws are quite as infallible as they are considered to be by those who have enunciated and repeated them, but in India it has been over-looked that a certain set of circumstances has always been pre-supposed. They are based upon the assumption that the merchants of any place in which people are suffering from a scarcity would be sufficiently alive to their own interests to import large supplies of food, and this assumption would, probably, be correct so far as most European countries are concerned, but it involves the necessity of the merchants being largely supplied with capital, and being prepared to take rapid and decided action upon the state of the markets. Now it is at least very questionable whether the grain merchants of inland districts in India fulfil either of these conditions. They are usually people of very small means, and they are by custom so wedded to a particular course of action that they would be very slow to extend their basis of operations, and this is the only explanation that can be given of the apparent anomalies which occur during every period of famine, prices very frequently varying by 100 per cent. in localities within a few miles of each other.
“168. It must also be remembered that the import trade in grain has very frequently to be created, that is to say, the locality suffering from famine has probably always theretofore furnished its own food supply, and at the commencement of the pressure there are no persons actually engaged in the trade upon which the lives of millions may shortly become dependent. It has been shown in the first part of this paper how, under somewhat similar circumstances in 1846, the late Sir Robert Peel, one of the greatest Statesmen that have ever guided the councils of the State, did not hesitate to import Indian corn into Ireland upon Government account, and how the present Lord Russell, his successor in office, did not scruple in the following year to establish depôts for the sale of food in those quarters of the country which were far removed from the sources of supply.
"169. The Hindoo merchant is slow of action even when his own interests are deeply concerned, and he is loath to make investments in a business which is new to him, yet if the so called politico-economic rules are to be rigidly adhered to, unless he sees the advantage of employing his capital in a new import trade, and unless he takes prompt and immediate action in doing so, thousands of lives may be sacrificed in a few months. It is well known that during the Guntoor famine of 1833 grain was comparatively plentiful in several of the Madras districts, yet the natural course of trade, even aided by the grant of bounties on importation, did not supply the Guntoor district with sufficient food to prevent the destruction of one-third of the inhabitants; and, upon the whole, it must at least now be acknowledged that it is not safe on all occasions to trust to the natural laws of supply and demand, and to the self-interest of those employed in mercantile business, when a large district is visited by famine. This is no new heresy, if heresy it be, so far as the Madras Presidency is concerned, for upwards of thirty years ago a distinguished Officer of the Madras Civil Service,* after a residence in India of upwards of 20 years, when discussing the question in an article in the Madras Journal of Literature and Science for 1839-40, writes as follows:—
" 'It is not enough for the Government to offer the people work, and pay them for their labour, when the crisis of famine has arrived— trusting to the native traders' unassisted energies to provide the requisite supplies to meet the urgent demand for food—but they must, by a prudent foresight and by their own energy, bring the abundance and stores of distant and foreign markets within the timely reach of the retail trade, or the pressure of famine will remain in full force till the population is brought down to the level of the numbers which the Native trader can supply.
" ' If these views are borne out by experience, they lead us to an inference wholly opposed to that assumed in the Government orders ; and in lieu of concurring in the opinion that 'if the Government were to throw a quantity of grain into places which would not receive it in the ordinary course of mercantile speculation, the only effect of this measure would be to convert a scarcity into a famine,’ I should almost be disposed to assert the reverse, and to maintain that at present in South India, whilst its grain trade and trade in general are at so low an ebb, the timely and judicious interference of Government, instead of aggravating, is the only mode in general by which scarcity can now be greatly mitigated and famine prevented. And that an importation of grain through the means of Government capital, and possibly of Government agency, from foreign or distant markets where there is abundance, into districts suffering from dearth, may be, under the existing circumstances of the country, a measure of sound policy, and the best, if not the only, practical method by which the distress caused by the peculiar character of tropical droughts can be greatly alleviated.
“ ‘It is no argument against an interference of this nature to cite to us, as the orders of Government do, the fact that Native rulers in former times, participating in the ignorance and the prejudices of the people, have converted scarcities into famines by the barbarous policy of compulsory sales, or other arbitrary interference with the capital, or with individuals in the trade. There can be no question now as to the proper course to be pursued on this head; for Dr. Smith has placed beyond dispute the importation principle that the interest of the inland dealer and the public is the same, and the more free he remains the better.
“ ‘No interference with this branch of the trade is for a moment advocated; for if adequately supplied the home dealers, it is certain, are fully equal to the due distribution of all the grain brought into a district in a year of famine, inasmuch as they distribute the larger supplies of abundant years. But it is in the importation—the foreign or wholesale trade—that we would propose the interposition of Government. Not by any restriction on the wholesale merchant, or the importer, but by offering to him the assistance of Government, and by endeavouring to infuse into the import and wholesale trade a spirit of adventure and activity adequate to meet the urgent and large demand of famine. And should this, after full trial, fail to place the necessary supplies in due season at the doors of the retail dealers, then only, by leaving the wholesale merchant to himself and making use of a Government agency for introducing for sale into famine districts only, timely supplies from distant and foreign markets at the risk of Government; whilst the home or the local trade should be left altogether to take its own course, and purchase large or small supplies, as it might see fit.’
“170. Since the foregoing paragraphs of this paper were written, the views expressed have been confirmed by the general opinions given in the London Journals of the policy adopted by the Bengal Government in Orissa during last year. The Saturday Review remarks that there is a vast difference between acting in default of laws of political economy and acting in contravention of them, and that when it is found that, from natural or artificial causes, the demand for food was wholly unanswered, the Government was not only justified but bound to provide for the exceptional necessity.
"171. The discussion which has taken place on this somewhat intricate question will, it is hoped, put an end to that blind reliance on every occasion and under all circumstances on a set of rules which, under certain circumstances, may be very advantageously followed, but which are not invariable in their application. At the same time, hasty action on the part of Government when a scarcity of food is impending is on all accounts to be deprecated, and were any attempt to be made to equalize prices, by the establishment of Government grain agencies in ordinary times, a fatal blow would be given to the growth of that mercantile enterprise which it is the duty of all Governments to foster, and upon which, when properly developed, the greatest reliance can be placed for the prevention of scarcity in any locality.
"172. It would seem from a careful and impartial consideration of the subject, aided by the experiences gained during previous famines, and more especially during the recent terrible calamity with which the province of Orissa has been afflicted, that it is the duty of an Indian Government not to lay down fixed principles for its guidance regardless of the varying circumstances of different localities, but to keep itself thoroughly acquainted with the food supply and the course of trade in every portion of the dominions under its charge, to be ever watchful of any variation of season which may indicate the approach of drought, and to be prepared under certain circumstances, and should necessity arise, to import food for the preservation of the lives of its people on Government account, or even to establish dépôts for the sale of food in certain localities.
"173. It is also questionable whether the heretofore received system of providing labour for the able-bodied with money wages at rates fixed with reference to existing prices, and food for those unable to labour, purchase in the local market, as the first measures of relief, whenever a district is oppressed with famine, without any regard to the position of the district as to food supply and import trade in provisions, is correct. Such a course must tend to increase the scarcity of food, and thus must augment the distress it is intended to alleviate. Those who are provided with food at Government expense, or with money to purchase food in the same manner, will not in any way reduce their consumption, and the proceedings of Government must thus, to a certain extent, have the effect of counteracting the healthy action of high prices in times of scarcity. At the same time these measures would cease to be objectionable in a coast district which naturally drew its food supply from elsewhere, and in which a regular food import trade was in existence, or in any district, if the Relief Depôts were provided with food imported by the State from a distance, and if the wages of those employed on relief works were paid in grain obtained in the same manner. The action of the politico-economic rules as to consumption would then be left unfettered, that is to say, all those of the people who could do so, without being reduced to starvation, would reduce their consumption of provisions, and the consumption of the lowest classes would cease to fall upon the local market in the same manner as if they had perished of famine.
“174. Probably, therefore, when a sacrcity is apprehended in any particular locality, the first step to be taken by the State should be to provide labour on public works, with wages paid in grain, or money, according to the locality and state of trade in the district; and in order to insure rapid action it would be well that during prosperous times a large number of works not requiring skilled labour should be planned and estimated for in every village, the list and estimates being lodged with the Tahsildar of the Taluk.* Should matters become more serious, Relief Depots supplied with grain from a distance should be opened for those unable to labour, and eventually, should it be found that prices were rising so much beyond those ruling in neighbouring countries as to show that the grain merchants were not importing from without, then steps should be taken by the Government to create such a trade, either by importing on Government account or by offering a bounty on imports, or making advances to merchants, or any similar measure which would have the effect of throwing a supply of grain into the distressed locality.”
12. Having premised thus far, I will proceed to describe the steps taken to collect and put together the little information which has been obtainable.
13. On the 1st July 1867 the following Circular was addressed to all Collectors :—
“ Sir,—Under instructions from Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the Supplement to the Government Gazette of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the Presidency Famine Report, the compilation of which has been assigned to me.
“ 2. I am to desire that you will be good enough to use every endeavour to collect information on the subject of past famines in the districts under your control.
“3. It is presumed that this may be done in respect to the failure of rain, and consequent failure of crops, since the introduction of the British Government, from the English and Vernacular records readily accessible.
“4. There will be greater difficulty, no doubt, in procuring this information in years preceding the accession of the British Government, and it is suggested that recourse be had to such Native records and papers as may still be in the possession of the Hereditary District and Village Officers.
“5. I am also to suggest the probability of valuable information being obtained from private sources.
“6. The nature of the information desired in each case of famine or scarcity is simply—
“I. The extent of the distress and its results.
“II. The extent of the country affected.
“III. The measures of relief adopted.
“7. When you are satisfied that all that could be done has been done in your districts in respect to the collection of facts, either from the Hereditary Officers aforesaid or other sources, you are requested to be good enough to embody those facts in a concise English narrative, and forward the same to me, with copies of any Vernacular documents (without translation) which you may think fit to send in extenso.”
14. Political Officers in charge of districts were also invited to give similar information to the extent that it could be obtained from old dufturs, family records, and other sources to which access might not be denied them.
15. It was then my intention to supplement this information by an epitome of the evidence forthcoming from the Peishwa’s Duftur relating to events prior to the introduction of the British Government, and by a summary from the records of the Secretariat, and other sources available in respect to events since.
16. As it will be useless to attempt to describe the various famines and scarcities which from time to time have occurred with variable intensity, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, strictly with reference to their geographical limits, I propose to give the Collectors’ and Political Officers’ replies as received, taking care only so to place them that the information respecting adjacent districts and territory may come together, by which means perhaps a more connected form of narrative, extending over a large area or tract of country than any one Collector or Political Officer might have it in his power to speak of, may be obtained.
17. It will be well, however, to preserve the line of demarcation of the ghauts south of the Taptee, as separating the Concan from the Deccan and Southern Mahratta Country by a natural barrier.
18. Commencing then from the north, I will first give the Commissioner's description of past famines and droughts in Scinde, including Thurr and Parkur. Mr. Havelock writes—
"As requested in your letter dated the 1st July last, I have the honor to submit such information as I have been able to procure on the subject of past famines in Scinde. This information has been obtained by personal enquiry on the part of the Collectors and Political Superintendents, as well as from reports submitted by their District Officers, and from a memorandum drawn up by Syud Sabur Ali Shah of Tatta, whose intelligence and position entitle what he has written to be received with due consideration. The Collector of Shikurpoor reports that he has received great assistance in his enquiries from His Highness Meer Ali Moorad and Jam Abdool Kheir, Hissadar of Obowra.
"2. Before proceeding to analyze the several reports received, I may remark generally that this Province has apparently been singularly free from what can be strictly termed famines. It will be seen further on that, except when the country was disturbed by hostilities, and when crops were destroyed, and cultivation prohibited either as an aggressive or a defensive measure, there has been no general distress, but simply a scarcity of food in certain districts caused by drought, and I can only attribute this immunity from general famine to the fact that Scinde Proper is not dependent on rain for its cultivation, and that the difference in the levels of the country prevents a total failure of crops; for when the inundation is unfavourable from excess or deficiency of water in one part of the country it is often favorable in another.
"3. The earliest famine regarding which information is procurable appears to have occurred in A. D. 1527, when Mirza Shah Beg Ayhoon conquered the Province. Jam Ninda, then ruler of Scinde, directed that all grain should be burnt, in order that it should not fall into the hands of the Conqueror. This famine lasted for six months. The next famine occurred in A. D. 1540. Mirza Shah Hunun, the ruler of Scinde, hearing that Shah Hoomagoon, who had been lately defeated by Share Shah at Lahore, was about to invade Scinde, directed that crops should not be grown on either bank of the river. The import of grain was also prohibited. This famine lasted for three years, and is said to have been particularly severe.
“4. A famine occurred in A. D. 1759, caused by war, but it was neither severe nor of long duration.
“5. In a. d. 1782, when the Kulhora dynasty ceased, and that of the Talpoors commenced, a very severe famine, which lasted for 2½ years, occurred. During four months of this time not a grain of corn was procurable. This famine was caused by the burning of crops, and the suspension of cultivation during a period of hostilities. There was also no rain-fall for two years.
“6. On the occasion of this last famine the following remedial measures appear to have been adopted:—
“I. Cultivators who had only 20 Kurwars of grain were not called upon to pay any assessment.
“II. The Government share of grain was retained by the cultivators as seed for the next season.
“III. Cultivators who had above 20 Kurwars of grain paid only 1 Kurwar in 20 to Government.
“IV. Cultivators who had only 2 Churkas (Persian wheels worked by 2 animals) had their assessment remitted.
“V. Cultivators who had more than two Churkas paid Rs. 2 per Churka, and Rs. 1 per ‘Hoorla’ (Persian wheel worked by one animal).
“VI. The Government share of grain was sold at Rs. 50 per Kurwar, and the cultivators had the option of paying their rent in money at that rate, or in kind.
“VII. Creditors were prohibited from pressing Zamindars while the famine lasted.
“7. The Ameers also, with the aid of Aga Ibrahim Shah, Kaisur Khan, and some of the Tatta Syuds, prepared lists of people other than traders and cultivators who were in distressed circumstances with a view to their relief; they also gave up their share of the land revenue, and divided it into 3½ portions, two of which were distributed among poor Syuds and Mahomedans, who were thus supported for five or six months; the third portion was allotted to the necessities of strangers and travellers, and the balance was given to distressed Hindoos.
“8. Slaves sold during the prevalence of the famine were restored to their relatives and sent back to their homes.
“9. During this period grain was selling at Rs. 80 per Kurwar; it afterwards fell to Rs. 15 and 16 per Kurwar.
“ 10. This famine corresponds with that in 1783 mentioned by the Political Superintendent Thurr and Parkur, which will be noticed further on.
“ 11. From the reports of the Collector of Shikarpoor there would appear to have been a very severe famine in Upper Scinde in a. d. 1820, or 1822, caused by an extraordinary high inundation, which washed away all the crops in the districts. During this period the price of grain rose to Rs. 90 and Rs. 120 per Kurwar.
“ 12. The Ameers met the distress by throwing open the Government granaries, selling grain at reduced rates, granting remissions of revenue, and making advances on liberal terms.
“ 13. The Political Superintendent Thurr and Parkur has given an account of famines in the districts under his charge during a period of 163 years, i. e. from a. d. 1703 to a. d. 1866. The information appears to have been gleaned from reports made by his District Officers. These famines occurred in the following order :—
- “ The first in a. d. 1703.
- “ The second in a. d. 1745 to a. d. 1752.
- “ The third in a. d. 1752 to a. d. 1755.
- “ The fourth in a. d. 1783.
- “ The fifth in a. d. 1790.
- “ The sixth in a. d. 1803.
- “ The seventh in a. d. 1807 to a. d. 1813.
- “ The eighth in a. d. 1810.
- “ The ninth in a. d. 1812.
- “ The tenth in a. d. 1825.
- “ The eleventh in a. d. 1834.
- “ The twelfth in a. d. 1836 to a. d. 1842.
- “ The thirteenth in a. d. 1860.
“ 14. I am not, however, prepared to admit that in each of the above cases a regular famine occurred. In most of them the poor suffered on account of the high price of grain in the market owing to drought; indeed, in every instance ‘want of rain’ is reported to have been the cause, and that this was the cause there can be little doubt, since the rain-fall in the desert is very slight, and since the inhabitants depend upon the rain for their scanty cultivation and pasture for their cattle. I note, moreover, that particular districts only were affected in most of the instances mentioned, so that instead of famines they should rather be termed periods of scarcity, for it was in the power of the inhabitants of a particular district to move into more favoured districts where they could obtain food. In every instance the distressed inhabitants appear to have been assisted by the Ameers, the Rana of Nuggur, and other petty Chiefs, as circumstances demanded.
"15. The nature of the relief afforded is not in each case stated, but I learn that in A. D. 1812 His Highness Meer Ali Moorad, father of the present His Highness Meer Shere Mahomed, K.S.I, fed the distressed people in the Deepla districts, and remitted the assessment in the case of cultivators ; and that in 1860 the famished inhabitants of the Nuggur district found means of subsistence by labouring in the Narra irrigational works.
"16. With the exception of the second, third, seventh and twelfth famine, the scarcity of food extended over periods averaging from four to fourteen months.
"17. The second famine, which lasted from 1745 to 1752, occurred in the Narra districts.
"18. The third, from 1752 to 1755, in the Omerkote Talooka.
"19. The seventh, from 1807 to 1813, and the twelfth, from 1836 to 1842, in the Narra districts, but in each of these exceptional cases, although the people doubtless suffered great distress, they migrated to other adjoining districts, where many of them obtained food.
"20. The following is a chronological list of the famines and periods of scarcity to which allusion has been made :—
| " 1. | General | A. D. 1521. | ||
| " 2. | Do. | do. | 1540 to 1543. | |
| " 3. | Narra Districts | do. | 1745 to 1752. | |
| " 4. | Oomerkote do. | do. | 1752 to 1755. | |
| " 5. | General | do. | 1759. | |
| " 6. | Do. | do. | 1782 to 1784. | |
| " 7. | Oomerkote District | do. | 1790. | |
| " 8. | Nuggur | do. | do. | 1803. |
| " 9. | Narra | do. | do. | 1807 to 1813. |
| " 10. | Oomerkote | do. | do. | 1810. |
| " 11. | Mittee | do. | do. | 1812. |
| " 12. | Upper Scinde... | do. | 1820 to 1822. | |
| " 13. | Nuggur District | do. | 1825. | |
| " 14. | Do. | do. | 1834. | |
| " 15. | Narra | do. | do. | 1836 to 1842. |
| " 16. | Nuggur | do. | do. | 1860. |
"21. By the expression General I mean Scinde, exclusive of the Thurr and Parkur Districts."
19. Next, in order of proximity of territory, comes the report of the Political Agent in Kutch. Major Shortt wrote as follows on 19th September:—
“1. In reply to your letter and circular of 1st July last, I have the honor to inform you that I regret that there is but little information forthcoming in this province, either from the records of the Durbar or from private sources, in regard to past famines and years of scarcity.
“2. Enclosed, however, is a tabulated statement of the prices of grain, &c., most in use here, which has been compiled from the private accounts of persons of respectability in Bhooj, not only for years of famine and scarcity, but for intermediate years, so as to show the relative intensity of the distress occasioned, for I need scarcely point out that the actual prices in former famines are but little criterion of this, for during the last few years grain and other necessaries of life are dearer than they have been in most famine years.
“3. I also forward in the Vernacular some narratives drawn up by well-informed persons of information and events which have come under their own personal observation, and also from tradition, in regard to the extent of the distress occasioned by the most severe of the Kutch famines, the country affected, and the measures adopted for relief.
“4. One of these is by Mukkonjee Wora, the Sheristedar of the Agency, a man of great local knowledge, and now upwards of 75 years of age.
“Another is by Moung Ruttonjee Meta, who was a member of the first Regency after our conquest of the province in 1819, now 81 years of age.
“5. Kutch is particularly subject to visitations of this kind—the all but invariable cause being the failure of the monsoon.
“6. Situated between Guzerat and the normally rainless province of Scinde, it seems just to lie within the limit and influence of the south-west monsoon; and yet it is almost wholly dependent on rain for the raising of its crops.
“7. There are no means of irrigation. The wells are not numerous, for it is only in certain localities that the water is not brackish. In many parts of Kutch it is so salt as to be useless for irrigational purposes, and even fresh water wells become salt in years of drought.
“8. The district of Wagur is more favoured than that of Kutch proper. The soil is richer and deeper, and it is more in the line of, and within the influence of, the south-west monsoon.
“9. Another cause of the failure of the crops is locusts.
“ 10. And in one year at least (that of Sumvut 1871, a. d. 1814) rats, which covered the country in great numbers, and were the cause of the scarcity of that year. This same cause extended more or less to all the surrounding countries.
“ 11. The general condition of the country is not favorable for storing grain in large quantities. Its produce is not sufficient for its consumption, and but for the facility its bunders and shipping afford for the importation of grain such calamities would be much more severely felt.
“ 12. The measures adopted for relief in years of great scarcity are very limited.
“ The Raos of the country have always distributed charity in grain with open hand, and have opened grain-shops for its sale at reasonable prices. Such measures can, however, only be looked on as partial in their effect, and confined to a small portion of the country, while they must always be open to the charge of being prompted by motives of ostentation; but they have no doubt effected much good, and have had the effect of breaking down combination to a great extent.
“ 13. The employment of available labour paid for in grain in the deepening and cleansing of tanks is another means which has been generally resorted to as a means of affording relief.
“ 14. But the more immediate effect of a scarcity in this province is the emigration of a large portion, varying from a quarter to a third, of the agricultural population to Scinde with their cattle, where they have always found the means of gaining a livelihood till the return of better times in this province.”
20. As the above report did not appear to me to treat the subject comprehensively, I suggested the expediency of further minute enquiries being made during the next three months, and requested that the result might be communicated at the end of that time in a supplementary form. I remarked that I did not understand whether it was an ascertained fact that no old records of a nature to throw light on the subject were in the possession of the various hereditary officers of districts, or that the Raos of the country had been specially invited to give information. I also requested that the contents of the Vernacular reports of living persons might be embodied in the supplementary narrative.
21. Major Shortt replied that the information he had already sent was furnished by His Highness the Rao, and that he had no means of obtaining more; that from the disturbed state of the province prior to 1819 there were but few old records extant, but that should the Durbar be successful in a further search he would be happy to make known the result, though His Highness was not sanguine on the subject.
22. Major Shortt finally reported, on 25th February last, that no further information was forthcoming, "though persons had been specially appointed to search for it;" but translates were sent of the Vernacular statements referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his original letter of 19th September, as follow:—
"Statement of Wora Mukkonjee, who states that the following is partly from hearsay, and partly from his own observation—dated 18th September 1867.
"1. In Sumvut 1859, a. d. 1803, I was ten years old, and therefore I remember well that in that year the scarcity was caused by the crops having been injured by locusts.
"2. Sumvut 1860, a. d. 1804, was a year of drought, and the necessaries of life were very dear. In the months of Asad and Shrawun, Jemadar Futteh Mahomed opened the Durbar grain stores, and at first sold grain at the rate of 3 Pattees per Koree,* and afterwards he engaged 250 camels from the Bunee and sent them to Scinde to bring rice, which was brought to Bhooj about the month of Ashwin (October), and was sold at 4 Pattees per Koree. This act of the Jemadar relieved the inhabitants of Bhooj, as well as those of the surrounding villages, from destitution, and I have heard that from the forces (British) having scoured all over the Deccan the famine of this year was as much felt there as the famine of Sumvut 1869, a. d. 1813, was felt in Kutch and other places on this side. In that year I was 11 years old.
"3. A great famine occurred in Sumvut 1869, a. d. 1813, when I was 20 years old, though none of the Kutch people died of hunger that year. In Shrawun the necessaries of life became so dear that one could scarcely get 1¾ Pattees per Koree. The grain market was closed. On the 2nd or 3rd of Shrawun those who used to purchase grain daily were unable to get it. About 300 women who wanted grain assembled at the Ber* gate, where they saw Jemadar Futteh Mahomed near the ‘Mandavee.’ They surrounded his carriage and raised a great clamour. Some of them who were aged said to Futteh Mahomed, ‘Child! where are you going? We are dying of hunger, give us food, and then go, or otherwise we wont allow you to go.’ Upon this Futteh Mahomed came out of his carriage, and took his seat on the ‘Mandavee,’ and told the women not to be afraid, and that he would provide them with grain, and then go where he was going. Then he sent for Sha Bhuwanjee Moteechund and others, and told them that they should sell grain at 3 Pattees per Koree, or otherwise the Durbar would open a grain shop. After this he sent some labourers and brought grain, which he distributed among the women, giving 4 Pattees each in charity, and informed them that they would get it from to-morrow at a proper rate. Whereupon he opened a Durbar shop, and sold it at 3 or 4 Pattees per Koree, allowing a man to have only two Korees’ worth at a time. This induced the merchants to sell the grain at the same rate. In Anjar the Karbharee Pragjee Wagjee had taken care to provide the Sebundees with grain, and in Mandavee and other places measures were taken by the Durbar. All those who died of starvation belonged to Kattywar. They crossed the Runn and came to Wagur, but on their way they could not get food, and they devoured the bodies of even their nearest relations, viz., a wife devoured her husband’s corpse, a husband devoured his wife’s corpse. The parents devoured the corpses of their children. A cat or dog was accounted a rare feast during that year. I was then at Anjar, where I saw a woman hang a cat, for which a sweeper woman abused her, and asked her why she killed the cat; thus a quarrel ensued, which was put a stop to by me by giving a seer of flour to the woman, and getting the cat thrown away by the sweeper. The Ameers of Scinde also extended liberal protection to the people of Kattywar and Kutch, who succeeded in reaching that country by engaging them in diverse canal works. This great famine raged only in Kutch, Kattywar, and Marwar. The district of Kuree, as well as the whole of Guzerat, was favored with a good fall of rain, and grain was produced, but as it was exported to other countries great scarcity was felt in Guzerat as far as Surat. At the end of this year several of the inhabitants of Wagur subsisted on the bark of trees called Khijura and Kerda, and some subsisted on a herb called ‘Bokna,’ from which their feet swelled, and ultimately they died. Sumvut 1868, a. d. 1812, the locusts ate the grass also, and therefore the famine was severely felt in this year.
“4. In Sumvut 1869, a. d. 1813, almost all the cattle died from want of grass, and therefore ghee was only obtained for some months in 1870, a. d. 1814, at the rate of half a seer per Koree. Fever of a bad type was also prevalent this year, which carried off the Chiefs of several fortified towns in Wagur, as also Rao Raedhinjee and Jemadar Futteh Mahomed. Many of the merchants who suffered little from the famine of 1869, a. d. 1813, fell victims to the fever of this year. From this it has become a common saying that
In 1869, a. d. 1813, the people died from want, and in 1870, a. d. 1814, they died from pain, the play of words being on ‘Bhooke’ and ‘Dhooke.’
“ 5. In Samvat 1871, A. D. 1815, rats were produced in great numbers, and the year was in consequence called in Kutch and Kattywar the year ‘ of rats.’ They bit off the ears of corn, and carried them into their holes after satisfying their hunger. The poor men used to take out the grain thus stored from their holes and subsist on it. This was the state of things, but the abundant produce of the year preceding served to keep the prices of grain within their means.
“ 6. In Samvat 1876, A. D. 1820, the grain sown was rotted by excessive rain. This caused the prices to be very exorbitant, i. e., 6 Pattees per Koree. Afterwards Jowaree and wheat were frost-bitten.
“ 7. In Samvat 1882, A. D. 1826, rats were again produced in great numbers in Kattywar and other places. A less number, however, was produced in Wagur, and still less in Kutch. Grain suffered less than in Samvat 1871, A. D. 1815. This year was therefore not called ‘ Oonderioo,’ or a year of rats.
“ 8. In 1890, A. D. 1834, rain fell copiously. Grain was sown, and the crops were in good condition; but locusts appeared in innumerable flights in all the parts of the country, and destroyed all the crops and grass, as well as trees. While on their flight they rushed through the houses of persons, and rendered cooking impossible. They entered the British Residency at Bhooj by the large gate, and came into the Office by the western door, and went out by the eastern. They injured the hedges and the trees in the garden by eating leaves and bark, and leaving only the pith. This circumstance caused the famine of this year. Measures were taken by the Dewan Lukhmidass for relieving the poor from their sufferings.
“ Statement of Meherban Meta Ruttonjee Monjee, aged about 81 years.
“ Samvat 1847, A. D. 1791, was a year of famine. In the month of Jesht the heat was very great, and in consequence innumerable black ants were produced in almost all parts of the country. The cattle suffered much from want of grass. They used to eat the dead bodies of the ants. It rained afterwards, and grass was produced, but the dead bodies of the ants lay so thick that they were eaten by the cattle together with the grass. At this time I heard my father and others say that the legs and feet of the ants were seen in the freshly extracted milk of cows. I was a boy then.
“ In Samvat 1871, A. D. 1815, the fall of rain was copious, and the crops were in good condition, but this year, in the month of Shrawun, rats were produced in the jungles in almost all parts of the country. They destroy all the fields, and disappeared in about two months.
“ On this account this year is called ‘ Oonderioo,’ or the year of rats.
“ Statement of Metta Madhowjee Sheoram, one of the Durbar's late Karbharees.
“ Having been furnished with a translation of a Circular from the Compiler of the Presidency Famine Report, requesting to be furnished with details of famines which happened in this province prior and subsequent to the arrival of the British forces in Kutch, together with the measures adopted for the relief of the poorer classes from their distress, I now proceed to relate what I have heard or seen, or what I have come to know from perusal of the old records, leaving it to you to select what you may think of use.
“ Sumvut 1635, A. D. 1577, was a year of great famine. Maha Rao Shree Khengarjee was then alive; but the affairs of the State were conducted by Rao Barmuljee on account of the former's old age. The measures adopted for the relief of the poorer classes are enumerated in the genealogy of the princes. The following couplets are quoted from that:—
છોરૂ છવણ કેઆ ષતો ચડા આપે ગઉત. ૧
નવસોરઠ નવકોઠ મઢિઆન નવ લખેતાહે
જે ખેલહતો મનમોટ તેષોભિર આપ ગહંટ. ૨
નાગણ પુછે નાંગેક આવે તલ આ પાર
એકાચ રહ ચડાયા ભુજપતી પાર. ૩
“ The meaning of these couplets is not very difficult, though I beg to explain it according to my abilities—
“ 1. In the great famine of 1635, A. D. 1577, even very respectable men had to succumb to its influence. They were unable to support their children, and therefore Rao Bharmuljee, the son of Rao Khengarjee, extended his liberal protection to these gentlemen, and relieved them from their distress.
“ 2. Several of the Jagheerdars possessing large Jagheers in this and in other countries came to Rao Bharmuljee in his palace. He received them kindly, and extended his liberal protection to all during the famine, which was very severe. These noblemen returned to their houses after matters had improved.
“ 3. Beneath the place on which food was cooked for these gentlemen, there was a serpent's hole, in which a male and female serpent lived. The female serpent asked the male what had caused the great heat over their hole; the male serpent told her that the heat was caused by Rao Bharmuljee, the King of Bhooj, having ordered food to be cooked in large utensils for the people. This, however, is nothing but a figure of the poet.
“The foregoing is what I know regarding the measures adopted for the relief of the poor from the distress caused by the famine of 1635, A. D. 1577. But I do not know anything regarding any other famine until that of Sumvut 1803, A. D. 1746.
“In Sumvut 1803, A. D. 1746, a great famine occurred. Maha Rao Shree Desuljee was then alive, but the affairs of the State were conducted by Rao Lukhputjee, who, with a view to relieve the poor from their sufferings, caused food to be cooked in large quantities near the Bid* gate, and allowed every one who came there to satisfy his hunger, and to take home with him sufficient food for one other person. This he continued till the rain fell. The building erected on the cooking spot is still called ‘Tota Wallee Wurundee.’
“Sumvut 1813, A. D. 1757, and Sumvut 1822, A. D. 1766, were famine years. In the former year Rao Lukhputjee was the reigning Prince, and in the latter year Rao Gohodjee. I do not know what measures were adopted to relieve the poorer classes from their sufferings at that time.
“Sumvuts 1830, 1838, 1840 and 1847, A. D. 1774, 1782, 1784 and 1791, were also famine years, but I do not know any particulars.
“Sumvuts 1859 and 1860, A. D. 1803 and 1804, were also famine years: Rao Raedhunjee was the reigning Prince, but Jemadar Futteh Mahomed was conducting the State affairs. He opened Durbar shops near the Bid gate, and sold grain at a cheaper rate, viz., 4 Pattees per Koree. But the resources of the country being very limited, many people migrated to Scinde, and returned after the rain fell.
“Sumvut 1869, A. D. 1813, was a year of great distress, which was felt in all parts of the country. In the commencement of the famine many died of hunger, and many sold their children for food. This famine was a great calamity. It affected the nature and the inclinations of the people. Modesty disappeared. As regards the people of this particular province, it is said that no one died of hunger. But many people from Kattywar and other provinces beyond the Runn left their estates and children, and from dread of want proceeded towards Scinde through this province. Those men who were able to reach Scinde obtained grain on payment, but many men and children died on their way. Owing to large numbers of these emigrants remaining in Kutch from inability to proceed further, the people of Kutch were themselves unable to get sufficient food. The grain shops were shut because the hungry people, who traversed the country, used to seize every thing eatable. No one could take grain or any thing else home unless accompanied by a guard. Grain was also sold (in places well guarded) at the rate of Pattees 2 or 1½ per Koree. This distress existed for four months, and it is impossible to describe it fully. During these four months Jemadar Futteh Mahomed commenced the construction of the tank of Desulsur (at Bhooj), and furnished the labourers with half a Pattee of grain each per diem. He also opened grain shops, well guarded, near the 'Bid' gate, but the weak and lame could not avail themselves of this benefit even on paying money. Only those who were sufficiently strong were able to get it on payment. Four months of great distress thus passed. In the month Kartick grain was imported from different countries, and plenty was restored. Grain was sold throughout the whole year at 4 Pattees per Koree. During those four months the distress had exceeded the bounds of belief. At this time Bhooj, Anjar and Wagur, were under the management of Jemadar Futteh Mahomed; and Mandavee, Moondra, and other places, were in the hands of the Karbharees. In Mandavee, Sha Shivram Soondurjee supplied food to the people, and Khutree Soondurjee gave a seer of dates, with some sugar and ghee, to any one who went to his gate to ask for food. Several other respectable merchants extended their liberal protection to their dependents. In Moondra, Mahomed Meeya opened grain shops for the benefit of the ryots, but the measures taken to relieve the poor from their sufferings fell short of the requirements during these four months, and many died of hunger. Everywhere there was lamentation. The calamity chiefly fell on the poor foreigners who happened to be in the province in great numbers. Such a state of things had not been known for a century past. Employment for labourers was very scarce. The extent of the distress at that time makes a man tremble to think of even at this distant day.
"After Sumvut 1875, A. D. 1819, when the British forces had established their supremacy in Kutch, a great famine fell in Sumvut 1881, A. D. 1825. At that time the British were encamped at Bhooj, and British authority regulated the resources of the province. The number of emigrants was very small. No one died of hunger. Besides this, food was offered in charity by the members of the Regency. One seer to each man from the Durbar stores, half a seer to each from the house of Khutree Ruttonsee, and half a seer from the house of Metta Lukmidass. Thus food was provided from these places also. Besides this, half a Pattee of grain was offered to every one employed in excavating the tank of Humeersur. These were the means adopted to relieve the poor from the famine of this year. After this the people became more wise, and wherever there was sweet water they caused wells to be sunk, and thus got a great part of the land irrigated. On this account no such want of food is now experienced.
"Sumvut 1890, A. D. 1834, was again a year of scarcity in Kutch, but it was not so in other countries. Meta Lukmidass was the chief member of the Regency at the time. Distress was mitigated in consequence of the aforesaid improvements, as well as from the importation of grain both by land and sea. Not less than 4 Pattees per Koree were sold. But I do not know what measures were adopted by the Durbar for the relief of the poor. Samvuts 1895, 1897 and 1898, A. D. 1839, 1841 and 1842, were also years of want. During these years Rao Desuljee had, with a view to help the poor, caused several Wadees to be built advancing money for the purpose; and he also ordered the completion of the Humeersur and Desulsur tanks. Between two and three thousand persons were employed on this work; they received their wages in grain at the rate of one Pattee per man, and half a Pattee for a boy. This was continued during these three years. Besides this, he caused a Pattee of grain per man per diem to be sent from Mandavee to all the Jaraja Byuds in Abrassa who reported their poverty to him.
“ Sumvuts 1902, 1905 and 1910, A. D. 1846, 1849 and 1854, were also years of scarcity, not famine. The rain was scanty, and produce was only forthcoming from a few villages. In some villages there were no crops other than from the irrigated lands. During these years also the Durbar extended liberal protection to the public. Grain was sold at 4 to 6 Pattees per Koree, but not less than 4 Pattees.
“ Samvut 1917, A. D. 1861, was a famine year, in which His Highness the present Rao Pragmuljee opened his stores of grain, and sold it at Pattees 5 or 6 per Koree. He resumed also the digging of the tanks of Desulsar and Humurseer, and gave the labourers grain as wages at the rate of one Pattee for a man and half a Pattee for a boy, and for his other Ryots he remitted the transit duties and other taxes on grain imported by land from other countries.
“ Samvuts 1918 to 1923, A. D. 1862 to 1867, were not years of famine, but the necessaries of life were very dear from other causes, and still continue so to be. The cultivators, Girassias, merchants and labourers, have, however, suffered less, as their traffic has been largely increased. But with a view to help those who are unable to work or carry on traffic, the Durbar has opened a ‘Pedhee,’ or grain store, in which grain is sold at 4 Pattees per Koree. The Durbar has also increased the salaries of its servants, and in Mandavee, Moondra, and other towns, it has remitted customs and other duties on grain to encourage its importation by Sowkars for the purpose of a retail sale to the poorer classes at a cheap rate.”
23. The following is the tabulated Statement referred to in Major Shortt’s second paragraph :--
Notes
- *. For the financial year ending 31st March.
- *. "Mr. John Fryer Thomas, who entered the Madras Civil Service in 1815, and, after holding numerous appointments in the Provinces and at the Presidency, became Chief Secretary to Government in 1844, and Member of Council in 1850.
- *. It would, perhaps, be better to lodge them with the Collector of the District.
- *. Bid is the grain market.