[The following speech was delivered by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji at the First Congress held in Bombay 1885.]
I am glad my friends, the Hon'ble Mr. Telang and the Hon'ble Mr. S. Iyer, have relieved me of much trouble, as they have anticipated a deal of what I had to say, which I need not repeat.
We asked for representation in the Legislative Councils of India. It is not for us to teach the English people how necessary representation is for good government. We have learnt the lesson from them, and knowing from them how great a blessing it is to those nations who enjoy it, and how utterly un-English it is for the English nation to withhold it from us, we can, with confidence and trust, ask them to give us this. I do not want to complain of the past. It is past and gone. It cannot be said now that the time is not come to give representation. Thanks to our rulers themselves, we have now sufficiently advanced to know the value of representation and to understand the necessity that representation must go with taxation, that the taxed must have a voice in the taxation that is imposed on them. We are British subjects, and I say we can demand what we are entitled to and expect still at British hands their greatest and most noble institution and heritage. It is our inheritance also and we should not be kept out of it. Why, if we are to be denied Britain's best institutions, what good is it to India to be under the British sway? It will be simply another Asiatic despotism. What makes us proud to be British subjects, what attaches us to this foreign rule with deeper loyalty than even our own past Native rule, is the fact that Britain is the parent of free and representative government, and, that we, as her subjects and children, are entitled to inherit the great blessing of freedom and representation. We claim the inheritance. If not, we are not the British subjects which the Proclamation proclaims us to be—equal in rights and privileges with the rest of Her Majesty's subjects. We are only British drudges or slaves. Let us persevere. Britain would never be a slave and could not, in her very nature and instinct, make a slave. Her greatest glory is freedom and representation, and, as her subjects, we shall have these blessed gifts.
Coming to the immediate and practical part of our demand, I may say that it will be to Government itself a great advantage and relief—advantage, inasmuch as it will have the help of those who know the true wants of the Natives, and in whom the Natives have confidence, and relief so far that the responsibility of legislation will not be upon the head of Government only, but upon that of the representatives of the people also. And the people will have to blame themselves if they fail to send the right sort of men to represent themselves. I think Government has now reason rather to thank than repel us for demanding this boon which, if granted, will, on the one hand, make government easier and more effective, and, on the other, attach the people to British rule more deeply than before.
Our first reform should be to have the power to tax ourselves. With that and another reform for which I shall move hereafter, India will advance in material and moral prosperity, and bless and benefit England. The proposal about the right of interpellation is very important,—as important and useful to Government itself as to the people. The very fact that questions will be put in the Council, will prevent in a measure that evil which at present is beyond Government's reach to redress. Government will be relieved of the odium and inconvenience which it at present suffers from misunderstanding and want of opportunities of giving explanation. The British Parliament and public, and the British Government in all its departments, benefit largely by this power of putting questions in Parliament, and the same will be the result here. There will be, in the circumstances of India, one essential difference between the British Parliament and the Indian Legislative Councils. In Parliament, the Government, if defeated, resigns, and the Opposition comes into power. That cannot be done in India. Whether defeated or not, Government will remain in power. Moreover, the Secretary of State for India will have the power to veto, and no harm can happen. If the Government, either Provincial or Supreme, disregard the vote against it, and if the Secretary of State support the disregarding Government, there will be, as a last remedy, the Standing Committee of Parliament as the ultimate appellate body to decide on the point of disagreement; and thus Parliament will truly, and not merely nominally as at present, become the final controlling authority.
We are British subjects and subjects of the same gracious sovereign who has pledged her royal word that we are to her as all her other subjects, and we have a right to all British institutions. If we are true to ourselves, and perseveringly ask what we desire, the British people are the very people on earth who will give what is right and just. From what has already been done in the past we have ample reason to indulge in this belief. Let us for the future equally rely on that character and instinct of the British. They have taught us our wants and they will supply them.
After some discussion, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said:— Before the Hon'ble Mr. Telang replies, I may ask to be allowed to say a few words. I may just explain what an important thing this Standing Committee will be. During the East India Company's time, Parliament was entirely independent of it. Parliament was then truly an effective appellate body. It took up Indian questions quite freely and judged fairly, without the circumstance of parties ever interfering with its deliberations. If there was a complaint against the Company, Parliament was free to sit in judgment on it. What is the position since the transfer of the government to the Crown? The Secretary of State for India is the Parliament. Every question in which he is concerned becomes a Cabinet question. His majority is at his back. This majority has no concern in Indian matters further than to back the Government, i.e. the Secretary of State for India. All appeals, therefore, to Parliament against the Secretary of State become a mere farce. M. P.s are utterly discouraged from their inability to do any thing. And the Secretary of State becomes the true Great Mogul of India—a despotic monarch. His will is his law. Nor can the people of India influence him, as their voice is not represented in Parliament. Thus, that tribunal can scarcely exercise any effectual check over his despotism. The present legislative machinery, from the Local Councils upwards, is simply a device to legalise despotism and give it the false mask of constitutionalism. The tax-payers have no voice in the imposition of the taxes they pay, and Parliament has not the ability to prevent the levy of unfair or oppressive taxation. The ultimate controlling authority seems helpless to control anything. Now if we have complete representative legislation here, and if we have a Standing Committee in Parliament, we shall have both the voice of the taxed on the one side and effectual control of Parliament on the other. Such a Standing Committee will naturally be independent of all parties. Its decision will be no defeat of Government. It will be simply a final decision on the point of difference that may have arisen between the representatives of the people in India on the one hand, and the Government on the other, on any particular question. India will thus have an effectual parliamentary control.
It is said we should propose something as a substitute for the present India office Council. The resolution now before the Congress makes this unnecessary. The Council, when it was established, was considered to be protective of Indian interests. It has not proved so. When it suits the Secretary of State, he screens himself behind that Council. When it does not suit him, he flings the Council aside. We have no means of knowing what good at all is done by the Council. Its irresponsibility and its secrecy are fatal objections to its continuance. Such a thing in Government of an empire of 200 millions of people and under the British is an utter and an inexplicable anachronism. Moreover, the majority of the Council consists of Anglo-Indians. These, sitting in judgment on their own hand work, naturally regard it as perfect. Having left India years ago, they fail to realise the rapid changes that are taking place here in our circumstances, lose touch with us and offer resistance to all progress. Times are now changed. The natives, I may say, have come of age. They can represent directly their wishes and views to the Government here, and to the Secretary of State. They do not require the aid of this Council at the India Office for their so-called representation or protection.
I may here remark, that the chief work of this the first National Congress of India is to enunciate clearly and boldly our highest and ultimate wishes. Whether we get them or not immediately, let our rulers know what our highest aspirations are. And if we are true to ourselves, the work of each delegate present here will be to make the part of India where he happens to live devote itself earnestly to carrying out the objects resolved upon at this Congress with all due deliberation. If, then, we lay down clearly that we desire to have the actual government of India transferred from England to India under the simple controlling power of the Secretary of State, and of Parliament, through its Standing Committee, and that we further desire that taxation and legislation shall be imposed here by representative Councils, we say what we are aiming at. And that under such an arrangement no Council to advise the Secretary of State is necessary. Neither is a Council needed to attend to the appellate executive work. There is a permanent Under-Secretary of State who will be able to keep up continuity of knowledge and transact all current business. There are, besides, Secretaries at the head of the different departments as experts. I do not deny that at times the India Office Council has done good service. But this was owing to the personality and sympathy of individual men like Sir E. Perry. The constitution of the body as a body is objectionable and anomalous. When the whole power of imposing taxation and legislation is transferred here, the work of the Secretary of State will be largely diminished. It will only be confined to general supervision of important matters. Whatever comes before him for disposal will be set forth by the Government from here fully and fairly in all its bearings. No Council will be needed to aid him in forming his judgment. Thus no substitute is required for the India Office Council. It is enough for us to formulate the scheme, now submitted for your consideration, as one which India needs and desires, viz., representative Legislative Councils in India, with full financial control and interpellatory powers. And we shall not need to trouble much the authorities in England.
Notes
- *. Resolution.—That this Congress considers the reform and expansion of the Supreme and existing Legislative Councils, by the admission of a considerable proportion of elected members (and the creation of similar Councils for the North West Provinces and Oudh, and also for the Punjab) essential; and holds that all Budgets should be referred to those Councils for consideration, their members being moreover empowered to interpellate the Executive in regard to all branches of the administration; and that a Standing Committee of the House of Commons should be constituted to receive and consider any formal protests that may be recorded by majorities of such Councils against the exercise by the Executive of the powers, which would be vested in it, of overruling the decisions of such majorities.